

**PART PLAYED BY THE PUNJAB IN THE
REBELLION OF
1857-1858**

Revised

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

AT

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH.

by :
Krishan Lal

1971

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INTRODUCTION

I

SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT

It is more than a century ago that the Rebellion of 1857-58 broke out. Regarding the 'PART PLAYED BY THE PUNJAB IN IT', controversial views have been expressed by different writers, historians and politicians - but the readers have not been able to decide as to what its nature was and what causes motivated it. There are reasons why this controversy has not been finally settled.

None of the modern writers has so far exclusively written on the subject 'THE PART PLAYED BY THE PUNJAB IN THE REBELLION'. I do not claim that this subject has remained exclusively untouched. I just modestly claim that this subject has not been so far dealt with thoroughly. Most of the writers have written on the Indian Mutiny of 1857. A few writers have, of course, tried to go into details, regarding a few events but they could not do as much as the present writer who took up this subject for a thorough study. The result of all this is that the controversy over this subject is as alive as ever.

The most unfortunate thing is that no contemporary work bearing correct and adequate details written by an Indian writer is available. The reason is that the British Government, in order to check the spread of the rebellion, adopted very severe measures to ensure that nothing which might encourage rebellious ideas was written

or published. As a result truth about many aspects of rebellion remained obscure.

The editors of the various Indian newspaper in 1857 were strictly warned against writing any exciting article. They were free to condemn the rebels but they could not approve of their (rebels) activities. Those who dared to defy the orders were dealt with very severely. Heavy punishments were inflicted on them. So, history has been deprived of some of the very valuable details which could otherwise have been procurable on this subject.

The contemporary works available on the subject are mostly by the European writers. In their accounts, most of them have overrated the events concerning the Government and underrated those concerning the rebels. They could not observe impartiality in their assessment and interpretation. Regarding most of the events, the reality has therefore, been masked.

Ample original material on this subject is available at the Archives of the Government of India, New Delhi and at the State Archives Patiala. (Accounts and reports by persons involved in the very events are quite revealing. The reader, however, cannot take every detail for granted. The persons concerned have sometimes slurred over important details or even twisted the facts to save their skin for certain defaults of theirs. For example, I. Taylor (the Magistrate) at Kasauli, Brigadier Innes, the Station Commander at Ferozepur and Brigadier Johnstone, the Station Commander at Jullundur, present some of the examples.

7
to unearth the reality the reader must consult other supporting details i.e., reports by other concerned persons. Sound conclusions can only be drawn if a careful study of most of the details is made.

These original reports also suffer from another flaw. The rebel side has almost been neglected. Only unavoidable (and even then incomplete) details concerning the rebel activity in various events have been conveyed from one officer to the other. Where European officers have been praised for their gallantry, only scanty and mostly derogatory reference has been made about the rebels here and there. Important facts about the rebel activities, and gallantry displayed by them remained neglected and unmentioned. Here and there some passing reference can be traced - reference over which the reader is required to pause to be able to draw a few trustworthy facts about the rebel side. The reader, in order to do justice to both the sides has to struggle and work a lot. Careful study, however, can lead to sound conclusions because of the availability of abundant of material. Although, the material is scattered yet trustworthy conclusions can be drawn.

A word may also be said about the works of the modern writers. None of the modern writers seems to have taken up this subject for detailed study or as a subject of research. Some of the writers like S.N.Sen, Dr. R.C.Majumdar have drawn very useful conclusions, but some of the Indian writers have too committed the same mistake as committed by the contemporary European writers.

They have exaggerated the role of the rebels and condemned the role of the Government. A student of history is to lift himself above the bounds of passion and partiality, he is to work like a third person, a fair judge and a man true to history, ^{and depend} on the basis only of unimpeachable evidence. A concerted effort has been made in this work to tap as much of the available evidence of reliable nature as possible under trying conditions.

I have made a hard and earnest endeavour to study and explore the maximum material of all sorts i.e. original records, contemporary printed works, various newspapers and modern printed works. Efforts have been made to explore the original records thoroughly. I have tried to study almost every available detail on almost every event which took place in the Punjab in 1857. I have tried to draw conclusions after due thought and consideration.

I have, throughout, ^rstriven hard to be a vigilant observer with strict detachment and objectivity. I have carefully adhered to the principle of calling a spade a spade. Approaching both the sides - the British Government and the Rebels as a concerned spectator, I have tried to give veritable accounts of various events with logical inferences from relevant evidence, ^apast and present.

I modestly claim that I have succeeded in finding out some of the most valuable material that throws light on my subject. I may give a few examples of my efforts to that effect.

1. I have, for instance, searched out the original letters written by the Chiefs of Patiala, Nabha and Jind to G.C. Barnes, the Superintendent and Commissioner of Cis-Satluj States. In these letters they have given details of the services rendered by them to the British Government.

2. I have also located the correspondence between General Wilson and John Lawrence about the state of affairs at Delhi, the Military position of the Government and the immediate and acute need of reinforcements there.

3. Regarding the crucial battle of Najafgarh I have found out original report written by General Nicholson to General Wilson, regarding the operation carried out by him against the rebels.

4. I have been able to tap ample original records regarding the role of the Nawab of Jhajjar in the Rebellion ending in his trial, and his subsequent execution and confiscation of his estate.

5. I have also located the original report made by General Wilson to John Lawrence, regarding the final assault and capture of Delhi.

6. I have also explored the original papers of the Court of Enquiry held to investigate into fire incidents at Ambala in the month of February and April.

7. I have discovered an edition of the newspaper 'Nurulakhbar' (published from Delhi in the year 1857). The editor of this newspaper in this edition has done nothing but to praise the Government and condemn the rebels. He has called them the persons false to their salt and traitors to the Government. This newspaper shows that the Government

would never allow any edition of a newspaper to be published without censor. It also reveals the sense of loyalty, which was expected of the subjects in those days.

8. I have also discovered a useful material on the role played by Rao Tula Ram of Rewari in the Rebellion.

The above are only a few examples of the original papers found out by me. I trust they will add to the knowledge of history.

I have made an exhaustive effort regarding the controversy over 'THE PART PLAYED BY THE PUNJAB IN THE REBELLION OF 1857-58'. I have placed maximum number of significant details before the readers. I hope these evidences will go a long way in helping the student of History in understanding the nature of this controversy and to arrive at unbiased conclusion.

The reader may find different spellings of some of the places and names of the persons, in the references quoted by me. For example Karnal has been spelt as Kurnaul, Jhajjar as Jhujjur, Patiala as 'Puttiala, Ambala as Umballa, Delhi as Delhie, Haryana as Hurrianah, Satluj as Sutledge etc.

I have retained the spellings in the references quoted by me as I found them in the records. However, in my own observations and comments, I have given the spellings that have come to be finally adopted in the country in the last two decades.

I most humbly write that I have made a keen and sincere attempt to revise my thesis. I have tried my utmost to revise the thesis in the desirable manner. I have removed the superfluous material and added more desired one. I thoroughly studied the Pre-1857 period of the history of Punjab from all available sources and have added one more chapter having two parts; the first part is 'Restlessness and its Causes in India - particularly in the Punjab - on the Eve of Mutiny,' and the second part is 'Punjab on the Eve of Mutiny'.

II

I must express my deep sense of gratitude to my guide Dr. R. R. Sethi, who all along remained a source of consolation and inspiration to me. He, with his rare understanding and expression worked as a beacon of light to me. He most generously and affectionately helped me to overcome any obstacle that impeded my efforts. Thanks to his readily available sympathy and guidance, I could bring my thesis to completion. It was with the help of his inspiration that I could submit my revised thesis in time. I wonder, if I can adequately thank him for all that he has done for me. I am equally thankful to Dr. P. L. Mehra, the Head of ^{the} History Department of Punjab University, Chandigarh. I have throughout the period of my thesis, found in him a great source of inspiration to me. I express my deepest gratitude to him for the affection and inspiration given to me. I am really indebted to him.

I am thankful to the Librarian and other staff of the Punjab University Library, Chandigarh, who extended best possible co-operation. I would especially congratulate them for introducing the open shelf system in the field of rare books. But for it I may not have studied so much material.

I am no less thankful to the authorities and the staff of National Archives, New Delhi and that of the State Archives Patiala. I am obliged to them for the co-operation which I readily received from them.

I am equally thankful to the Librarian and other members of the staff of National Library Calcutta and that of Osmania University Hyderabad for the co-operation I received from them.

Krishan Lal

ABBREVIATIONS EXPLAINED

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Cons. | Consultations |
| 2. For. Deptt. | Foreign Department |
| 3. Lt. | Lieutenant. |
| 4. Mily. Deptt. | Military Department. |
| 5. n.d. | no date |
| 6. Pol. | Political. |
| 7. P.G.R. | Punjab Government Records |
| 8. Progs. | Proceedings |
| 9. Regt. | Regiment |
| 10. S.C. | Secret Committee |
| 11. V. | Volume |


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NAMES AND THE RANKS OF THE CONCERNED BRITISH OFFICERS
APPOINTED IN THE PUNJAB OR ELSEWHERE IN 1857 - 1858 .

- | | | |
|-----|--|--|
| 1. | Lord Canning. | Governor General of India. |
| 2. | G. F. Edmonstone. | Secretary to the Government of India. |
| 3. | John Lawrence | Chief Commissioner of Punjab. |
| 4. | E. Temple | Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Punjab. |
| 5. | A. Brandreth | Officiating secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Punjab. |
| 6. | H. R. James | Officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Punjab. |
| 7. | C. B. Thornhill | Secretary to Government of N. W. P. Agra. |
| 8. | George Anson | Commander-in-Chief of India. |
| 9. | Major-General
A. Wilson Bart | Commander-in-Chief of India on the Eve of Mutiny. |
| 10. | Brigadier Major
Neville Chamberlain | Adjutant General of the Army. |
| 11. | Colonel A. M. Becher | Quartar Master General of the Army. |
| 12. | B. Tritton | Superintending Surgeon. |
| 13. | A. A. Abbot | Superintendent of Ordnance and Magazine Fort William. |
| 14. | Colonel Thompson | Head of the Commisariat Department. |
| 15. | Baird Smith | Chief Engineer. |
| 16. | Brigadier General
John Nicholson. | Leading the Movable Column. |
| 17. | Major F. J. Harriot | Deputy Judge Advocate General Meerut Division. |
| 18. | G. C. Barnes | Commissioner and Superintendent of Cis-Satluj States. |
| 19. | T. D. Forsyth | Deputy Commissioner of Ambala. |
| 20. | H. R. Barnard | Incharge of Sirhind Division. |
| 21. | L. Farrington | Deputy Commissioner of Jullundur. |

- | | | |
|-----|---------------------|---|
| 22. | Brigadier Johnstone | Commanding the Cantonment of Jullundur. |
| 23. | Lord Wilson Hay | ✓ Deputy Commissioner of Simla. |
| 24. | I. Taylor | ✓ Assistant Commissioner of Kasuli. |
| 25. | A.A. Roberts | Commissioner and Superintendent of Lahore Division. |
| 26. | Brigadier Corbett | Commanding Mian Mir Cantonment. |
| 27. | W.F. Cooper | Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar. |
| 28. | Brigadier Innes | Officer Commanding the Cantonment of Ferozepur. |
| 29. | Colonel Gerrard | Officer Commanding the Station of Jhelum. |
| 30. | Captain Crocraft | Deputy Commissioner of Murree. |
| 31. | Lieutenant Battye | Assistant Commissioner of Murree. |
| 32. | H.B. Edwardes | Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawar Division. |
| 33. | Captain James | Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar.
(after John Nicholson.) |
| 34. | Daniel | Collector of Hissar. |
| 35. | Lieutenant Barwell | Adjutant at Hissar. |
| 36. | Loch | Magistrate at Rohtak. |
| 37. | Ford | Collector of Gurgaon. |
| 38. | G.H.M. Ricketts | Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana. |
| 39. | Major G.W. Hamilton | Commissioner and Superintendent of Multan Division. |
| 40. | N.W. Elphinstone | Assistant Commissioner of Guger District. |
| 41. | L. Berkely | Extra Assistant Commissioner of Guger District. |
| 42. | Major F.C. Marsden | Deputy Commissioner of Guger District. |



MAP OF PUNJAB
AND
WESTERN U.P.
TO ILLUSTRATE
IN
1857



situated on the right bank of the Sutly was of an immense military operation commanded the ground between Rajah and Delle.

Parade ground where the Tallandar force were encamped.

Sketch of the Ghat at which the Tallandar Mutineers crossed and were encountered by the 4th Sikhs under Lt. Williams and Mr. R. Ckells C.S. on the night of June 19th.



Reference:-

- A. 400 Mutineers who could not cross River $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile broad.
- C. Position of Mutineers who had crossed ground undulating covered with brush wood.
- D. British Gun on high smooth ground 180 yards from river.

↑ D

Disarming at Mian-Mir

The position of the troops at the parade was as follows:—

Preliminary Formation

8th Cavalry Native	49th N.I	26th N.I	16th N.I	H.M.'s 81st	H.E.T.C. H.A.
-----	---	---	---	---	+ + + + +
-----	---	---	---	---	
-----	---	---	---	---	+ + + + +
-----	---	---	---	---	They were in their old dragoon helmets with tiger skin rolls, their dress jackets and their high knee boots
-----	---	---	---	---	
They were in their French grey kit of George IV Pattern	---	---	---	---	
-----	---	---	---	---	


They were in Scarlet and Shako
Second Formation

8th Cavalry	49th N.I.	26th N.I	16th N.I
-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----
+ + + + +	+ + + + +	+ + + + +	+ + + + +
H.E.T.C.'s Artillery	H.M.'s 81st	Cavalry	

Source:— Cooper, Fredric— The Crisis in the Punjab, Smith elder & Co, London 1858

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
PLAN OF THE FERROZEPORE CANTONMENT 1857




Source: Griffiths, Narrative of
Siege of Delhi, London, John Murray
1910, p. 50

SKETCH FROM MEMORY OF THE VILLAGE NARINSI
SHOWING THE ROUTES OF THE COLUMN OF ATTACK

SOURCE: Military Dept, Progs. 16th Oct. 1857, No 114






From Luddhiana
From Hoshiar pur

Delhi
Najafgarh Canal

PLAN
of
Engagement at Badli Sardhi



Republished specially for the military Department
Govt. of India (Based on the military records of
the Delhi and Hissar Revenue Survey in 1872-73.

RESTLESSNESS IN INDIA - PARTICULARLY IN PUNJAB - AND
ITS CAUSES, ON THE EVE OF MUTINY

Restlessness pervaded almost amongst all the sections of people in India on the eve of the Mutiny. The following were the major causes for that:

POLITICAL CAUSES

Policy followed by Dalhousie was mainly responsible for the political unrest. Doctrine of Lapse annoyed the Chiefs and Princes of states. He declared according to this doctrine, "it is necessary for the British Government to annex any territory or any state into the British dominions on any opportunity offering itself of doing it. This opportunity can come to us in two ways,"first, on the death of a natural heir to the throne and secondly, in case the British Government does not give permission of adoption to any ruler." He applied this Doctrine in the case of Satara (1849), Nagpur(1853) Jhansi (1853), Sambhalpur (1849), Jaitpur in Bundelkhand (1849), Bhagat (1850), and Udaipur (1852).

It is worth noting that with the establishment and expansion of the British Dominions in India, an assurance had been extended to the Indian rulers by the East India Company that not only their rights and privileges would be kept intact but their traditions and practices, social rules and religious susceptibilities would be duly respected by the British Government. From ages past it had been the custom among the kings in India to adopt sons in case of failure of natural heirs of the royal line. In other words, it had become almost a religious function. 'The Doctrine of Lapse' gave a direct blow to this old ingrained custom.

ANNEXATION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABOLITION OF PURELY TITULAR
SOVEREIGNTY

Dalhousie abolished certain mighty titular pensions and dignities. These were the following:

Carnatic (1855) - The Nawab of Carnatic who led a dissipated life died issueless in 1855. He had the semblance of royalty without power. Hence Carnatic was annexed in 1855.

Tanjore (1855) - The Raja of Tanjore died in 1855 leaving only daughters and so Lord Dalhousie straight way abolished the royal title.

Poona Peshwaship abolished (1853) - In 1853 Baji Rao II died and Lord Dalhousie refused to pay the pension of eight lakhs of rupees to his adopted son, Dhoondu Pant, also known as Nana Sahib, but allowed him to have £ 280,000 of private property left by Baji Rao and also gave him a Jagir. Nana Sahib felt extremely mortified at not being regarded heir to the last Peshwa . He took his revenge by playing a great part in the rebellion of 1857.

Bahadur Sah^h, the Moghul Emperor- Dalhousie also recommended that on the death of Bahadur Sah^h, grandson of Shah Alam, and the titular king of Delhi, the royal family should quit the palace fort. Only, the latter part of the proposal was accepted by directors.

ANNEXATION ON ACCOUNT OF MISGOVERNMENT

Under Lord Dalhousie, Colonel James Outram, the British Resident at Lucknow reported that the condition of

the province was getting worse day by day. As a result the Nawab was removed to Calcutta on a large pension.

ANNEXATION BY ASSIGNMENT

Annexation of Berar (1853)- Dalhousie annexed Berar in 1853. The Nizam owed a lot of money to the English Company on account of the charge of contingent forces. As such, the Nizam, who had not made payments of the debt which reached the figure of £ 780,000 had to enter into a new treaty with the English by which he gave Berar to the English for the maintenance of the contingent force and the payment of the debts.

CONQUESTS

Dalhousie was very ambitious and wanted to extend the frontier of British India. He annexed the Punjab by means of conquests and, as such, extended the boundary line of the British India upto its natural frontiers. He also annexed Sikkim.

Effectsof the Policy of Annexation on the Punjab

The Punjab was no exception to this policy. During the tenure of Lord Dalhousie only two wars were fought which resulted in the annexation of the Punjab. Within two years of the annexation of Sind it had been openly told that the country of five rivers would be of the British Government.

In fact, ever since the treaty of Amritsar, a systematic encirclement of the Punjab had been going on and

the shrewd Ranjit Singh had rightly remarked: "Sab Lal ho⁴ Jayega" i.e. the whole of India including the Punjab would pass on to the British.

Before long Maharaja Ranjit Singh closed his eyes, the British were preparing boats for making ponton bridges across the Satluj. Their military establishment on the Satluj frontier rose from 2,500 men in 1838 to 14,000 in 1843 and to 40,000 in 1845.

The Sikhs had not yet forgotten that the state which belonged to the mighty Ranjit Singh had been annexed to the British Territory. They still remembered their glorious days of the past. In their inner heart they had a contempt against the alien rule of the British.

2. MILITARY CAUSES

The highest rank that an Indian could get in the army department was that of a Subedar, whose monthly salary did not exceed Rs.60.00 or Rs.70.00 and, similarly, the highest job that an Indian could get in the civil department was that of an Amin, whose monthly income did not exceed Rs.50.00. Consequently all the chances of the Indians for promotion were limited.

3. ECONOMIC CAUSES

With the Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century, England ceased to be a merely commercial nation and was transformed into the manufactory of the world. Raw material for her factories and markets for her finished goods became England's prime needs. British policy in India was developed to meet those needs. The once famous Indian industry died

of English competition and neglect. India became a land exporting raw material and importing finished goods. The destruction of property rights and financial privileges was another cause of widespread unrest in the decade preceding the mutiny. The resumption of jagirs and inams commenced for the first time in India. Commissions and Survey parties were appointed in the North Western provinces, Bengal, Bombay and other areas. Property of every kind was rendered insecure.

According to an estimate about 35,000 jagirs and extensive Inams were inquired into, and of these ~~29~~ 21,000 were usurped. The Raja of Manipur, who was a powerful Talukadar of 189 villages was allowed to retain only 51. Maharaja Man Singh, who possessed 577 villages, was dispossessed of all but 6 villages in 1857.¹

From Bengal alone the Government of India got an extra annual revenue of more than £ 500,000, as a result of this new adventure.²

The figure for Bombay was as high as £ 370,000.³

Disraeli put the same fact before the House of Commons in a very precise and pointed manner.

1. Statement of material and moral progress of India 1872-75, p.27.

2. Disraeli (Commons), Hansard, 27-7-1857, p.459.

3. Ibid.

"I ask the house for a moment to pause and consider what a revolution in property has been going on under the new system of India, when a sum exceeding two thirds of a million of pounds sterling per annum has been obtained by Government as rental of land absolutely taken from individual proprietors."⁴

All this created a worse impression among the natives. Exactly in the same way, curtailment or absolute stoppage of pensions to the descendants of bygone dynasties, lashed them into a fur-y which was not to be controlled without a violent manifestation.

IMPACT ON THE PUNJAB

John Lawrence had of course adopted very sound measures to make the Punjab forget the past. He knew that the Sikhs must be pacified if the Government was to be stable here. He did all he could for it. The peasantry was pleased by his cutting down the revenue. They were allowed to bring more and more land under plough. The Punjabis were enlisted in a large number in the army. They remitted money to their families regularly. The priestly classes were given due respect. The nobles were granted lavish pensions; their hereditary claims were recognised. Their pensions were renewed every year to keep them satisfied.

But in spite of all of it restlessness was visible

4. Ibid.

here as well. The pensioners were dissatisfied. The 7
Sikhs resented the alien rule. At least a portion of
the population of Punjab was apt to rise against the
Government when chance permitted.

4. RELIGIOUS CAUSE

A constant nibbling at the religious system of the
people of India also converted the whole country into a
raging torrent. Christian missionaries had been preaching
in India ever since the days of Akbar and Jahangir. They
had received many royal favours. They, however, did not
create any substantial bitterness. Even the Hindus far
from looking with suspicion upon their activities had shown
the usual spirit of toleration.⁵ This was perhaps due to
the fact that there was hardly any race in the world better
armed at all points for theological discussions than they
were.⁶

But this position did not last long. The functionaries
of the Company's Government combined their secular duties
with their religious zeal to promote Christianity. This
caused a pang of pain and alarm through the hearts of the
Hindu population.

"What the Hindoo does not dread - what
he regards with the utmost jealousy -
what he looks upon with undying appre-
hension - is the union of missionary

5. Disraeli (Commons), Hansard, 27-7-1857, p.452.

6. Ibid.

enterprize of the Musalmans; the
Koran in one hand and scimitar in
the other.....⁷

It cannot be denied that the Government of India was responsible for many measures which touched tender consciences.

They had legislated that no man was to be deprived of his inheritance on account of change of religion.⁸

They paid heavy salaries out of Indian revenues to a vast church establishment in the country. They undertook extensive programmes of building new churches to convert the Indians.⁹

Their new rules stipulated the utilization of unfit sepoy on the performance of Cantonment duty instead of invalid pension.

In their army, a soldier renegade became Havildar and a Havildar forsaking his ancestral faith was promoted to a Subedar Major.¹⁰ High British officers went about with the Order book in one hand and Bible in the other. There were many of them who openly glorified in their proselysing efforts.¹¹

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7. Ibid, p. 463, Speech of Colonel Sykes (Commons) Hansard, 18-12-1858, 1625-27.
 8. Law passed in 1850 by the Legislative body of Calcutta.
 9. Sykes (Commons), Hansard, 18-2-1858, 1623-24.
 10. Confidential Report on Native Newspapers, extract from Kaiser-i-Hind, 1-7-1883.
 11. Speech of Lord Ellenborough in British Parliament, Hansard, 9-6-1857, p.1396.

9

Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler, who was a commandant of a regiment of Infantry in 1857, claimed for himself the zeal of a Christian Crusader devoted to the cause of converting sepois and others for twenty years. And this enthusiasm was not confined to the officers. It shot upwards. In his famous minute of 280 paragraphs, Lord Dalhousie exclaimed:

"It is announced as a certain fact of very great significance that the young Maharaja Dhuleep Singh had entered into a Christian Community and it is announced also as a matter of great significance that the daughter of Raja of Coorg had been baptized and that our gracious sovereign was her god mother."¹³

was

The above news/translated and circulated in many Indian newspapers. Lord Canning's subscription to the Bible Societies and Missionary Associations were a matter of common knowledge, so much so that Marques of Lansdoune was provoked into saying in the House of Lord that if such information ~~was~~ correct about him he did not deserve to be continued in office.¹⁴

But the best admission of Company's religious activities may be sought in the speech of Colonel Sykes in the House

13. Disraeli (Commons), Hansard, 11-8-1857, p.1429.

14. Speech of Lord Lansdowne (British Parliament) Hansard, 9-6-1857.

of Commons. Refuting the charge that Christianity was **10** not encouraged by the Company's Government, he quoted reliable figures to show the ever-increasing employment of Chaplains and Bishops in India from 1836-37 to 1855-56. He drew his information from return laid before the House of Commons. He boldly asserted:

"... it will be borne in mind that all this outlay of £ 2,453,882 in twenty years, for Christian purpose was from taxes paid by heathens."¹⁵

Again he remarked:

"Why in India the Company proclaimed its Christianity at the Cannon's mouth by saluting the Bishops when they arrived at Military stations. The sepoy's necessarily asked the cause of the salute, and were told it was to do honour to the head of the Christian Church, the Lord Padre Sahib."¹⁶

Ross Mangles, Chairman of the Board of Directors, expressed the following hope in the Parliament in 1857:

"Providence has entrusted the extensive empire of Hindustan in order that the banner of Christ should wave triumphant from one end of India to the other."

In the face of these facts the Company's Government

15. Hansard, 18-2-1858-, p.1626

16. Sykes, (Commons), Hansard, 18-2-1858,1620.

can hardly be exempted from the charge of religious **11**
interference. When such was the state of affairs in
the whole of India Punjab could not remain unaffected.
People seem to have felt the religious interference.

5. SOCIAL CAUSES

social reform

The policy of the Government gave an entirely
different colour to the various sections of the people.
Schemes already executed, or newly introduced by the
Company with the best of intentions were misunderstood.
The introduction of widow marriage appeared to carry a
new meaning. The stoppage of sati, infanticide, ghat
murders and sacrifices under the wheel of Jagan Nath's
ear was now interpreted with a tinge of suspicion by a
good number of high caste Hindus. They began to pause,
think and reflect on each reform with a finger under
their teeth. It deepened their suspicion of the British
design. The introduction of Telegraph and Railway
System served further to confirm their fears of a deep
landed conspiracy to convert them. Railways and Telegraphy
were quite understandable to the Indian mind. But here
again missionaries published manifesto which went to
prove that the Railways and Steamships of the Europeans
by facilitating the material union of all races of them,
were to be the indirect instruments for accomplishing
the spiritual union under one faith.¹⁷

17. Holmes, 78; Jarriot, J.A.R., The English in India, p.163

Great excitement prevailed amongst the people of Punjab. William Taylor the Commissioner of Patiala, reported on the especially dangerous feeling which the manifesto had awakened.

"A reassuring Proclamation, which the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal issued did not lessen the general alarm for the people believed that a Government which could meditate their conversion would be quite capable of making a false statement to lull their suspicion."¹⁸

6. GREASED CARTRIDGES

It is an established fact that the greased cartridges added fuel to the fire. They proved the immediate cause of the rebellion in parts of India including Punjab.

"One day in January 1857 a lascar, attached to the magazine of Dumdum near Calcutta, asked a sepoy of the garrison to give him a drink of water from his lota. Nettled by the laughty reply that the vessel would be contaminated by the lips of the low caste man, the lascar reported that the sepoy would soon be deprived of his caste altogether; for the Government was busy manufacturing cartridge greased with the fat of a cow or a swine, and the sepoys

18. Holmes, 78. *The Indian Mutiny, 1858*

would have to bite the forbidden substance,
before long." 19

Now it is hard to convey a sufficient idea of the stunning shock beneath which the imagination of the Brahman sepoy would have reeled at the news of the introduction of these cartridges. The story travelled fast with every gust of wind.

But the importance of the cartridge affair is some time exaggerated as the only cause of the rebellion. The cartridge affair was no more than a chance spark, which fell upon combustible material accumulating for a long time.

"The decline or falls of Empire are not affairs of greased cartridges. Such results are occasioned by an accumulation of adequate cause."²⁰

7. ALIEN RULE

This fact also cannot be denied that the people of India including the people of Punjab had not accepted the British Rule. They took this rule as an alien one. The extent and the intensity of hostility to British Rule may be judged from one of the letters which Field Marshall Earl Roberts (then a Lieutenant) wrote to his mother.

"I don't believe myself there is one simple

19. Homes, op.cit., p.78.

20. Disraeli (Commons), Hansard 27-7-1857, p.475.

Native in the whole country who would
not go against us, if they were not
better off by remaining on our side."²¹

21. Roberts, Letters written during Indian Mutiny p. 52.

II

PUNJAB ON THE EVE OF MUTINY

The Punjab in 1857 could mainly be divided into the following five parts:

1. Cis-Satluj
2. Central
3. North-Western
4. Southern
5. Border Hills

The political, economical and social condition of these parts may be studied as follows:

1. Cis-Satluj

The Cis-Satluj part of the Punjab comprised all the country north of Karnal between Jamna and the Satluj. The portion belonging to the British Government (excluding the hills) covered an area of 8,000 square miles. The Grand Trunk Road traversed the entire length from Karnal to Ferozepure a distance of about 200 miles. The population was of mixed races, more akin to Hindustanians than to the Punjabies, and more emanable to disruptive influence owing to the influx of the mutineers from the east, the military rising was turned into a mass movement. ¹

Inspite of this fact it cannot be said that they had any unity of purpose. Money was the main consideration with them. In Panipat, sixteen of the largest Jat villages refused to pay their revenue and drove out the Government watchman.

1. P.G.R, V. VIII, P. I, p. 8.

Nineteen other large villages, mostly in Bhalsi and Korana, rioted, burnt the Government buildings and committed various robberies. In Nardak Ranghars of many large villages like Siwan, Asandh, Julmana, Balla broke out. All of them were foremost in plundering but had no sympathy ^{with the} ² rebel soldiers.

At Ludhiana lived people of different races and different classes, pensioners and descendents of Shah Zaman amongst them. These people were dis-satisfied. Petty pensions had not finally consoled them. They had burning hearts and could rise into a rebellion.

2. CENTRAL PUNJAB

This part was the chief part of the Punjab. In it lay the largest commercial cities of which one (Lahore) was also the capital. The country side was studded with the seats of the native nobility, who under the Sikh rule coveted grants in land in these districts as being near the metropolis, and affording convenience for their constant attendance at Court.³

In this Division also lay Amritsar, the holy city of the Sikhs .

"In no place throughout the Punjab was the influence of the priest-hood so powerful; in no place had the spirit of nationality so largely survived the

2. Kaye, II, 506, *History of Sepoy War in India*

3. Gazetteer of Lahore District, Lahore, Govt. Publications, 1883-84, p.1.

subjugation of the people." ⁴ The Sikh inhabitants here had not forgotten the glorious days of Ranjit Singh. They were more likely to rise than the people in any part of the Punjab; more than any other point were the Sikhs likely to turn their eyes for a given signal of general insurrection.⁵

The division was so important that if Lahore had been seized by the rebels, the whole of Punjab, perhaps the whole of India might have been endangered.⁶

3. NORTHWESTERN

The North Western part of the Punjab was not as important as the Central Part and the Border Hills. But disturbance could be expected here also because of the inhabitation of the warlike tribes. The country folk being mostly uneducated were prone to rumours. The tribesmen could be easily excited. They had no unity amongst themselves but they could take up arms against the Government. The lust for plundering and a warlike nature could also excite them to rebellion.

Sense of loyalty had some valuable importance as well. The sense of loyalty amongst the various tribes was stronger than the sense of tribal or religious unity.⁷

4. Kaye and Malleon, History of India Mutiny, London, 1896, II, p.325.

5. Ibid.

6. Browne, J.Cave, Punjab and Delhi in 1857, Vol.I, Lahore 1861, p.91.

7. P.G.R., VIII, II, p.341.

The British Government utilized this sense of loyalty by calling the Chiefs of important tribes at Rawalpindi. The Chiefs presented themselves readily.⁸

4. SOUTHERN PUNJAB

The people in this part had a dual position. The people of Multan District were better off financially but the various tribes (belonging to Gugera District) were poor. Tribes such as Khattias, Wootoos, Fatwanas, Khurrals lived there. These pastoral and predatory clans of Mohammedans occupied the extensive waters, south of Gugera and about 8 miles from Lahore, which stretched from the right bank of Satluj, across the Doab, and for some 12 or 15 miles beyond the Ravi. They had few villages and generally resided in temporary huts, which were constructed in such localities as afforded the best pasturage and water for the numerous herds of cattle. These tribesmen were given to the habit of plundering and cattle stealing. They were apt to take advantage of any lawlessness that could afford them a chance to do so.⁹

These tribesmen did avail of the chance the rebellion threw open to them. They had no unity amongst themselves; but however, gathered to serve their common purpose. They could not put up a joint resistance for long. A bit of the pressure from the opposite side or

8. Ibid.

9. P.G.R., VIII, II, p.56.

any bad failure in an action disunited them.

19

5. BORDER HILLS

The people of the border hills had a war-like spirit. Foreign invasions had remained, common so the people had developed the spirit of fighting. They had come to have the habit of settling their personal disputes at the point of bayonet. As a result lawlessness and disorder had prevailed there for centuries. Plundering was a habit amongst most of them. The British Government had, of course, come to have a hold on them, but this hold could no longer be considered final. The people who had fought for centuries could not be expected to be permanently subdued within a short period of about a decade.

In the beginning of May, 1857 perfect peace reigned in the district of Hazara and Kohat and upon their mountain borders. "The irritable and bigotted, but simple and manly races had been tamed by every revenue and kindly rule into that chronic contentment which is the nearest approach to loyalty that new conquerors can expect."¹⁰

In the rich valley of Peshawar the same ease and prosperity prevailed. But for one crime or another almost every tribe beyond the border was under blockade.¹¹

But this prosperity could not be expected to keep them quiet for long. They must avail of any clear-cut chance which fell into their hands for rising into a rebellion. Their

10. P.G.R., V. VIII, P. II, p. 132.

11. Ibid.

war-like spirit could not be tamed within such a short period. "In the great ring of mountains and in the plains of the valley the Afghan tribesmen looked with intense excitement what might be-fall."¹²

There did come a time during the days of mutiny when Colonel Edwardes found that the people of Peshawar Valley were losing respect for the British Government. But once the disaffected regiments were successfully disarmed, friends came to him like summer flies - none had come to him before that.¹³

It can ^{not} however, be said that all were to rise. Some people did have a deep sense of loyalty - loyalty to the Government was considered to be a virtue of a subject in those days. Khelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment showed utmost and unshakable loyalty to the Government. So did the Guides Infantry.

So leaving a few, most of the Peshawar Division could take up arms against the Government. So much so - that John Lawrence - out of fear of a severe rebellion here- was ready to hand over Peshawar to Dost Mohammed. But Colonel Edwardes protested against it. Lord Canning declined the proposal of John Lawrence.

12. Macmunn, Sir George. The Indian Mutiny in Perspective, London, 1931. p.23.

13. Gazetteer of Peshawar District, 1883-84, p.68.

14. Newspaper, Nurulakhbar, H.R. Political Delhi, File No.10.

The Cis-Satluj States of Patiala, Nabha, Jind and the State of Kapurthala, however, were the tributaries of the British Government. These states looked upon the British Government as their saviour and protector. The Treaty of Amritsar of 1809, had been signed only to this effect. They were bound by treaties to help the British.¹⁵ They might have followed an independent policy but they did not do so. They joined the British side without giving any thought to the rebel side.¹⁶

But this was not the case with other petty chiefs of Cis-Satluj. Nowhere in India had the British claim to escheats been more systematically enforced. Up to the time of mutiny nineteen chiefships, covering an area of 811 sq.miles and yielding an annual revenue of £ 45,000 had thus lapsed by the failure of direct heirs. After the First Sikh War, an area of 2,774 sq.miles and a revenue of £ 75,000 were confiscated for failure in duty on the part of the Chiefs, with nine exceptions ^{they} were reduced to the position of ordinary British subjects. Of the nine escheats free states, two subsequently became escheats, and one was suppressed for misgovernment.¹⁷

15. Govt. of India Newsletter, type-script, dated: 4th Aug. 1841, 859, Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1931, p.159.

16. Holmes, 337. (op. cit)

17. Aitchison, C.U., op.cit., p.82

In 1857 only six states remained there. They were ²²
Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Malerkotla, Faridkot, Kalria.

PUNJAB AS A WHOLE

Punjab as a whole was not a uniform province. Different economical, social and political conditions prevailed in its different parts. A similar reaction to the rebellion could, therefore, not be expected in every part of the Punjab. The causes of rebellion were also different in its various parts. Moreover, John Lawrence, the first Chief Commissioner of Punjab had followed a very sound policy to keep the people of the Punjab happy, prosperous and peaceful. He had not only tried to bring financial prosperity but also had given the Punjab, a peaceful life after a turmoil of so many years.¹⁸

But it cannot be denied that the Punjab could also rise in case of any display of weakness by the British Government.¹⁹

The Sikhs had not completely forgotten the defeat they had met at the hands of the British Government. The glorious days of Ranjit Singh were still in their minds. They could rise if the Government would have proved weak, on any point.

Education had not stretched on a big scale so the

18. ^lHolmes, op.cit.

19. Macmunn, op.cit., p.69., Latif, S.M.-History of the Punjab, 1964.(Chapter Administration of the Punjab from 1848-1847.)
Holmes, T.R.,History of Indian Mutiny, London 1898, p.311.

So the people had not developed the idea of nationalism. On the other hand, personal enmities made the people avail themselves of any chance for settling their disputes at the point of the sword. Lawlessness or disorder was, therefore, keenly awaited. There were tribes in certain portions of the Punjab such as Gugera and eastern portion of Cis-Satluj etc. who were hereditary thieves, they were ready to clutch at the opportunity of re-n-ewing their depredation.²⁰

Emissaries in the garb of fakeers, were going from one cantonment to the other to spread rebellious ideas.²¹ But these fakeers were not doing so under any well concerted plan. These efforts were only individual ones.

Maulvis were also preaching in the mosques and other places on the expediency of rising against the English Government.²² These Ma-ulvies were also preaching of their own accord without being deputed by any pre-planned regularised society.

Most of the petty Chiefs on account of the policy of Escheets were rendered to the position of ordinary subjects. They were ready to avail of any chance to take revenge.²³

20. Holmes, op.cit, p.337, Marx and Engels, The first War of Indian Independence, Edition 1857, work dated: July, 22, 1857.

21. Judicial File No:29, Circular No.45.

22. General & Political, File No:54, P.G.R., VIII, I, p.94.

23. Aitchison, op.cit., p.82.

C H A P T E R I I

AMBALA FOREMOST IN REBELLION

The following were the Regiments stationed at Ambala on the eve of Mutiny:

<u>Regiment</u>	<u>Officers</u>
1. H.M.'s 9th Lancers	Colonel J.Hope Grant
2. Two Troops of Horse Artillery	1. Captain Francis Turner 2. Captain E.K. Money
3. 4th Native Cavalry	Colonel H. Clayton
4. 5th Native Infantry	Major F. Maitland
5. 60th Native Infantry	Colonel R. Drought

UNREST AMONG THE SEPOYS

Ambala was the first place where signs of rebellion were visible the earliest in the Punjab. The sepoys here were highly disaffected. Greased cartridges seem to be the immediate cause of restlessness. In Feb., 1857 officers attached to the Depot received complaints from their men that they might be excluded from caste due to the greased cartridges. This unrest was on an increase during the following months and there were incidents of fire in the month of April,¹

A barrack containing malt liquor was set on fire by an unknown person riding a horse. It is worth noting that not even a single cask of liquor was taken out by any one of the native sepoys. Only 80 casks of liquor (out of 442 casks) could be saved; all others were destroyed. A court of enquiry was held on April, 18, 1857 to enquire into the incidents of fire. The following were the members of this court:

1. P.G.R., VIII, I, Punjab Government Press, Lahore, 1911,P.341.

PRESIDENT

25

Lieutenant R.A. Yule -- 9th Lancers

MEMBERS

Captain A.V. Dumbleton -- 4th Light Cavalry

Lieutenant H.P. Bishop -- Horse Artillery

Captain H. Dumbleton was to act as interpreter by order.

Sergeant John Foxwell Commissariat Department stated during the course of enquiry that when he reached the spot he saw a large number of sepoy alongwith the officers. He did not see even a single sepoy bring out a cask of liquor. Lieutenant A. Perkins' statement also proved that the sepoy remained indifferent and gave no substantial help in extinguishing the fire.²

Fires began to occur again on 19th April, 1857, and though they were at first attributed to thatchers it was proved that the soldiers and none others were their real authors.

Two European barracks were also burnt and a police station was also set on fire. In spite of the efforts of Captain However the fire spread from one barrack to the other. It was greatly suspected that the sepoy were behind it.³

General H. Barnard arrived at Ambala in the last week of April and requested T.D. Forsyth to enquire into the cause of fire with the help of the District Police. Through the exertion of Jawala Nath, Sham Singh a Sikh Sepoy of the 5th Regiment N.I. was induced to give information he could collect.

Subsequently the information took a more tangible form

2. Military Department, Proceedings Volume, 3rd July, 1857, No. 172.
3. P.G.R., VIII, I, p.134.

and it was positively stated on the 7th and 8th of May that in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Ambala and that a general rising of the sepoys would take place.⁴

The sepoys however did not have any definite plan for the rebellion. On account of general unrest the ideas of rebellion spread from one regiment to the other. Mr. Barnes, the Commissioner, and his District Officers exerted themselves to their best to put down all discontent and crime.⁵

On May 10, 1857, the day on which the rebellion actually broke out at Meerut, there was a great stir throughout the lines of the Native Sepoys at Ambala. Rumour spread that the Native Regiments, the 4th Light Cavalry and the 5th and 60th N.I had turned out without orders, and stood to their arms.⁶

Early in the morning (of May 10) the kotwal rushed with the information that the 5th and 60th Regiments Native Infantry had taken their arms and turned out, and a man at the same time came from treasury, with the news that the guard, a detachment of 60th N.I., had suddenly got under arms. The subedar was atonce summoned to explain his conduct which he could not do. Though ordered to dismiss his men to their lines, he allowed his men to be armed during the whole day. It was clear that he had acted on a concerted plan, which if carried out, would have caused the loss of the treasure.

General Bernard hastened to their lines and found the Infactory Corps in open mutiny. Some of the 5th N.I. had loaded, and were actually pointing their muskets at officers.

4. Ibid.

5. Gazetteer of Ambala District, Lahore, 1883-84, p.19

6. Browne, Cave, The Punjab and Delhi in 1857, Vol.I
Willian Blackwood and Sons', Edinburgh and London, 1860.

It seems the sepoys at Ambala knew that the rebellion was to break out on May 10, 1857. They themselves had formed a plan to attack the Europeans, while the latter were praying in the Church. The Europeans did not know anything about it. It was sheer by chance that they were saved. The incident was like this. The old church Bungalow, which had been used for many years during the prolonged construction of the church stood in the middle of the European lines - the 9th Lancers barracks on one side and those of the artillery on the other. The new church occupied an open space beyond the cavalry lines with only a row of unfinished empty barracks separating them from the lines of the 6th and 5th N.I. Rumours had long been prevalent that the sepoys contemplated an attack on the Europeans some day during divine service.

It had been arranged that on the Sunday morning, May 15, 1857, the service should be held in the new church which had not yet been ~~ix~~ used since the day of its consecration by the Bishop of Madras. This step could prove disastrous to the Europeans. The sepoys could easily see the opportunity which was here offered to them. The lancers and horsemen, without horses and guns, with the officers and their families all collected together at a distance from the remaining European troops - and they mostly on guard or in hospital would have been ⁷ and easy prey.

The tragedy was, however, averted by chance. It was decided a day before that the service should be held in the old church, as usual as the new church was not yet fit for use. In this way the Europeans remained safe while praying in the old church.

7. Browne, Cave, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

A few hours, later, a sepoy of the 60th N.I., was reported to be using mutinous language in the lines. The officer of the company, Captain Brabazon, hastened down and ordered to take him into custody. The whole body threatened to rescue him. But they had already been baffled and disconcerted that morning. The plot had thus been unconsciously counteracted.

EFFORTS MADE BY THE AUTHORITIES AT AMBALA TO COUNTERACT
THE REBELLION.

When the reports of mutiny at Meerut and Delhi reached Ambala, Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala acted with promptness and requested the Commissioner to come down. One hundred Sikh and police were placed on picket duty day and night and 200 men kept constantly under arms to be in readiness. A party of Civil Sowars were detached to Karnal to watch the road, with the orders to hasten back and report any advance of the rebels.

The assistance of the Chiefs of Sikh States was won over by Forsyth. The military position of Ambala was weak. The station was left with four weak companies (about 250 men) of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, the 5th Regiment Native Infantry, and some six pounder guns. There were only native artillerymen to man them.

A redoubt was erected with the church in the centre, and the remaining residents were concentrated in the houses around. A militia was formed of uncovenanted officers; and the magazine, the treasure, and the commissariat stores, were all lodged in the redoubt; which was garrisoned by a company of Fusiliers.

The general population at first seemed aghast when the rebellion broke out. But this state of their mind did not last long. Soon followed the desire to rebel. But the authorities were determined to quell it with a strong hand. The police were exhorted to use their arms freely against any one found in the act of perpetrating violent crime. The lawless and predatory were checked by the manifestation of a will on the part of the officers. Some were killed and 123 prosecuted by process of law, partly by district officers sitting in commission and partly by Barnes himself.⁸

Moreover mutineers from every corner were rounded and severely dealt with to set an example for others. About 258 mutineers were executed and 102 sentenced to imprisonment, as they belonged to the mutinous regiments at Ferozepore. It was only by means of such measures that the districts were controlled which were quickly escaping from the grasp of the Government.⁹

8. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

9. Ibid., p. 21.

CHAPTER III

PANIC AMONG THE EUROPEANS AT SIMLA AND REFUSAL OF THE GORKHAS TO MARCH FROM KASAUJI

No Sepoy Mutiny or Civil revolt broke out at Simla proper. Here an unprecedented panic spread among the British people by means of a news that a battalion of Gorkhas had mutinied. It sent high ranking officers running from bungalow to bungalow, fleeing for their lives.

The Europeans were so much terrified and panic-stricken that a woman of Simla made a ridiculous announcement in a local newspaper, mocking at those who were hiding themselves at the places of safety.¹

All this, however, added to the fears of the Gorkhas. They, who were already excited on account of the news of disasters in the plains, the relief of the various guards, and the orders to march; thought that they were distrusted. They looked on the fact of the Europeans arming themselves as a mark of fear, and as a sign of a definite intention to destroy their creed and their nation.²

They rose in a body, turned their depot men with ignominy out of the cantonments, clamoured and shouted against their officers, the Government and the Commander-in-Chief. The more moderate, however, withheld the others from the actual perpetration of violence, which they set out to perform.³

For many hours the uproar in their lines was indescribable. Lord William Hay, the Deputy Commissioner of Simla District, and Major Bagot, their Commanding Officer, at length allayed the excitement, and succeeded in making them hear reason. On assurance of the speedy redress of their grievances, the turmoil subsided and the men returned to their lines.⁴

The Government had to adopt a milder policy here at Simla but there was no alternative. Had a harder policy been followed, the Gorkhas might have mutinied and it would have put the people of Simla in a most precarious situation.⁵

1. Richard Collier, *The Sound of Fury*, St. James's Place, Collins, 1963. p. 65.

2. Gazetteer of Simla District, 1888-89, p. 30.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Cooper, F., *Op. Cit*, p. 105.

NASIRI REGIMENT AT KASALI DISAFFECTED

The Nasiri Regiment contained men as thoroughly mutinous as any in the worst regiment which mutinied in the plains. It was a delicate handling and judicious treatment which saved it in the first instance from the commission of the worst excesses but its subsequent good behaviour is owing to one thing - the fact that the other ^uGorkha remained faithful⁶.

The Nasiri Regiment had been ordered to march to Ambala. They, however, did not comply with the orders.

The non appearance of the detachment made Captain Briggs to march to Ambala. He reached there at about 9 a.m. on May 15, 1857, and found that a convocation of the Commanding Officers and Heads of Department was being held at the residence of H. Barnard. Barnard took him to his bed room, read the letter he had received from Simla, and expressed his conviction that he must expect to hear of the whole native Army having risen.

Brigs then received orders to return to the hills at once. He reached Kalka at about 5 p.m. on May 15, 1857. But before reaching there he was met by his second Assistant Knowles. The latter informed him that the Kasauli treasury had been robbed by the guard of the Nasiri Battalion and that he was proceeding, under orders of the Officer Commanding, to Kasauli.

On the morning of May 16, 1857 Captain Brigs obtained private information that the Nasiri Battallion had refused to march and that among a certain portion of the Simla residents panic had spread.

When he reached Kalka, he found everyone in a state of alarm. Both Europeans and Natives were panic-stricken, as the most exaggerated reports of the proceedings of the Gurkhas had -----

been spread and they were believed to be marching upon Kalka.

Brigs rode on to Kasauli where he arrived at 11 p.m. on May 16, 1857. He found all the European inhabitants in the barracks which had been barricaded in expectation of an attack.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED NASIRI REGIMENT TO REBEL

When the report of the conduct of the Gurkhas at Simla reached I. Talyer, Assistant Commissioner and Joint Magistrate of Kasauli, he determined to secure money by its removal from the Treasury into the Barracks. The treasury was under the guard of the Gurkhas. Thinking that they were distrusted, the Gurkhas took it ill. After 40,000 Rupees had been removed to the barracks, the Gurkhas Guard when asked to take charge of these, refused to do so.

Late at night it was reported that the Gurkha Guard, instead of guarding the money, left in the treasury under their charge, had walked away with it, none knew where.

Briggs was told later on that at Haripur they had destroyed a mail bag, burnt one of the Commander-in-chief's tents, which was being carried to the plains, and had attempted to set fire to the staying bungalow.

HOW THE GURKHAS WERE PACIFIED

After consultation with Col. Congrave the officiating Adjutant General, Captain Briggs started for Simla and Jatog (the head quarter of the Nasiri Battalion). On the way he met them (the Gurkhas Guard). He had a talk with them but he had to rush away from there to save his life.

On reaching Jatog, Briggs induced the regiment to appoint representatives to confer on the subject of their wrong. Their principal requests were the restoration to service of two of their comrades Munheer Sahai and Seeladhar who had been dismissed for mutinous language by sentence of a court martial, the payment of arrears of pay due from Government and a free pardon to all the regiment for what they had done.

The requests were granted. But the conduct of Kasauli Guard, condemned as it was by the rest of the regiment, could not be overlooked. They were not to be forgiven.

Thus, the rest of the Nasiri Regiment expressed themselves as having been disgraced by its mutiny. The Guard were seized with the spoil of Rs. 7,000/- and confined.

Thus, Briggs not only succeeded in restoring confidence in them but also in winning over their active support against the mutinous guards.

The Gurkhas then marched according to orders in a day or two, and the society freed from the incubus of their presence recovered its usual tone.

CONDUCT OF THE CIVIL POPULATION

Because the hold of the British Government was somewhat loosened, some people in the bazar of Simla, had become a source of great trouble for the inhabitants of that place, particularly the Europeans. The officer at Delhi expressed a great concern over the safety of their families at Simla. Col. Mecher wrote to Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab on July 22, 1857:

"I, in common with others in camp whose wives and families are at Simla, have for sometime past received intelligence of continual alarm and excitement going on there owing apparently to the belief that the residents of Simla in bazar are most disaffected... in event of any rising in the bazar, many of the residents especially those in the Cheta on Simla direction would be quite at the mercy of the Insurgents."¹⁰

9. Ibid. 10. R/269, 1857, pp. 133-134.

Moreover, there was a vast amount of private property to excite cupidity besides the treasure in the Bank and it was feared that many would be actuated by the spirit of revenge when they heard of the retribution inflicted on their countrymen in Delhi. The ladies of Simla petitioned to the Chief Commissioner to adopt suitable measures for their safety.¹¹

Lord William Hay reported that the hill chief showed a good spirit throughout. His principal trouble was caused by the turbulence of the low population infesting the bazar and a strong hand was required to restrain it.¹²

11. Ibid.

12. Gazetteer of Simla District, Op.Cit,pp 30-31b

CHAPTER IV

REBELS VICTORIOUS AT JULLUNDUR

The sepoys at Jullundur were disaffected much before the outbreak of Mutiny at Sialkot. It is not all of a sudden that the rebellion broke out here at Jullundur. The rebellious ideas had been prevailing long before the actual outbreak of the Mutiny.

The news of the outbreak at Delhi reached Brigadier Hartley at Jullundur on Monday evening, May 11, 1857 and it was communicated immediately to L. Farrington, the Deputy Commissioner of Jullundur District.

The authorities thought it essential to secure the strong points. The first thing to be done was to secure the Fort of Phillaur because of a big magazine it contained and also because of its being situated on the G.F. Road, the road which led to Delhi directly¹. So an official of the Telegraph Department was despatched by an express cart to Phillaur and he succeeded in setting up the apparatus in the Fort and opening communication with Jullundur by 10 P.M. on the same night i.e. May 11, 1857.

The 3rd N.I. stationed at the Fort of Phillaur were disaffected but the appointed hour had not yet arrived².

Brigadier Hartley resolved to occupy the Fort of Phillaur. Accordingly at dusk on May 12, 1857, he despatched a small detachment of the N.M.'s 8th and a couple of the Horse Artillery Guns off from Jullundur which reached Phillaur just at day break the next day, i.e. on May 13, 1857, covering a distance of twenty-four miles.

The British troops reached there early in the morning when the gate of the Fort was opened and the grass cutters were carrying the grass inside.

1. Kaye and Malleon, History of Indian Mutiny, Part II, 1896, p.333.

2. Ibid, pp. 333-335.

The British Troops followed the grass-cutters quietly. Having entered the Fort no time was lost in ordering off the detachment of 3rd N.I, who were struck aback on account of the sudden surprise by the British Force.³ Had the European detachment not reached in time there would have been a clash. Their timely arrival saved it.

There was a lot of excitement among the native sepoys at Jullundur as well. It appeared that some of the cartridges had been received from Ambala and were laid out for inspection at the quarter guard of the regiments. These were destroyed by orders of the Brigadier. The sepoys were however not satisfied and the symptoms of rebellion were clear.

Fires were of constant occurrence in the cantonment. Sometimes there appeared a lull, then renewed excitement. Eight or ten days previous to the outbreak the manner of the native soldiery was quiet, indeed occasionally obsequious.⁴

A seditious notice threatening certain native officers, supposed to be well disposed towards the Government had been pasted.⁵ Major Edward Lake Commissioner and Superintendent of Trans-Satluj states took this notice to be a challenge to the British authorities because General Johnston the officer commanding the Jullundur Station had on the previous day at parade, mentioned the native officers thus threatened as specially deserving of approbation and confidence.⁶

A few days before the actual outbreak at Jullundur on June 7, 1857, a 6th Cavalry Trooper taunted one of his comrades and a non commissioned officer. The case was one of a District Court Martial to deal with but at the earnest solicitation of the Native Officers of the cavalry (who expressed themselves anxious to maintain the credit of the Corps the man was tried by the regiment at Court Martial, and by them acquitted to the surprise of everyone).⁷

4. P.G.R., V.VIII, P.I, p.176.

5. For. Sec. Deptt., 25 Sept. 1857, Cons. 11-14.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

Regarding the truth of the charge imposed on the man an evidence is available. The same trooper later on shot at his own commanding officer.⁸ The conduct of the Native Officers forming the Court would lead to the supposition that there was a pre-concerted design to secure the man's acquittal at all risks.⁹

Regarding the imminence of the Mutiny at Jullundur Major Lake wrote to the Judicial Commissioner, R. Montgomery:-

"None who had watched the temper of the troops forming the native brigade at Jullundur could be surprised at their breaking out into open Mutiny."¹⁰

The sepeys broke out into open Mutiny on June 7, 1857. The English Officers being small in number were more or less at their mercy.¹¹

All was quiet in the cantonment at 10 O'Clock at night on June 7, 1857. Shortly after 11 O'clock a fire broke out in the lines of the 36th N.I. and the Officer of the day who went down for the purpose of extinguishing it found some of the men with cross belts and pouches on deliberately loading the muskets. When Major Lake remonstrated with them, one of them shot at him. This appeared to be the signal for others to possess themselves of their arms. The disturbance became general not only in the Regiment but in the 6th February also where a trooper shot at his commanding officer, and the men mounted their horses in defiance of order received from their European Officers.¹²

The mutineers had a plan about capturing the guns if chance permitted. They, however, failed in their objective. Before leaning for Phillaur and then to Ludhiana they fought over the division of the treasury.¹³

- 8. Ibid.
- 9. Ibid.
- 10. Ibid.
- 11. Ibid.
- 12. Ibid.
- 13. Ibid.

The pursuit was unprecedently delayed by the inactive policy followed by Brigadier Johnstone in spite of being repeatedly persuaded by his subordinates. The pursuing column was sent after 4 a.m. only on June 8, when the Mutineers had gone much ahead. When the pursuing column reached the river Satluj it was found that all the mutineers had crossed by that time. Moreover, the Bridge of boats had also been destroyed by the orders of Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana District, probably to check the advance of the mutineers. And worst of all no food arrangements had been made by the Brigadier for the British troops. No utensils, no provisions and no cooks were supplied.

On their advancing nearby the opposite bank of the Satluj, the pursuing troops received a message saying the mutineers had advanced, and joined the Guard in the Ludhiana Fort. This fact was immediately intimated to General Johnstone who was still much behind.

Hearing that the mutineers were together and some 1600 to 1700 strong, Major Olpharts did not consider himself warranted in moving on them without General Johnstone and his forces¹⁴. Had they gone on they should only have had one hundred European Infantry with guns and had to cross a long narrow bridge within fire of the Fort of Ludhiana¹⁵. Major Olpharts therefore avoided the risk.

It was just sunset when they arrived at Ludhiana. Chapaties were cooked and beer supplied to men (food arrangements were made hereby the Ludhiana authorities).

The Europeans were foot-sore. They were disappointed at the chance lost. The mutineers had left Ludhiana. The officers declared that the men were unable to go further. L. Farrington advocated an abandonment of the pursuit. The pursuing column returned to Jullundur on June 13. Thus the mutineers escaped safely and reached Delhi where they joined other rebels.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

THE SCHEME OF DISARMING AND REVOLT OF THE TROOPS AT LAHORE

Lahore being the capital of the Punjab naturally the news of the rebellion, at Meerut and Delhi was to be conveyed there. The news of the mutiny reached Lahore on May 11, 1857. The message from Delhi was this that the sepoys had come from Meerut and were burning everything. Death of Mr. Todd and several other Europeans was also reported.¹

The Chief Commissioner was away to Murree. The responsibility of the safety of Lahore and Punjab, on the whole, fell on Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of Punjab.

Lahore was the most important place of all not even second to Peshawar. It was the centre of the Muslim and Sikh Kingdoms of the past. Any disturbance here might have raised untold elements of unrest.²

Montgomery realized all this. He summoned a conference of the leading officers of the station at Anarkali. Donald McLeod, Financial Commissioner; A.A. Roberts, Commissioner; Major Ommoney, Chief Engineer; Colonel Macpherson, and Captain Hutchinson. It was here that Montgomery suggested the scheme of disarming the native troops.³ All the officers present at the conference agreed to his proposal and the Judicial Commissioner, accompanied by Colonel Macpherson, proceeded to Mian Mir. The experiment of disarming the troops was introduced here first of all.

Most of the regiments were disaffected. The original plan was to deprive the native sepoys of their ammunition and percussion caps but the revelation of a plot confirmed the idea of the total disarming of the sepoys. A Sikh non-

1. Browne, *Cave, Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. I. London, 186.

2. Macmann, Sir George- *The Indian Mutiny in perspective*, London 1931, p. 30.

3. Latif, *History of the Punjab*, 1964, pp. 577-78.

commissioned officer in the Police Force brought the report of wide-spread conspiracy, which had been formed by the Mian Mir Troops. This conspiracy threatened the safety of Lahore Fort, and the lines of all the European residents in the cantonments and the Civil station at Anarkali.⁴

The plan of rebellion was like this. While the wings of both the regiments were in fort together, in the act of relief, amounting to some 110 men, they were to rush on their officers, seize the gates, take possession of the citadel, the magazine and treasury; to overpower the small body of Europeans, some 80 men of H.M's, 1st, and 70 men of artillery thus about 150 in all; and to fire an empty hospital in the deserted lines at Anarkali, close by, as a signal to their Comrades at Mian Mir, that the plot had succeeded. The rise was then to become general in the cantonments, the guns to be seized, the central jail forced, its 200 prisoners liberated, and a promiscuous massacre of the Europeans to be done. Such was the nature of subsequently disclosed conspiracy.⁵

All this having been known and confirmed the final decision of disarming the troops was taken. The cantonment of Mian Mir was about 4 miles from Lahore. It extended a length of about five miles and contained extensive lines of barracks. The following troops were stationed there:⁶

	Europeans.	Natives
H.M's Regiment.	836	--
Artillery. ...	449	170
8th Lt.Cavalry. ...	12	374

4. Browne, Cave, Op.Cit., p.93
5. Ibid, Cooper.op.Cit; pp.7-8
6. Macmunn, Op.cit., p.71.

	Europeans	Natives	41
16th N.I.	10	792	
26th N.I.	11	940	
49th N.I.	14	879	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	
Total:	1,332	3,155	
	<hr/>	<hr/>	

Disarming was thought to be a risky experiment by some of the European Officers, but most of the civil government officers considered it to be a useful measure to check the spread of the rebellion. Brigadier Carbett was fully prepared to carry out the measure.

An excuse to hold the parade was already there. Mangal and Ishwari Pande of the 34th N.I. at Barrackpore had been blown from the guns. In order to terrify the sepoys at Mian Mir, a parade had already been arranged on May 13, 1857, to convey the sentence to the troops.⁷

The parade was duly held ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~place~~. ~~As~~ Cave Browne writes that never had such parade been held, Europeans and natives were turned out, avowedly to hear the general order for disbanding the seven companies of 34th N.I. at Barrackpore.⁸

Adjutant General's Department rode slowly towards Captain Thomas Gardiner commanding the 16th N.I.. The 81st fell back by sub-division between the guns. When the order was given to ~~to~~ pile arms; the native regiments found themselves face to face with a long line of Artillery, and a row of lighted port fires in the hands of the English gunners.⁹

So the native troops were left with no alternative but to lay down their arms.¹⁰

Thus were some 2,500 native soldiers disarmed in the presence of ~~scarcely~~ scarcely 600 Europeans, and marched off to their lines, comparatively harmless.¹¹

⁷ Munn, Op. Cit., p. 71. ⁸ Browne Cave, Op. Cit., p. 97, P. G. R., VIII, 2, 229

⁹ Keye and Malleson, ¹⁰ Cooper, Op. Cit., 11. ¹¹ Browne, Op. Cit. p. 99.

While these proceedings were being enacted at Mian Mir,⁴² Colonel Smith, Her Majesty's 81st, had marched a portion of that regiment to the citadel, and had with equal tact and success disarmed the wing of the 26th Native Infantry.¹²

Thus by effecting a successful disarming at Mian Mir and Lahore Fort, the position of the Company's Government became safer. ~~The~~ It gave the British Government a foot hold in North India when the empire was almost overwhelmed by the flood of mutiny.¹³

The disarmed men of 26th N.I. however mutinied on May 30, 1857 on account of their undecided future. They bolted in a body from their camp at Mian Mir. The Quarter Master Sergeant of the Corps and Major Spencer, the Commanding Officer were both attacked and murdered along with Havildar Major and the Subedar.¹⁴

If there was any hesitation or wavering, the indiscriminate firing of the Sikh levies precipitated the matter and frightened all good, or bad. The mutineers took to flight.

The news reached Anarkali only in the afternoon, when the Judicial Commissioner and Commissioner of Lahore, and subsequently the Chief Commissioner rushed to Mian Mir. These Officers found that the pursuit of the mutineers had been given up, and that there was no information of the route taken by the mutineers. These officers despatched three strong parties of the mounted Police towards Amritsar, Kasoor, Harike, the three routes towards the Sutlej.

12. P.G.R., VIII,I, 229.

13. Gazetteer of Lahore, District, Op.Cit.p.33.,Cave Browne, Op.Cit.,p.107.

14. ~~xxxx~~ For. Sec.Dept.,25 Sept.,185.,Cons.30-32
Cooper,Op.Cit.,p.153

In addition to these precautions, information was also sent⁴³ out in every direction offering rewards for the capture or¹⁵ destruction of the mutineers.

On the next day i.e. May ³¹~~29~~, 1857, it was ascertained that the rebels had taken northern direction apparently with a view to making for Gurdaspore. On June 1, 1857 they were reported crossing the river Ravi but the Police and the people of the area killed many of them on June 2, 1857. Some took refuge on an island in the river Ravi.¹⁶

F.Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar procured boats to the villagers who brought the rebels ashore with their hands tightly tied. A few of them plunged into the river, the rest numbering about two hundred and eighty two were conveyed to Ajnala. He shot 150 of them and the rest died on account of suffocation in the insufficient accommodation of the room in which they were enclosed in that summer day.¹⁷

The execution of these mutineers secured the Punjab still more. The awe of the British Government was established.

15. For Sec. Deptt., 25 Sept. 1857, Cons. 30-32.

16. Ibid.

17. Cooper, Op.cit., pp 162-63, For, S.ec., Deptt., 25th Sept. 1857, Nos. 30-32, Cave Browne, op.cit., 100-101.

CHAPTER VI

FEROZEPORE CHARGED WITH REBELLION

At Ferozepore not only sepoys but also the civil population was disaffected. The atmosphere in the military lines and amongst the civil population was charged with rebellion.

Military Aspect

Some signs of disaffection were evinced in the 57th Regiment native Infantry, during the very month of March, 1857. Placards threatening the life of the commanding officer in return for some supposed grievance had been struck up at the Brigadier's house.¹ A sepoy of that regiment had also been ex-communicated by his comrades for handling one of the enfield rifles and was forced to take refuge in the Regimental Hospital.

At a court of enquiry, assembled sometimes previous to the Delhi mutiny, a native officer of the 57th Native Infantry at Ferozepore declared that it was the purpose of his regiment to refuse the enfield cartridges.²

This raised a strong feeling of suspicion against the corps, but the 45th Native Infantry, which was not on good terms with the 57th, and had openly declared their contempt of the resolution of the 57th, was considered loyal.

On May 13, 1857, Brigadier Innes anxious to discern for himself the leaning of his men, held a morning parade. Their demeanour was not encouraging. It was plain that something was coming.³

Brigadier Innes immediately judged the danger. He wanted to take timely measures to avert it. Having given thought to the problem, he determined on separating the 45th and 57th Regiments and move them out of the cantonments, the 45th to take up a position on the Ludhiana Road, near the icepits, and 57th on the extreme left of cantonments near the European burrial ground.

This, in his view, was the only step which could save Ferozepore, a place of paramount strategical importance. Moreover, there was a big magazine here.⁴

1. P.G.R., VIII, I, p.47.

2. Gazette of Ferozepore District, 1883-84, p.28.

3. Kaye and Malleon, op.cit., Vol.II, p.107. 329

4. Browne, Cave, op., cit., Vol.I, p.107.

The disaffected 57th N.I., the danger from which was greater, however, reached their allotted ground without any disturbance on their part and bivouacked quietly for the night but not so the 45th which was expected to be quiet and peaceful. While marching through the great bazar they lost the little loyalty ^{they had} That was on account of buyers and sellers who were scatterers of sedition.⁵

When nearing the entrenchment Lt. Col. Liptrap, commanding the regiment, found the column, of the 45th inclining towards the glacis and the men getting beyond control. "Dugha Hai" (there is a treachery) became the cry. And then the sepoys broke out into open rebellion. Some two hundred of them broke off, loaded their muskets and made a rush for the ramparts. The rest marched on quietly under their officers to their camping ground.⁶

The mutineers attacked the magazine twice, but were defeated. In this attack Major Redmond, of Her Majesty 61, was severely wounded.

The attack was repulsed, but before the 61st could load, the sepoys dashed at the glacis but were pushed back. And then with an air of innocence they reformed their column and marched quietly with their European Officers to the camp.

British victory here was of a great significance. Had the rebellion been a success here, it would have been followed at most of the places in the Punjab.

However, the sepoys failed in their attempt. Disappointed they returned into the ranks of the regiment and being infuriated started the work of destruction as soon as the night fell.⁸

This time, the 61st could do nothing to save the contonment from destruction. Threatened from behind and before they could not stir, and were compelled to look on at the spread of the flames, as they enveloped building after building.

5. Kaye and Mallsen, op. cit., page 330.

6. Cave Brown op. cit., p. 48, Gazetteer of Ferozepur District, 1883-84, p. 28.

7. P.G.R., VIII, I, p. 48, / Cave Brown, op. cit., p. 109, Gazetteer of Ferozepur District, op. cit. p. 28, P.G.R., VIII, I, p. 48.

The officers of the 45th remained with their colours throughout the night, making every effort to restore confidence and quieten the minds of men. About 150 men refusing to join their comrades in Mutiny, affected loyalty and devotion to their Officers and colours.

During the night of May 13, 1857, the 57th remained perfectly quiet and orderly at their camp; scarcely any man deserted. On the following morning Brigadier Innes sent out a message to Col. Barvell that he was willing to receive all the men of the regiment who could come and lay down their arms. The Light Company almost to a man, under Captain Salmon, and through his exertion and influence, marched into the European lines and gave up their arms, and were permitted to return to their lines. Here were some rebels of the 45th N.I., who taunted them with cowardice and threatened to attack them.

A company of the 61st were then ordered out to clear their lines, but the other men of the 57th N.I. concluded that their Light Company had been made prisoners. A panic seized them and instead of marching in as they were prepared to do, to lay down their arms, they rose and bolted.

After a time, order and partial confidence was restored amongst them and several parties returned to the camp and in the course of evening Col. Barvell marched them all into the European Barracks, where they gave up their regimental colours and arms.

On the morning of May 14, it reached the ears of Col. Liptrap that 45th N.I. intended to seize the regimental magazines.¹⁰ To remove the magazine was impossible. It was therefore blown up.

This act so enraged the 45th, that they seized their regimental colours and started off in the direction of Faridkot only 130 remaining. They were marched by Col. Liptrap to the barracks of 61st and relieved of their arms.

9. Browne, Cave, Op. Cit., p. 110.

10. Abid., page 111.

The 61st pursued them for about 12 miles. They, however, returned later on. The mutineers reached Delhi and joined other rebels there. The weak administration of Brigadier Innes only helped the mutineers escape.

MUTINY BY 10th LIGHT CAVALRY

The 10th L.C. was dismounted and disarmed on July 11, 1857. On August 19, 1857, however, they made a rush at their horses, cut loose about 50 of them, and seizing every penny or horse they could find in the Station, including many officers charges, mounted and rode off for Delhi. With the connivance of the Indian horse keepers they also attacked the guns, but were repulsed, though not until they had killed three of the 61st Regiment, and wounded three more.¹¹

A lot of hue and cry was raised by the officers, but nearly the whole country between Ferozepore and Delhi, belonged to independent chief and was thinly peopled; and there was no natural obstacles to delay the progress of the Mutineers, they reached Delhi.¹²

The Chief Commissioner of the Punjab was later on convinced that the arrangements at Ferozepore cantonment were inadequate. The successful Mutiny was also a sufficient proof of this fact.¹³

CIVIL ASPECT

There was no civil revolt at Ferozepore. Rebellious ideas of course prevailed. One of the causes of the rebellion of 45th N.I. was there passing through the main bazar. The sepoys were was incited by the fanatic Maulvies and disaffected Bunias. The rebellious ideas were discussed in the Bazar openly.¹⁴ Sparks, thus, flew about in the city of Ferozepore to bring on a great explosion.¹⁵

11. Gazetteer of Ferozepore District, Op.Cite., p.29.

12. For.Sec.Deptt., Cons.425-431,2,para 5.

13. Ibid.

14. Browne, Cave, Op.Cite.p.108.

Major Marsden received the information at one time that a Fakir, named Sham Dass was collecting followers for the purpose of rebellion. Major Marsden moved against him by surprise and attacked and defeated him. The Fakir lost several men. He himself was seized and executed. This action naturally saved Ferozepore from further trouble.¹⁶ There was, however, no more Civil Revolt here at Ferozepore.

CHAPTER VII

SIGHT OF THE DISARMING TROOPS CAUSES REVOLT AT JHELUM

The troops at Jhelum were entirely natives of Poorbiah extraction -- Major Knatch Bull's Native Field Battery, the 14th Regiment N.I. and 39th N.I.¹

The sepoys here had for some time shown a bad spirit, and more than once were expected to break out in open mutiny.²

But Colonel Gerrard who commanded the corps entertained full confidence in his men and the wives and families of the officers who at the Chief Commissioner's recommendation had been removed from the station were recalled by Colonel Gerrard.³ There was a proposal to remove the Bridge of boats lest it should be carried away by the rising river. On this being known to Colonel Gerrard, he said that if this measure was carried out, the sepoys would mutiny. The Chief Commissioner not wishing to bring the matters to extremity allowed the bridge to stand; and in the mean time accumulated at Jhelum a considerable body of military police and of new levies. The river did shortly afterwards rise, and the bridge had to be broken up but the sepoys remained quiet.⁴

It is clear that Colonel Gerrard failed to judge the situation, but at last wise steps had to be taken. The 39th N.I. were ordered to march without their magazine towards Shahpore by orders. Their destination was Dera Ismail Khan, but it was an object to avoid any resistance which might have broken out at Jhelum by keeping them ignorant of their future destination. They were sent down the left bank of Jhelum.

1. Gazetteer of Jhelum District, Govt. Publications, Lahore, 1911, p. 47.

2. For. Sec. Deptt., Nos. 14-27, 28th Aug., 1857.

3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

They reached Dera Ismail Khan without giving any trouble. The native artillery were ordered to Lahore, and there afterwards disarmed.

However, a few nights subsequently an attempt was made to destroy between 30 and 4,0000 Rupees worth of Government Stores lying at the Ghat of the river Jhelum, over which there was a guard of the 14th N.I.. The fire was discovered by the police and put out before any damage had occurred. "But the set was that of an incendiary, as well as well acquainted with the nature of the stores, for the fire was placed under certain boxes which contained turpentine." wrote A. Brandreth to G. F. Edmonstone. Thereby he meant that the native sepoys were behind the fire.

The General commanding ⁱⁿ the Punjab, had for sometime been desirous of disarming as many of native Regiments of the line cantoned Cis-Indus as possible. And Brigadier General Nicholson had disarmed the 33rd and 35th as a precautionary measure at Phillaur, feeling that for want of reliable cavalry, he had not the means of intercepting any Native Regiment, which might escape to Delhi.

The Chief Commissioner therefore also resolved to disarm the 14th N.I. Two companies of the 14th N.I. were ordered to march to Rawalpindi on the pretence of forming a treasure but in truth to weaken the regiment. This move left but 500 men at Jhelum.

Colonel Ellice was ordered to affect disarming at Jhelum.

5. Gazetteer of Jhelum District, op. cit., p. 46.

He marched from Rawalpindi on July 2, 1857, with 280 men of H.M. s 24th and three guns and was overtaken by 400 Multani Horse before his arrival at Jhelum, on their way to join the moveable column. The night before his arrival, the Punjabis to the number of 106 had been separated from the rest of the 14th under the pretext that they were to go with the detachment of the 24th at Lahore.⁶

Ellice arrived at Jhelum on the morning of July 7, 1857. He was joined by the strong body of the Military Police and moved down towards the 14th which were on parade.

The moment however the Hindustanis (Poorbias) saw the Troops they loaded their muskets and began to fall back on their lines, firing at their officers. Colonel Ellice attempted to stop them with his cavalry and Guns, until ~~the~~ the infantry could come up; but the mutineers made good their retreat to their lines.⁷

There they manned the quarter guard, a regular defensible building, and their own huts, which they had loopholed. A severe fight ensued. The Infantry on either side was about equal in numbers. The mutineers are calculated to have mustered 500 bayonets, and the Detachment of the 24th and Military Police. Infantry, with the Punjabis, under McDonald, who fought on the British side were equally strong. The rebels had the advantage of position and the Government troops of 3 guns.⁸

After a severe contest which lasted hours, during which Col. Ellice was severely wounded in heading an attack on the quarter guard of the 14th, the rebels were driven out of their

6. For. Sec. Deptt., 28 Aug., 1857, Nos. 14-27, Cooper, op. cit., p. 124, Gazetteer of Jhelum District, op. cit., p. 46.

7. For. Sec. Deptt., 28 Aug. 1857, Nos. 14-27, Gazetteer of Jhelum District op. cit., p. 46.

8. For. Sec. Deptt., 28 Aug., 1857, Nos. 14-27.

their own lines and those of 39th N.I. which adjoined the quarter guard. But about 300 of the insurgents made good their retreat to an adjacent village strongly situated, at the Banks of the Jhelum. It was then 10'clock and the Europeans had marched or fought since midnight and had not broken their fast. To attack was not advisable but Colonel Gerrard decided to do so.

The position was difficult of access, and the insurgents protected by the houses resisted desperately. The Government infantry were forced back and one of their guns, all of which had been brought as close as possible, fell into the hands of the rebels. The fight then ceased, but the cavalry remained round the village.

The battle cost many lives of the Europeans. Colonel Ellice commanding the detachment of Her Majesty's 24th, was dangerously wounded, and Colonel Spring was killed. The heat of the July sun told terribly upon the British troops. The 6 pounders and guns proved useless against mud walls and the fortified guard room of the 14th, and when after desperate fighting the lines were cleared of the mutineers, the Government troops were too exhausted from heat, toil and want of food to follow up their advantage. At 4 p.m. Colonel Gerrard, who had assumed command after Colonel Ellice's fall, ordered an attack on the village to which the sepoys had retreated.⁹

The street fighting proved disastrous to the Government troops. The guns of the Government were brought up too close to the houses, the gunners and horses were mowed down by the fire of the mutineers, ammunition ran short, and a retreat was sounded.

9. Gazetteer of Jhelum District, op.cit., p.46.

Two guns were brought off the field; and the third, after a gallant defence of it by Lt. Battye, Assistant Commissioner, of Jhelum District, in command of 30 Police Horse, and two or three other ineffectual attempts to recue it, was captured by the mutineers and used against the Government Troops.¹⁰

During the night, however, the rebels endeavoured to escape. Some few got across the Jhelum in pleasure boats they found in cantonments, but were shot as they landed. Some were drowned and others cut by the Cavalry. About 150 made good their retreat for the time. A boat load was drowned and a party which got across had been disarmed and seized in Maharaja Gulab Singh's Territory, in Kashmir, and about 50 were at large, followed by the Military Police."¹¹

Although the loss on the Government side was very severe, the rebels could not march to Delhi in triumph. Colonel Ellice, who was reported killed was alive though severely wounded.

10. Gazetteer of Jhelum District, op.cit, p.46

11. For, Sec. Deptt., 28 Aug. 1857, Nos. 14-27, Gazetteer of the Jhelum District, op.cit, p.47.

C H A P T E R VIII

TROUBLE AVERTED AT RAWALPINDI AND MURREE BY THE TACTICS AND VIGILANCE OF THE AUTHORITIES

Disaffection was rife in the Rawalpindi District as well. The sepoys and a portion of the civil population were disaffected. Rumours about the end of the British rule prevailed. Emissaries from the King of Delhi played a great role in convincing the people that the King of Delhi had replaced the British Government.

On the eve of the Mutiny there were stationed at Rawalpindi two regiments of Irregular Cavalry, the 58th Native Infantry, a regiment of Gurkhas, a wing of 14th Native Infantry, and a native troop of horse artillery.

This was a brigade powerful enough to give just cause for alarm. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, who was also present at Rawalpindi determined to disarm the Native Infantry. This was done on the 7th July. On the morning of the day 7 cos. of the 58th and 2 of the 14th were disarmed. The only casualty was Captain Miller of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers who was severely wounded. The force for disarming at Rawalpindi was small, consisting of 240 men of Her Majesty's 24th and 150 of the Military Police. But the two companies of the 4th Punjab Infantry arrived in time to have aided had the sepoys resisted.¹

The sepoys on seeing the guns, as the Europeans deployed broke out and made for their lines which were within a few hundred yards. The guns had not been allowed to open and the European Infantry remained steady.

¹.Mily.Deptt.,Progs.21 Aug.1887

The sepoys on arriving at their lines loaded their muskets and everything portended a desperate resistance. But the European officers behaved admirably. Colonel Barston and the officers of the 58th and Lieutenants Norman and Chapman of the 14th went among their men as did Brigadier Campbell. In the end after nearly two hours delay what with the tact, temper and coolness of the officers and their evident influence with the men aided by the presence of guns, and European Infantry drawn up ready to advance nearly all the sepoys gave up their arms. Upwards of 30, however, made off with their muskets, but were followed and captured or killed. It was in this affair that Miller was wounded.²

Even after the disarming, the men of the 14th continued to be so insolent and insubordinate that they were confined in the central jail.³

ATTACK ON MURREE

DISCOVERY OF ATTACK ON MURREE

A private guard had been provided for Lady Lawrence. At its head was Hakim Khan, one of the lambardars or Chief men of Lorah, a village in the lower mountains, some 20 miles from Rawalpindi, and to the guard was a Sikh Ratan Chand, a resident of Saidpur, which was 8 or 10 miles from Rawalpindi.

Hakim had betrothed his son to an infant daughter of Ahmed Khan, a lambardar of Mallot, a large village to the North East of Murree. There was another lambardar named Baz Khan, in Mallot, own brother to Ahmad Khan. Baz Khan was a person

2 Ibid.

3. Gazetteer of the Rawalpindi District, Lahore, 1883-84, p.1.

of whom Thornton the Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi had been suspicious since he first knew him in 1850.

Hakim Khan of Lorah during his attendance on Lady Lawrence and subsequent residence at Murree was in the habit of receiving from the house of Ahmed Khan in Mallot such supplies of Milk and butter as he required for his daily use. On the night of Sept.1, 1857, Ahmed Khan's wife sent word to Hakim Khan that the station was to be attacked that night. The message was communicated instantly to Lieutenant Battye and was immediately credited and acted on both by him and Captain Berry.⁴

Rumours had already reached the Deputy Commissioner of Murree, Captain Crocraft, during May and June, of an uneasiness amongst some of the neighbouring tribes. It was affirmed that a Dua-i-Kher' or solemn compact, had been affected, that the object was an attack upon the power of the government, from what quarters or on what place could not be ascertained.

CHIEFS OF TRIBES CALLED TO MURREE

The Chiefs of several tribes were called to Murree and told that their presence would be useful to the cause of the government. To prevent their thinking a small allowance of 8 rupees per mensem was made to them by the government.

Such a step proved useful, in the long run. It not only won the support of the Chiefs for the government but also kept them away from the atmosphere of rebellion.

The rumours received in May and June proved more than true. Other compacts were formed, and other plots hatched which culminated on the night of the 2nd September, 1857 when the station of Murree was attacked by 300 men.⁵

4. P.G.R., VIII, I, pp. 340-341. 5. P.G.R., V. VIII. P. I, p. 248

■ Lieutenant Battye, Assistant Commissioner of Murree, took immediate measures for the safety of the station. The ladies, of whom a large number was then in Murree, were immediately concentrated. The Civil and Military Officers held a consultation, and despatched urgent requests for help to Thornton at Rawalpindi and Major Becher at Hazara.⁶

Arrangements were made to check the rebels. A cordon of sentries composed of Europeans and the police force under Lieutenant Bracken, was drawn round the station and strong pickets were posted at three places which were considered the most vulnerable.⁷

Finding their plan was discovered and not anticipating resistance, they speedily gave up the attempt and retreated, leaving one man dead, who turned out to be Dhoond from the village of Bhatteen-

The corporal with a party of Europeans, engaged in driving out some men who had got into some out houses received a bullet wound of which he shortly afterwards died.

Among the assailants the voice of Ahmed Khan of Mallot was clearly recognised by Captain Robinson. The man was loudly exhorting his companions to advance.

On the morning of September 2, 1857, a party of the insurgents were soon collected at Kuldana, a low mountain connecting Murree with Hazara. The number was about 1000. These men maintained their position during the day. Another party of similar strength was at Topa, a mountain adjoining Murree to the North East. This party succeeded in driving off the small guard of men who were at the flats in charge of the camp of

6. Ibid; 7. Ibid.

Lieutenant Braken's detachment and then plundered the property which had been left there.⁸

On September 3, 1857 , Lieutenant Battye sent the pirs and their followers in the direction of Topa to disperse the insurgents who were still assembled there and then to proceed to Mallot and burn it, as he had ascertained that Baz Khan was a leader of the night attack on the station. The Pirs did disperse the ~~x~~ insurgents and also burnt a few houses of Mallot.

The active rebellion had not extended more widely owing to the timely discovery, the prompt defence and the consequent failure of the first move. The obedience yielded by the Pirs to Lt. Battye's summons was probably the result of ~~the~~ ~~x~~ this success.

CHAPTER IX

RESENTMENT AGAINST DISARMING CAUSES MUTINY AT SIALKOT

At the time of mutiny at Meerut and Delhi, the following troops were present at Sialkot:

Colonel Daves troop, Horse Artillery; Captain Bourcher's European Battery, Horse Artillery; Her Majesty's 52nd Foot; 46th Native Infantry; 9th Light Cavalry; 35th Native Infantry; Masketry Depot, 27 Europeans and 165 Natives.

When the movable column was formed all these troops were withdrawn, with the exception of the 46th Native Infantry and a wing of 9th Cavalry. Brigadier Brind was the Commandant of the Cantonments, Colonel Farquharson and Captain Canefield were commanding the 46th N.I. and Lt. Montgomery was commanding the 9th Light Cavalry. The Europeans were very few in number and ~~is~~ ~~he~~ could do nothing in the event of revolt.

The disarming of the 33rd and 35th N.I. was resented by the native sepoys of the 46th N.I. and 9th L.C. In their eyes the victims of this outrage were innocent men, for they had done nothing offensive. Moreover John Nicholson was coming North and the sepoys well knew their own fate.

The sepoys, at last, broke out into open mutiny. The first intimation of disorder was given by a number of mounted troopers who rode furiously into the infantry shouting "Deen! Deen!" (meaning thereby that their religion was in danger). They called upon the soldiers to rise to save it. This alarm soon spread to the town. The Europeans were startled. They were roused by the cries, "Fly, fly for safety, the force has mutined." At about 1½ a.m. I Butler was called by one of his servants rushing into his bed room, calling out: "Sahib, Sahib, Juldee Ooth. Sowar log bundook Chalata aur Pulten bigara hy." (meaning thereby that the sepoys were up in arms and were going to start firing). As soon as possible

I. Butler dressed himself, called all the members of the family and went to the verandah to see what was going on. He then saw several sowars riding about, some leisurely others furiously, and heard pistol shots in several places - waited momentarily expecting some intimation from the authorities as to what course was best to ~~px~~ be pursued.¹

It had already been decided that in case of an outbreak all European families should be conveyed to the fort.² This was done and some of the things they had pre-determined to take with them were put into carriage. But before putting their families into them Lt. Saunders mounted his horse and rode down to army mess house about three hundred yards distant when he met some sowars. He asked them what was going on. They replied "bhag jao" (run away) and proceeded on their way.³

Butler was at that time standing in the verandah and watching their movements. As soon as they arrived at the gate of the compound they consulted together for a moment or so, turned the heads of their horses and went in an opposite direction.⁴

At the time there were two or three parties of sowars who rode in the direction of 46 N.I. and then apparently patrolling the station at all their timings, ^{made off} About half an hour elapsed from the time. Butler then came out to see how far had the things progressed.

1. For. Sec. Deptt., 28 Aug. 1857, Nos. 79-80

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

A pistol shot was heard to the extreme left when some of the servants (most of whom were congregated in one part of the house) said that there was the Doctor's buggy coming. Butler looked in that direction and saw Miss Graham weeping and bewailing.⁵

He helped her in taking out his ^{dead} father's body and had it placed in one of the verandahs of the servants houses. Then they determined upon not venturing out in that direction. They were confused and did not know what to do.

At that time they were joined by Gerrard the Veterinary Surgeon who came up in good spirits.

Sowars were riding hither and thither passing their compound but taking no notice of them. Frequent pistol shots were, however, heard. The 46th N.I. ~~men~~ entered ~~the~~ McMohan's House. Butler and party were three, all armed to defend themselves. All this time their families were retreating from the bathing room and securing themselves in a godown. The rebels were keeping up a constant fire in the rooms and breaking open doors. They burst into the zenana compound and fired at the door.⁶

From thir hiding place Butler and party could hear them calling out to the chowkidar, to point them out. He replied that they had left. "I cannot tell the painful state of anxiety and surprise they were kept in that time till about 11 O'clock when the chowkidar came in and told them to be quiet as the sepoys had left the house,"⁷ wrote Butler. But the rebels had been roaming about. Then they began to plunder the house.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

The yells that over and over arose caused by the plunderers breaking open the war robes almira and chests kept the European families in a constant state of alarm.⁸ But for the help rendered by the chowkidars, they might not have survived.⁹ The adjoining godown was broken into. The magazine was exploded. When a second magazine was blown up and there was a great noise and riding about, the Europeans thought that the mutineers had brought the canon to bear upon the place to induce them come out to be massacred.¹⁰

Hunter, the missionary with his wife and children was murdered not a quarter of a mile from their lines.¹¹

The police sowars appear to have taken no active part in the mutiny. But there was not found one man amongst them sufficiently loyal and brave to strike a blow in the cause of the Government.¹²

The mutineers, however, treated some of the officers very kindly. Colonel Farquason and Captain Canefield of the 46th were kept in confinement throughout the whole day of mutiny, and finally allowed to escape. The mutineers regarded both of these officers with utmost consideration.¹³

THE REBELS PROVED VICTORIOUS

The rebels could not be intercepted by the Government. They proved victorious and marched out most majestically.¹⁴

Brigadier General Nicholson received the news of the outbreak at about 3 a.m. on July 11, 1857. He instantly disarmed

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid, Cooper, op.cit., p.139.

14. Cooper, op.cit., p.148.

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the left wing of the 9th Cavalry which formed a part of the movable column and marched to intercept the mutineers.¹⁵ He had three guns of Light Field Battery in the centre, the troops of Horse Artillery equally divided hundred yards on the sides; and 300 men of Hm's 52nd with Enfield Rifles, in extended order one face between and on planks of infantry, with the real and reserve.

Finding the Government troops advancing in their pursuit, the rebels opened heavy fire on them.¹⁶ The struggle was a fierce one, but the mutineers withdrew in the long run. Mindful of his want of reliable cavalry, Nicholson wisely decided not to pursue but wait for further news of the rebels movement.¹⁷

He got intelligence of their movement ^a in little above Gardaspur. On July 12, 1857, Brigadier General Nicholson intercepted them just after they had crossed Ravi. The Government troops defeated them immediately after their arrival. All the plundered property which the rebels had brought fell into the hands of the Government troops.

After the affair of July 12, 1857, the mutineers fell back but on the next day, they attempted the crossing of the Ravi in the same place. Finding the Ravi guarded, unwilling to retire and unable to advance, the mutineers took possession of an island. Here many of them left the main body and attempted to escape in small parties but were intercepted and killed or captured.

July 13, 14 passed quietly, hands of mutineers being brought by the villagers having thrown away their arms and accoutrements to expedite their flights, and ~~mutineers~~ render capture less certain.

15. For. Sec. Deptt., 18 Dec. 1857, Nos. 405-407.

16. Cooper, op. cit., p. 147.

17. Ibid.

On July 15, 1857, General Nicholson heard that 300 of them had taken possession of the island in the Ravi. On the morning of July 16, Nicholson attacked them. They were defeated. About 200 fled into Gulab Singh's territory in Kashmir, who were, however, delivered to the British Government, later on.^{18.}

The significance of this affair was very considerable. Its effect on the country at large was very beneficial. But its main result consisted in the loss which had been directly or indirectly on the general cause of the mutineers in India, and especially in the Punjab. The Sialkot mutineers encouraged by those at Jullundur evidently intended to sweep across the country, picking up on their route the 2nd Irregular Cavalry at Gurdaspur, with whom they had an understanding; the 4th Native Infantry at Nurpur and Kangra; and many of the disarmed sepoys of the 33rd, 35th and 59th at Jullundur and Amritsar; and would have marched to Delhi with 3 or 4000 good native soldiers to the infinite encouragement of mutineers in that city.¹⁹

An account of the number of Sialkot Mutineers.

No. who gave up their arms -	19
Killed defending their line...	144
Executed	
Executed after the flight..	108
Drowned.	25
Killed by the police.	23
Imprisoned for various terms.	4
Prisoners..	138
	<hr/> 461 ²⁰

18. For. Sec. Deptt., 18 Dec. 1857, Nos. 403-404.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

The villagers of the round about area availed themselves of the chance. They plundered the Sadar Bazar. McMohan, the Assistant Commissioner of Sialkot had issued a proclamation to the effect that unless the plundered property was given up within twenty-four hours, the Lumberdars of villages would be seized and if property was given up within that period they would be let off. The Lumbardars gave full help. Property of every description was found in from the surrounding villages. ²¹

Such villages as contained the plundered property were heavily fined. The people of Sialkot town, however, behaved very well. They offered no molestation to the European, and very generally abstained from plunder. They assisted them by at once answering all demands for provision.

21. For Sec. Deptt., 18 Dec. 1857, Nos. 405-407.

THE TURBULENT PESHAWAR VALLEY

The Peshawar Valley could not remain unaffected by the events that took place at Meerut and Delhi. Informations about the disturbed minds of the people were received by the authorities. The British Government therefore did their best to keep the valley under control. Many restrictions were placed on the various tribes. But for one crime or another every powerful tribe was under a blockade.¹

Restrictions were put on the various tribes as follows:-

1. The Mallikdin Kheyli Afridis had assassinated a Police Officer while visiting at his home and were therefore blockaded till they should pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- and do justice to the heirs of the murdered men.
2. The Zukha Kheyli Afridis were under blockade for high way robbery.
3. The Kukikheyli Afridis were under blockade for murdering Lt. Lind.
4. The Michni and Pindali Mohmuds were excluded for a long course of raids.
5. Totye had become the asylum of Afaon Khan and Mukarrab Khan, round whom gathered all those who escaped from the British Police, so the people of Totye ^{were} under ban.
6. Mukarrab Khan, the chief of Panjtar, though not under actual blockade was active in inspiring the people to rise. He had called into Panjtar as auxiliaries a detachment of fanatics from the colony of Ghaznies who had for years been settled at Sitana on the Indus supported by secret supplies of money from disaffected Indian princes.²

1. P.G.R., VIII, I, p.132.

2. Ibid. p.133.

The people were not in a mood to help the Government. Colonel Nicholson endeavoured to raise levies through the chiefs of the Peshawar District, but the time had passed. It had become known that Delhi had fallen into the hands of the mutineers, and men had not forgotten Kabul. Not a hundred man could be found to join so desperate a cause.³

The news of the revolt at Meerut reached Peshawar in the midnight on May 10, 1857 and it became evident that immediate measures must immediately be resorted to.⁴

FORMATION OF A MOVABLE COLUMN

On the receipt of the intelligence from Meerut, Colonel John Nicholson, who was the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar then, proposed to H.B. Edwardes the formation of a movable column of picked troops to put down the mutiny that broke out any where in the Punjab, and they went together to Brigadier Sydney Cotton, who was then commanding the Peshawar Brigade. It was a significant suggestion, which of course, proved very useful, later on. Brigadier Cotton agreed, and he obtained the concurrence of Major General Reid, who commanded the Division, so that orders were issued on May 12, 1857, for the 55th Native Infantry to march from Nowshera and relieve the Guides, the corps in charge of the Fort of Mardan, and for the Guides (on being relieved) to join Her Majesty's 27th at Nowshera, in anticipation of John Lawrence's approval of the Movable Column for which he had been telegraphed at Rawalpindi.

CALLING THE COUNCIL OF WAR

A Council of War was called, Brigadier Naville Chamberlain, who was at Kohat, was also invited to attend. This was done

3. Gazetteer of Peshawar District, 1883-84, p.67

4. Ibid.

with the consent of General Reid and Brigadier Sydney Cotton . The Council was to think on some effective step to be taken against the rebels.

The Council met on May 12, 1857 at 11 a.m. General Reid, Brigadier Sydney Cotton, Brigadier Naville Chamberlain, Colonel John Nicholson, and H.B. Edwardes participated in it. The measures resolved on were briefly the following.

1. The concentration of all military and civil power in the Punjab, by General Reid (the senior officer) assuming Chief Command and joining Head Quarters of the Chief Commissioner leaving Brigadier Sydney Cotton in command of Peshawar.

2. The organization of Movable Column of thoroughly reliable troops, to assemble at Jhelum, and then take the field and put down the mutiny wherever it might raise its head in the Punjab.

3. The removal of a doubtful sepoy garrison from the Fort of Attock, and substituting a reliable one in that important post.

4. The levy of a hundred Pathans, under Fateh Khan Khattock, a tried soldier to hold Attock Ferry - a vital point in communication with the Punjab.

5. The Deputation of Brigadier Chamberlain to consult further with the Chief Commissioner.

6. The deputation of Colonel John Nicholson as Political Officer with the movable column (but this was objected to by the Chief Commissioner, later on).

IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL

There is hardly any doubt that calling the Council of War was a very wise step on the part of the British Officials. Peshawar was a vital point of the British Territory. It was

very essential to maintain peace here. Going of Peshawar meant going of the whole of the Punjab.

On May 18, 1857, the Commanding Officer of the 10th Irregular Cavalry at Nowshera reported to Brigadier Cotton that 55th Regiment of Native Infantry at both Nowshera and Mardan were in a state of discontent, and next day Colonel Nicholson telegraphed at Rawalpindi that the detachment of 10th Irregular Cavalry at Mardan also showed signs of disaffection.

Early on the morning of May 21, 1857, Fateh Khan Khattack who had been posted at the Attock Ferry, was in a highly mutinous state. He and his men were, indeed, soon observed to be in motion, leaving their post.

Lt. Lind, second in command, 5th Punjab Infantry (Major Vaughan's Corps) went across the river with a small party of his men and tried to recall the Subedar of the 55th N.I. to his duty. The Subedar warned him off, called on his men to load if they had not yet done so, and the men fixed bayonets and prepared to charge.⁵

This Subedar was named Saodin Dooby, and it had been ascertained that he was in close correspondence with Sewra Khan Dooby, the main leader of the 3rd Native Cavalry at Meerut and Delhi, and had in consequence arranged to light a corresponding flame in the Peshawar Garrison. The 55th Native Infantry and 3rd Cavalry had been stationed together at Meerut in 1846 and at Nowgang in 1852-53 so that the men of the two regiments were intimately acquainted. Lind, however, escaped and sent a horseman to ride and inform the Commanding Officer at Nowshera of the approach of the mutineers. Major Verner went out on the Attock Road with a party of 10th Light Cavalry, met the mutineers at the entrance of the cantonments, and ~~the~~ disarmed them.

⁵. P.G.R., VIII,II,p.145

But when some companies of the 55TH Native Infantry , who were at Nowshera, saw their comrades brought in as prisoners, they broke out. On the night of May 21, 1857, the 55th at Mardan also mutinied and seized the magazine placing a guard over Lt. Horne, the Assistant Commissioner, who effected his escape.⁶

Brigadier General Cotton though lamenting the necessity of disarming wanted to disarm the 55th N.I. He summoned all the Commanding Officers at his quarters.

Day dawned on May 22, 1857, before all the commanding officers were collected at the Residency, and for two hours the commandants of the regiments, protested against the measure. There arose a storm of remonstrance protesting their entire confidence in the fidelity of their men, the commandants clamoured violently against this move.⁷

The commandants failed to judge the seriousness of the situation. In fact they were in the dark about the reality. General Cotton did not care for their protests and announced his determination to disarm the four most doubtful regiments. He ordered them to parade each on its own ground at 7 a.m. for that purpose.⁸

EXECUTION OF THE MEASURES

The corps to be disarmed were :

1. 5th Light Cavalry.
2. 24th N.I.
3. 27th N.I.
4. 51st N.I.

6. Ibid, p.146.

7. Kaye and Malleon, op.cit, II, p.359.

8. P.G.R., VIII, (II), p.147.

The 21st Native Infantry were spared because it had declined to set a mutinous example, and because at least one infantry corps was indispensable for carrying on the duties of the station. The 7th and 18th Irregular Cavalry were also not disarmed for at that early stage of the revolt it was hoped that they would be kept quiet seeing their service in stake and it would be easy to coerce them after disarming the other regiments.⁹

It remained, however, to be seen whether the regiments would submit to be disarmed, and if they resisted, whether the three excused regiments would not fraternize with them at once, and reduce the struggle to the simple issue of the black and white races.¹⁰

At the appointed hour (7 a.m. on May 22) the troops paraded under arms, the two European Regiments (H.M.'s 70th and 87th) and the Artillery taking up position at the two ends of the cantonments, within sight of the parades, ready to enforce obedience, if necessary, yet not so close as provoke resistance.

The sepoys were completely taken aback. They were allowed no time to consult. Isolated from each other no regiment was ready to commit itself. The whole ^{of them} laid down their arms.¹¹

Some of the British Commanding Officers, however, took it as an insult to their sepoys. They could not bear it and threw down their swords on the pile of arms as a protest against what they considered unmerited humiliation of their corps.¹²

⁹. Gazetteer of Peshawar District, op.cit., p.68

¹⁰. Ibid. ¹¹. Ibid. for., Sec. Deptt., Progs. Vol. I, 25th Sept. 1857. pp. 2987-88.

¹². Holmes, History of Indian Mutiny. pp. 325-26, Gazetteer of Peshawar Distt., op.cit., p.68

Disarming here eased the situation for the British Government. The Chiefs of the country had expected a resistance from the native sepoy going to be disarmed. As the British Officers rode down to execute the disarming, a very few Chiefs and countrymen attended them. In fact they had come to judge their faces which way the tide would turn.¹³

But when they rode back, friends were as thick as summer flies. They believed that the Government was strong because it was daring.¹⁴

On the night of disarming, 250 sepoy of the 51st Native Infantry deserted and fled in different direction. They were, however, seized by the police and brought alive with their savings.¹⁵

The Colonel of the 51st N.I. when called on to draw the charge for the trial of these deserters simply charged them with being absent without leave but General Cotton soon changed it to plain English of desertion. On the former charge simple imprisonment, or dismissal would be awardable, on the latter imprisonment with hard labour, transportation or death.¹⁶

On May 23, 1857, the Officer Commanding at Nowshera reported that the 55th Native Infantry at Mardan were in a state of mutiny. Lt.Horne the Civil Officer at Mardan, escaping from the Fort took refuge with the Chief of Bnsufzye.¹⁷

13. Kaye and Malleson, op.cit.,II, p.361.

14. Gazetteer of Peshawar District, op.cit., p.68, Kaye and Malleson, op.cit.,II, p.361.

15. Gazetteer of Peshawar District, op.cit.,p.68.

16. P.G.R.,VIII,II, p.147.

17. *Idem* Gazetteer of Peshawar District,op.cit.,p.68.

It was soon reported that both 55 N.I. and 10th Irregular Cavalry at Mardan were in a state of disaffection, the former regiment having threatened to murder their officers and the latter to "roast".¹⁸

Colonel Spottis wood of the 55th N.I. reported to General Cotton that he had implicit confidence in his men, whom he considered to be only acting under panic.¹⁹

FORCE MOVES TO DISARM THE ~~55~~ 55TH N.I.

In the course of May 22 and of May 23, it was seen that all was quiet at the other outposts, and at 11 O'clock at night of May 23 a force of 300 European Infantry, 250 Irregular Cavalry, horse levies and police, and eighty guns (of which 6 x were howitzers) left Peshawar under command of Colonel Chute of H.M.'s 70th, accompanied by Colonel Nicholson as political officer and neared Mardan at about sunrise of May 25, after affecting conjunction with H.M.'s 27th Regiment and 200 Punjab Infantry from Nowshera.

No sooner did this force appear in the distance than the 55th N.I. , with the exception of 120 men broke from the fort and fled towards the hills of Swat.²⁰

They carried with them whatever they could lay their hands on. They took away their arms, their regimental colours, all the treasure they could seize and all the ammunition they could carry with them.²¹

The mutineers of the 55th N.I. met a terrible fate later on. Most of them were pursued and killed. Some of them changed their religion compelled by starvation and misery.

18. Ibid.

19. P.G.R., VIII, II, p.150

20. Pbid., p.151.

21. Cooper, Op.cit., p.64

On May 30, 1857, a sepoy of the Khelati-Ghilzai regiment broke out into mutiny and rushed to the magazine. He was, however, shot down by his own fellow sepoy. So marked was the staunchness of the Khelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment that they were exempted from being disarmed.²²

On the same morning a detachment of the 64th N.I. at Abazye was disarmed by the force with Colonel Chute and Colonel Nicholson, and another detachment of the 64th at Shabkadar was disarmed by a party of Major Brougham of the Mountain Train, who went on to Michnee and disarmed the rest of that discontented corps.

FORT MACKESON

It was reported to Edwardes that the sepoys at Fort Mackeson were forming plans to mutiny. At first they ventured to think of marching by night on the cantonment of Peshawar and raising the other troops; but finally they turned their attention to escaping from the Valley.²³

The elders of the Afridi Tribe who were offered 3000 rupees to pilot them through the hills to some ferry of the Indus, reported the matter to Handerson, at Kohat. General Cotton decided to take the initiative and disarming them. The task was given to Edwardes.²⁴

Before dawn on the 7th July, 1857, the British Forces had surrounded the fort and placed the guns in position. The sepoys were entirely surprised, and at the summons of their Commanding officers Major Shakespeare, the sepoys came out and laid down their arms.^{24 a}

216/1000/1000

22. P.G.R., VIII, II, 156 23. Ibid P. 163. 24. Ibid. 24 a. Ibid.

On July 9, 1857, two Afridis of the Sipal tribe entered the lines of the 18th Irregular Cavalry and presented to the Hindustani Sowars a letter from Malik Surajuddin, the head of their tribe and one of the most powerful men in the Khyber. The latter offered an asylum in the writer's hills to any blackman either of cavalry or Infantry who chose to mutiny and come to him. ²⁵

The Cavalry, however, handed over the letter and also the emissaries to their British Officer, Major Rejnes, for which two or three of them were promoted. Instead of hanging the emissaries Edwardes imprisoned them. He also invited Surajuddin and asked him about the whole affair. The latter, however, showed no nervousness or awfulness but adhered bravely to his word.

One Mir Baz Khan, along with some Hindustanis, went into the village nearest to Panjtar and began to instigate them to raise the standard of the prophet and to refuse to pay their revenue. Major Vaughan, then at Mardan, at once marched out on July 2, 1857, and fell upon them with about 400 horse and foot and 2 mountain guns, killed Mir Baz Khan, took prisoner a Rehila leader, hanged him and the headmen of the rebels, burnt two of the villages which had revolted and fired others.

REWOLT AT NARINJI

The most disastrous news came daily from Hindustan (Delhi and Uttar Pradesh) and echoed in still more alarming voices among these hills. Special messengers made their way from Delhi. As a result of all this a revolt took place at the village of Narinji. The village was so strongly situated that the Police scarcely dared to go near it, and it became a refuge for every rebel.

²⁵. Ibid.

The holy war was auspiciously opened with every requisite - a priest, a banner, a fastness, and several days provisions.²⁶

But on the morning of 21st July Captain James surprised them with a force of 800 horse and foot and 4 mountain guns, under the command of Major Vaughan, and put the rebels to disastrous flight. No less than 50 or 60 of them were slain.²⁷

A GENERAL RESTLESSNESS

About this time a general restlessness was observed amongst the chiefs of the district, as well as amongst the native community. Delhi still held out and doubts were entertained regarding the strength of the British Government. The moneyed classes showed a peculiar behaviour. They were summoned for the purpose of loan, to be collected for the government. They reached about two hours late. And when at last they came everyone wanted to sit in the row except the first. No presentation at all had been brought by them as if the British rule were over.²⁸ And then most ridiculously, they put ~~put~~ up the proposal of collecting the loan of Rs.15,000.00.²⁹

After a fortnight Syad Amir, with a body of Mohmands and 40 or 50 of the escaped sepoy of 51st Native Infantry, made a mighty attack on the fort of Michni. The Mohmands opened fire on the fort, with their gazails but the 51st deserters, with a far more formidable weapon, appealed to every prejudice in the garrison and screamed to them to betray the fort if they valued their country or religion.

26. Gazetteer of Peshawar District, op.cit. p.72.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

& 29. Ibid.

A company of Afridi Sepoys was hastily thrown into the citadel, but ~~and~~ something more was needed. The Mohmands were in the highest excitement, sending the fiery cross to all their neighbours.³⁰

Colonel A Edwardes was helpless. It was a time for yielding with a good grace as could be assumed. He sent them word that they were just going the wrong way to work, and that, if they wanted to regain their confiscated privileges, they must render some marked service to the Government instead of adding to the embarrassments, of a passing crisis. For instance let them send the fanatic Syed Amir up to the court of Kabul and there make him over to Dost Mohammad Khan. In such a way, their case could be recommended for their reinstatement. The Mohmands sent in their hostages to Peshawar, packed the Syed off uncerimoniously and sat down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindustan.

REVOLT BY THE DISARMED & 51st N.I.

Rumours prevailed to the effect that the regiments continued secretly to provide themselves with arms and General Cotton, therefore, resolved that the staff officers of the Division and the station should make a thorough search of the lines of the 51st N.I. under well concerted arrangements,³¹ during which swords, hatchets, muskets, pistols, bayonets, powder balls and caps were found stowed away in roofs and bedding, and even drains. Exasperated by the taunts of the newly raised Afridi regiments carrying out the search the 51st broke out.³² They rushed upon the officers of the 1st

30. Ibid. page 74.

31. P.G.R., V. VIII, P. II, p. 174.

32. For. Sec. Deptt., 30 Oct. 1857, Cons. 38-46.

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Punjab Infantry foiled their attempt and saved their officers.

Another party of the mutineers rushed towards the barracks and magazines of the Peshawar Light Horse, and a desperate struggle ensued. They got possession of several stands of arms and used them well. The mutineers however, were defeated having suffered a heavy loss.³³

The main body of the mutineers having failed in these attacks ran off towards Jamrood followed by the 1st Punjab Infantry. The mutineers were chased and killed.³⁴

Thus the British Government succeeded in suppressing every type of rebellion in the Peshawar Valley. The Rebellious ideas were dealt with iron hand. Tact, efficiency, diplomacy of the British Officers helped them in crushing rebellion in this part of India. The Peshawar which could do a lot of harm to the Government by getting out of control during the rebellious period was kept completely under control although there was every possibility of its going out of hold. The war-like races of the valley could rebel any time. But they were not allowed to avail of any chance. The Native sepoy posted in this valley were mostly disarmed and thus rendered helpless. Thus, the British Officers by saving the Peshawar Valley in a way saved the whole of the Punjab, because success of the rebels here could be an instigation for others in the Punjab.

33. Ibid.

34. See Appendix No: I

CHAPTER XI
DISTURBANCE AT ROHTAK

The mutiny of the troops at Meerut on the 10th of May, and the seizure of Delhi by them on the 11th, took the Rohtak District, like the rest of North India by complete surprise.¹

Large number of Jats and Rajputs were serving in the army, but it does not appear that there was any feeling of excitement among the people noticeable before that month.²

But as day succeeded day, and it appeared that nothing could be done to re-assert the British authority at Delhi the "troublesome portions" of the population began to raise their heads, and the whole of the once warlike people became profoundly stirred.³

On May 23, 1857, an emissary of the King of Delhi, Tafazzal Husain by name, entered the district of Bahadurgarh with a small force. Bakhtawar Singh, the Tehsildar of Rohtak, who had been sent there to meet him, was unequal to the task of encountering the rebels, and fled to Rohtak. John Adam Loch, the Collector of the District, at first, wished to stay at his post and fight the rebels, but despairing of success, he left Rohtak by night, accompanied only by Thanedar Bhura Khan, and made his way by early on the morning of the 24th May to Gohana.⁴

Rustam Ali Khan took charge of the Tehsil buildings, and guarded them with all their records and money, until order was again restored in the autumn.

But nowhere in the Rohtak District were hands stained with English blood. The Ranghars clamoured for it at Mahim and elsewhere, but the Jats and Baniyas defeated their purpose. In nearly all cases the Europeans were conducted to a place of safety with expected kindness and consideration.⁵

1. Gazetteer of Rohtak District, Lahore, 1883-84, p.24

2. Ibid

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid, pp.25, Cave Browne, Op.cit., V.I, p.142.

5. Ibid, p.25

Deserted by their Magistrate, the soldiers, collected at the Headquarters, naturally dispersed to their homes, or perhaps joined the rebels, who arrived at Rohtak on May 24, and proceeded to set free the prisoners in the jail, and burn the court building and the record office.

The Deputy Collector, Misr Mannu Lal, and the Sadr Amin, Muhammad Abdullah Khan, remained at their posts, but they were unable to do anything to control the course of events, and the former was shortly afterwards compelled to flee. An attempt was made by the Delhi force to plunder the Hindus of the town, but this was frustrated. After two days' stay, they returned to the capital, carrying off nearly two lakhs of treasure, and burning the sampla Tehsil on their road.⁶

The confusion was added to by the rebel troops of Hurriana Light Infantry and the 4th Irregular Cavalry who had mutinied at Hissar and Hansi, and murdered their officer, the Collector and other Europeans, passing on their way to Delhi. Lachhman Singh, the Tehsildar of Mahim, made over to the neighbouring villages such treasure as was in the tehsil, and disappeared, and the buildings and records were destroyed.

Loch returned to Rohtak on May 28, 1857 at the desire of Barnard in company with 60th N.I. This regiment, however, was also disaffected. It upset Loch rather than give him any assistance and relief.⁷ Being frustrated, Loch wrote to Thornhill, "Despatching a mutinous corps to settle a disturbed district appears to me to be a new principle of administration in fact I thought I had fallen from the Fry pan into the fire."⁸

7. For. Sec. Deptt., 25th Sept. 1857, Nos. 100-103.

8. Ibid.

This regiment (60th No.1) which had been quartered at Banda and Umballa since 1857, had been marched from the latter place on 22nd May inspite of grave misconduct there. On reaching Karnal, it was diverted to Rohtak ostensibly to intercept the rebels from Hissar and Hansi, but really because it was known to be mutinous to the core, and it was unsafe to take it to Delhi. The proper course would have been to disarm it; but instead of this it was determined to send it to Rohtak. On the march down the men guilty of repeated instances of insubordinate conduct, showed no improvement whatsoever in their behaviour.

Although no acts of violence were being perpetrated, yet the District was in a complete state of disorganization.⁹

Loch with 60th N.I. made a forced march into Rohtak with a view of intercepting the Harriannah Light Infantry on their way to Delhi but were late by a few hours."If we had come in contact with the Hurriannah Light Infantry as we anticipate I actually believe that this regiment would have patronized with them." Wrote Loch about the mutinous inclination of 60th N.I.^{9a}

On June 4, 1857 60th N.I. was actually going to break out into mutiny but they were prevented from doing so by their Colonel.

The mutiny was however inevitable and could not be long deferred.

On the afternoon of June 10, 1857 the Granadier

9.9^a. Ibid.

Company, which had all along been the leader in insubordination, broke out into mutiny and seized their arms.

Not a single native officer remained true to his colours, not a soldier came forward to quell the emeute, and there was nothing left for the Europeans but to ride off. They were fired upon by the men but fortunately they all escaped unwounded, except the Sergeant Major.

The mutineers of 60th N.I. did not follow them, and the Europeans gathered together half a mile from the camps. After waiting for some time for a few brother officers (who had gone off to shoot early in the morning, and who had already received the news of the outbreak and made their way to Delhi in advance), they turned their backs on Rohtak, and reached the ridge at Delhi at 9 O'clock on the morning of June 11, 1857. Loch fled on foot to Sampla, and then on horseback to Bahadurgarh, from which place he was escorted to Delhi by Resaldar Sandal Khan of Kalanaur and his father.¹⁰

But ~~Sampla~~ from the exposure of the day he never recovered, and there was a pathetic letter of his, stating that he was then quite blind, and ascribing the origin of his affliction to his flight from Rohtak, under the exposure to the midsummer sun¹¹.

All vestiges of the British Government, then disappeared like snow in thaw. The mutineers killed Bhura Khan, the Thanedar and after trying unsuccessfully to plunder the town went off to Delhi where they distinguished themselves in the attack of 14th June on the ridge but were defeated in the long run.

As day succeeded day, and it appeared that nothing could be done to re-assert the British authority, the population began to raise their heads, and the whole of the

10. Abid; 11. Gazetteer of Rohtak District, op.cit., p.24

once warlike people became profoundly stirred.¹²

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The revolt by the civil population at Rohtak was a sort of disorder or lawlessness. The Mohammedans, in the zeal of their new born piety, desired to slay all the Hindus, and the latter had a large number of old clan disputes to settle among themselves, and lost no time in settling about their decision.¹³

Although no acts of violence were perpetrated, yet the district was in a complete state of disorganization. The Ranghars and the butchers set up the Muhammadan green flag (for Jihad), and round it gathered some of the people, and lawlessness ruled supreme in the district till the middle of September, 1857.¹⁴

12. Ibid.

13. Browne, Cave, Op.Cit.I, 142

14. Gazetteer of Rohtak District, op.Cit,p.26.

C H A P T E R X I I

REBEL SOWARS FROM DELHI INSTIGATE REBELLION AT HISSAR.

At about 1 p.m. on May 29, 1857, a custom's peon came running into the Collector's office. He gave the information that some rebel sowars had arrived from Delhi. E.C. Smith, a clerk and Wedderburn, the ^{head} clerk were also present there.

On going out they saw a number of sowars standing about the new jail, planning schemes. Just as they (Collector and party) were going to start in their buggies, they were followed by 4 or 5 ¹ sowars, when they had to retreat to Kutchery.

The collector and Head clerk on going towards the tumbrils ² shed for safety were each shot by a matchlock. The Collector fell dead forthwith. The Head clerk escaped the shot but died later on.

The sowars and the customs peons together then plundered Daniel's house and set fire to it. They then returned to Kutchery and took away 16 sepoy of the Hurrianah Light Infantry Battalion. Every public article in the buildings was pillaged and all public records destroyed by some of the mutineers.

About the same time the remaining mutineers went to the old jail and sought admittance. On being admitted they released all prisoners and afterwards the 50 prisoners working at the manufactory near Smith's house. All goods in the manufactory were plundered.

Some of the sowars and other mutineers rushed into the compound of Smith's house and that of the Head clerk and before the latter's wife and the former's family of 5 children and wife could get into the jungles about 100 ³ places distant; they were all cut down by two Ranghars.

1. For. Sec. Deptt., 25 Sept. 1857, Nos. 100-103.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Describing the total destruction of his house and property by the mutineers, Smith stated:

"Before dark the whole of my property and live stock were plundered in toto. And houses and Palkee Gharie all burnt and the doors of my house taken out, and roof timbers all taken away, leaving me without the least article of clothing or property in addition to the total destruction of all my poor family."⁴

The Collector's house, which was vacant, Doctor's shed and in fact every European's house had been totally destroyed by the mutineers and pillaged by the Dogar butchers and villagers.⁵

About 3 or 4 p.m. the mutineers went to the Treasury in the Fort, asked entrance and the detachment of 100 sepoy of the Harriannah L.I. and Guards allowed them in. They and the sepoy then took possession of the fort.

Lieutenant Barwell (Adjutant), and Taylor, and Hallet of the Customs were in the Fort. Lieutenant Barwell called out for a guard, but was shot at by his own men and he fell, the other were wounded.

Relating how three ladies and one child were cut down by the Custom's peons, E.C. Smith stated:

"The 3 ladies and 1 child Mrs. Barwell, Mrs. Weddleburn and child and Mrs. Hallet were then spared by the Subedar of the Guard, and retaken back to the House but sorry to say were not long there before they were all cut down by the Custom's peons on Guard."⁶

Thompson, the Tehsildar was killed at the thana. E.C. Smith fled to Bikaner State. Here he found Alex Skinner and

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

family in the fort of Rajgarh, through the great assistance rendered by Coleridge incharge of Detachment of Bikaner Troops and guns sent out by the Chief of Bikaner to Rajgarh for protection. The Chief of Bikaner had sent 50 sowars to escort Skinners safely to Rajgarh.

The same night the whole of the Hissar Treasury consisting^s upwards of a lakh and a half of rupees was taken off to Hansi by the detachment of the Hurriannah Light Infantry.

The same kind of occurrence happened at Hansi on May 29, 1857. The whole regiment went away with the treasure. Three ladies, five men and six children were estimated to have been massacred there.

Similar occurrence took place at Sirsa on the same day. All the European residents escaped. The treasure had been brought away and was at Hissar on May 5 and was under charge of 2 companies of the Hurriannah L.I. Battalion and, Ressaldar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry and a number of Dadree Horse. They left Hissar for Hansi that night.

CIVIL REVOLT AT HISSAR.

As a result of the sepoy mutiny at Hissar the civil population of the near about villages availed themselves of the lawlessness and came to plunder the town of Hissar. A great disorder prevailed there.

Lieutenant Midmay was ordered to proceed to Hissar to suppress the rebellion there. He started on Aug. 18, 1857, with the force detailed below:
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Lt. Hunt	45th N.I.
Lt. Lamb	45th N.I.
Lt. Boileau	16th N.I.
Lt. Jackson	Attached to Sikh Artillery Levies.
Irregular Horse	350
Sarfraz Khan Horse	100
Kamalaodeen Khan's Horse	100 75

and 100 Googaira Mounted Police under Resaldar Sher Mohammed Khan,
Malik Fatch Sher Khan

This force was augmented by a company of the Kattar
Mukhee Regiment and 45th Punjab Barkandazes.

HISSAR ATTACKED BY THE REBELS

At about 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ a.m. on Aug. 19, 1857, ~~the~~ the town of Hissar
was suddenly attacked by a large number of Ranghar villagers,
whose number estimated 2000 with a good many sepoy of the Hurriana^h
Light Infantry, and 400 sowars for the most part of the Irregular
Cavalry all led by Shahzada Mohammed Azam whose family were in
Hissar at that time.

The rebels were, however, defeated. They left 300 dead
on the field and more than 600 of them were wounded.

MANGLI OPERATIONS

In obedience to Vancortlandt's orders, G.G. Pearse
Commanding the Bhuttiana Field Force, marched on the night of
Sept. 10, 1857, to suppress rebellion at the village of Mangli
with the following force:

Puttiala Horse	250	Sabre
Usman Khan's Resala	35	
Peshawurree Resala	50	
Punjab Police 8th and 9th Troops	100	
Esakheli Resala	100	
Tawana Resala	100	
Kamaloodeen's Resala	100	
Multan Horse	140	
Total	875	

Three power guns of the Chief of Bikaner, manned by
Patiala gunners, and commanded by Jackson were also with Pearse.

The Infantry consisting of 645 men were from the following Regiments:

	Puttiala Foot	95
8.	Ibid.	
9.	Ibid.	
10.	For.Deptt., S.C., Progs.	27 Nov. 1857, p. 5228.

Peshawurree Foot	150
Dogras	125
23rd Regt. Punjab Infantry	125
Kattar and Suraj Mukhees	<u>150</u>
Total	<u>645</u>

The march was exceedingly long and fatiguing one of upwards of 21 miles. They reached Mangli a little after sunrise on Sept., 11, 1857.

The rebel cavalry were on the north front and it was there that they challenged for attack; but this decidedly was their strongest point, and was therefore declined. The position of this rebel village was similar to that of all villages of that part of the country, a large village with a ditch 15 feet broad and strong enclosed gates.

Pearse brought the guns close and a heavy fire was opened. Not a man on the British side was touched or wounded within the seven minutes of the commencement of the action.¹¹

What was true in the commencement of the assault was reverse in the pursuit, and duringⁿ street fighting. The British Troops suffered heavy loss.¹²

The rebellion at Mangli was however suppressed although the villagers were fully supporting the rebels.

ACTION AGAINST JAWALPUR (A strong village)

On Sept. 13, 1857 Pearse proceeded with a portion of Irregular Hurrianah Force under his command. The rebels mustered a good force of 700 or 800 Horse and from 400 to 500 Infantry. They had also guns to defend the village. After a severe fight the rebels were defeated. The ammunition lying in the camp of the rebels fell into the hands of the British Troops.¹³

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ For. Deptt., S.C., Progs. 30th Oct. 1857.

C H A P T E R XIII

TIMELY ACTION CHECKED LUDHIANA FROM A REVOLT

The Civil population of Ludhiana was highly disaffected. Heavy preparations were being made by the people for the rebellion against the Government.

The population of Ludhiana consisted of different sections and communities. There were the descendants of Shah Zaman and Shah Shujah of Afghanistan; there were Kashmiri shawl makers; the remaining Muhammedan population consisted of fraternity of Gujars and Syads, old landed proprietors of Ludhiana and the low Muhammedan communities who lived in the bazar in the old cantonments.

The descendants of Shah Zaman and Shah Shujah had increased to the dimensions of a small colony. They were pensioners and a sum of Rs 75,000/- a year was distributed in pension amongst them. In-spite of it they were ^{disatisfied} ~~dissatisfied~~. The reason was that they were in a state of exile¹

A Maulvi did his maximam in exciting the Muslims population against the Government. Single handed he succeeded in creating an acute hostile opinion in a large section of them². He had a tremendous influence amongst almost all the classes. He was respected by many of the Afghan Shahsadas, with one of whom - Safdarjang by name, he was in league, and with the inferiour classes he was all powerful³.

Not only at Ludhiana proper, the Maulvi had his influence throughout the District. This was so because he was a Gujar, a numerous race, bordering on the Satluj all along the lowlands. Later when the mutineers from Jullundur arrived at Ludhiana, he collected all his disciples, hoisted the green flag of his faith, and then led to Delhi. The Deputy Commissioner failed

1. P.G.R. VIII, P.I., p.91.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

to control him and felt relieved when he left for Delhi.⁴

The Hindu population of Ludhiana consisted of principal chaudhris, traders and the banking community. They were very influential. They, however, kept aloof. They refused to extend any loan to the Government before the fall of Delhi.⁵

The Hindus and the Muslims of lower classes did not remain unaffected by the tide of the mutiny. They bore no goodwill for the British Government. They followed any casual leader that turned up and worked for spreading general disorder and promiscuous pillage. Every class of Ludhiana town participated against the Government. As a result, almost every class had its representatives on the gallows.⁶

G.H.M. Ricketts was the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana when the rebellion broke out, at Meerut and Delhi. The Military condition of the Government at Ludhiana was weak. The native troops stationed here consisted of 50 men of the 9th irregular (who were later on sent to Delhi with the first siege train); of a guard of 40 sepoys of the 3rd Bengal Native Infantry in the Treasury, about 65 men of the same regiment in the Fort; and small guards at the general hospital, commissariat godown, and a post office in all about 130 men of all ranks.

The Deputy Commissioner also detained the march of the 4th Sikhs who had luckily marched into Ludhiana.⁷ Adequate steps for security were taken. Detachment of District Jageerdari horse were maintained at each Thanah and Tehsil, at the road from Ludhiana to Ropar. The Malerkotla cavalry were posted along the Grand Trunk Road from between Sirhind and Karnal to beyond Jagraon. The 32 Putteela Horse were

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. p. 102.

8. Ibid. pp. 110-111.

posted on the Ferozepore Road towards Sidwan. The Maharaja of Patiala was entrusted the road towards Ferozepore and ghats along the river towards Jullundur.⁸

The Deputy Commissioner tried his best to maintain his hold on Ludhiana. From the middle of May he used to patrol the city and its environs every night, at any time between 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. Lieutenant Campbell of the 9th irregular Cavalry, who was then quartered in this Station, Captain Cox of Engineer Department, Lt. Yorke, Commanding detachment of 3rd Native Infantry, assisted in this duty till the Mutiny actually broke out.

Alien citizens in the city were sent to their home districts. Individuals guilty of violent crimes, robbery, or murder, were summarily disposed of with drum head court celebrity. And ~~not~~ when all classes joined in the outbreak they were subjected to fine to reimburse the sufferers.

It was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that the sword sharpeners in the city were busily doing their trade. 56 Swords were there in a shop close to his own house. He therefore determined to disarm the whole city.

Ricketts got an opportunity when Major Coke's Regiment 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Young-husband with a squadron of Punjab Cavalry arrived. By day break the Officers acquainted with city had taken positions of these troops round the city, posting parties at every outlet.

Major Coke then proceeded with the main body through the streets, posting his men at the cross roads and on all roads commanding houses.

8. Ibid. pp. 110-111.

Search for arms revealed that almost the whole of Ludhiana town was apt to rise against the Government. Well sharpened weapons were found out in a huge number.

The search was conducted by hands of the police, each under a European Officer, each party having a separate division of the city. The result was two bullock hackery loads of swords and matchlocks. These were distributed to the numerous new levies.

When the mutineers from Jullundur occupied the Fort of Ludhiana, the people of Ludhiana helped them in every way. They helped them in mounting the guns and also gave them provisions to last for about 10 days.

The Deputy Commissioner himself saw them helping the Mutineers.

The people gave the Mutineers shelter in their houses. The Deputy Commissioner was frustrated. He could do nothing immediately.

MILITARY ASPECT

The troops at Ludhiana had already formed a plan to possess themselves of the Fort of Phillaur. This plan of theirs, however, could not be put into practice. They were anticipated only 18 hours before it could have been executed.

The Mutiny in the Jullundur was not a matter of chance. On the other hand it was a pre-planned incident. The Mutineers had a set programme. The sepoys at Jullundur mutinied first, they informed the sepoys at Phillaur, who sent information to Ludhiana.

C H A P T E R X I V
T R I B A L D I S T U R B A N C E I N G U G E R A D I S T R I C T

Disturbance in the District of Gugera was of a tribal type. The various tribes here openly took up arms against the Government. Cattle stealing and high way robbery were very frequent.

On September 14, 1857, the pastoral and predatory clans of Muhammedans who occupied extensive waters south of Gugera and about 80 miles from Lahore, which stretched from the right bank of Satluj, across the Doab and for some 12 or 15 miles beyond Ravi broke out. These clans could muster some 20,000 to 30,000 men, and occupied a tract of country, in the Gugera District of all 40 or 50 miles in breadth, and from 70 to 80 miles in length. They had few villages and gradually resided in temporary grass huts, which were constructed in such localities as afforded the best pasturage and water for the numerous herds of cattle. They were Khurrals, Khattias, Wootoos, Fatwanas, and other names of jat lineage.¹

The insurgents broke out simultaneously. They had few arms, those which they possessed had been obtained from the Bahawalpur Territory and Ferozepore District, where the rebels had not been disarmed. They surprised the scattered police forces in the wastes, and along the Multan Road, disarmed the police, intercepted the postal communications, and levied contribution from the small town of Hurrappa and Kote Kamalia.

The first information of the intended insurrection was brought to Elphinstone by Sarfraz Khan Khural, on the night of Sept. 16, 1857.² This information was confirmed from other sources, and Elphinstone lost no time in sending intelligence to the Chief Commissioner and to Hamilton. But these express messages were intercepted by Mordana Tribe at Mohammadpur.³

1. For. Sec. Deptt., 18th Dec. 1857, Cons. 440-452.
2. P.G.R., VIII, II, 44-45.
3. Ibid. P. 45.

The information reached Lahore only in the evening of Sept. 16, 1857 and within four hours afterwards, 200 men of the new Regiment of Sheikh Horse were despatched to Gugera. Before day light 1 company of European Infantry, 3 Horse Artillery guns and 150 of Military Police all the force that could be spared from Lahore, followed.⁴

Ahmed Khan Khurral was the most important leader of this insurrection. He owed allegiance to the King of Delhi. L. Berkeley was sent in the mean time with 20 men, to capture if possible Ahmed Khurral, before he had crossed Ravi opposite to his village of Jhumra, and Lt. Mitchell and Lt. Elphinstone commenced to make preparations to counteract the outbreak which was then evidently about to take place. The levies were all armed and mustered.

Elphinstone received a note from L. Berkeley informing him that he had not succeeded in intercepting Ahmed Khurral and that the boat in which the latter had crossed had been moored in a creek on the opposite side beyond the reach of Musketry.

The chowkidar incharge of it had declared that he had received strict order not to let the boat return, and he was determined to obey this order, as Ahmed Khurral, had become king of the Country.⁵

Ahmed Khan soon made his appearance, and in reply to Berkeley's threats and remonstance informed him that he had renounced his allegiance to the British Government and considered himself a subject of the King of Delhi, from whom he had received orders to raise the whole country.⁶

His followers thereupon began the matchlock fire which was returned by the horseman of the British side but without

4. For., Sec. Deptt., 18th Dec. 1857, Cons. 440-452(5) P.G.R., VIII, II, 46.
6. Ibid.

effect till Berkeley himself brought down with his rifle a conspicuous person who was recognised to be the Mullah of the village.⁷

On receipt of this intelligence Elphinstone immediately despatched Lt. Mitchell with 60 of the Kuttar Mukhee Battalion, and 100 of the levies to reinforce Berkeley and later on himself joined the detachment at the ferry. On the British force approaching nearer, the rebels dispersed with the first volley of the musketry.⁸

This defeat of Ahmed Khan was not without effect. The Khurrals of that part of the district could never be induced again by Ahmed Khan. The chief after several fruitless efforts, was obliged to join with his immediate dependents the Wootoo tribe on the left bank of the river.⁹

On September 20, 1857 Elphinstone despatched Lt. Chichester and Mitchell across the river with the instruction to scour the country so far as Pindi Sheikh Moosa, and attack and disperse any insurgents they might still find assembled on the other side.¹⁰

A few hours after their departure Elphinstone received intelligence that some Khurrals under Ahmed Khan had crossed the river during the night and had been joined by a large body of Wootos, and they had signified their intention of attacking during the day. An express was immediately despatched to Colonel Paton, and letters were sent to Lt. Chichester and Berkeley communicating this intelligence and requesting them either to co-operate or cut off the retreat of the insurgents in the event of an attack taking place.¹¹

7. P.G.R., VIII, II, p. 46. 8. Ibid.

9. Ibid. p. 47.

10. P.G.R., VIII, II, p. 47.

11. Ibid pp. 47-48.

When the rebels had approached within 400 yards the guns opened upon them with grape and after a few rounds they retired slowly. They could not be pursued by the British troops. On September 21, 1857, Elphinstone received reliable information that Ahmed Khan and some other Khurral Chiefs had retreated ~~to~~ into the jungle near Gishkowlie and had been joined by a large number of Woottoos.

Captain Black was thereupon directed to proceed with a party of horsemen to Akbar, and after being joined there by the Lieutenant Chichester's detachment to surprise and if possible to destroy the body of insurgents.

The rebels were also prepared for the attack. They received Captain Black's party with a discharge of matchlocks, which killed the Resaldar on the spot and unhorsed several others. This created a confusion, which the insurgents took full advantage of by advancing with loud shouts, and surrounding the sowars. The jungle was heavy ¹⁴ or 15 of the sowars were killed.

The British force was, however, soon rallied by their officers near a ravine, and several of the insurgents who had ventured so far in the pursuit had been cut down, and among them Ahmed Khan Khurral himself, ¹² the ~~insurgé~~ insurrection, however, did not end with the death of Ahmed Khan. The rebels soon after drew L. Berkeley into an ~~an~~ ambushcode. Berkeley with 26 out of 40 of his Military Police was killed. ¹³

The news of the disaster regarding Berkeley and his troops reached Elphinstone on Sept. 22. A party of Subhan Khan's

12. P.G.R., VIII, II, p. 49.

13. For. Sec. Deptt., 18th Dec. 1857, Cons. 440-452.

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judgment was despatched to Nur Shah, where Berkelay's detachment had retired to after their engagement. And on the arrival of Egerton from Lahore Elphinstone made over the station to him and started towards Koure Shah accompanied by Captain Black and Lieutenant Chichester.

On the morning of Sept., 26, 1857, they had advanced two miles from Hurrappa when a noise of drums and sunkhs ^(shells) from a line of jungle announced the approach of the rebels. Elphinstone made up his mind to attack him. But the guns were again opened as at Gugera when the rebels had reached within 400 yards, and no use was made of the cavalry when they fled. The whole force was sent in pursuit at the usual rate of about three miles an hour and the rebels of course disappeared.

About five miles from Mohammadpur Fresh cattle tracks across the road made it evident that considerable droves of cattle had recently entered the jungle to the left of the road. Captain Snow thereupon received permission to make a reconnossance which however proved far from successful. A party of the insurgents surrounded the Lahore Light Horse under Captain Snow in a dense jungle, wounded that officer himself as well as the Sergeant Major and one of the troops.¹⁴

On Oct. 2, 1857, Elphinstone made into Gugera to complete the dak arrangements. Dak horses had all been fortified, and a strong guard of horse and food had been placed in each to protect the communication.

Elphinstone found on his arrival that a considerable body of Wootos had collected on the right bank of the river opposite Gugera and that a party under Nadir Shah Khureshi had destroyed the boats at the Maree ferry and had driven away some workmen

¹⁴. P.G.R., VIII, I, p. 52

who were constructing a tower for the protection of ghauts.

Information had been received from Major Chamberlain that he had crossed the Ravi near Hurruppa and was about to attack the insurgents at Jullee on the right bank of the river. The insurgents at first exposed themselves very freely, but a few well directed rifle shots from some of the officers who accompanied the force soon caused them to take shelter in the ¹⁵ jungle.

The Khurrals in the mean time had surrendered and the Wuttoos had returned to their village, but the tribes assembled at Jullee and the Katheahs, who after their defeat near Hurruppa had returned towards Jumbre, were still in arms. A slight demonstration made by the Begke Khurrals at Mohruwalla was put down by the approach of a detachment from Lahore under Roberts, the Commissioner.

The rebellion had not been suppressed so far. On Oct. 16, 1857, Major Hamilton determined to attempt the seizure of the boats at Julli. Information had been received that although more of the boats had been sunk on the opposite bank of Ravi, the insurgents were in the practice of using two or more boats for crossing the river.

The British sent more machhees to fetch the boats. They were driven back speedily. The British force could not keep down the matchlock fire.

On Oct. 21, 1857, two Horse Artillery guns under Captain Delaine arrived, and on the 22nd of Oct. 1857, the following force was under arms:

15. P.G.R., VIII, II, pp. 54-55.

200 Infantry.
About 12 Irregular Horse
Major Marsden
Captain McAndrew
Lt. Chichester
Lt. Norgali
Lt. Graham

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Major Hamilton determined at once on the resumption of the attack, as there was some expectation of counter attack.

This time casualties inflicted on the rebels were severe. Men of note like Julla, Maneensye, Naranga, Murad etc., were killed.

At last Major Marsden who was well acquainted with the area was sent to quell the rebellion finally. He succeeded within a very short time in suppressing the rebellion. All the chiefs were at last defeated and compelled to repent and peace was restored in the area in the long run.

CAUSES OF REBELLION IN GUGERA

The rebellion in the Gugera District was mainly attributed to the Machination of an adjacent chief; to emissaries from Delhi; to the return to their lines of one or two escaped convicts from the Agra Jail. All these circumstances had an influence on those clans. The denuded state of the country, the effect of the European and Punjabi troops, and the disarming of the Hindustani Regiment might have an effect on the minds of the people. Fanaticism, the love of plunder, the desire of change, a disliking for the alien rule were some of the causes of rebellion.¹⁶

The rebellion put the Government to an embarrassing situation for a while. It might have affected other parts of the Punjab had it not been effectively suppressed.

16. For. Sec. Deptt., 18 Dec. 1857, Con. 440-452.

C H A P T E R XV

RAO TULA RAM OF REWARI DEFIANT TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES

Rao Tula Ram of Rewari was not well disposed to the British Government. He did not side with the British Government at once, when the rebellion broke out. The Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon District, at first did not believe that the Rao would take an active part against the government. But it is was proved later on that the Rao did not have any sympathy for the government although he did not want to come into open picture against it.

Rao Tula Ram also seems to have miscalculated the strength of the government and designed to become independent of their control.¹

On the outbreak of mutiny and the cessation of all effective British authority, Rao Tula Ram at once assumed the government of the Pargannahs of Rewari and Bahova, collected revenue, raised forces, cast guns, and kept the country quiet and protected it from Meos.²

His position as head of the Aheer clan about Rewari readily brought him men and he raised money for the town of Rewari to keep his forces together.³

There is no doubt in the fact that Rao Tula Ram was a most influential chief in that part of the country. The people of the area followed his lead. He succeeded in protecting Rewari from the Meos who might otherwise have destroyed it.

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1. Gazetteer of Gurgaon District, op. Cit., pp. ²⁷48-49, Mutiny 1857,
 2. Ibid p.27. ~~or~~ R/180
 3. Mutiny 1857, R/180-~~49~~ p.48.

Rao Tulā Ram like the Nawab of Jhajjar tried to follow a dual policy. He did not take an active part against the government but he ~~want~~ was in active correspondence with the King of Delhi and sent him money as well.⁴

He did to some extent keep up communication with the British authorities but on the other hand he undoubtedly intrigued with the Delhi Court. He pursued in fact in a temporizing policy, waiting to see how matters would go before declaring himself too openly on either side. And meanwhile anxious to keep safe the country which he hoped to obtain as his share.⁵

Again like the Nawab of Jhajjar Rao Tula Ram was prepared to fight for getting Rewari and for this purpose he had made preparations too. The Fort of Rewari was well stored with warlike munition and guns had evidently been cast during the period of rebellion.⁶

Rao Tula Ram, however, permitted no bloodshed at Rewari,⁷ nor he himself did any harm to the Europeans.

Although he could not decide upon joining any party, he did not indulge in any violent act for which he could be punished. But he disobeyed the summons to present himself at the British camps at Rewari.⁸ There was a reason why he did so. Rao Tula Ram was warned on June 30, 1857, against molesting a small town named Bahowah. He however neglected the warning and attacked the town. This is why he was afraid to attend the British Camp at Rewari.

4. Ibid.pp.48-49

5. Gazetteer of Gurgaon District,Op.cit,p.27.

6. Mutiny 1857,R/180,p.49.

7. Gazetteer of Gurgaon District,op.Cit.,p.27.

8. Ibid.

Later on Rao Tula Ram wrote a letter to the British Authorities to be excused, for his conduct. Out of fear however he fled away from India to Candhar.

His fleeing from Rewari led to the confiscation of the istamrar. Tula Ram and his cousin brother Gopal Dev both died as fugitives, one at Kabul, and the other at Bikaner.

DISTURBANCE IN THE OTHER PARTS OF GURGAON DISTRICT

Disturbance in the Gurgaon District was mostly on account of old Feuds and a lust for revenge and plundering. In old days the life of the district had been turbulent and stirring, but it then seemed to have settled down into a peaceful and quiet routine. The feudatory races had betaken themselves to agriculture, the higher castes to agriculture, to the Government service; and old feuds, in this way, if not extinct were at least dormant.⁹

When in May 1857, the Meerut mutineers entered Delhi, Mr. Ford of the Bengal Civil Service was Collector of the Gurgaon District. He, at first, with the assistance of a body of Pataudi Sowars who were in attendance on him, drove off some troopers of the 3rd Light Cavalry who had come over from Delhi to attack the station, and suppressed the outbreak in the Jail. But eventually he was compelled to leave the station, which was thereupon plundered and burnt. He went to Hodal.

Meanwhile the Meos were up at once and plundered Taoru, Sohna, Ferozepur (Jhirka), Punahana, Pinangwan, and Nuh.

Except in Mewat there was no general or widespread disturbance; but no sooner was the pressure of the English rule removed, than old feuds which had apparently long been

9. Gazetteer of Gurgaon District, published by the authority of the Punjab Government at Arya Press, Lahore. 1883, 84, p.1.

buried burst into life. In Palwal there was a tribe of Jats, known as Surat; inhabiting Hodal and the surrounding villages, and in alliance with a Pathan village called Seoli there had been before 1803, a quarrel which had cast many lives on either side. The Rawats also had an old feud with the Chirkot Tribe of Meos, their western neighbours, ~~xxx~~ originating a claim of the former to the village of Kot, out of which they affirmed, that they were cheated by the craft of a Qanungo in the time of Mughal Emperors. The quarrel had long been dormant, but now the Rawats were attacked on both east and west by their enemies, and allied themselves with the Rajputs of Hathon, and the fight went on for months.¹⁰

10.Ibid.

C H A P T E R X V I

NAWAB OF JHAJJAR REMAINS INDIFFERENT TO THE GOVERNMENT

Abdul Rehman Khan, the Nawab of Jhajjar although did not join the rebel side openly but he remained indifferent to the British Government. In fact, he tried to follow a dual policy. He wanted to win the favour of the King of Delhi as well as that of the British Government. He tried to help both the parties. W. Ford when questioned in the Court whether he was satisfied with the conduct of the Nawab of Jhajjar, stated that he was not. Giving reasons of his being so, Ford said that Greathed (Commissioner of Delhi), and Agent of the Lieutenant Governor directed the Nawab to send accredited commandant to him at the Camp before Delhi. The Nawab asked who Greathed was, though he very well knew him. He wanted to avoid the orders.¹

The Nawab also showed no regards for the British officials. For example Theophilus Bart after effecting his escape from Delhi and experiencing considerable danger and hardships for three days proceeded to Jhajjar in the hope of obtaining friendly protection from the Nawab, but he was not permitted an interview with the Nawab. He was most unceremoniously dismissed from the threshold without escort or guides, and without arms except an old sword.²

The requisitions for aid which were made to the Nawab on the breaking out of the mutiny, of the officers of the adjoining districts, Ford the Magistrate of Gurgaon and Loch the Joint Magistrate of Rohtak whom he was bound

1. For. pol. Deptt., 9 July, 1858, Cons. 176-190

2. Ibid.

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by treaty stipulation to support and defend with his troops, were either unreplied to, or attended to with considerable reluctance and in a most unsatisfactory and unfriendly manner. A few Sowars were of course sent after sometime, but only to mutiny and not to help. They disobeyed all orders, spread disaffection, and increased the difficulties of those officers a hundred fold.³

Moreover the Forts of Kanaund and Jhajjar were found in a state of preparations for active hostilities against the Government. The guns had been planted on the battlements with their sunkers fully supplied with ammunition and prepared for immediate action. The magazines had been replenished, with stores and ammunition.

Not only this but also a manufactory for preparing grape shot was discovered where the materials had evidently been very recently made use of and ammunition boxes in course of construction were found in the carpenter's workshop. In fact everything showed that the Nawab and his adherents had prepared themselves for resistance.⁴

It was generally believed that the Nawab would have resisted had the British Officers taken a very small force with them. The force with the British Officers terrified the Nawab; moreover arrangements were made to cut off the retreat of Nawab's retainers from the Fort of Jhajjar to the Fort at Kanaund through the excellent management made by Brigadier Showers in command of the

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

column.

Accredited agents were always in attendance upon the King of Delhi, as proved by the Diaries found in the Palace. Although directed by Greathed to send a Vakil to be in attendance upon him in the Camp, he neglected to do so, thus strikingly evincing his loyalty with the King.⁵

The troops of Nawab were some-times reinforced and were employed not only as guards and patrols, and as escorts of treasurer, to assist in collecting Revenue for the King but were also on several occasions actually employed against the British in the different engagements which took place before Delhi. Their leader Abdul Samand Khan, father-in-law of the Nawab, remained in command of these troops throughout the siege, and returned to Jhajjar 3 or 4 days before the assault of Delhi for change of air, and for the recovery of his health which had ^{been} effected by exposure during the campaign.⁶

The sum of Rs.500 was remitted by the Nawab for the payment of his Cavalry contingent arrayed in arms against the British and a remittance of treasure under a strong guard was on another occasion sent by him to Delhi.⁷

On 26th May, 1857, just a few days after the Delhi massacre a the Nawab of Jhajjar acknowledged the receipt of several letters from the King directing his personal attendance at the Palace. He accused himself by pleading the disturbed state of the country, but hoped the King would

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

accept his subordinates and representatives, his uncle Muhammed Ibrahim Ali Khan, and his father-in-law Samand Khan. The Nawab also promised that he would present himself at the throne as soon as he had placed his territory in a state of security.⁸

The Nawab obeyed the orders received from Delhi and also indulged in protestation of fiderlity and allegiance to the King. He offered prayers for the success of his cause. He, however, did not want to part with his treasure. He contended himself by offering small nazzars (presents) at different Muhammedan festivals. He however went on promising that he would help the King ~~from~~ ^{with} 3 to 5 lakhs of Rupees. He agreed to forward as soon as he could negotiate a loan to that extent from his subjects, and with this view he actually took from the leading merchants and traders of Jhajjar promissory notes to the amount of Rs. 40,000 and upwards towards the loan.^{8a}

The Nawab sided with the King because of his conjuncture that the King would win against the British Government. In fact, he also like many others miscalculated the British strength. The Nawab, however, did not come into open picture. He helped the King indirectly. He also rendered some nominal assistance to the British Government so that in case the later one was victorious in the struggle, the Nawab should ^{not} come to know harm. But he failed to conceal his designs. His plans were leaked out to the British Government.

8. Ibid., See Appendix No: II

8.a. Ibid. See Appendix No: III

The Court investigating into the case declared the Nawab guilty and sentenced him to death and confiscation of his estate. The following verdict was passed against him:

"The Court on the evidence before them, are of the opinion that the prisoners Abdool Ruhman Khan, Nawab of Jhujjur is guilty of the charge preferred against him. The court having found the prisoner guilty of the charge preferred against him, do sentence^d him, Abdool Ruhman Khan, Nawab of Jhajjar to be hanged by neck until he be dead; and the Court further sentenced him to forfeit all his property and affects of any description.⁹"

⁹For. Pol. Deptt., 9 July, 1858, Cons. 176-190.

C H A P T E R XVII

CHIEF OF PATIALA RUSHES TO THE HELP OF THE GOVERNMENT

When the news of the rebellion at Meerut and Delhi reached Patiala, Narender Singh, the Chief of Patiala immediately placed himself at the head of all his available troops and marched to Jesomli, a village about 4 miles from Ambala to help the British Government.¹

On hearing from the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala of the disaffection of the troops there, he gave immediate orders for the despatch of elephants, camels and other carriages.²

The Maharaja sent his best troops and officers to support the British Government. The following are the names of the officers employed by him:

1. Partap Singh, Syud Muhammed Hussain in Delhi.
2. Kanwar Deep Singh at Thanesar.
3. Hira Singh and Hazara Singh at Ambala.
4. Karam Singh at Hissar
5. Buta Singh, Fateh Singh and Maulvi Nooruddin Hussain at Hansi.
6. Jiwan Singh and Resaldar Elahi Bakhsh at Ferozepore.
7. Hazara Singh at Saharanpur.
8. Ram Dayal and Sheikh Elahi Bakhsh at Jagadhark
9. Malik Nazammuddin at Rohtak

1. Lepel H. Griffin, Rajas of the Punjab, the history of the principal states in the Punjab, Lahore, 1870, p.234.
2. For. Pol. Deptt., 2 July, 1858, Cons. 166-190, p.123.

Carriage of every description such as elephants, camels, Hackeries etc. were always furnished by the chief without distinction and by whomsoever required. Soon after receipt of the news of rebellion. The Maharaja gave immediate orders for the despatch of the elephants, camels and other carriages for the conveyance from Kalka to Ambala of the three European Regiments stationed at Kasauli, Dagshai, Sabhathu.³

At the request of the British Government the Maharaja appointed his agent at Delhi, to inform of the needs of the British Government. When Captain Hodson required 19 mares for Government purposes, through the agents, the Maharaja complied with the demand at once.

The Chief of Patiala had an interview with the Commissioner, C.G. Barnes, the Commander-in-chief, who gave him to understand that the protection of the territory between the Jamna and Satluj would in a great measure depend upon his troops. The Maharaja then offered himself to go to Delhi, but this proposal was negatived as he was told that his presence was more required in the Cis-Satluj province.⁴

The British Government was passing through straightened financial circumstances. The Maharaja of Patiala also gave 5 lakhs of rupees to them in cash and promised to double the amount if they needed.⁵

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

The Maharaja proceeded to Thanesar personally. He remained there for four days and in communication with the Deputy Commissioner placed a force of 1299 soldiers and 4 guns for the protection of Thanesar and its neighbourhood. The Maharaja himself was prepared to shoulder any responsibility. He himself attacked the mutineers who had fled from Ferozepore.⁶

He remained vigilant to see that nothing untoward happened in the neighbouring territory of Jind. He adopted measures to preserve its security.⁷

He was more particular regarding the maintenance of peace in his own territory and he also succeeded in it. During the whole period of insurrection and revolt of the inhabitant about and around the Cis-Sutlej states the Maharaja's territory remained quiet and peaceful and gave no trouble whatsoever.

The Maharaja remained ready to do all he could do for quelling the rebellion. The following is the total number of troops and guns sent by the Maharaja for helping the British government in the various campaigns in 1857.

Guns	8
Horse	2156
Foot	2846
Officers	156
Camp Followers	970

The British Government was grateful for this helpful conduct of the Maharaja. The Commissioner of Cis-Satluj States expressed his gratitude as follows:

"This straightforward and loyal conduct was of infinite importance to our cause at that time."⁸

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6. Mahdi Hasan, Bahadur Shah II, And War of 1857 in Delhi, Atma Ram & Sons, 1958, p.195.
 7. For. Pol. Deptt., 2 July 1858, Cons. 166-190.
 8. Griffin, op. cit., p.234.

There is no doubt that the Maharaja placed his whole power, resources, and influence at the absolute command of the English; and he did so openly and unhesitatingly. During the darkest and most doubtful days, he never for a moment wavered in his loyalty, but on the other hand redoubled his exertions.⁹

The Governor-General thanked him in the following words:-

"This conduct has gratified me very much. The zealous fulfilment by you of your engagements will not be forgotten by me, and will tend to the advantage of your highness. I beg you to accept my warmest thanks for the sincerity of your attachment and devotion to the British Government."¹⁰

The Maharaja of Patiala therefore was splendidly rewarded by the British Government at the end of the rebellion. Not only new honours were bestowed on him but more territory was also granted to him.¹¹

9. Ibid.

10. See Progs. Vol. 28 Aug. 1857, p.86.

11. Griffin, op. cit., p.234.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CHIEF OF NABHA CASTS HIS LOT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Bharpur Singh, the Chief of Nabha proved a faithful ally of the British Government in the rebellion of 1857. Hearing about the rumours of the rebellion, without waiting for its official information, he marched with all available troops and guns. Condemning the rebels and mentioning his immediate move, Bharpur Singh wrote to Penny:

"The ungrateful mutineers having risen against the Government encountered the troops of the British at Delhi and Meerut and the Sepoys stationed at Umbala also pursued a rebellious conduct, I accompanied by my brother and troops both foot and horse, set out from my state without any instructions from the British Government and pitched my tents about six miles from Nabha. I addressed a letter to the Commissioner soliciting his permission to go Ambala and assist the European troops."¹

G.C. Barnes, the Commissioner and Superintendent Cis-Satluj state directed him through a summons to march to Ludhiana for its protection.² The Chief complied with his wishes without delay. Accompanied with his brother and all the men whom he had collected, reached Ludhiana and engaged himself to arrange the affairs of the place. In obedience to the orders of the Local Officer, he despatched 350 men

1. For. Deptt., S.C., 29 June, 1858, Nos.595-96.

2. For. Deptt., S.C., Progs., 2 July, 1858, p.329.

consisting of Sepoys and Sowars with their Commanders 114
to Phillaur to bring artillery magazine and other ammunition.
He sent to the banks of the river Satluj another body of
Sowars and Sepoys to the number of one hundred with their
officers for the purpose of quelling the disturbance there.^{2a}

He then in person with such men as he had under him brought artillery and other ammunition to Ludhiana, and then he caused all the articles to be carried with a great care to the troops at Panipat.

The important service rendered by him was to provide the escort for the siege train ordered from Phillaur to accompany the Field Force under the Commander-in-Chief to Delhi. The Nasiri Battalion had been appointed for duty, but at the eleventh hour they displayed mutinous spirit at Jatog and would not march. No other troops were forthcoming and it was here that the Raja offered himself for services. Accordingly the heavy guns and the ammunition, comprising a train of some hundred waggons were taken in safely from Phillaur to Karnal by the Nabha troops.³

The next service performed by him was to proceed with Mr. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana, to the Lusam Ghat, to oppose the passage of the Jullundur Mutineers comprising nearly four regiments of the sepoy. In this attempt, the Nabha men behaved gallantly. Some Artillery men were killed, others wounded, and they lost one of their guns, which was however recovered after fall of Delhi.

The Chief also furnished a contingent of 150 men and 140 Foot were posted at Sarsoli near Delhi, on the

2 a. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Grand Trunk Road, under Captain McAndrew and did excellent service, throughout the campaign, in escorting conveyances of stores to the camp.

At requisition the Chief sent from his own Treasurer a sum of Rs.2,50,000 as a loan to the British Government. Money at that time was very scarce and urgently needed.⁴

The Raja evinced the utmost alacrity in obeying orders. He caught several mutineers and gave them up to the Deputy Commissioner. He provided carriage for the conveyance of stores and Bullocks for the army Transport Train.⁵

The Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana made over the protection of the District to him and to his troops. He at once posted 30 horse and foot for the protection of the roads between Nabha and Ambala, 4 Shutter~~s~~ Sowars between Ambala and Ludhiana, and 40 Horse and Foot between Nabha and Ferozepore, ~~retain~~ retaining with him at Ludhiana 250 Horse, 275 Infantry, 30 Officers, 2 Guns and 21 Gunners, 15 Camels with small guns, 12 elephants, 200 Camels, 50 orderlies etc.⁶

On receiving information from Ricketts, of the mutiny of Troops at Ferozepore, he immediately despatched Horse and Foot some distance roundabout the neighbourhood to seize hold or cut up the mutineers.

He gave orders to his officers at Nabha to enlist as many soldiers Horse and Foot as possible and they enlisted 450 men whom he posted in his own territory in this way. Illaqa Amloka 100, Fort of Badson 25, Fort of Kasurgarh 25, Fort of Danola 200, Fort of Boopdyalgarh 200, Fort of

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

Fort of Jaitoo 300 and at Nabha itself 600 men.⁷ 116

The Raja requested the Commissioner to allow him to send some of his force escorting the heavy guns from Ludhiana to Ambala on to Delhi if he so wished. 150 Sowars and 100 Infantry were sent on with the guns and they likewise did good service nearby Delhi and its neighbourhood under the control of Captain McAndrew.⁸

To prevent any disturbance or breach of peace occurring at the Eed he sent 50 peadahs, and 25 Sowars, and 2 elephants to the Deputy Commissioner's house at the request of the latter.

To keep all robbers and freebooters from creating disturbance, on the request of the Deputy Commissioner, he posted 500 Horse and Foot between Phul Dyalpura and Jastodi, and despatched 10 Sowars and 20 Infantry to Ferozepore for the same purpose.

Aggreeably to the Commissioner's orders to furnish carriage he forwarded 535 Camels and stated that he had at Nabha 450 Camels and 50 Hackeries which he would also send if required.

The Deputy Commissioner informed him that the 10th Light Cavalry had mutinied and fled from Ferozepore and to make arrangements for intercepting or destroying them. He immediately despatched for this purpose 40 Sowars to Jagraon and 40 Sowars in the direction of the Bahesar, Raikot, Pakhowal. His troops did good service by seizing near

7. Ibid., p.334.

8. Ibid., p.334.

Jaitoo 8 troopers and 6 Horses near Pakhowal, 3 Troopers and 3 Horses, for which he rewarded them.⁹

On August 28, 1857, the Chief reported to the Chief Commissioner his desire to volunteer and to fight the mutineers at Delhi, but his desire was declined because of his youth.

Complying with Commissioner's request, he issued orders to all his officers to render every assistance to Captain Briggs in making arrangements for the army Transport Train conveying stores from Ferozepore and elsewhere.

He and his brother remained at Ludhiana for six months performing good services on account of Government and doing all that was required of them by the Government Officers.¹⁰

The Troops employed by him at different places in the service of the Government are noted below:¹¹

TROOPS AT THE SERVICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LUDHIANA

10	Harkaras
300	Sowars
400	Soldiers
15	Camel Guns
2	Guns
25	Artillery Men
10	Hackeries
6	Kargudars Kardars
200	Camp Followers
250	Camels

TROOPS WITH HIMSELF AT LUDHIANA

100	Sowars & Foot Soldiers
60	Orderlies
10	Kardars
250	Camp Followers
15	Harkaras
50	Camels

TROOPS EMPLOYED BETWEEN DELHI AND KARNAL

150	Sowars
140	Foot Soldiers

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 337

8	Officers
50	Camp Followers
2	Shutter Sowars
2	Harkaras
4	Hackeries
22	Camels

TROOPS EMPLOYED AT AMBALA

20	Sowars
20	Foot Soldiers
2	Shutter Sowars
5	Harkaras

TROOPS EMPLOYED AT FERIZEPUR

10	Sowars
20	Foot Soldiers
2	Hackeries

TROOPS EMPLOYED AT LAHORE

13	Sowars
2	Shutter Sowars
2	Harkaras

The services rendered by the Raja were appreciated by the Commissioner and Chief Commissioner from time to time.¹²

Bharpur Singh sided with the Government on account of many reasons. He enjoyed security in their rule and had nothing to fear from the rebels. He felt indebted to the Government and was ready to render every help.¹³

Moreover he wanted to make up for the mistake his father had committed. During the First Sikh War, his father Devinder Singh withheld supplies from the British and neglected to attend the requisition of the agent of the Governor General.

As a punishment Devinder Singh ^{was} deposed in 1846. 1/4th of his property viz., the Districts of Pakhowal,

12. Ibid.

13. ~~XXXX~~ For. Sec. Deptt., 29 June, 1858, Nos. 595-96.

Dehrara and Rori, less a portion worth Rs.12,000/- was confiscated, and all transit duties, estimated at Rs.12,000/- a year with the exception of customs of the town of Nabha, were abolished. To compensate for this mistake of his father, he rendered all possible assistance to the Government although he was not bound to supply any forces in time of War.¹⁴

¹⁴. Aitchison, C.U., op.cit. p.131.

QUICK MOVE OF THE CHIEF OF JIND IN FAVOUR OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Rja Sarup Singh, The Chief of Jind proved himself a quick supporter of the British Government. On the 12th of May, on hearing of the Mutiny of Delhi, and even before receiving the notice from the Commissioner of the Protected States, the Chief of Jind, marched with all his troops and one siege gun from Sangrur, his residence, and on the 13th of May arrived at Ghabdal from which place he sent orders to Commandant Khan Singh to join him without delay, with all the troops and guns under his command¹

1. He also sent Bakshi Harnarain and Munshi Gohar Singh to the Commissioner of Ambala to solicit orders from him. While still at Ghaddah, he received a communication dated May 13, 1857, from T. D. Forsyth, Deputy Commissioner Ambala, directing him to send all its troops to Ferozepore on receipt of the instructions.

Shortly after he received a letter from the Commissioner, dated: May 14, 1857, thanking him for his readiness in marching and for his proof of attachment to the Government, and requesting him to proceed to Karnal with his troops, to protect the road and the station of Karnal and to collect supplies for the army about to advance from Ambala.²

On receipt of the orders he immediately sent a parwanah (royal order) to the Thesildar of Safidon to send carriage and stores to Karnal for the European Troops.

"On the 15th May, under burning sun, I marched with all my troops, and arrived on the 16th at Dunata, on the banks of Ghuggur, making a forced march of 22 coss, and after a short stay of about 3 hours to rest Horses and men, made a march of 18 Coss, and on the 17th arrived at Pehoa, from

which place after a little refreshment I marched

1. For Deptt., Pol., Progs. 2 July 1858, p. 354

2. Ibid.

I marched and arrived at Thanesar the same day, at about 8 p.m. thus making a march of 50 Coss in one day", wrote the Chief.^{2a}

On May 18, 1857, making a forced march of sixty kis (about ninety miles) in one day, commandant Khan Singh and his force, with two horse guns, joined him at Thanesar. The same day he received a letter from the Commissioner of Ambala, informing him of the approach of Captain Hodson, with a detachment of European Troops, and directing him to give him any aid in his power. Hodson was well directed by the Chief of Jind's men.³

On May 18, 1857, he marched from Thanesar, and after a ride of 18 Kos, arrived at Karnal, where he met Captain's McAndrew, Hodson, and Lakes, and with their consent undertook the protection of the city and the cantonment. His presence gave confidence to the authorities and secured that station from plunder.⁴

On May 20 at Captain McAndrew's request he appointed a Subedar and 26 men to secure the bridge at Baghpat on the Jamma, on the Meerut Road, which duty they performed to their great satisfaction. The same day he ordered his cousin, Punjab Singh with 25 Sowars to escort Captain Hodson to Meerut and ^{he also} returned back with him to Karnal in a day and night. Hodson greatly praised him for these services.

On May 21, at the request of Captain McAndrew a party of hundred and eleven sowars, was deputed to bring in some refugees who had arrived at Sarsauli from Delhi. The party brought 3 ladies and 2 men in a van at 10 p.m. the same day.

On May 22, 1857, after making arrangements for the protection of Karnal, the Chief of Jind with Captain McAndrews marched to Panipat, and arrived there the same evening. He found the

2 a.Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

butchers and the mob in revolt on which he sent two companies of sepoy and two guns to punish them. But a portion of the town came out, and requested for pardon. Their request was granted on the condition of their joining up all their arms and ammunition. The sepoy and guns were then withdrawn.

Mentioning the services of the Chief of Jind from Karnal onwards, G.C. Barnes writes:

"From Kurnaul the Raja of Jheend with a little force accompanied by Captain McAndrew marched always in advance of the army, occupying each position and collecting supplies from the main column. In this manner Paneeput, ~~and~~ Sumbhalka and Rae were recovered - the road was made secure, the people quieted, maraunders were driven away and the movements of the Field Force under General Barnard, greatly facilitated".⁵

From May 22 to May 31, the Chief employed himself in every way to keep open the roads and watch the city. He sent in disguise Khushal Singh to the Rajah of Ballabgarh, and Harnah Jamadar to the Nawab of Jhajjar with the letters from the Commissioner, Cis Satluj States, requesting them to come with their forces to assist the Government.⁶

After that the Raja held the position on the Grand Trunk Road distant 34 miles from Delhi. Here his troops rendered excellent service in providing escorts for various convoys going to camp and for the sick and wounded returning therefrom.⁷

5. Ibid., p.357

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

A company of sepoy and 50 sowars with one gun were sent with Captain Mc Andrew to assist him in searching the houses of the inhabitant of Kasampur for the property which they had plundered from the Europeans and other travellers while the chief stood on the road to catch the fugitives from that village, and 11 Zamindars and ~~Chowkidars~~ Chowkidars were brought in as prisoners and after conviction were hanged.⁸

The Zamindars of Radhana were also suspected of plunder and their houses were also searched by the same detachment under Captain McAndrew and Captain Hodson and some property was also found in that village and many Zamindars were made prisoners.

Some sowars and one Company of sepoy were sent to the Baghat Ghat to act as Guides to some European troops from Meerut. Twenty five Sowars of the Resala headed by Resaldar Punjab Singh were placed under Captain Hodson, to render him service.

At the request of the Commander-in-chief, he ordered Derm Khan Subedar with some Sowars and sepoy to escort about 200 Bullocks for Artillery Guns from Ambala to Alipur.

On June 7, 1857, the Chief of Jind joined the

8. Ibid., p.358.

British Camp at Alipur. On June 8, at the battle of Badhki-Serai, his cousin Resaldar Punjab Singh, at the head of all his Sowars and sepoy, under the command of Co. Bucher and Captain Hodson, displayed great bravery. The Commander-in-Chief was much pleased and he complemented them on the field. A horse under Punjab Singh was wounded and one under Anokh Singh was shot dead on the same day?

At Captain McAndrew's request, some sepoy of his regiment were appointed under Major Attar Singh, to accompany the captured artillery and escort it safely to the cantonment of Delhi.

News reached the same day that some regiment had gathered near the village of Alipur with the intention of plundering the baggage and rear of the camp. Some Sowars and a light field gun were ordered to go with Captain McAndrew to check their advance and punish them. The Commander-in-Chief before going into action at Badli Serai had wished him to remain behind, and protect the rear of the camp and baggage, and to join him on the receipt of instruction. In compliance with the wish he remained behind for a short while, when he was requested in a letter to march on. At the rebels were defeated, and their position taken he then took charge of the camp followers and brought them to the camp before Delhi where he pitched his tents. Information was then brought that some of the rebels still lay in Badli Serai, in which he immediately ordered Subedar Karam Singh, with a company of sepoy, who after some opposition shot a great number of them and put the remainder to flight
9. Ibid., p.359.

and thus cleared the Serai.¹⁰

On June 9, the captured guns of the rebels were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, who, without any requisition from the Chief bestowed one of them on him and sent a kharita of thanks.

From June 9 to June 18, he remained with the Camp and rendered every service which was required of him, without even a thought of loss, and at the risk of his bodily health and comfort.

On June 19, 1857, as soon as information was given to him that the Nasirabad force had appeared to the rear to attack the camp, he ordered his troops to get ready and immediately informed the Commander-in-Chief. In the meantime, the mutineers commenced firing into the camp, and the chief's troops, who were now ready, and assured of handsome rewards, together with the British force who joined the advanced. Regarding the bravery shown by his men, the chief of Jind wrote:

"In the morning, the enemy again attacked my camp, and balls from their guns fell like hail stones on our tents. Under each fire my men kept their ground firmly and my guns answered those of the enemy. We were now reinforced by the English troops and being thus strengthened we killed, wounded and drove back the enemy. On witnessing the bravery of ~~the~~ my men, in this action I rewarded them from my treasury and promoted

10. Ibid., p.360

them to higher ranks." 11

On June 21, 1857, at the information of the Commander-in-Chief to restore the bridge at Baghpat, with a great labour he did the needful but the bridge had again to be destroyed on June 26 by desire of Captain McAndrew. On June 28, he arrived at Sarsoli with instructions from General Bernard to protect the road from Karnal to Camp before Delhi.

On hearing of the disturbances in some of the villages of his own territory, he reached Safidon having obtained permission from the Commissioner of Ambala. He punished the villagers of Nuchee and Ranee Pargah. He then employed himself in enlisting recruits ^{for} ~~from~~ the Government service. Twenty mares for European cavalry were purchased at moderate prices and sent to Captain Hodson, Asstt: Quarter Master General, who highly approved of them. On July 7, Ram Singh, Jumand Singh, and Kanhya Lal with 300 men were sent to Gohana, District Rohtak to maintain order and collect revenue. They also punished the mischief mongers, collected arrears on account of the Canal, as well as land revenue. Mr. Campbell, Collector of Rohtak praised these men highly, in a letter addressed to the chief.

On Captain Hodson's arrival at Rohtak, the Chief of Jind sent his recruits he had raised for infantry and cavalry regiment, under charge of Punjab Singh Resaldar, Narain Singh Jemadar and Durga Parshad. In obedience to a summons Samud Singh also joined him from Gohana with 25 Sowars who greatly distinguished themselves for bravery in

11. Ibid., p.361.

cavalry engagement with the Rohtak rebels, under Balsar Khan, in which fight two Sowars and two horses were wounded. Captain Hodson greatly admired them.

After restoring peace in his own territory, he left Safeedon for the British Camp on Sept. 9, 1857 and informed the Commander-in-Chief and also the Commissioner. His force at Sarsoli which had reached Delhi before his arrival there, in obedience to the Commander-in-Chief's orders, then joined him.

On September 14, 1857, he ordered all his force under commandant Khan Singh headed by Colonel Dunford, to take part with the British force, in storming and entering Delhi by scaling ladders in which duty they displayed true heroism, entered the city through the Cashmere Gate, not fearing shell or sword. In this action four men lost their lives and few were wounded.

CARRIAGES AND SUPPLIES PROVIDED

Hackeries	77	
Camels	191	
Donkeys	50	
Bearers	10	
Flour	1000	maunds
Ghee	150	maunds
Pulse	100	maunds
Grain	1000	maunds

CARRIAGE AND STORE SUPPLIED AT RAEE

Hackeries	50	
Donkeys	62	
Mules	13	
Ponies	7	
Flour	966	mds.22 srs.
Ghee	36	mds.11 srs.
Pulses	5	mds.

The Chief of Jind was the only Chief who was personally present with the British Army before Delhi:

"He thereby gave the strongest proof of his loyalty and courage.... the more honour is for the bold and loyal course he adopted. There was never any flinching or despondency. He at once threw himself on our side."¹²

There was a great risk involved in his decision. If there had been any reverse the Raja's life would have been sacrificed and his family and property would have been at the mercy of the rebels.¹³ He supplied with every material needed without even a thought of the risk involved in his helping the Government openly and whole heartedly.¹⁴ Major General Sir A. Wilson Bant, in his despatch dated September 22, 1857 announcing the fall of Delhi brought prominently to notice the admirable services performed by the Chief of Jind. He said:

"The Jind Rajah and his troops who were said not only to have discharged harassing duties in the constant escort of convoys but to have added the Major General on more than one occasion in the field and finally to have participated in the glorious assault and capture of Delhi."¹⁵

After the fall of Delhi, the Chief of Jind ~~payed~~ paid a visit to General Wilson, in the King's Palace and

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

congratulated him on his success. General Becher, and Saunders permitted him to return to his own territory.

CAUSES OF THE CHIEF'S JOINING THE GOVERNMENT SIDE

From the commencement of the disturbances the chief had done everything in his power to win the Government's favour. He succeeded in obtaining good wishes of the Government and its officers, right from the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief to the private.¹⁶

In fact, he never thought of joining the rebels. Taking the Government to be his supreme power and the saviour and protector, he immediately threw himself on the side of the British Government. He also expected that some more rewards would be granted to him as a result of his sincere services. He fully succeeded in his aim. Not only he won thanks of the Government, but some more territory was also granted to him. The Governor-General, the Chief Commissioner, Head of the Commissariat Department, and Deputy Commissary General, all thanked him for the services rendered.¹⁷

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

C H A P T E R XX

CHIEF OF KAPURTHALA HELPS LIKE AN ENGLISHMAN

Randhir Singh was the chief of Kapurthala when the mutiny broke out in 1857. As he had commuted for his contingent by a large money payment, he was not bound to furnish a single man when called upon for. In spite of that at Captain Farrington's request he placed every available soldier and gun at the disposal of the Government. He himself came at their head bringing with him his brother Bikram Singh, and his principal advisors, he remained throughout the emergency at Jullundur, giving up every comfort without a murmur during the trying season of the year.¹

The force of the Chief employed during this time consisted of 1,200 Infantry, 200 Cavalry, 5 Guns. To this force the Company's Government sanctioned in Nov. 1857, gratuity of Rs.12,000 equivalent to a month's pay to each officer and soldier.²

He volunteered to send a portion of his troops to Delhi but he was informed that he could not be spared as the Government depended upon him and his troops for the security of the Jullundur Doab. To their presence on the night of the mutiny at Jullundur was due the safety of the Civil Station, of the Jail and Civil Treasury. On the Morning following the mutiny the Raja and his brother Bikram Singh went to the city reassuring the town people

1. For. Pol. Deptt., 2 July 1858, Nos. 191-194.

2. Griffin, Rajas of Punjab, Op. Cit., p. 527, f.n.

who were disposed to close their shops and desert the place. He also detached a body of his cavalry in pursuit of the mutineers under the orders of Captain Farrington.³

When in the month of July, the mutiny at Sialkot rendered it necessary to strengthen Colonel Abbot at Hoshiarpur, the Chief detached one hundred Cavalry, 200 Infantry and 2 Light guns for the protection of that Station and there they remained till November 1857.

A hundred of his men were posted at Jullundur after the withdrawal of the Company's force, and a detachment of his troops were employed in escorting the wives and children of Officers and soldiers from Jullundur to Lahore as well as in other miscellaneous duties. Two houses of his at the hill station of Dharamshala were placed at the disposal of ladies who had taken refuge there from the plains.⁴

When the movable column had marched to Delhi the only trustworthy chief at Jullundur was the Raja of Kapurthala without the exception of one hundred Europeans, forming the garrison of the Phillaur Fort.⁵

From the commencement of the struggle till the fall of Delhi the chief consideration was how he could best assist the British Government and the Europeans as a whole. His brother Kanwar Bikram Singh was imbued with the same spirit and all classes of the chief's officials gave on every occasion most active and valour support. Although the Rajah's soldiers were encamped for six months in the neighbourhood of a large town no breach of discipline occurred, and their conduct throughout was most exemplary.⁶

3. Ibid

4. Ibid.

5. ~~xxxx~~ Griffin, Opp. Cit, p.527.

6. For. Pol. Deptt., 2 July, 1858, Cons. 191-194.

The success of the operations at Delhi depended upon order being maintained in the Jullundur Doab through which passed the telegraphic and postal communication and in which was situated one of the principal magazines from which the British Army derived the supplies necessary for carrying on the siege. The maintenance of order in this Doab was mainly owing to the decided part taken by the Chief at the commencement and the active co-operation he afforded throughout the struggle.⁷

He placed at the disposal of the Government from May, 1857 to November, 1857, a force which in round number consisted of twelve hundred Infantry, two hundred Cavalry and five Guns.

The Chief could withhold the tribute for the period for which his troops were employed in the field. But he paid the tribute most punctually. He involved himself deeper and deeper in debt in order to relieve the financial pressure under which the British Government was suffering. None afforded more zealous and active support than the Chief of Kapurthala.⁸ "If he had been an Englishman his services could not have been more hearty."⁹

He took the side of the Government without hesitation, and without having had time or opportunity he ascertained what were the intention of the great Cis-Satluj Chiefs.¹⁰

Admiring Randhir Singh, the Chief of Kapurthala, the Governor-General wrote to him:

"This conduct has gratified me very much.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Griffin, op. cit., p.527.

The zealous fulfilment by you of your engagement will not be forgotten by me, and will tend to the advantage of your highness."¹¹

As a reward the tribute due from him was reduced to Rs.25,000/- a year, one year's tribute was altogether remitted, and khillats of Rs.1500⁰/- and Rs.5,000/- respectively were conferred upon him and his brother. A salute of eleven guns was assigned to him, and the honorary title of Farzund dilband rasikh-ul-itikad, was also given to the Chief, while Bikram Singh, his brother, got the title of Buhadur.¹²

11. For. Sec. Deptt., Progs. 28 Aug. 1858, p.86.
12. Griffin, op. cit., p.529, f.n.

C H A P T E R XXI

PUNJAB REGAINS DELHI AND SAVES THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA

Delhi happened to become the deciding point, The rebels began to rush to Delhi from every quarter. The mutineers from Meerut having occupied it made it their strong hold and seemed to be determined to rout the Government there. The British authorities knew it fully well that they could crush the rebels only if they could regain Delhi. The defeat of either party here was to sound the death knell of the other. Views of John Lawrence about the importance of Delhi are as follows:-

"Delhi is not a city the Chief Commissioner considers, which we may hold or abandon, at our pleasure. The possession of Delhi is a Tower of strength to us politically and morally.¹

NEWS OF THE MUTINY REACHES THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief was at Simla when the rebellion broke out at Meerut. Late on May 13, a note from Meerut, dated midnight 10, 1857, reached him stating that the native troops were in open mutiny. The Commander-in-Chief with the Adjutant General and Quarter Master General of the Army, the 2nd Adjutant to the former and the formal staff prepared to start for Ambala in the morning on May 14, 1857. The 2nd Fusiliers were ordered to Ambala at once. He wanted to move on Delhi immediately but preparations were yet to be made for it.

An artillery officer was sent express to Phillaur with instructions for a third class ~~train~~ siege train to be immediately got ready and also for the spare waggons of the Troops of Horse Artillery at Ambala and a quantity of small arms ammunition to be despatched to the latter place.

1. For. Deptt., S.C., 18 Dec. 1857, No. 447.

The Nasiri Battalion, which was believed to be perfectly loyal was to march next day with all expedition to Phillaur, there to be joined by as many of the 9th Irregular Cavalry as could be spared and then to escort the siege train to Ambala.

The Native Company of the artillery at Nurpur and Kangra were ordered to move to Phillaur to come down with the train.

During May 15, and morning of May 16, the Commander-in-Chief and the staff reached Ambala, and the same morning Heads of ~~Departm~~ departments and commanding officers met at Barnard's house when General Anson had taken up his quarters.²

Anson was of the opinion that Force must be moved on Delhi; but the number of available troops was very small. Very little cartridge and hardly any dooly bearers were available. The artillery had only the ammunition in their waggons, which might be expended in one action. Even the Infantry had very little ammunition with which to commence a campaign and without some heavy guns it seemed useless to attack Delhi.

However the Commander-in-Chief desired that an advance must be made as soon as possible and the greatest possible exertions were required from departmental officers to enable the move to be made.³

The 2nd Fusiliers reached Ambala on the morning of May 17, and the forces there consisted of two troops of European Horse, 5th and 60th Native Infantry.

2. Mily. Deptt. Progs. 18th Dec. 1857, No. 144a

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Regiments were simply on incumbency so there remained disposable about 450 effective cavalry and 1800 effective Infantry with 12 Light Cavalry.

There was much difficulty in providing Artillerymen for the service of the siege train and eventually it was found that only one company of Europeans (not 40 men) could be spared. This was the Reserve Company at Ferozepur.

The Company was ordered by Bullock Train and 100 Artillery Recruits were ordered to join Head Quarters with the Lieutenant Norman's detachment that came from Meerut.

On the night of 17th May, 1857 two Horse Artillery guns, a squadron of 9th Lancers and four companies of 1st Fusiliers started for Karnal, subsequently corps could be equipped. When other troops reached Karnal the first detachment marched to Panipat, where the Jind Raja's contingent of about 800 men was posted, and being joined by two more squadrons 9th Lancers four guns and remainder 1st Fusiliers the whole was pushed on to Rae (about 25 miles from Delhi) where they reached on June 20, 1857.⁴

Between Panipat and Delhi, the rebels had destroyed the Police Station, Dak Bungalows and Telegraph wires.

On May 25, 1857, the Commander-in-Chief reached Karnal and was attacked with Cholera on the following day i.e. May 26 and died on May 27, 1857. Sir H. Barnard who was in immediate command of the Delhi Field Force, had reached Karnal on the night of the General's death. He took over the command of the British Force.

4. Ibid

On the morning of June 4, 1857, the Head Quarter of the Force were at Raee and on June 5 they marched to Alipur within 10 miles of Delhi.

On June 6, 1857, the siege train reached the camp together with the Head Quarter 2nd Fusiliers ~~with~~ which had joined it by two marches from Ambala.

On June 7, 1857, Wilson having crossed the Jamuna at Baghat arrived with his small force. The force now in the camp consisted of:

16 Horse Artillery Guns.
6 Horse Battery Guns.
9th Lancers.
Two Squadrons cavaliers
6 Companies 60th Rifles
75th Foot
1st Fusiliers.

And 6 Companies of 2nd Fusiliers, Head Quarter Sirmoor Battalion and portion of Sappers and miners.

In round numbers there were 600 cavalry and 2400 Infantry with 22 Field Guns⁵

Besides the above the ~~the~~ siege train which consisted of 8 eighteen pounders guns, 4 eight inch ^F mortars and twelve five and a half inch mortars, were attached to it; and also a Cavalry Artillery (4 or 6 prs.) and 100 Cavalry Artillery Recruits were there.

The Head Quarter and Squadrons 4th irregular Cavalry and a wing of 8th Irregular Cavalry were also in the camp.

At 2 a.m. on June 8, 1857, the ~~the~~ Corps in anticipation of an attack from the rebels advanced and took position at Badli.

5. Ibid.

The rebels heard that the Government troops had arrived at Alipur; so they came out to meet them near Badli-ki-Serai (about 12 miles from Delhi). The Government troops were then competent enough to face the rebels.

General Barnard proposed that the main attack with five heavy guns should open on the enemy from the road itself with a light battery on either flank; that Brigadier Showers, with the 75 Foot and 1st European Fusiliers, should operate on the right; and Brigadier Graves with the 60th Rifles, 2nd European Fusiliers, and Sirmur Battalion to the left of the Road.⁶

At day break the lights in the camps of the rebels were visible and the guns of the government troops advanced to open fire. But before they were in position, the rebels began to contest with a burst of artillery. The government guns advanced and returned the fire. The leading Infantry Brigade moved off the road to right and displayed, the 75th Regiment on the left, the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, partly in support and partly on the right of the 75th Fusiliers.

In this order the brigade advanced in line towards the rebels under the play of their powerful artillery.

To the destructive fire no adequate answers could be made. For the English guns were few and of small calibre and men and officers therefore began to fall quickly. The Second Brigade had fallen behind, and there was no sign of any flank attack by the Government cavalry?⁷

The situation was critical when the general gave the order to charge heavy guns. The 75th advanced and drove back

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.

The rebels inflicting a heavy loss upon them. After that, supported by the 1st Fusiliers, the 75th pushed upon the serai and burst open the gate.

The combat was fierce and short. The rebels fought desperately and the English soldiers with their bayonets destroyed them.

The Battery and serai were scarcely taken when Graves appeared on the right of the rebels, and Brigadier Hope Grant with the Cavalry took upon in the rear on the left. The chargers charged, as a result of which, the rebels fled on all sides leaving several guns in the possession of the government troops.

GOVERNMENT NOT READY FOR FINAL ASSAULT OF DELHI

But the Government was least prepared for the herculean task which fate had thrown upon them. In spite of the heartfelt desire of the chief Commissioner to bring about the speedy fall of Delhi, delay was naturally to be there because of the unpreparedness of every department. The delay in regaining Delhi was causing disaffection to spread.⁸

Even the Punjabis were watching the turn of the tide very carefully. The Pathans of the Peshawar Valley could take up arms if delay in repossessing Delhi continued.

But the resources at the hands of the Government were too scanty to take immediate measures. The financial condition of the Government was also deteriorating. Money could last hardly,

8. For. Deptt., S.C., 28 Aug. 1857, Nos. 7-12, p. 1.

uptil the end of September 1857 and not beyond that?⁹

MILITARY POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT AT DELHI WAS NO LESS DEPLORABLE

The Military position of the Government at Delhi was no less deplorable. General Wilson with the consultation of Colonel Baird Smith the Chief Engineer with the Force said that any immediate measures must end in their defeat and disaster.¹⁰

While the British troops were utterly unprepared, the rebels were well prepared. They were well-equipped.¹ Wilson believed that the English troops were in fact besieged rather than the besiegers.¹¹

General Wilson found himself completely helpless. He wrote to John Lawrence:

"...I candidly tell you that unless speedily reinforced this Force (English troops) will soon be reduced by casualties and sickness that nothing will be left but a retreat to Karnal. The disaster attending such an unfortunate proceedings I cannot calculate!¹²

The Chief-Commissioner assured the General that heavy reinforcement would be sent from the Punjab. Almost all the reinforcements were to be rushed from the Punjab.

The rebels planned to intercept these reinforcements. General Nicholson was ordered to march against the rebels. He marched with the following troops and guns:

1st Squadron 9th Lancers
16 Horse Artillery Guns
80 Punjab Cavalary

9. For. Deptt., S.C., 18th Dec. 1857, Nos., 405-407.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

100 Guide Cavalry
 200 Multani Cavalry
 420 H.M.'s 61st
 380 1st Fusiliers
 400 1st Punjab Infantry
 400 2nd Punjab Infantry
 30 Sappers

BATTLE OF NAJJAFGARH

The rebel force was about 13,000 in number. Nicholson marched on June 25, 1857, to intercept the force of the ^{said} rebels, ~~not~~ to be moving from Delhi to Bahadurgarh with the intention of attacking the Force in the rear.

On his arrival at the Village of Nagali, about nine miles from there, he had to cross two difficult swamps. He learnt that the rebels had been at Pal^am the previous day, and would probably reach Najafgarh in the course of the afternoon. He, therefore, decided on leaving Bahadurgarh and if possible coming up at Najafgarh before night fall. It was 5 0' Clock before the troops were across the ford. He found that the strong point of the rebels was an old Sarai. Nicholson advanced and charged the left centre of the Sarai. The rebels did not make much resistance to the British Force. They retreated across the bridge. Lt. Cobbett of H.M.'s 61st was mortally wounded. The loss on the rebel side was heavy.¹³

Nicholson passed the night at the bridge with the first Fusiliers and Second Punjab Infantry and a detachment of artillery and Lancers. He had the bridge blown up by the sappers. He reached back in the camp in the evening of June 26, 1857.

John Lawrence, on hearing of this victory was so much excited that he wished he had the powers of knighting him on the spot.

13. Mily. Deptt., Progs. 16. Oct., 1857 No: 543.

FINAL ASSAULT ON DELHI

After the utmost efforts by the Chief Commissioner of Panjab, the following Force could be provided for the final assault on Delhi.

FORCE BEFORE DELHI ON SEPT. 2, 1857.

EUROPEAN TROOPS

Artillery	549
H.M.'s 6th Dragoon Guards	134
H.M.'s 9th Lancers	402
H.M.'s 8th Foot	143
H.M.'s 52nd Light Cavalry	529
H.M.'s 60th Rifles	252
H.M.'s 61st Regiment	468
H.M.'s 75th Regiment	504
H.M.'s 1st Fusiliers	472 437
<u>H.M.'s 2nd Fusiliers</u>	<u>478</u>
Total Europeans	3896

NATIVE TROOPS

Artillery	625
Sappers, and Miners	758
1st Panjab Cavalry	143
2nd Panjab Cavalry	105
5th Panjab Cavalry	129
Guid Cavalry	291
Hodson Horse	278
Sirmur Battallion	217
Kumaon Battallion	307
Guid Infantry	278
4th Sikh Infantry	461
1st Panjab Infantry	650
2nd Panjab Infantry	704
<u>Total</u>	<u>4886</u>

Thus the total effective force at the disposal of the Government was as follows:-

European	4895
Natives:	3896
Total:	<u>8791</u>

The historic assault on Delhi was made on Sept. 14, 1857. The whole British Force was divided into following five columns:-

Force	1st Column	Commandar General Nicholson. Engineers
Detail of Artillery	300	Captain A. Taylor
H.M.'s 75th Regiment	250	Lt. Medley.
Bengal Fusiliers	500	Lt. Bingham
2nd Panjab Infantry		Lt. Lang
		Ensign Chalmers

They were to assault the breach in the Cashmere Gate.

2nd Column

Commandar - Brigadier Jones H.M.'s 60th.

Force	Engineers
H.M.'s 8th Regiment	Lt. Greathed
4th Sikh Infantry	Lt. Hovenden
	Lt. Murray
	Ensign Gustavinski

They were to attack the Water Baston

3rd Column

Commandar Brigadier Campbell H.M.'s 52nd.

Force	Engineers
Details of Artillery -	Lt. Home
300	Lt. Salkeid
H.M.'s 52nd	Lt. Tandy
240	Lt. Nuthall
2nd Panjab Infantry	
500	
Kumaon Battallion	
260	

4th Column

Commandar Major Reid

Force

60 Rifles	50 Men
Sirmoor Battallion	200 Men
1st Fusiliers	160 Men
Guides	200 Men
Coke Corps	25 Men
Kumaon Battallion	65 Men
<u>H.M.'s 61st</u>	<u>80 Men</u>

Total: 780

Engineers.

Lt. Maunsell
Lt. Tennant

Reserve Column

Commandar

Brigadier -

Longfield

Force

H.M.'s 60th Rifles	200
H.M.'s 61st Regt.	250
Baloch Battallion	200
4th Infantry	500
<u>Jind Force</u>	<u>200</u>

Total 1350

Engineers

Lt. Ward
Lt. Thackery

The purpose of this column was to cover the other attacking columns.

CAVALRY BRIGADE

Commandar

Brigadier J. Hope Grant

Force

H.M.'s 9th Lancers	200
Guides, 1st, 2nd,	
5th Punjab Cavalry	410
Hodson Horse Guns(4)	

Almost all the columns had to face considerable opposition from the side of the rebels. Many officers including Brigadier General Nicholson and Neville Chamber^{lain} were fatally wounded. But inspite of all this the British troops proved more than a match for the rebels. The farmers went on taking advanced corps. On the evening of September 19, 1857, the Burn Bastion, which had given a considerable annoyance to the

British troops, was surprised and captured. On the morning of 20th September, the British troops pushed on and occupied the Lahore Gate, from which an unopposed advance was made on the other Bastions and Gateways, until the whole of the defence of the city fell into the hands of the Government.¹⁴

Thus the British troops came out victorious inspite of so many odds and ends.¹⁵ Delhi fell and British Government regained its last glory in India.

The Governor General Lord Canning extended hearty thanks to the British Force as well as to the chiefs of Punjab (Mainly the Sikh Chiefs) who rendered invaluable services to the Government at this critical time.¹⁶

The greatest share of thanks went to John Lawrence the Chief Commissioner of Punjab, whose indefatigable efforts not only kept Panjab silent but sent all its sources to Delhi.

14. Mily. Deptt., Progs. 6 November, 1857, No. 481.

15. Ibid

16. Mily. Deptt., Progs. Nov. 6, 1857, No. 481.

C H A P T E R XXII

MEN WHO MADE DELHI FALL

CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN LAWRENCE

Delhi happened to become the central point of the contest between the British Government and the rebels.

The British Government had not only lack of European and native sepoys but it also lacked in ammunition.

The Superintendent of Gun Foundry Rossipur wrote to Colonel A.A. Abbott, Superintendent of Ordnance and Magazine, Fort William, on August 17, 1857:

"I have the honour to bring to your notice that the recent heavy and urgent requisitions upon the Establishment have practically shown that the means at our disposal are not quite sufficient for such emergencies, and it is probable that the demand for work will not be reduced for some time to come and as a factory of this description should overture to think be placed on such a footing as to be at all times equal to such demands as may on emergencies be made upon it."¹

The Europeans were quite insufficient, in number. Different Departments, in the Punjab, were quite incompetent to help the Commander-in-Chief. When disaster hung over the heads of the Europeans, when no ray of hope was visible, John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab came to the rescue of the Europeans, as well as their Government.

1. Mily. Deptt., Progs, 4th Sept; 1857, No.118.

In spite of the darkest circumstances, in spite of maximum disappointment and helplessness in which the British officers found themselves, Lawrence stood firm as a rock, ready to stand unshaken in the storm. He was determined and resolute to weather the storm by all means. He was determined not to yield.

The Commander-in-Chief could get no help; all departments, including the Commissariat, needed months to be prepared for war. Nothing but total annihilation seemed to be imminent. John Lawrence, however, was still hopeful, ~~as~~ he started his campaign in the most efficient manner. Lawrence wanted General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, to move on Delhi without delay.

When Anson, placed his difficulties before Lawrence and showed his inability to move on Delhi immediately, Lawrence wrote to him in the following words:

"Your Excellency remarks that we must carefully collect our resources, but our material, these are all ready at hands, and only require to be handled wisely and vigorously to produce great results, we have money also, and the control of the country. But if disaffection spreads, insurrection will follow and we shall then neither be able to collect the revenue nor procure supplies."²

2. For. Deptt. S.C. Progs. 26 June 1857, p. 1694.

Lawrence, being himself too enthusiastic in the performance of his duties could not even think of anything impossible. He did not even believe that a person, willing to do anything, could have any difficulty in achieving his goal. He took that Anson was delaying the things deliberately; so he was dissatisfied with what Anson was doing and ordered him to move at once.

A MAN OF VIGOUR AND PROMPTNESS

He had a great love for vigour and promptness. The following words may be noted to this effect:

"Pray ~~do~~ reflect on the whole history of India where have we failed where we have acted vigorously where have we succeeded when guided by timid counsels."³

He could bear no delay; he wanted immediate movement of forces: The following observation shows his quality of resoluteness:

"I cannot comprehend what the commissariat can mean by requiring from 10 to 20 days to procure provisions. I am persuaded that all you can require to take with you must be procurable in two or three (days)"⁴, wrote John Lawrence to General Anson.

A SHREWD DIPLOMAT

John Lawrence was not only an adept administrator but a shrewd diplomat. He knew how to find ways and

3. For Deptt., S.C., Progs, 26 June 1857, p.1694.

means. He understood what role the Chief of the Punjab could play. Their joining either side, the Government or the rebels, meant sounding the death knell of the other side. His first step was to win them over to his side.⁵

Lawrence trusted the Chiefs of the Cis-Sutluj States-and the country generally for they had shown evidence of being on their side, but he utterly, distrusted the Regular Sepoys.⁶

The military position of the British Government in spite of the endeavours of John Lawrence remained weak.

General Wilson wrote to John Lawrence on July 18, 1857 that any attempt to assault Delhi would bring them ruin and he might be compelled to withdraw to Karnal, which would be followed by total destruction of the Government. He told Lawrence frankly that he could not stick to his post without adequate reinforcements from the Punjab. He wanted the assurance of maximum aid from the latter.

John Lawrence never liked that Wilson should withdraw. He knew what would follow if such a mistake was committed by him. Lawrence assured General Wilson of all possible reinforcements, Europeans as well as native troops. Wilson agreed not to withdraw but to stick to his gun.

5. Aitchison, Lord Lawrence, Oxford, 1892, p.83.

6. Ibid.

Still the outlook was very gloomy. Everywhere from below Delhi came reports of the disappearance of British power. Many began to doubt, some began to trim. Even the brave heart of Lawrence failed him. For ^{the} whole a month he feared they should not weather the storm. Their salvation was on the speedy fall of Delhi.

Lawrence, in the beginning of the rebellion, however, failed to judge the gravity of the situation correctly. He never hoped that there could be a big rebellion against the government. Lawrence expected that the people of Delhi would welcome the English troops when the latter attacked Delhi. He observed:

"I do not myself think that the country anywhere is against us, certainly not from here to within a few miles of Delhi. I served for nearly 13 years in Delhi and know the people well. My belief is that with good management on the part of the civil officer, it would open its gate on approach of our troops. It seems incredible to conceive that the mutineers can hold or defend it."⁷

Lawrence, however, realised, later on, that the struggle was not so easy as he had taken it to be.

The British force, which could be mustered after all possible efforts, was about 13,000, the European as well as native troops. The rebel force, on the other hand, was a greater in number, it was above 40,000.⁸

7. For Deptt., S.C., 26 June 1857, p.1691.

8. Mark and Engels, Moscow, 1859, p.107

LAWRENCE DESPATCHES MAXIMUM REINFORCEMENTS

But in spite of all obstacles John Lawrence reinforced the troops at Delhi. There was every possibility of a rise in the Punjab, because troops left behind were quite insufficient to preserve peace here.⁹

LAWRENCE HOPEFUL

Lawrence did not lose heart even under these circumstances, he had won most of the influential people of the state to his side. Regarding it, Aitchison observes:

"In those dark days of 1857, too, when the valleys of the frontier lay defenceless and open to the free booters from the mountains, Sir John Lawrence had dexterously drawn to his services the marauders of the border. Adventurers from many tribes- Afridis and Mohmands, Daudzais and Yusafzais even robbers from Boner and zealots from Swat- had answered his call, and had marched, regiments after regiments, to fight our battles on the Ridge at Delhi and on the plains of Hindustan."¹⁰

HIS ENDLESS EFFORTS

It was all due to his resoluteness, continuity of purpose, and his real regards for the British Government which helped him to bring Delhi to knees before the British troops. His splendid services to the state, his soldierly qualities, his firmness and energy and fertility

9. Ibid., p.108

10. Aitchison, op.cit, Introduction,p.12

of resource in difficulty, his adroitness and penetration in native diplomacy, his straight forward bluntness, his experience of tribal modes of warfare, singled him out as the man best qualified to deal with the serious entanglements into which frontier affairs had drifted.¹¹

Just after the fall of Delhi, the esteem of the British Government rose as high as ever in the eyes of the people in the Punjab, including the Peshawar Valley.

The effect of the fall of Delhi was instantaneous. It was felt in the remotest corner of the province. It was felt in Afghanistan - Peshawar was illuminated for several nights in succession. From sunset to sunrise the city was brilliant with lamps and fire works. Six percent paper which had fallen to 26 percent discount rose rapidly to par. Rich merchants began to apologise for not having subscribed to the loan. Fair weather friends came to the front with their congratulation. The British prestige stood higher than ever.¹²

CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN NICHOLSON

A GREAT SOLDIER

Nicholson was a successful administrator, a great soldier and a perfect master of men in India.

He was strongly built, broad shouldered and deep chested. He resembled Disraeli in colour and eyes. It was said that he never smiled and had cold abrupt manner which annoyed most of the people. Inwardly, however, he was quite good. When he was a boy he went to the church every Sunday.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

But when he grew up he drifted away from God.

A TRIAL OF STRENGTH

Nicholson once remarked that the Indian sepoy^s wanted to have a trial of strength with the European sepoy^s.¹³

None else but Nicholson had expressed such a view. It might be that at some of the places the native sepoy^s were disgusted with the harsh behaviour of the European officers and thus awaiting a chance to measure their strength^g with them. They might not have been satisfied with the behaviour of the British officers, but there was no unanimous plan of the sepoy^s to free India from their hands.

NICHOLSON BADLY AWAITED AT DELHI

Nicholson was badly awaited at Delhi. The condition of the British troops was critical before his arrival there, the number of the British force was too small to stand the onrush of the rebels.¹⁴

The number of rebels outnumbered the British forces greatly. When they got scent of the siege train being sent from the Punjab, the rebels thought of intercepting it. Some 13,000 of them left the city of Delhi for effecting the objective. It was a critical time for already too small number of British troops. Nicholson was ordered by General Wilson to march against them on Aug.25, 1857. Nicholson started with 2,000 men and two guns and won a

13. Pearson, Lord Hasketh, Hero of Delhi, 1939, p.125.

14. Marx and Engels, op.cit., p.106.

decisive victory at Najafgarh, by his indefatigable energy.

"The firmness and decision displayed by General Nicholson in making the march to Nujufgurh and bringing the insurgents to action at-once, merit high praise. The Chief Commissioner is well acquainted with the ground on which the Troops had to move. At this season of the year it is more or less flooded."¹⁵

NO HOPE OF ASSAULT BEFORE NICHOLSON REACHED

Before the arrival of Nicholson there was no hope of assault to take place, at all. The resources were too meagre, the number of troops too small even to think of the assault and the spirits of officers too low to take up such a bold step. They were besieged rather than besiegers.

Nicholson raised the spirits of the British troops high. He, sometimes, went beyond his powers and visited all the posts to read the situation. It was he who took steps to strengthen those posts. Moreover it was he who compelled General Wilson to fix up Sept. 14, 1857, as the date for assault. Nicholson was ordered to lead it.¹⁶

The fact stands that but for Nicholson Delhi would not have fallen. There was none else in the British camp at Delhi who could have done so much as Nicholson did.

The following words written at his death are a right tribute to Nicholson:

15. For Deptt., S.C., 30 Oct. 1857, Nos. 1-11.

16. Hesketch, Pearson, op.cit., p. 242.

"The Chief Commissioner cannot close this despatch without again adverting to the loss of Brigadier General Nicholson. The noble soldier was mortally wounded on the 14th and died on the 23rd of September. He was an officer of the highest merit, and his services since the mutiny broke out not have been surpassed by those of any other officer in this part of India. At a time like this, his loss is a public misfortune."¹⁷

OTHER COMMANDERS AND OFFICERS

There were very efficient commanders in the British force: General Wilson and Chamberlain were the most outstanding ones . Chamberlain had been a commander of repute. He led the movable column in the Punjab. He had a great hand in maintaining peace in the Peshawar Valley as well. He helped in suppressing rebellion at Gugera. Chamberlain was really a brave soldier. He knew ^{how} to fight undauntedly. He was ready to proceed against the enemy even at peril of his life. He was seriously wounded at Delhi.

General Wilson deserves appreciation. It is true that he was over cautious and delayed the things but he was a good soldier and good commander. It was, after all, under his upreme command that Delhi fell.

G.C. BARNES

Barnes the Commissioner and Superintendent of Cis-Satluj States worked most enthusiastically. He sought

17. For. Deptt. S.C. 18th Dec. 1857, Nos. 440-452

the help of the chiefs of Cis-Satluj states and kept up uninterruptedly the line of communication and transport from Ambala to Delhi. He performed meritorious services.

CAPTAIN BRIGGS

Captain Briggs deserves no less praise. But for him, the reinforcements could not have been rushed to Delhi, the scene of final trial. He arranged the transport system remarkably well. But for him there was every possibility of transport being jammed.

CHIEF OF PATIALA

The Chief of Patiala helped in guarding the road between Ambala to Delhi. It was very necessary to guard the road and the Chief of Patiala did it well.

CHIEF OF JIND

He proceeded at the head of the British troops proceeding to Delhi, clearing all hurdles. He also arranged for food supplies for the British troops.

ENGINEERS

The engineers attached to each column of assault rendered invaluable services. They themselves participated in exploding various points. Some of them even laid down their lives.

It were these engineers who had guided in the construction of various batteries for effecting breaches in the walls, but for which the siege could not have succeeded, because entry within the city walls was possible only due to it.

Smith and Taylor were the main engineers. Smith being the Chief Engineer, effected the explosions most judiciously.

Most of the engineers actually participated in the assault helping on every spot of danger and difficulty.

Thus it was on account of the inexhaustive energy and good good will of the British officers and the Chiefs of Punjab for the British Government which compelled Delhi to fall before the Britishers.

C H A P T E R XXIII

CAUSES OF REBELLION IN THE PUNJAB

The sepoy mutined in different cantonments of the Punjab and the civil population rebelled at some of places in the Punjab, on account of different reasons. The following were the main causes of the Rebellion in the Punjab.

1. INTRODUCTION OF NEW CARTRIDGES

The introduction of new cartridges seems to be the immediate cause of rebellion. It caused a general stir and discontentment among the sepoy as well as the civil population.

It was a general feeling of the British authorities also that the introduction of the new cartridges was the main cause of the rebellion.¹ Regarding the Governor General's opinion the following may be noted:-

"... he still perceives that the very name of new cartridges causes agitation and he has been informed that some of those sepoy who entertain the strongest attachment and loyalty to the Government and are ready at any moment to obey the orders, would still be under the impression that their families would not believe that they were not in some way or other contaminated by its use."¹

The Governor General, however, contended that the Government had no such intention.

Signs of unrest were visible in the sepoy at Ambala a few months before the actual mutiny broke out. In February 1857, Officers attached to the depot received complaints from their men that they might be excluded from caste due to greased cartridges.²

1. Mily. Deptt. Progs. Vol., 19th June 1857.

2. P.G.R., Vol. VIII, P.I., p.34.

This unrest was on an increase during the following months and there were incidents of fire in April.

Most of the English historians have attributed the rebellion to the use of greased cartridges and other things which created discontentment amongst the Indian soldiers against the British Government.³

Taking the case at Rohtak we see that there was no unrest there before the news of the mutiny reached there. It shows that mutiny spread from one place to the other. The discontented sepoys, who resented the greased cartridges, spread their resentment from cantonment to cantonment.

"The mutiny of the troops at Meerut on the 10th of May, and the seizure of Delhi by them on the 11th, took the Rohtak District, like the rest of North India, by complete surprise."⁴

Large number of Jats and Rajputs were serving in the army, but it did not appear that there was any feeling of excitement among the people noticeable before that month.⁵

John Lawrence the Chief Commissioner of Punjab also believed that the greased cartridges were the main cause of rebellion.⁶

John Seeley and R.C. Roberts also support this view.⁷

For example there was a good deal of excitement amongst the troops at Jullundur. It appeared that some of the cartridges had been received from the Ambala Depot and were laid out for inspection at the quarter guards of the regiment.

3. Kapoor, Gurbaksh Singh, History of British India, S.Chand and Co., 1968-, p.555

4. Gazetteer of Rohtak District, Govt. Publications. Lahore. 1883-84. 24

5. Ibid.

6. History of British India, Gurbaksh Singh Kapoor, S.Chand and Co. 1968, p.551.

7. Ibid.

These were destroyed by orders of the Brigadier, and the men expressed themselves satisfied but it was evident that the sepoys were still very unsettled.⁸

The British authorities, after calling reports from the manufactory proclaimed that the new cartridges were introduced for the guns which could cover greater distance and greasing was done like the tradition in England, without any intention of interfering with the religion of the natives. But the common masses had developed the suspicion once for all; it could not be removed.

George Anson, the Commander-in-Chief issued a general order on May 14, 1857, informing the Indian Army that it had never been the intention of the Government to force them to use any cartridges which could be objected to; and that they never would be required to do so.⁹

The following statement shows the concern over the excitement on account of the new cartridges.

"The Commander-in-Chief solemnly assures the army that no interference with their caste or religion was ever contemplated solemnly he pledges his word of honour that none shall ever be exercised."¹⁰

2. DISARMING

Disarming was the immediate cause of mutiny in most of the regiments of the Punjab. The sepoys who resented the use of new cartridges were disaffected. The Government being afraid lest they should take up arms against it

8. P.G.R., Vol. VIII., P. I., p. 172

9. Mily Deptt, Progs, 19th June 1857.

10. Ibid.

thought of disarming them. R. Montgomery was the originator¹⁶¹ of this measure.

Although this measure went in favour of the Government in the long run, it resulted either in desertion or mutiny of the regiments disarmed. Some of the regiments revolted even before having been disarmed, doubting the intentions of the Government, not knowing what the latter had in its mind. Some of the regiments revolted at the very sight of the disarming column of the Government.

"The misfortune of the present state of affairs is this, - Each step we take for our own security is a blow against the regular sipahi. He feels this, and on his side takes a further step, and as we go on, until we disband or destroy them, or they mutiny and kill their officers."¹¹

LAHORE

First of all 26th N.I. were disarmed at Mian Mir on May 13, 1857 at the point of bayonet. These disarmed sepoys mutinied on May 30, 1857.

JHELUM

The Chief Commissioner resolved to disarm the 14th N.I. at Jhelum notwithstanding the commanding Officer's surety of their loyalty.¹²

Two companies were ordered to Rawalpindi on the pretext of forming a treasure party, but in truth to weaken

11. Kaye and Melleon, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 352

12. Gazetteer of the Jhelum District, op. cit, p. 46.

the regiment. This move left but 500 men at Jhelum.

To disarm the rest at Jhelum Colonel Ellice marched from Rawalpindi on July 2, 1857, with 250 men of H.M.'s 24th and 3 guns and was overtaken by 400 Multance Horse before his arrival at Jhelum.

The moment however the Hindustanees described the troops, they loaded their muskets and began to fall back on their lines, firing at their officers. Colonel Ellice attempted to stop them with cavalry and guns, until the Infantry could come up, but the mutineers made good their escape to their lines.¹³

SIALKOT

The news of 33rd and 35th N.I. having been disarmed was the immediate cause of mutiny at Sialkot. It was resented by the native sepoy~~s~~ there. In their eyes the victims of this outrage were innocent men, for they had done nothing offensive. And then Nicholson was coming north, and the sepoy~~s~~ expected that they were going to meet the same lot. They revolted before Nicholson could reach there.

OCCUPYING THE FORT OF PHILLAUR

The Brigade was under the command of Brigadier Jehnstone who was away and Colonel Hartlay of the 8th Queen's was in temporary command of the force. The sepoy~~s~~ of the 3rd N.I. had a plan to revolt there but the appointed hour had not yet arrived.¹⁴

For-Sec.

13. Deptt., 28 Aug. 1857, Cons. 14-27

14. Kaye Malleon, History of Indian Mutiny, Longman's Green and Co. London, New York, Vol. II, 1896, p. 333.

Colonel Hartley resolved to occupy the Fort and accordingly at dusk on May 12, 1857, he despatched a small detachment of H.M's 8th and a couple of H.A. guns off from Jullundur, which reached Phillaur just at day break, i.e. on May 13, 1857, covering a distance of twenty four miles.

HARTLEY'S TACTIC AVOIDED REVOLT

The European force arrived at a very opportune time. In the morning the gate was naturally opened due to multifarious needs of the garrison. One of the needs was the provision of a grass by the grass cutters. Just when the grass cutters were carrying the grass into the fort the European force stealthily followed them without being noticed by the sepoy. The sepoy of the 3rd N.I. came to know of it only when the armed Europeans ordered them to leave the fort.¹⁵

Had the sepoy got a scent of the Europeans, coming to disarm them, they would certainly have revolted. What happened at Jhelum because of the disarming column having reached late, was avoided by the timely arrival of the Europeans who surprised the 3rd N.I. The sepoy came to know of it only when ordered to leave the fort or to bear the consequences.

PESHAWAR

There was a lot of controversy over the disarming of the Indian sepoy. Some of the officers strongly

15. Cooper, Crises in the Punjab, Smith, London, 1858, pp. 109. 110.

opposed this measure. They expressed the opinion that it would lead in the revolt of the sepoy.

Colonel Edwardes, was not ready to accept this plea. He ultimately decided to carry out the proposal and the Indian sepoy were armed.

DESERTION OF 250 SEPOYS OF 51st N.I.

On the night of disarming (May 22, 1857) 250 sepoy of the 51st Native Infantry deserted and fled in different directions. They were, however, seized by the police and brought alive with their savings.¹⁶

The most evident restlessness pervaded the disarmed regiments, arms were said to be finding their way, into the lines inspite of all precautions and symptoms of an organised rise began to appear.¹⁷

It was believed that arms were being collected by them with the intention of rising against the Government. A search for arms in their lines was made. They revelled as a result of this. Colonel Galloway wrote to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General on 1st Sept. 1857, saying:

"I have honour to report for the information of the Brigadier General commanding the Division, that at half an hour afternoon on the 28th ultimo while a search was being made for arms in the lines of the disarmed Regiments, at this the 51st Regiment N.I. broke out into open mutiny and rushed upon the officers of

16. P.G.R, V-VIII, P.II, p. 149

17. Ibid, p.174

the 1st Punjab Infantry, who were superintending the search of the lines of the two last companies of the 51st Regiment N.I., and but for the prompt assistance rendered by the men of the Punjab Infantry these officers would have been killed."¹⁸

3. LUST FOR PLUNDER

Most of the civil population took advantage of the disorder on account of the rebellion and indulged in plunder. They joined the rebellion only for this purpose. The sepoys also availed of the opportunity of plundering, whenever they got such a chance.

At Hissar the sowars and the customs peons together plundered the Collector's house.

The mutineers of 46th N.I. at Sialkot plundered everything on which they could lay their hand. Later a Brandreth wrote to G.F. Edmonstone that the insurgents had brought over the Rav: nearly all their plunder.¹⁹

FIGHT OVER PLUNDER

The following observation leaves no doubt regarding the lust for plunder, the mutineers at Jullundur possessed:

" I have since heard that the mutineers remained a considerable time on the 61st parade, dividing and fighting about the Treasury _____"²⁰

18. For Sec. Deptt. 1857, Cons. 38.46

19. For Sec. Deptt. 18 Dec. 1857, Cons. 403-404.

20. For Sec. Deptt., 25 Sept. 1857, Cons., 11-14.

Reported Farrington to Major Lake . The mutineers plundered to their best at Ludhiana as well.

4. WEAK MILITARY POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT

The weak military position of the Government was also a factor which encouraged the sepoys to break out. The European troops being fewer in number, could not watch every cantonment where the native troops were in excess in number. This went a long way in encouraging the Indian troops to rise. Had European troops been enough in number there would have been lesser chances of the revolts having taken place at Jhelum, Sialkot, Rawalpindi, Ferozepore and Jullundur.²¹

For example the alarm of Jhelum was considerable, as there was no European force to restrain the native battery of artillery and the two regiments.²²

On account of the weak military position of the Government:

"Towards the end of May and beginning of June daring outrages were of daily occurrence. The Grand Trunk Road for days was not safe. Close to the Umbala Cantonment a villager posted himself on the road with a gun in his hand, and plundered at his leisure. He was seized and immediately executed. Villages of Thanesar, headed by their lumberdars, turned out in broad day fully armed and equipped, with drums

21. Ibid.

22. Gazetteer of Jhelum District, Govt. Publications, Lahore, 1211 p 45

beating and flag flying, to prey on the weaker villages. Frequent fight occurred, and the police were afraid even to report the state of affairs." ²³

MESSENGERS OF BAHADUR SHAH II

Messengers of Bahadur Shah II, the King of Delhi, played a significant role in making the sepoy as well as the civil population rise. Mutiny at Sialkot resulted also due to this fact. There came a messenger from Delhi on the evening of July 8, 1857, bringing summons from the king commanding them to join the royal army.

Ahmed Khan Khurral proved a formidable enemy for the British Government in the Gugera District. He seems to have accepted allegiance to Bahadur Shah II renouncing that of the British Government. ²⁴

CONTAGION

Contagion played no less part. The Punjab Government Records bear the following account about the causes of the rebellion.

"It was too much, however, to expect that with such examples on all sides we would keep ourselves absolutely free from contagion. The river Jumna was fordable and the population on both banks was a lawless and predatory lot. The Ranghurs of Paneeput and Hissar were in successful rebellion, and taunted their brethren in the Cis-Sutlej territory with their want of courage in still submitting

23. P.G.R., V. VIII, P.I., pp. 10. 11

24. P.G.R., Vol. VIII, P.I., p. 46,

to the Feringhee. Men's minds were further unsettled by the passing of mutineers of the 45th and 57th Native Infantry from the cantonment of Ferozepoor, and by alarming stories in every quarter of the desperate position of the British in India."²⁵

The Chief Commissioner views about the causes of rebellion ^{in Gugeru} may also be noted from the followings:-

"The cause of the insurrection has not yet been discovered. It is variously attributed to the machination of an adjacent Chief, to emissaries from Delhi, to the return of their homes one of two escaped convicts from the Agra Jail, who have spread an account of the disorganization in N.W. Provinces. All these circumstances may perhaps have had an influence on these clans. The denuded state of the country, the effect of the Europeans and the Punjabi Troops, and the disarming of the Hindustani Regiments, may, and doubtless, had an influence on the minds of the people. The Chief Commissioner has not yet been able to ascertain the precise causes of disturbances. No doubt however fanaticism, the love of plunder, the desire of change, have all had an effect. The very people / who have benefitted by our rule, are not

25. P.G.R., V. VIII, P.I., p.10

always proof against such temptation, while those whose passions have been crushed are eager for revenge." 26

7. PART PLAYED BY THE EMISSARIES

Emissaries went from one Cantonment to another in the garb of Fakeers and either remained in the lines or hanged about the outskirts of cantonments. They spread the mutinous ideas. Thus rebellious idea spread from one cantonment to the other.²⁷

Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner, of Ambala heard of Mahomedan Fakeers and maulvees preaching in their mosques and other places on the expediency of rising against the English Government and joining in a general war of extermination.²⁸

8. CONTEMPT AGAINST THE ALIEN RULE

A general contempt against the British Rule was found amongst the Indians. The economic policy of the Government was detested by the Indians. They thought that the Government was responsible for their economic difficulties. The Indians disliked the social reform of the Government. They thought that the Government was bent on destroying the traditions of India.

The following words written by Field Marshall Earl Roberts to his mother show the intensity of this contempt:

"I don't believe myself there is one simple Native in the whole of country who would not go against us, if they were not better off by remaining on our side." 29

26. For. Sec. Deptt., 18 Dec. 1857, Cons. 440-452

27. Judicial File No. 29. Circular No. 45.

28. General & Political File No: 54

29. Roberts, Letters written during Indian Mutiny. p. 52

C H A P T E R XXIV

NATURE OF REBELLION IN THE PUNJAB

There was a stir in the Punjab, even before the news of rebellion at Meerut and Delhi reached here. The sepoy^s at almost all the cantonments were restless and out-break against the Government was expected. Fires at Ambala started in February 1857 and continued up to May 1857 when the actual outbreak took place.

Probably the sepoy^s of the different cantonments in the Punjab were in touch with one another but no evidence of a definite plan concerning a joint revolt is available. Unrest and disaffection were of course prevalent. No definite reasons of the sepoy^s being so, except a common resentment against the use of greased cartridges are available. The sepoy^s seem to have no common plan to follow, regarding the rebellion.

No evidence of any definite date for such an action is also available. There is however one evidence. The sepoy^s at Ambala took up their arms early in the morning on May 10, 1857, showing thereby that they knew of the outbreak going to take place at Meerut. No other evidence is traceable. The sepoy^s at Lahore, Jullunder, Phillaur had an understanding with one another but what and when was something to be done, this they had not decided.

As a result, revolts took place at different times at different places and on account of different reasons. Introduction of new cartridges seems to be the common cause of restlessness, but the final cause which made the revolt burst^s out was different at different places.

At most of the cantonments, efforts to disarm¹⁷¹ the sepoys precipitated the matters and the sepoys broke out into rebellion.

The civil population was also disaffected at some of the places but their disaffection was different as compared to that of the native sepoys. Cartridges did not concern them; but because they concerned the native sepoys, the masses too seem to have developed resentment against the Government.

It seems that neither the British Government nor the European civil population enjoyed full confidence of the masses of India. The former were considered aliens, who had come only to rule over them, and who did not bother for their sentiments.

But it can no longer be said that all the sepoys in the Punjab or the whole of the civil populace were disaffected; enough of them did remain loyal. They helped the British Government to the best of their capacity. The native mutineers were also captured by the civil population.

For example some of the mutineers from Peshawar and Ferozepore were captured by the civil population and handed over to the British Government.

Almost all Chiefs of the Punjab, Sikh Chiefs as well as others and all prominent and notable persons, with an exception here and there, stood by the side of the Government. They rendered all kinds of aid within their power. Those few who could not be invited for help, complained of it to the British authorities as to why they were not given a chance.

Some examples, however, are available which show that some sympathy was shown to the mutineers by the

by the native officers at Patiala as well as at Jammu and Kashmir. But nothing can definitely be said about it.

Some 100 mutineers of 45th N.I. from Ferozepore were captured in the territory of the Chief of Patiala. They were, however, released by the Dewan later on, after having taken their arms.

It was pleaded, afterwards, that it happened on account of a misunderstanding of the orders issued regarding the disarmed sepoy of Ferozepore. The order was to disband the disarmed sepoy. The Dewan at Patiala, however, released the rebel sepoy from Ferozepore, who had been captured in the territory of Patiala State. It seems, he did so on account of having sympathy for the rebels.

Similarly some 133 of the mutineers of the 9th Cavalry from Sialkot crossed into the territory of the Chief of Jammu. The Chief of Jammu pleaded with the British authorities that the mutineers had surrendered on the condition of their lives being exempted. Some 20 of them had already been released before being handed over to the Government. The remaining were however, executed by The Government after having been delivered to it by the Chief of Jammu later on.

The Chiefs of Patiala and Jammu and Kashmir helped the Government to their best, though evidence is there, which proves that they were not only in correspondence with Bahadur Shah II, but also forwarded some money to him. Keeping their later services in view, the Government however did not take a serious view of it.

There is no evidence also to show that the rebels in the Punjab had any common leader to guide and lead them.

Rebellion by the Sepoys

There was military rebellion at several places in the Punjab. Large portion of the 45th N.I. mutinied at Ferozepore and escaped without having been punished. 10th Light Cavalry also broke out on Aug. 10, 1857, taking also the horses with them. A lot of hue and cry was raised but the mutineers could not be intercepted because the people were mostly in their favour. They concealed the mutineers in their houses, thus saving them from being captured and executed.

In spite of the best ~~in~~ efforts of the authorities the people of Ambala District did not hand over to the authorities the rebels of 45th and 57 N.I. with the result that only 20 sepoys were captured; the remaining escaped safely under the protection of the general population.¹

Lukewarmness of the people made Forsyth say:

"One fact was evident to all engaged in pursuit, the population had decidedly not enlisted themselves warmly on the the part of the Government. Not a man turned out who was not compelled to do so through the fear of the loss of his jagheer, and in many instances information calculated to deceive was all that could be obtained!"¹

When the 55th N.I. mutinied at Peshawar and escaped, Colonel Edwardes called the influential Chiefs for

for assistance but they boldly expressed their inability to afford it. Headmen of villages however brought portion of men at this invitation, and satisfactorily proved that the body of the people had no sympathy with the sepoy^s.²

It was known however that 100 men^{of 55th N.I. at Peshawar} came out of the fort with their officers, who were all safe, except Col. Spottiswood who had committed suicide. The rest of the corps marched away with the colors, and Colonel Nicholson had gone in pursuit with the Horse Artillery and Cavalry. Lieutenant have of the 10th Irregular was severely wounded in the neck.

The civil population in the Peshawar District was divided into two portions regarding their attitude to the rebellion. One section sympathised with the rebels, the other helped the Government.³

The following observation may be noted as to how Lieutenant Horne the Assistant Commissioner was helped by the people of Eusufzye. On the night of the 21st the 55th at Murdan also mutinied and seized the magazine placing a Guard over Lieutenant Horne the Assistant Commissioner who effected his escape and was loyally received by the people of Eusufzye who assembled to protect him. Intelligence had been received that the decisive measures adopted had been attended with the best results, and that levies were clocking in.⁴

The successful disarming (a decisive measure) of the native sepoy^s at Peshawar brought good results to the Government.

2. For Deptt., S.C., Progs. 26 June, 1857 p. 1700 3. Ibid

4. Ibid. p. 1699.

It convinced the people, that the British Government was strong enough to suppress any rebellion and it was no use remaining aloof and losing its good will, so they began to enlist themselves in the army in a large number.

6th Light Cavalry, 36th N.I. and 61st N.I. mutinied at Jullundur on June, 7, 1857 and marched off to Delhi successfully. Brigadier Johnstone failed to do anything against them. On their way they plundered the public property and the houses of the Europeans at Ludhiana. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana tried to intercept them on the other side of the Satluj but failed to do anything; the mutineers forced their way into Ludhiana.

3rd Native Infantry mutinied at Phillaur on June, 8, 1857.

On efforts being made to disarm the part of the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum on July 7, 1857 the sepoys took up arms, killed some of their officers and escaped successfully.

A wing of the 9th Light Cavalry and 46th Native Infantry mutinied at Sialkot on July 9, 1857. There was a severe fight, most of the mutineers, however, escaped but were pursued by John Nicholson. Nicholson killed a major portion of them at Trimma Ghat at the river Ravi, the rest escaped into Jammu territory, but were later on, handed over to the British authorities.

A part of 5th Native Infantry mutinied at Thanesar on July 14, 1857. There the priests (Hindu Pandits) gave them protection, instead of handing over the rebels to the British Government.

The 26th N.I., whose successful disarming at Mian Mir on May 13, 1857, had ushered in the successful device of disarming broke into mutiny on July 30, 1857. They killed some of their officers and then escaped. They were, however, intercepted and, later on, arrested by F. Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar and were executed at Ajnala. Some 120 of them died there on account of starvation and suffocation, in a small unventilated room, where they were enclosed at Ajnala. Cooper was wholly and solly responsible for this tragedy.

The 51st N.I. who had been disarmed at Peshawar, deserted in large groups on Aug. 28, 1857, but were brought back by the police and zaminders.⁵

Remnants of 5th and 61st Native Infantry mutinied at Ambala and 9th ~~and~~ Irregular Cavalry mutinied at Mianwali both on Sept 30, 1857.

REBELLION BY THE CIVIL POPULATION

Some 30,000 tribesmen rebelled in the Gugera District. There place of rebellion extended at the distance of 30 miles. It was after a great struggle, loss and harrassment of the Government Officers that it could be suppressed only after the fall of Delhi.

Telling the nature of the rebellion in Gugera, Lawrence observed:

"The insurrection is not dangerous, not even formidable, but very troublesome."⁶

5. For Deptt., S.C. Progs. 26 June 1857, p. 1700.

6. For Deptt., S.C., No. 18th Dec. 1857, Nos. 440-452

Regarding the state of affairs in the Punjab, A Brandreth reported to G.F. Edmonstone on May 28, 1857:

"In conclusion the Chief Commissioner desires me to report that throughout the Punjab, the people continue quiet and to evince undaunted loyalty Peshawar is the sole cause of anxiety, and he cannot fail to perceive that affairs in that quarter are critical." ⁷

A large portion of the people of Punjab were carefully watching the events. They were restless to know which way the wind blew. In fact they intended to rebel only in case the Government proved weaker.

There were rebellions in several parts of the Punjab later on. Some parts could not rise but showed definite symptoms of disaffection; they defied the British authorities openly.

The people of Karnal and Panipat refused to pay even a farthing of revenue. It was only when the chief of Jind proceeded with a big force against them and threatened them with serious consequences that they submitted and consented to pay it.

The civil population of Ludhiana helped the mutineers from Jullundur in mounting guns on the fort and also in pointing out the houses of the Europeans to be plundered and pillaged by them.

On search several cart loads of swords and other weapons were found out from the houses of the people of Ludhiana.

Mangli village in Hissar District had a prominent part in the rebellion. The rebels were helped by the women;
⁷ For Deptt., S.C., Progs. 26 June 1857, p.1705.

who gave them shelter in their houses and allowed them to¹⁷⁸ fight against the Government troops from the very roofs of their houses. The rebels were, however, defeated in the long run.

At Ferozepur, it was the rebellious atmosphere in the Bazar, which incited the 45th N.I. to revolt.

On July 7, 1857, two Afridis of the Sipah tribe entered the lines of the 18th Irregular Cavalry and presented to the Hindustani sowars a letter from Malik Sarajuddin, the head of their tribe and one of the most powerful men in the Kheber. The letter offered an asylum in the writer's hills to any blackman either of cavalry or Infantry who chose to mutiny and^{come} to him.⁸

Bhutties of Khijracha and Saharan Villages of Sirsa District rebelled and occupied the villages strongly. After a severe fight and great struggle, in which the roofs of the houses had also to be removed to locate the rebels, the rebels were defeated by General Vancortlandt, after many hand to hand fights.

Rohtak and its neighbourhood were in rebellious state. The whole of the country was disaffected and the revenues were absolutely withheld by some of the villages.

The rebel Ranghers attacked Hissar on Aug. 19, 1857. Their number estimated at 2000, with a good many sepoy of the Hurriana Light Infantry, and 400 sowars for the most part of the

8. P.G.R., V. VIII, P.I., p.163.

Irregular Cavalry, all led by Shahzada Moheemad Azam Kahn. The daring attack made by the rebels was repulsed and they were, at last, defeated.

MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE GOVERNMENT

The force in the Punjab was hardly sufficient to meet such an emergency. Approximately 6000 European troops were there in the Punjab at that time. There were about 18,000 Hindustani troops excluding punjabi troops. Punjab could be held only if the Native troops remained loyal; otherwise disaster was waiting upon European population as well as the British Government.

The following observation shows how badly the help of the Native sepoys was needed by the Government:

"His Excellency appears to have enough European Infantry, but to be in great want of trustworthy Native Cavalry."⁹

The Chief Commissioner did not know whether European ~~Regiments~~ Regiment would be spared from Delhi for the Punjab or not. He was most unwilling to press his request for one. He perceived that European Troops could ill be spared from Delhi while they were much wanted in the Panjab.¹⁰ Out of the 6 Regiments of European Infantry in the Punjab, 3 were at Peshawar, and could only muster 1100 effective men. The

9. For Deptt. S.C. Progs. 26 June 1857, p.1700.

10. For Deptt. , S.C., 18th Dec. 1857,
No: 440-452.

other three were distributed over the rest of the country and probably muster about 2,300 effective men.¹¹ M

More European Troops from England were badly needed. "Some of these Troops were coming out in Steam Vessels, and perhaps arrived by this time. A small part of them would be Godsend to us. It is an immense temptation, a severe trial, on our allies and subjects, that month after month elapses, and not a solitary reinforcement reaches the Punjab."¹² said John Lawrence

Punjab was threatened not only from within but also from without. There were chances of disturbances on the borders. The following observation may be noted to this effect:

"The emissaries along a border of 800 miles the different races which we have conquered and subjugated within the last eleven years, the very soldiers we have been obliged to raise, cannot fail to see our weakness, and their strength. If any man told the Chief Commissioner a year ago that we could hold the Punjab with 5 or 6000 European soldiers, and the aid which the Punjabis themselves afford

11. *ibid.*

12. *ibid.*

and overawe nearly 20,000 Hindustani soldiers, he would have declared that man a visionary. But such is really the case. How long this can last it is impossible to say. But that aid is highly desirable cannot be denied. The Chief Commissioner can only hope that ^{all help which} is be in the power of the Supreme Government to afford it soon."¹³

There were huge magazines at Ferozepore and Phillaur. Mutiny, however, broke out at both of these places. But for the strategic and prompt action, the magazines might have been lost to the rebels and would thus have resulted in the starvation of the Government guns, bringing on a great disaster to it. The magazines were, however, saved by the shrewd and quick policy of the British Officers and the ammunition there was thus preserved for the Government troops at Delhi. These magazines, later on fed the Government guns inexhaustively.

UNPREPAREDNESS OF DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS

Different Departments of the Government were in a state of unpreparedness. No department could meet the demands of the emergency which had arisen:

"There was no carriage at hand neither camels, elephants, carts, or bearers. Colonel W.B. Thompson,

13. Ibid.

one of the most experienced and effective officers of the departments, frankly avowed his inability to meet the "incidents". He declared himself ready to throw up his appointment rather than sacrifice the army.¹⁴

Regarding the unpreparedness of the Government the following observation may also be noted.

"A message has been received from the Commander-in-chief stating that his Excellency arrived at Kurnaul Yesterday but owing to the faulty commissariat arrangements, the troops would not proceed further before the 31st (May) Instant and even then the heavy guns would not be with them."¹⁵

PUNJAB THE SOLE SAVIOUR

Punjab, of course, was the sole saviour of the British Government. The victory could, however, be achieved after persistent and sincere endeavours on the parts of the British officers.

The Native Chiefs were their main supporters to avert this crisis. John Lawrence played the worthiest part, in suppressing the rebellion, although his subordinates British Officers rendered no less service to the Government.

14. Browne, J. *Cave-Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, London, Vol.I, 1861, P.203.

15. For Deptt., S.C., Progs. 26 June, 1857. P.1700.

CHAPTER XXV

WAS WHETHER THE RISING OF 1857/A WAR OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE PUNJAB?

To determine whether it was a War of Independence or not, we will have to c^onsider the following questions:

1. Was it a War of Independence designed by eminent politicians to expel the foreign rulers and establish a national government? Or was it a result of general restlessness against the Government?
2. Was it a spontaneous outburst of sepoy discontent?
3. Was it a mutiny limited to the army or it commanded the support of the people at large?
4. Was it a religious war against Christianity or a racial struggle?
5. Were the rebels fighting for a common cause or they had their own motives?
6. Did the whole of the Punjab join it or only a portion did so?
7. What were the preparations made to make it a success?
8. Whether any large scale or small scale conference was held to reach some concrete conclusion regarding its aims and objectives?
9. In case, no conference could be held due to a strict vigilance of the Government what else was done to decide its aims and objectives?
10. How did the mutineers from the Punjab help the other mutineers at Delhi?

These are some of the questions which are to be faced fairly.

Different writers and politicians have given controversial views. I would like to quote the opinions of some of the most prominent personalities and writers about the nature of the rebellion as a whole, before finalising a definite conclusion.

Believing that the rising of 1857 in India was a war of independence Nand Lal Chatterji observes:

"Many academic historians in India as well as journalists and politicians have seen 1857 as the year of India's First War of Independence and the beginning of the nationalist movement, that was climaxed with the winning of freedom in 1947."¹

He summarises what seems to him to be evidence of this interpretation in the following passage:

"The rising of 1857 is Modern India's First War of Independence. It has been looked at ~~the way~~ and described in various ways. English historians have called it a sepoy mutiny but it was in fact more than a mutiny; for behind the grievances of the sepoy lay a more widespread political discontent among various elements of the country. It is clear therefore that the revolt of 1857 was not a simple movement but a complex one. It would be a mistake to treat it as a disconnected and sudden explosion."²

1. Problem in Asian Civilization; 1857 in India
Mutiny or War of Independence?
Boston, D.C. Heath and Company, 1963, p. 62

2. Ibid.

He believes that the Great Rebellion symbolised a new Political awakening in the land. This awakening was cultural, even though the sepoys were one of its "spearheads."³

Nand Lal believes that

"Religion and politics became mixed up in 1857 in a manner in which it cannot do so in any country than India, for the people were by nature and instinct intensely religious."⁴

S.M. CHAUDHRI'S VIEW

Chaudhri finds in the events of 1857 resemblances to earlier revolts by peasants against the oppressive system of taxation. He is especially concerned to combat the interpretation of 1857 as the last desperate effort of the old order to maintain its privileges. He insists that the evidence of both of 1857 and previous uprising indicates that the people were conscious that they were fighting for their way of life against an alien expression. The landlords who led revolts in many areas were, he argues, unconcious⁵ tools of a nascent nationalism.

VIEWS OF S.N.SEN

S.N.Sen believes that the people ruled by a foreigner certainly revolt to overthrow their yoke; He writes about the Rebellion of 1857 in India:

"The mutiny was inevitable. No dependent nation can for ever reconcile itself to foreign domination.

A despotic government must ultimately rule by

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

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swprd though it might be sheathed in velvet. In India the sword was apparently in the custody of the sepoy Army. Between the sepoy and his foreign master there was no common tie of race, language and religion."⁶

PROCLAMATION BY BAHADUR SHAH II

The following proclamation made by Bahadur Shah II shows that the revolt was of a national character. He proclaimed:

"It is well known to all, that in this age the people of Hindustan, are being ruled under the tyranny and oppression of the infidel and treacherous bounden duty of all the welathy people of India those who have any sort of connection with any of the Mohammedan royal families and are considered the pastors and masters of their lives for the well being of the public."⁷

V.D.SAWARKAR'S VIEW

Sawarkar believes that it was a War of Indian Independence and it was due to this very belief that he titled his work as "The Indian War of Independence."

The following observation of Sawarkar may be noted to this effect:

"After completing all the measures of security of the Punjab, Sir J.Lawrance began to extend his labours to place revolution outside his own province. When the news from Delhi reached him

6. Ibid, Introduction, p.xiii.

7. Ibid. Introduction. P. XIII.

He said it was not a rebellion but a national rebellion."⁸

MY OPINION ON THE NATURE OF REBELLION IN PUNJAB

I have made an exhaustive study of the printed material as well as of manuscripts including almost all government records: Basing my conclusions on the material studied, I can say that it was not a war of Independence in the Punjab, at least, in the beginning although it did take up a national character later on. But it was no longer only a sepoy mutiny as well. It was something between the Sepoy Mutiny and War of Independence.

It was not purely a War of Independence because no uniform scheme was discussed, planned or executed. There was no leader to guide all the mutineers of the country.

Most of the sepoys mutinied as a result of the scheme of disarming. The civil population mutinied either as a result of contagion or they did so ~~from~~ prompted by a desire of revenge or plunder. The civil population also had no leader on a national level. Rebellions at different places were led by different persons and the fact is that there was no leader at all, at most of the places.

At some of the places like Simla and Rohtak, some of the civil population availed themselves of the lawlessness which came to prevail and indulged in plundering and looting.

Temptation of money proved no less attractive for the rebels; who seem to have no higher aim before them. For example, after plundering the treasury at Jullundur, there was a lot of hue and cry regarding the distribution of the money. Had it been a national movement: the money would have been deposited in a common fund to be spent when need arose.

8. Sawarkar, V.D.QB. cit., p.80

Settlement of old feuds was another cause of rebellion in the Punjab. When the awe of the British authority was lifted people of Central Punjab and Border Hills took up their sword to settle these disputes personally.

Some of the classes who had lost their old privileges, which they enjoyed in the pre-British period availed themselves of the chance to fight against the Government; as it happened at Ludhiana and Rewar.

Western Education was limited to a very narrow circle so the idea of nationalism had not taken hold in the minds of the people. So a national revolt could not be ~~be~~ expected under such circumstances. Personal loyalties were dearer than patriotism and value of nationalism.

S.M. Chaudhri writes that the rebels had no plan for introducing democratic government nor for establishing any self government. He observes:

"It, however, appears quite plausible to maintain that no where during this period was any attempt made to establish the principles of democracy and self government."¹⁰

Over-ruling any possibility of national awakening in the middle of nineteenth centry,^u Chaudhri writes:

"India in the mid nineteenth century did not possess the material requisite for advanced political ideas and the insufficiency of her economic life rendered impossible any real extension of the revolution."¹¹

10. Problem in Asiatic Civilization, op.cit.,p.1.

11. Ibid.,p.65

Even Engels and Karl Marx believe that only the cartridges were at the root of the rebellion. They observe:

"The alleged cause of the disaffection which began to spread four months ago in the Bengal army was the apprehension on the part of the natives lest the Government should interfere with their religion. The serving of cartridges, the paper of which was said to have been greased with the fat of bullocks and pigs, and the compulsory biting of which was, therefore, considered by the natives as an infringement of their religious prescription, gave the signal¹² for local disturbances."

Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya expressing approximately similar views observes:

"The socio-religious policy of the Government of India during the year preceding the mutiny and the introduction of greased cartridges towards the close of 1856 reacted adversely on both the Hindus and the Muslims of the country. When through the initiative of the sepoys, the Mutiny broke out in 1857, both the Hindus and the Muslims ~~and the Muslims~~ joined it in protest against the attitude of the Government, towards their religious feelings and social prejudices. It is not, however, a fact that all the Hindus and the Muslims of the country rose¹³ in revolt."

12. Ibid., p.71.

13. Ibid., p.73

It is true that cartridges were the immediate cause of rebellion but they were no longer its sole cause. They may be called last of so many causes. The socio-religious and economic policy of the government had been a cause of great restlessness among the Indians. It is true that the administration of John Lawrence had brought about prosperity in the Punjab but it can no longer be said that the people of Punjab were finally pacified. In their inner hearts they had grievances against the Government.

The rebellion was however limited to no one section of people or to one community. Both Mohammedans and Hindus participated in it.

But it can no longer be said that the whole of India or the whole of Punjab was up in arms against the Government. A portion of population did so. Most of the population remained quiet. The Muhammadans of Calcutta reposed their entire faith in the policy of the British Government and pledged themselves to support Government during the crisis of 1857-59. On May 27, 1857, the members of the Muhammedan Association of Calcutta held a special meeting and passed resolutions, expressing their loyalty to Government and promising their entire aid and support to the suppression of the Mutiny.¹⁴

Haraprasad rightly believes that the rebellion was a joint effort of the Hindus as well as Muslims; it was no longer a sole attempt of the Muslims.¹⁵

14. Ibid., p.74.

15. Ibid., p.76

But it cannot be called a national war in the real sense of the word. R.C.Majumdar holds the view that a national war of independence could hardly be expected in 1857 or at any time before it. For nationalism and patriotism, in the true sense, was conspicuous by its absence in India till a much later date.¹⁶

At most of the places, where the rebellion broke out, nowhere did the sepoy and the civil population rise simultaneously. Either the army participated alone or the civil people, if at all they rose, they joined at a later date.

About the plan of revolt at Peshawar Col.H.B.Edwards^E, Commander and Superintendent of Peshawar observes:

"Reports were rife in the city that the Native troops were to rise to act, and that two or three days later they would be joined on the festival of Eed, by friends in the district."¹⁷

The **rebel**-lion of 1857 was not a War of Indian Independence in the Punjab because:

1. The rebellion flared up abruptly. In the beginning the rebels had no definite aim before them. There was not much stir before the introduction of new cartridges. It was only after the introduction of the new cartridges that the trouble started. People, in Punjab in my opinion, were not aware of ~~the~~ nationalism. Res^tlessness, however, prevailed.
 2. No leader was selected beforehand to guide and lead the rebels. Having resented the introduction of new cartridges, the sepoy rebelled at various places. The mutineers from Punjab rushed to Delhi, not because they knew the future plan of getting independence for India, but they had no
16. Ibid, Introduction, p.xi.
17. For Deptt., Progs.Vol.I., 25th Sept.1857.

alternative. Having rebelled, it was no longer possible for them to stay in the Punjab. The Government would chase and execute them so they tried to escape to Delhi.

They accepted the leadership of Bahadur Shah not voluntarily, but as other mutineer from the various parts of the country had done so, the mutineers from Punjab could be no exception.

Mahdi Hussain is of the view that Bahadur Shah accepted voluntarily the offer made by the rebels. I, however, do not agree to it. Leadership was in fact forced upon Bahadurshah II. Later on, being tired of the misbehaviour of the rebels, Bahadur Shah reminded them that it was they who had compelled him to lead them, he had no longer requested them to proclaim him their leader,

3. It was mainly the sepoy who rebelled. 36th N.I. and 61st N.I. mutinied at Jullundur; 45th N.I. mutinied at Ferozepore and 55th N.I. at Peshawar. 26th N.I. mutinied at Lahore, 9th Light Cavalry at Jhelum, 46th N.I. at Sialkot. Afterwards 51st N.I. mutinied at Peshawar and 10th Light Cavalry at Ferozepore.

In the opinion of Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya the nature of rebellion may be briefly reviewed as follows:

"In the North Western provinces, Bundelkhand, Saugor and Narbada had a popular basis. In the rest of the country including the South, the Punjab, Rajputana, Sind, Hyderabad, Bengal, East Bihar, Orissa and Assam, though there were risings of the native soldiery here and there, the civil population remained on the whole, quiet and peaceful. The mutiny in other words was not a popular movement on all

India basis."¹⁸

4. It is true that civil population in the Punjab also took up arms against the government at certain places; but their aim was no longer freeing India; they did so on account of different reasons.

Rising of the sepoy's naturally incited them to rebel without calculating the pros and cons of such a move. There were popular risings at Hissar, Sirsa, Rohtak, Panipat, Karnal, Thanesar, Simla, Narinji (Peshawar); the nature of rebellion was, however, different at different places.

In this connection, the following may be noted:

(a) The people refused to pay the revenue at Panipat, Karnal, and Thanesar (including the areas in the neighbourhood of these places).

(b) The pandits at Thanesar, sheltered the mutineers from being captured by the government officials. They did not hand them over to the latter.

(c) There were, of course, armed revolts at Hissar, Sirsa, Rohtak and Narinji; the government had to send force to suppress the rebellion there.

In the words of Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya:

"It was popular only regionwise, that is, on a zonal basis. In the regions or zones which witnesses popular risings, the civil population rose in arms against Government not, however, with the politocal motive of liberating India from the

18. Problem in Asian Civilization, op.cit.,p.76

I fully agree to the above opinion. The masses rebelled or gave shelter to rebels or showed rebellious attitude not for liberating India but due to one or more of the following reasons:

(a) They had been incited by the rumours of the rebellion.

(b) Many of them simply caught the contagion and rebelled as a result of it.

(c) Initially many felt indignant at the introduction of the greased cartridges.

(d) Quite a few of them were moved by the prospects of plunder.

(e) Many failed to resist the influence of some prominent local rebels.

(f) They did not like that their brethren Indians should be executed by the aliens.

(5): No conference of the leading persons of the various places of the country and the native officers of the military unit was ever held to decide the course of action. It is, of course, true that the iron hand of the British Government was there to ban any conference of this type; but there is no trace, whatever of even such an idea of the rebels. No endeavour was made to hold such a conference and none forwarded any proposal to this effect.

(6): Discipline was no longer visible in the rebels, which is probably very important factor for any War of Independence. The rebels, at Delhi, seem^ed to be anxious

to win name individually rather than put a united front for some common cause. Everyone of them wanted to hold a prominent position in the war. Not only this, they insulted the king, their leader, worse than an ordinary man; They made him actually cry on some of the occasions.

At Jullundur the mutineers created lot of noise for distribution of the plundered money; at Simla the Nasiri regiment carried away a part of treasury and squandered the money very badly. It shows that the sepoys were not without a desire for making their fortune by plundering the money and other available items.

(7): There was no definite plan as to how the civil population was to collaborate with the sepoys in the rebellion. The people acted differently at different places without any previous notion of their role revealing thereby that it was not an organised rebellion; it cannot therefore be called a War of Independence.

(8). Even the regiments which revolted had no uniformity of plan. They mutinied at different places on account of different reasons.

For example when the regiments at Peshawar were paraded separately and ordered to lay down their arms; they yielded and did not revolt. Having no pre plan, what to do under such circumstances, they had no course but to surrender and lay down their arms.

REBELLION GATHERED MOMENTUM

But it cannot be denied that the restlessness which prevailed in the scattered way in the country on the eve of the rebellion was turned into a nationwide understanding. A general hatred against the Government was quite conspicuous

The rebellion, which started purely as a mutiny by the sepoys, however, gathered momentum later on. Had the government not acted promptly, had Punjab not helped them, had Delhi not fallen even for a month more, there would have been the possibility of a general rising. It may again be stressed that even this general rising would not have resulted in some substantial **form** of government. There was no idea whatever before the rebels regarding the setting up of democratic government and other useful type of government, which may be called to have come out as a result of any war of independence. I mean to say that the people were not fighting for liberating their country and for setting up some specified type of government. In fact, they had no definite aim before them. In spite of this fact that the mutiny had been turned to some extent into a national rising at that time, still nothing tangible was expected, Even in case of the victory of the rebels.

S.N.Sen, however, observes:

"At the same time it would be wrong, to dismiss it as a military rising. The mutiny became a revolt and assumed a political character when the mutineers of Meerut placed themselves under the King of Delhi and a section of the landed aristocracy and population declared in his favour."²⁰

It is true that the rising assumed a political character; but this assumption could not be called a final one. The rebels placed themselves under Bahadur Shah not because they wanted him only to be the king but because having rebelled at Meerut, they had no other alternative but to accept him as a leader.

²⁰.Sen, S.N.Op.Cit., page 411.

From the above details we come to the conclusion that it was not purely a War of independence. It was, however, not only a sepoy mutiny as well. A general restlessness prevailed in the Punjab also as it prevailed in other parts of India. This discontent was limited not only to the sepoys but also to the civil population. Socio-political, economical policies followed by the British Government seem to be its main cause.

Greased cartridges added fuel to the fire and the rebellion broke out. The rebels of India and so the rebels in the Punjab had no common plan to follow. They acted as the circumstances permitted them. Some of the regiments had a bit of understanding with each other but that too only superficial. Nothing solid and substantial was preplanned. So the rebellion was confined to a few places. And there also the rebels fought individually unassisted from any other quarters.

The rebels both military and civil had no leader to guide them on a nationwide scale. Bahadur Shah II led only at Delhi and that too not effectively. The revolt did take a national character later on when the rebels of whole of the India came to have a sympathy for one another. But it was too late and the rebellion was suppressed by the British Government first at Delhi and then in the other parts of India.

C H A P T E R XXVI

GENERAL MEASURES ADOPTED TO KEEP PUNJAB SILENT

The authorities knew very well the importance of the Punjab. Rising of the Punjab against the British Government meant the annihilation of the Europeans. Appropriate measures were, therefore, speedily adopted to keep peace and tranquility in the Punjab. The following steps were taken.

DISARMING THE NATIVE SEPOYS

The disaffected troops were disarmed. This measure was suggested by Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab and it was brought into practice without loss of time. It not only eliminated the disaffected troops but also helped in recruiting¹ troops which proved loyal because of the example set, by disarming the disloyal ones. The following is the list of the regiments disarmed at various stations:-

S.No.	Station	Regiments Disarmed
1.	Mian Mir	16th N.I., 26th N.I., 49th N.I. and 8th Native Cavalry.
2.	Ferozepore	45th and 57th N.I.
3.	Jullundur	There was a plan to disarm the 36th and 61st N.I. but the sepoys anticipated the authorities by rising into arms.
4.	Kangra	4th N.I.
5.	Peshawar	24th N.I., 27th N.I., 31st N.I. and the 5th Light Cavalry; 51st N.I. and 55th N.I. Mutinied.
6.	Naushera	10th Irregular.
6.	Naushera	

DISARMING THE PEOPLE

Orders were issued to disarm the general population where ever necessary.

DISARMING THE PEOPLE OF LUDHIANA

The people of Ludhiana showed a great disaffection. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana thought of disarming the people. The force at his disposal, was not enough. However the first favourable opportunity was on the arrival of Major Coke's regiment, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Younghusband, with a squadron of Punjab Cavalry. They arrived before dawn; by day break, officers acquainted with the city had taken portions of these troops round the city, posting parties as they went at every outlet. Major Coke then proceeded with the main body through the streets, posting his men at the cross roads and on all commanding houses. The surpriseⁱ was most complete. When the population began to stir, they were summoned to return and remain in their houses by some threatening riflemen; those failed in one exit attempted in another, but with a like result. The search for arms was conducted by gangs of the police, each under a European Officer, each party having a separate division of the city. The result was 11 two bullock hackery loads of swords and matchlocks, these swords were distributed to the numerous new levies, who hastened down to Delhi.¹

1. P.G.R., Vol. VIII., P.I., p.97.

On the first July having received orders to disarm the district, McNeile/^{carried}the disarming out himself at Thanesar, Mr. Levien did the same at Shahabad, Lieutenant Parsons at Kaithal, and Tehsildars and Thanedars at other places.²

SEVERE ACTION

The British Government adopted severe measures against the villages, reluctant to pay the revenue. They needed money and, moreover, thought it necessary to maintain their prestige. It was also to help in checking the expansion of the rebellious ideas. Incidents in the Thanesar District, related by McNeile the acting Deputy Commissioner are as follows:-

".....wishing to punish the village of Assundh, as well as to make the Nirdhuk pay up their revenue, I marched on the 16th via Kurnaul, selecting that route at the request of the authorities there who wished the force to pass through the Karnnaul pergunna.

Captain Hugh's dashing, affair at Bulleh saved me from my trouble at Assundh, which was vacated at my approach and which I burnt. I then moved upon, Dhatrut, the largest village in arrears of revenue, and which had also plundered and destroyed its neighbourhood. Chatur had similar account to settle, and on both I imposed considerable fines..... All the defaulting villages then gave in and the Government

2. Ibid, p.32

3. P.G.R., Vol. VIII, P.I. p.33

demand was realised in full throughout
the tahsil."³

TRANSFERS

Transfers were effected according to the need:-

Detachment of the 3rd and 6th Punjab Infantry, 18⁴ strong, under the command of Lieutenant Boswel, acting 2nd in command of the 6th Punjab Infantry were attached to the Punjab Movable column.

Lieutenant Harcourt of the 1st Madras Fusiliers (acting adjutant of the 1st Sikh Infantry) who had accompanied a detachment of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers to Multan, was authorised to do duty with the last named Regiment, until an opportunity might be afforded to him of joining his own regiment.

Of the two companies of the Punjab Sappers and Miners (formerly belonging to the Darbar) No.1 Company was ordered from Dera Ghazi Khan in Bhutiana, and No.2 company employed at Kohat, was incorporated into the Punjab Regiment being raised at Rawalpindi.

With the concurrence of the Major General Commanding in the Upper Provinces, the Sikhs and Punjabis temporarily transferred from the Corps of the Line in the Punjab, to the New Punjab Regiments, were permanently posted to the latter.⁴ On the requisition of the Major General commanding in the Upper Provinces the Detachment of Artillerymen, Hazara Mounted Train, doing duty at Govindgarh, was transferred to Phillaur.⁵

3. P.G.R., Vol. VIII, P.I., p.33

4. For Sec. Deptt., 27th Nov. 1857 Cons. 35-42

5. Ibid.

C. Reilly, Sub Engineer in the Department Public Works, who was unable, owing to the disturbed state of the country, to join his appointment at Benaras, was detained at Ferozepore, to assist the Executive and Garrison Engineer. 202

With the concurrence of the Major General Commanding in the Upper Provinces, the Sikhs and Punjabis of the 3rd Native Infantry, were transferred to the new Ludhiana Regiment (22nd Punjab Infantry).

Keeping in view the political importance of Amritsar, the belcoh Battalion, except one wing was ordered to proceed to Amritsar.

APPOINTMENTS

Sanction was solicited to the following appointments of officers to duty with certain levies:-

Sialkot Levy: Lieutenant M.I. White, 26th N.I. appointed on May 18, and transferred on May 21 to the charge of the Punjab Irregular Force recruiting Depot at Lahore.

Sialkot Levy: Lieutenant N.I. Stewart, 45th N.I. appointed on May 21, 1857.

Captain A.C. Word, 16th N.I. appointed on September 17 with effect from the date on which he took his charge.

Lieutenant T.N. Rutherford 33rd N.I. appointed on July 31, 1857 for Gurdaspore Levy.

Lieutenant A. Legellais, 4th N.I. appointed on August, 1 1857.

The above officers were allowed the same amount of salary as had been sanctioned by the Government for the officers doing duty with the Punjab Infantry Regiment viz- Rs. 137 per mensem.⁶

6. For Deptt., S.C., 27th Nov. 1857, Cons. 35-42.

Captain C. Mc Andrew, 47th Native Infantry Assistant Commissioner and Acting Commandant of the 22nd Punjab Infantry was appointed to act as Captain of Police of the Lahore Division in the place of Captain R. Lawrence, appointed to the charge of the Jammu auxiliary force. Lieutenant J. Howenden, of Engineers, had been selected by Brigadier General Cotton Commanding the Peshawar Division to act on that officers Divisional staff, as Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General on the departure of Captain Roberts with the movable column and afterwards to Delhi. The Chief Commissioner sanctioned his temporary transfer from Department of Public Works.

With the concurrence of the Major General Commanding in the Upper Provinces, Lieutenant Colonel M. Boyds of the 59th Native Infantry was appointed to command the movable column at Amritsar, retaining also the command of his own Regiment.

PROVISIONS, REPAIRS OF FORTS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS

On a report from Lieutenant Oliphant^a who was deputed to examine the Fort of Phillaur, and^{out} the recommendation of the Officiating Chief Engineer, an expenditure upto Rs. 1500 was authorised for the improvement of the defence of the Fort, and for providing accommodation for its increased garrison, stores as recommended by Brigadier General Chamberlain and Nicholson.

The Ferozepore Magazine being the most important in India, arrangements were made to make it safer. Estimates aggregating Rupees 2330-2-4 for alteration and addition to the Ferozepore Magazine Entrenchment required for the accommodation of the European garrison of the Entrenchment, were sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner.⁷

7. Ibid

The Assistant Commissary General Mian Meer was authorised to provision the Fort of Govindgarh with stores and slaughter cattle (sheep) for one month's consumption.⁸

The Commissioner in Jhnd was requested to supply 30 cut of sheet Iron, for the Magazines at Sukkur and Karachi for the Ferozepore Magazine.

EQUIPMENT

The Deputy Commissioner of Sialkot and Gujrat were directed on July 1, 1857 to send to Lahore, for the use of Raja Jawahar Singh's contingent, all the arms of the Raja at those stations. Lieutenant Williams, 2nd in Command of 4th Sikh Infantry, (who was left wounded at Ludhiana when the regiment marched on to Delhi) was ordered to raise Sikh recruits for the regiment of that station.⁹

The officer commanding the Lahore Magazine was directed to issue 160 lbs of powder for the use of a detachment proceeding to join Raja Jawahar Singh contingent.

ECONOMY EFFECTED

The British Government were passing through critical financial circumstances. A scheme to place the salary in arrears was being thought upon. Final instructions were issued on the 21st July, ¹⁸⁵⁷ to place in arrears for three months, the pay of all the Native troops, except Irregular Cavalry and mounted Police, and except new Regiments, and levies and the troops employed at Delhi. Irregular Cavalry Regiments and

8. Ibid.

9. For Deptt. S.C. 27th Nov. 1857, Cons. 35-42.

mounted police were directed to be kept two months, in arrears only in consideration of their having to provide their own equipment, and feed their horses.¹⁰

FACILITIES TO EUROPEANS

The Chief Commissioner authorized the transmission free of cost, of letters by post and of small parcels by Bullock Train, sent by the families of Europeans soldiers in the Punjab to their relatives in the Delhi field Force, and the Postage on letters sent by European soldiers from Delhi to their families was in like manner remitted.¹¹

RAISING LEVIES

On the first breaking out of the disturbances in the Upper Provinces, several District Officers were authorized to raise foot levies, partly for the security of their districts, as a sort of Military police and partly with a view to forming recruit Depot whereby efficient Transfer for the new regiments might be obtained.

POLICE HORSE

The Commissioner of the Trans-Satluj States was authorized to entertain 100 police horse for each of the Districts of Jullundur and Hoshiarpore.¹²

In other districts also, parties of horsement were raised for military police duty. The captain of police Lahore Division was directed to raise four Resalas of horse, composed mainly of Sikhs; and two Resalas were

10.Ibid.

11.Ibid.

12.Ibid.

raised by the Chief Commissioner at Rawalpindi. The men being armed half with carbines and half with pistols and the officer incharge of the Lahore Magazine was directed to hold the necessary arm in readiness of issue.¹³

The Chief Commissioners authority was given to a supply of arms and ammunition from the Ferozepore magazine to the Assistant Commissioner Kasur, for the use of a body of Pathan Police raised for the protection of that District.

RAISING CAVALRY

The Commissioner of the Trans-Satluj States was authorized to raise a troop of cavalry to be attached to the Irregular Regiment at Jullundur (the 21st Punjab Infantry) on Mounted Police rates of pay.

General Vancortlandt was authorised to raise one hundred horse for his service with his field force.

Captain F.Wale Brigade Major at Peshawar, was directed to raise a regiment of Sikh Irregular Cavalry at Lahore.

APPOINTMENT ON CONDITION

With the concurrence of the Major General Commanding in the Upper Provinces, the undermentioned Officers were selected to fill appointments in the new Punjab Infantry Regiments. They were, however, distinctly given to understand that the appointments were acting and temporary, and that the parronage rested with the Government, who might desire to retain the appointment for officers who

13. Ibid.

distinguished themselves during the war. For the sanctions to which those officers were appointed vide order, dated 1st August republished on 12th August, in Punjab Gazette of 15th¹⁴. They were appointed according to the following plan:

Sr.No.	Name of the Officer	Name of the Regiment
1.	Lieutenant I.F.Stafford	4th Native Infantry
2.	Lieutenant C.H.Brownlow	1st Sikh Infantry
3.	Lieutenant C.A.McNair	H.M.'s 70th Foot
4.	Lieutenant I.Williamson	5th Punjab Infantry
5.	Lieutenant N.E.Boileau	27th Native Infantry
6.	Captain P.F.Gardiner	Late 29th Native Infantry
7.	Lieutenant C.F.Gordon	39th Native Infantry
8.	Lieutenant T.I.Watson	Late 46th Native Infantry
9.	Captain E.S.Dennies	62nd Native Infantry
10.	Lieutenant A.H.Millet	69th Native Infantry
11.	Lieutenant A.P.Thew	Late 74th Native Regiment
12.	Captain I.C.Blgrave	Late 26th Native Infantry
13.	F.I.McDonnell	Late 14th Native Infantry
14.	Ensign E.Sweethern	Lte 45th Native Infantry
15.	Captain E.S.Garsten	Late 5th Native Infantry
16.	Lieutenant S.B.Leon	62nd Native Infantry
17.	Lieutenant I.B.Leon	62nd Native Infantry
18.	Lieutenant H.I.Runtion	Late 45th Native Infantry
19.	Ensign T.H.Scott	Late 45th Native Infantry

14. Ibid.

CONTINGENTS OF JAGIRDARS CALLED OUT

In the Ambala District Congingents of Jagirdars were called out. They were considered to be more loyal than the new levies of Police. Relating the step taken by him in this connection, Barnes writes:

"I called out the contingents of the Jagheerdars who were defranchised in 1849. These petty nobles are very numerous in the Cis- Sutlej territory; they all pay in times of peace a commutation tax of one eight of their income in lieu of service. As these chiefs had their houses and estates in this province, I conceived we had excellent guarantees for their loyalty.....I therefore issued a general summons demanding their assistance and relieving them temporarily from the payment of the commutation. This irregular force was placed at the disposal of the district officers, and distributed to the different thannahs and tahseels; they were employed to carry on the communication to escort treasure." 15

Thus it is clear that the Jagirdars obeyed the orders of the company without hesitation.

CLOSING THE FERRIES TO CHECK THE SPREAD OF THE OUTBREAK

George Barnes was the first who developed this system, realising the acute importance of roads and water routes.

"This division acted as a kind of breakwater, beyond was raging sea; inside as yet was comparative calm. It became the duty of myself and the district officers to take

15. P.G.R. VIII. 1.9

every precaution to preserve the territory from the surrounding contagion. The first measure was to close the ferries on the Jumna. This step had been partially taken on our own instincts, but it was generally and effectively adopted by the orders of the Chief Commissioner for every river of the Punjab....."¹⁶

PATROLLING THE ROADS

The police strengthened by Jagirdar contingents, were put on the alert, the roads were well patrolled, and explicit instructions given to attack and destroy and plundering bands seen in the actual commission of the crime.

RESTRICTIONS ON AMMUNITION COMMODITIES

Fearing a general outbreak Barnes thought it essential to impose restrictions on the explosive commodities. Such plans were actually detected by the authorities.¹⁷

MEASURES FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE

It was thought essential that all the main stations should be kept informed of the various happenings. Additional establishments therefore were organised for the speedy transmission of intelligence between the different stations.

HELP FROM THE CHIEFS OF THE PUNJAB SOUGHT

16. Ibid.

17. P.G.R. VIII.I.39.

The Government approached the Chiefs of the Punjab to render as much help as possible. The response was very good. The Chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Jind and Kapurthala rendered timely and considerable help to the Company.¹⁸ Their joining the Government side went a long way in keeping the people quiet.

SECURITY OF POSTAL CORRESPONDANCE AND IMPORTANT ROADS

The postal Department was taken into confidence to find out the secrets of the sepoys intending to rebel. The danger of dissemination of treason through the post office was recognised from the first; and in most places the district officers in person opened every post bag and suppressed suspicious letters, especially those addressed to Sepoys.¹⁹ The Chief of Patiala sent his brother with sepoys and artillery and ordered him to guard the Thanesar Road, and the Chief of Jind took up the strong position at Panipat. When these two important stations were thus guarded, the road from Delhi to Ambala and also the uninterrupted communication with the Punjab were perfectly secured.

ARRANGEMENT FOR STRENGTHENING OF POLICE LEVIES

There was lack of Europeans, so the British Government had to recruit native policemen. In every district the police force was increased to meet the new situation.

¹⁸. Savarkar, op. cit. 112

¹⁹. P.G.R., Vo. VIII, P.II, p.201.

CENSORSHIP OF THE NATIVE PRESS

The Native Press was early put under a strict censorship. At Peshawar the Editor of the Moortizaie was imprisoned for publishing treasonable matter, and his paper was stopped. The native paper at Multan was likewise suppressed. The Editor of Chaska-i-Feiz was ordered to remove his establishment from Sialkot to Lahore where his paper, together with the two already published at the capital, was put under rigid surveillance.²⁰

SUSPECTED PERSONS ARRESTED AND DEPORTED

The suspicious persons were arrested and deported. Explaining this measure in the Lahore Division, Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab, wrote to R. Temple Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab:

"The Superintendent of this compulsory exodus and the arrest and deportation of numbers of vagrants formed no small part of the Deputy Commissioner's work. Biweekly kafilas were formed of Hindoostanees. They were sent down to Hurreekee Ferry under guards of police, with lists signed by District Officer, and duly checked at certain stations. As many as 2,536 Hindoostanees were thus sent home during the siege and in a few weeks immediately succeeding the capture of Delhi."²¹

20. P.G.R. VIII, II 201-02.

21. P.G.R. VIII.II, 233

RAISING OF THE LEVY

The raising of the levy was an important part of the work of the District Officers. It was entrusted to Captain Adams, and the force had been pronounced one of the best bodies of men that had been raised in the Punjab.³²

Regarding it Naesymth makes the following remarks:

"This general enlistment was one of the most popular, as it was among the most effective measures adopted by Government and contributed in a vast degree to link the popular feeling in this part of the country with the British cause. A mutual interest and sympathy was created to support that cause which had now become common; deep and earnest were aspirations vibrated in every homestead, and evinced that the military spirit of the nation had been gratified, and afforded an assurance that its valiant sons would not be backward in vindicating the trust bestowed."²²

The financial condition of the Government was not sound. The District Officers were directed to make the people lend money to the Government. "Under instructions contained in the Financial Commissioner Circular No:65 dated 8th July, a 6% loan was directed to be opened."²³

21. P.G.R. VIII,II,233

22. P.G.R. VIII, II, 239.40

23.....P.G.R. VIII.I.195

Those who were not willing to pay were compelled to do so.

RAISING OF SIKH FORCE

The Chief Commissioner instructed the District Officers to raise new Sikh Force. There was no alternative to it because the European sepoys were fewer in number.

DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES

The Company, moreover, wanted to take advantage of the disunity among the different communities.²⁴ The Sikhs were enlisted in a considerable number.²⁵

POSITION AT PESHAWAR STRENGTHENED

Peshawar was very important from the political and military point of view. It was not easy to keep those people in check. Their rising could prove very dangerous to the Company. Position there was strengthened, therefore.

ON the 18th May all the Police Sowars of the district, excepting upper Meeranzye, and a portion of the Akhora Sowar, with 50 Khuttuck contingent, proceeded into Peshawar in one March, and were followed during that day by the village militia. On the 22nd May a party of 160 rifles was called for at 9 a.m., marched at 10 a.m. and reported themselves in Peshawar, 40 miles next day with their ammunition and baggage.²⁶

24. In that territory, Hindus, Mahomedans, and Sikhs were at daggers drawn, Savarkar, op.cit 122

25. ...they raised the Sikh strength in the army almost to the point of saturation, Sen, op. cit.,²⁴⁴

26. P.G.R., VIII, II.103

Under orders from the Chief Commissioner, on the 31st May, the 2nd Punjab Cavalry marched into Peshawar.²⁷

Summing up the forces gathered at Peshawar, Edwardes wrote to Montgomery.

"To face these elements of danger, what forces garrisoned the Peshawar Valley? About 2,800. European and 8,000 native soldiers, horse and foot, with 18 fieldguns and mounted battery; in numbers and high discipline a goodly army, deemed on the 10th of May equal and ready to meet the shock of Central Asia.²⁸

EXEMPLARY PUNISHMENT TO REBELS

The Government made it a point to terrify the people of the Punjab as much as possible. In some cases the punishment was very severe, but it was thought essential for the safety of the Government. The following is the account of the people hanged or shot in the Peshawar alone.²⁹

<u>Method of Punishment with Name of Authority</u>	<u>No. of Sepoys</u>
Blown from guns:	47
Shot by Musketry	715
Hanged by Military Authorities:	28
Hanged by Civil Authorities	20
Total:	<u>810</u>

27. P.G.R., VIII, II, 104.

28. Ibid, 134

29. P.G.R., Vol VIII., P.II., p.131.

TREASURY REMOVED TO PLACES OF SAFETY

The District Officers worked intelligently and removed the treasury to places of safety. For example, observing the precaution at Peshwar Colonel Nicholson promptly removed the treasure (about 24 lacs), from the Central Cantonments to the fort outside, where the magazine was, and Brigadier Cotton, placed a European garrison in it at once.³⁰

FORMATION OF MOVABLE COLUMN

The formation of a Movable Column was the most remarkable step taken by the Government. The Column under the command of Brigadier Chamberlain went throughout Punjab and suppressed rebellion at several places, most effectively. The proposal was for Brigadier Cotton to command it, but the Commander-in-Chief rejected it and ordered Chamberlain to do so.

"The Commander-in-Chief most wisely telegraphed for Brigadier Chamberlain to command the Punjab Movable column, and declared that Brigadier Cotton (who had been proposed) could not be spared from Peshawar."³¹

CREATION OF HATRED AGAINST THE REBELS

To arouse hatred and dislike for the rebels the Company's Government took another step. Appeals were

30. P.G.R. VIII. II. 139.

31. P.G.R. VIII. II. 140

issued to general people to hunt them out. They were ²¹⁶
given handsome rewards for it. This step not only
helped the company in checking the rebellion from becoming
a general uprising but it also helped them in killing the
rebels and winning the support of general people.

NULLIFYING THE RUMOURS

When the rebellion broke out so many rumours
were abroad. Those could make the general people rise.
The Company's Government took appropriate steps to nullify
the exaggerated reports and rumours. About such measures
taken in the Kohat District, Edwardes writes.

"In contradiction of the false reports spread
about the country, all good news was carefully
circulated by me through the District Khans,
and also through our friends in the hills.

The same was done through the station and
neighbourhood, and believe in all cases with the
best effect."³²

Thus the propaganda which could prove fatal to
the Company was effectively met with.

ARREST OF SUSPICIOUS CHARACTERS ON THE HIGH WAYS AND PASSES

Parties were placed on principal roads and passes
to terminate all the suspicious characters. Mendicants
and messengers from the rebel leaders were arrested. In
this way the cause of the rebellion was crippled. The
plans of the mutinous regiments could not take the practical

32. P.G.R. VIII.II.106.

form.

FORTIFYING THE FORTS AND ARRANGEMENT FOR FORT SUPPLY

Different forts in the Punjab were repaired and fortified. Provisions for sepoy for a considerable period, were arranged therein.

By adopting these measures, the British authorities kept the Punjab (including Peshawar) under control. The people of the Punjab were in a way compelled to keep quiet. But for these steps, the people of Punjab might have risen in a broader scale. Rebellions, of course, broke out here and there but they failed to gather momentum only on account of these measures, adopted by the British authorities.

CHAPTER XXVII

S U M M A R Y

The news of the disaster at Meerut and Delhi reached Lahore on May 12, 1857.

The message informed the authorities at Lahore that the mutineers from Meerut were creating havoc at Delhi. They were killing the Europeans and were burning every thing they could lay their hand on.¹

John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab was away to Rawalpindi and the responsibility, therefore, of tackling the situation in the Punjab fell on Robert Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab.

Montgomery realised the seriousness of the time and acted with remarkable promptness and decision. He put forth the proposal of disarming the disaffected regiments. This suggestion proved miraculous, in the long run. The experiment of disarming was, first of all, carried out at Mian Mir cantonment and the 26th N.I. were disarmed there on May 13, 1857. Aitchison observes about it as follows:

"Before twenty four hours were over, the Native troops at Lahore, who were on the watch for the signal from below, were disarmed, three thousand well trained soldiers, piling their arms, with silent and angry astonishment before some four hundred European infantry with twelve guns."²

The native sepoy were taken unaware; they got wonderstruck. They never expected such a step so soon from the Government. They were however helpless and had to lay down their arms before the European soldiers who were

1. Browne, Cave: op. cit., V.II P.361.

2. Aitchison: Lord Lawrence, Op. cit. p. 78.

ready to enforce the orders at the point of bayonet.²¹⁹

The effect of disarming was tremendously favourable to the British Government. The people of the Punjab got terrified on account of this unprecedented bold step taken by the authorities.³

The Chief Commissioner had 7 Battallions of Police Infantry in the Punjab besides a large body of levies, of various kinds, all the available means/^{weye} however little enough to defend a frontier of 800 miles, to help the Government in holding the country from the Soleman range to the Jamna.⁴

The situation in the Peshawar District was no less taxing. There being not enough of troops in the Punjab, no force could hence be sent for the safety of that part of the country.⁵

GOVERNMENT UNPREPARED

It is really surprising that the Government thought to be formidable was taken by surprise. There were no preparation of war at all. There is no doubt whatever in the fact that the Government, at the time of the outbreak, was quite incompetent to face such an emergency.

Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, was wanted by the Chief Commissioner of Punjab to move immediately to Delhi. However the former was completely unable to comply with the wishes of the latter. No department even by name was in a position to render him the desired services.⁷

Anson's trouble were just beginning. He discovered that he had nothing at hand quite ready to do anything in the

3. Ibid.

4. For. Deptt., S.C., 18 Dec. 1857, No. 434, p.8.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Pearson Hasketh, The Hero of Delhi, op.cit., p.241.

in the near future, was the opinion expressed by Pearson. Anson definitely desired to move the force immediately but the number of available troops was small, very little cartridges and hardly any doly bearers were available, the artillery had only the ammunition in their waggon, which might be expended in one action, even the Infantry had very little ammunition with which to commence a campaign without some heavy guns it seemed useless to attack Delhi.⁹

On June 7, 1857, there were only 600 Cavalry and 2400 Infantry and 22 Field Guns at Delhi.

The financial condition of the Government was also straitened. It is clear from the following statement.

"The Chief Commissioner calculates that with great care and economy we have money to last until the end of September, but unless Delhi shall have fallen by that time, we shall then be utterly without funds, exclusive of such sums as we may be able to borrow."¹⁰

EFFORTS TO KEEP PEACE IN PUNJAB

The Chief Commissioner kept nothing untried for maintaining peace in the Punjab. Other British Officers, posted under him, extended him best possible co-operation. The followings were the main measures adopted to achieve this objective:

9. Mily. Deptt., Progs. 18th Dec. 1857 No. 144 a.

Disaffected troops at Mian Mir, Jullundur, Ferozepore, Jhelum, Sialkot, Rawalpindi, Thanesar, Peshawar and Mardan etc. were disarmed.

Civil population at Ludhiana, Thanesar and its neighbourhood was also disarmed.

The Chiefs of Punjab, who were certainly to play a dominant part, were approached by the British authorities, well in time and their support was won over. Most of them had already moved for the British help before even receiving any order.

Explosives at Ambala were seized.¹¹ It was done so because ^{reports} were coming that the explosives were being purchased in a large quantity by the people.

As the Government troops were insufficient in number, new regiments were raised to meet the crisis. The Chief Commissioner had partially raised 15 Regiments of Punjab Infantry. Out of those one had been sent to Meerut and a second to Hansi, 9 Regiments and the Military Police with a small European force held the banks of Jamna. All the remaining six old Regiments with four new ones were stationed on the Frontier.¹²

Best possible precautions were taken to take quickest action in case of an outbreak of the sepoys any where in the Punjab. It was done in case of the Regiments where Hindustani and Punjabi soldiers were stationed.

11. For Deptt. S.C. 25 Sept. 1857 No. 80 P. 1.

12. For Deptt., S.C., 18th Dec. 1857, No. 416-417.

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Not a single man of the 18882 Hindustani soldiers was to be trusted. They ~~are~~ were all a source of weakness and danger. In every station the European and Punjabi Regiments were on duty day and night, ready on the first alarm, to fall on the Hindustanis. In some places such as Peshawar, Lahore and Amritsar, the latter were in their tents, pitched under the range of the British guns. In no single station was there a soldier to spare.¹³

Loyal sentiments were encouraged, Khiallats were also conferred for this purpose.

PEOPLE DISTURBED

In spite of this policy of precautions, check and suppression, the people in some parts of Punjab were disturbed, while in other parts were watching the turn of the tide impatiently. They seemed to decide their course of action only afterwards having seen the fate of Delhi.

The rebels were considered martyrs at some places. In spite of the best efforts of the authorities at Ambala, the people of Ambala District did not hand over the rebels of the 45th and 57th N.I. who had been given shelter there. Similarly the Hindu priests (pandits) gave protection to the rebel sepoy of the 5th N.I. at Phanesar.

The people of Karnal and Panipat openly defied

13. For Deptt., S.C., 18th Dec. 1857, No. 434.

the British authorities, by refusing to pay the revenue, due against their names. It was only when the Raja of Jind proceeded with a big force against them and threatened them with serious consequences that they submitted.

When the rebel sepoys from Jullundur marched into Ludhiana, the people of Ludhiana welcomed them: They pointed out to them the houses of Europeans, whom they seem to hold in contempt. They also helped the rebels to mount guns on the Fort.

Glaring were the rebellious intentions of the civilpopulation at Ludhiana. The masses had made huge preparations to fight against the Government. On research having been made, cart-loads of swords were captured.

Mangali village in the Hissar District played a prominent part in the rebellion. The villagers concealed the rebels in their houses. The women of the village tried to give best possible protection to the rebels who fought against the pursuing British force from the roofs of the houses.

Similar was the case of the village Narinji (lower as well as upper Narinji) in the Peshawar Valley. The British troops had to exert a lot against the rebels who had declared a jehad (religious war) against the Government. However, the rebels did not fight as desperately as those of the village at Mangali in Hissar District.

The rebellious ideas were discussed openly at the shops of the Banyas (Banya word is used for Hindu shopkeepers in the Punjab) in the bazars of Ferozepore.

It was only due to it that 45th N.I. considered to be loyal, broke into rebellion, having been instigated by rebellious talks while marching through the main bazar of Ferozepore.¹⁴

On July 9, 1857, two Afridis of the Sipah tribe entered the lines of the 18th Irregular Cavalry and presented to the Hindustani sowars a letter from Malik Surjuddin, the head of their tribe and one of the most powerful men in the Kheber. The letter offered an asylum in the writer's hill to any black man either of cavalry or of Infantry, who chose to mutiny and come to him.¹⁵

The Bhutties of Khijracha and Saharon villages in the Sirsa District, rose into rebellion. They were suppressed by Gen. Vancortlandt after a great deal of hand to hand fight.¹⁶

Rohtak and its suburbs were highly disaffected, and the revenue was withheld by some of the villages.

Hissar was attacked by a large force of Ranghar villages with a good many sepoy of Hurrianah Light Infantry, repulsed after a tough fight.

Signs of unrest were visible at Ambala before the actual breaking out of the rebellion. In February 1857, officers attached to the depot received complaints from their men that they might be excluded from caste due to greased cartridges.¹⁷

14. Browne, Cave, op.cit. Vol. I. p. 10

15. P.G.R., V. VIII., P. I., p. 163

16. For. Sec., Deptt., S.C., Progs. 25 Sept. 1857, p. 3125.

17. P.G.R., V. VIII., P. I., p. 34

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This unrest went on increasing during the following months and there were many incidents of fire during the month of April.

The Peshawar Valley resounded with the rebellious voices.

PUNJABEES WATCHING ANXIOUSLY

The masses in the Punjab were watching the events with a great interest. They seemed to be undecided, regarding the course of action, they should adopt. They, however, did not sympathise with the Government. Without more European Regiments from England, peace could not be assured in the Punjab. Regarding it the Chief Commissioner observed as follows:

"There is every reason to anticipate that within the next month, Regiments may arrive at Kurrachee from England. This circumstance will alone produce a beneficial effect in the Punjab, but it is scarcely possible, that any position of them can be brought to bear, in the event of disturbance, for two months¹⁸ afters."

ROLE OF CHIEF OF PUNJAB

Native Chiefs were to turn the tide of the events. The English as well as the rebels knew it fully well.

Sir John Lawrence lost not a single day in enlisting the active services of the Native princes.

18. For Deptt., S.C., 18th Dec. 1857
No. 434 p. 11.

Every thing depended on getting them to declare themselves. Within a few hours after receiving the intelligence from Delhi, he wrote personally to the Ruling Chiefs and to many men of influence in the Punjab, that now was the time to prove their loyalty and earn a good name. And favourably they responded.¹⁹

Governments

They helped the /favourably, liberally with men money and material.

The petty Sikh Chiefs, who were not called for help, complained of it later on.²⁰

Lord Canning, the Governor General of India thanked the Chiefs of Punjab (especially the Phulkian^k Chiefs)²¹ heartily.

But for the invaluable services rendered by the Chiefs of Patiala, Nabha and Jind, the British Government had no hope even of survival not to speak of suppressing the rebellion.

It is clear that the Sikh and Hill States (Particularly Patiala, Nabha, Jind and Kapurthala) played a conspicuous and decisive role in the victory of the British Government over the rebels. But for their hearty assistance, it would not have been impossible for the British Government to stand the crisis unless aid would have been rushed from England, which was not possible, at least in the near future.

19. Aitchison, Lord Lawrence, Oxford, 1892, p.83

20. Ibid.

21. For Deptt., S.C., Progs. 25 Aug. 1857, p. 2505.

Annihilation awaited the Government and the European population. The Chief of the Punjab, however, successfully averted it by fighting against the rebels tooth and nail.

The British Officials followed a shrewd policy. They knew how to handle the situation. They had remarkable quality of keeping up the presence of mind during the most troublesome days. It was sheer by their tacts and on account of their intelligent way of thinking that they won the support of the chiefs of the Punjab and succeeded in bringing about peace again.

LAWRENCE DOES MIRACLE

John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of Punjab did a miracle. In spite of the total unpreparedness of the Government for such a challenging crisis, he successfully weathered the storm by his presence of mind, skilful policy, resoluteness, diplomacy, iron handedness and stamina.

"Lawrence's splendid services to the state, his soldiery qualities his firmness and energy and fertility of resource in difficulty, his adroitness and penetration in native diplomany, his straight forward bluntness... his experience of tribal mode of war fare, singled him out as the man best qualified to deal with the serious entanglements into which frontier affairs had drifted." ²³

23. Aitchison, p.cit.p.12

High skilled officers and commanders like G.C. Barnes, Edwardes, Ricketts, Wilson, Nicholson, Smith etc. played an eminent part in the victory of the British Government.

The rebels were defeated due to shortage of funds lack of discipline paucity of good leaders and absence of unity of purpose, in spite of innumerable forces, guns and a huge quantity ~~of~~ ammunition which they had at their disposal.

One thing is quite clear and ^{is} free from any doubt that the Punjab proved the Saviour of the British Government. All reinforcements and other requisitions at Delhi were meted out from the Punjab.

On May 11, 1857, when the rebels from Meerut had occupied Delhi, not even a single sepoy was there ready to fight against the rebels and think of turning them out.

Troops, funds, provisions, ammunition, means of conveyance, along with moral support came from the Punjab for Delhi to be besieged, assaulted and captured. The ~~Assault~~ assault of Delhi took place on Sep. 14, 1857, and lasted upto September 20, 1857. Everything, however, uncertain, none could definitely say what was going to be the conclusion of the assault.

But for the prompt, adequate and timely support from the Punjab, the British rule would have been uprooted, at least once, till aid would have been rushed from England to support the cause the Government to reinstate them.

Delhi happened to become the centre for the decision of the contest. The rebels from every quarter of India rushed to Delhi in a large number, fully armed, partially armed or unarmed, whatever way they found convenient. The British Government had also realised it and all possible aid was accumulated at Delhi to win the final victory over the rebels.

The Government could not afford to take any action before September when the siege train from Punjab was to arrive, to reinforce the insufficient, weak and numerically small force of the Government.

In spite of a very keen desire of John Lawrence to assault Delhi at once, it was impossible to do so. The Generals and other officers, already sent to Delhi found themselves too weak to attack the overwhelming number of rebels there.

On September 4, 1857, in the early morning, the siege train arrived. The great guns drawn by elephants were accompanied by a vast number of carts carrying sufficient ammunition.

DELAY CAUSED ANXIETY

The delay in possessing Delhi was causing the disaffection to spread.²⁴

24. For Deptt.S.C.28 Aug.1857 No.7-12 p.1.

General Wilson, however, was helpless to comply with the wishes of the Chief Commissioner ~~for~~ assaulting Delhi all at once. He expressed his helplessness on July 18, 1857 in the following way:

I have consulted with Colonel Baird Smith the Chief Engineer with the force, and we have both come to the conclusion that any attempt now to assault the city of Delhi, must end in our defeat and disaster. The force consists at present exclusive of cavalry and Artillery of 2,200 Europeans and 1500 Natives, or total of 3700 bayonets, while the Insurgents are numberless having been reinforced by the mutinous regiments from every quarter."²⁵

General Wilson's following statement convinces us of the extremely strong military position of the rebels:

"I candidly tell you that unless speedily reinforced the force will soon be reduced by casualties and sickness that nothing will be left but a retreat to Kurnaul. The disaster attending such an unfortunate proceeding I cannot calculate."²⁶

25. For Deptt., S.C., 18th Dec. 1857, Nos. 405-407

26. Ibid.

About the inferior weapons used by the British officers, Karl Marx wrote that the weapons used by the British officers were much inferior to those used by the rebels.²⁷

Karl Marx and Engels concluded from the information gathered by them that there were dissensions amongst the British Commanders at Delhi and that they were not in a mood to co-operate with each other.²⁸

The observation is an exaggeration. However, this much, is true, that Wilson delayed the assault. He was not at all ready to do so till he was confident of success. Other commanders and officers did not like to prolong it unnecessarily. There were differences due to it, otherwise there was nothing like the observation made by Marx and Engels.

Rebels, where they were innumerable in numbers, had a large quantity of ammunition and a number of guns with them. Moreover most of them had been trained efficiently by the very officers, against whom they were fighting. The British troops and their commanders were, therefore, not in an easy state of affairs. They were to face a formidable force of the rebels.

27. Marx, K. and Engels F.A: The First War of ^{Indian} Independence, 1857-59 Moscow, 1957, p.25.

28. Ibid.

Regarding an action, Thomas Reid M., General Commanding Field Force at Delhi, wrote to the Secretary to Governor General of India on July 6, 1857,²⁹ that the loss on their side was very severe.

WILSON CONSENTS UNWILLINGLY

Wilson, although yet unwilling to assault Delhi, had to bow before his officers, who might have assaulted Delhi even keeping aside his orders, in case he still persisted to postpone the assault. The whole force was divided into five columns. After a tough fight and heavy loss on both the sides, the English won. The British troops had many a hand to hand fights with the rebels in the very streets of Delhi. General Nicholson was killed and many more British officers were either severely wounded or ^{they} lost their lives.

The British Engineers attached to the different columns played a decisive part in exploding many formidable points of the rebels.

Delhi fell before the British troops on September 20, 1857. Bahadur Shah II was made a captive although his life was excused by Hodson.

29. Mily. Deptt. Progs. 21st Aug. 1857 No. 391.
 30/ For: Deptt.; S: C: ; Progs: Oct: 1857:

The British troops won because they were disciplined, well armed, well provisioned, well organised and well led. The rebels were defeated because they were not disciplined, were ill organised, ill provisioned, ill led, lacked unity of purpose and could not manage the arms properly on account of dissensions and hunger for leadership.

The following observation shows the cause of the defeat of the rebels:

"By the latest trustworthy accounts which came down to 1st Sept...it will be seen that the mutineers are split up into small factions, have no united plan of operations; and are deficient in munitions of war, and in money. Humanly speaking it may be fully anticipated that they will not be able to withstand our assault and that the first Regiment which enters the Town will be the signal for the General rout."³⁰

The calculations prophesied in the above observation proved true, to a great extent. In spite of such a big force, numerous guns and huge munitions of war, the rebels could not withstand the assault even for a week. The assault started on Sept. 14, 1857, and Delhi was completely captured on Sept. 20, 1857.

30. For Deptt., S.C., Progs. Oct. 1857.

APPENDIX I

Source: For Deptt., Pol., 30 Oct., 1857, Nos.38-46.

Extract Division orders issued by Brigadier General Cotton, Commanding Peshawar, Division.

Division Head Quarter

Peshawur 20 Sept. 1857.

No.476

The recent outbreak enmasse of the soldiers of the 51st Regiment N.I. brings another corps on the loss of list of these, which after years of gallantry and meritorious services, have basely revolted against the Government and on no occasion trthroughout the land has retribution more speedily or thoroughly awaited the mutiny and treachery of these misguided men.

Terrible indeed has been the example of this formerly esteemed and highly disciplined corps. In a few hours the 51st Regiment N.I. which had served the state upwards of half a century, and proudly bore on the col/ors the words "Punniars" "Punjab", "Mooltan", and "Goojrat" ceased to exist, and these colors have been thrown into the shade and put off sight for ever.

Prompt and ever has been, and ever will be the punishment awarded in the Peshawar Division to the perpetration of atrocious crimes.

To the loyal true and well affected of Her Majesty's deed the Hon'ble Company's words under his command who on many trying occasion and throughout have evinced the most determined and energetic bearing, Brigadier General Cotton tenders his warmest thanks. At the recent mutiny the conduct of the troops was most exemplary. The best was excessive, and many valuable men in discharge of their duty were laid lowly

by an overpowering sun.

The best thanks of the Brigadier General are especially due, and they are given to Brig. Galloway, commanding the Peshawur District and the Colonel Chute of H.M.'s 70th Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Kyle, H.M.'s 27th Innenkillins Commanding Wings of Peshawur Brigade, as well as to the whole of staff and Regimental Officer employed in a service of very considerable difficulties.

True Extract

Sd/- I. Wright Coptt.

Dy. Asst. Adjt. General,

A P P E N D I X II

(Letter written by the Nawab of Jhajjar to Bahadur Shah II).

Source: For. Pol. Deptt., 9 July 1858, Cons. 176-190.

After compliments

My Lord! At the present time the most unbounded disorder and anarchy are prevailing in this part of the country in so much that the crimes and highway robbery and murder are perpetrated daily and your slave is night and day engaged making arrangements to establish order in the territory. Your slave has therefore sent his grandfather Mahomed Ibrahim Ally Khan, and the Khan Sahib (the Chief) Ubdool Summund Khan, with a Regiment of Cavalry to the Royal Presence. These remaining ready to have the bliss of kissing your Majesty's feet will exert themselves to carry out all orders after establishing order here your slave will also attend your Majesty's presence. May the sun of your wealth and prestige continue to shield, and may your exalted shadow endure for ever over the heads of mankind.

The petition of the house born (slave)
attested with the seal of Ubdool Rahman Khan
Bahadoor.

A P P E N D I X I I I

(Answers given by the witness Dhunna son of Doolia a grain seller of Jhajjar and a resident of Jhajjar on Querry made by the Advocate General).

Source: For. Pol. Deptt., 9 July, 1858, Cons. 176-190.

Question: Were you in August last called to the Nawab of Jhajjar's Kutcherry?

Answer: Yes, I was.

Question: By whom?

Answer: By a Messenger.

Question: Were any of the Nawab's high officials at the Kutcherry at that time?

Answer: Yes, Meer Khan Ressaldar, Sher Jung Khan the Nawab's Aides-de-camp, Akhtur Khan also one of his staff, and Ranyan Khan his Superintendent and Oversear.

Question: Did they or any of them require any money from you?

Answer: Yes, they asked me for money and said it was required for the King of Delhie, at first the demand from all the traders of Jhajjar was one lac of rupees, but subsequently the sum was reduced to 40,000 rupees declaring they were unable to produce the money, were imprisoned to the number of 37, and were kept in prison for 17 days, on the 18th day we were threatened with flogging, and hanging, and it was only on our entering into a written engagement, that we were released by those who had imprisoned us. The sum for which I gave my promissory note was 1000 rupees.

A P P E N D I X I V.

(Letter sent from 51st Native Infantry to the Khelati Ghilzai Regiment)

Source: Gazetteer of Peshawar District, 1883-84, p.66.

"This letter is sent from the Peshawar Cantonment to the whole^o 'Haviot Regiment' (name of the 64th N.I.)"

"May it reach the Subedar Bahadur" after some Hindu apostrophes, it proceeds, "for the rest this letter is written to convey from the whole camp at Peshawar obeisance and benediction ("from Brahman to Brahman") and salutation and service ("from Musulman to Musulman") to the whole Regiment of Haviot and Khelat - i- Ghilzai.

Further, the state of affairs here is thus, that on the 22nd day of the month the cartridges will be given to the Durbaran regiment, so do whatever seems to you proper. "the cartridges will have to be bitten on the 22nd instant, of this you are hereby informed. On reading this letter whatever your opinion is so reply. For consideration you who are our men, we have let you know before hand. Therefore do as you think right. This is addressed to you by the whole Regiment. O brothers! the religion of Hindus and Muhammadans is all one. Therefore all you soldiers know this. Here all the sepoys are at the bidding of the jemadar, Subedar Major and Havildar Major, all are discontented with this business, whether small or great. What more to be written? Do as you think best, High and low send their obeisance, benediction, salutation and service."

Post script by another hand "The above is the state of

affairs here. In whatever way you can manage it,
come into Peshawar, on the 21st instant. Thoroughly
understand this point. In fact eat there and drink here."
(a proverb for letting no delay intervene)

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<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Branch</u>
1.	Movable Column Formed at Peshawar.	29 May 1857	40-42	Secret
2.	Services rendered by the Chief of Patiala.	26 June 1857	23A-31	- do -
3.	Services rendered by the Chief of Jind	26 June 1857	29-31	- do -
4.	Report of disarming at Peshawar	26 June 1857	27-31	- do -
5.	Bullocks ordered from the Depot for the Movable Column	10 July 1857	381/3	- do -
6.	Commanding Officer of Ferozepore Requested to Punish the Mutineers accord- ing to the Act of 1857	11 July 1857	12-13	- do -
7.	On State of Affairs at Peshawar	31 July 1857	1-8	- do -
8.	Disarming of the 5th Native Infantry at Ambala	31 July 1857	1-8	- do -
9.	State of Affairs at and around Ambala	31 July 1857	1-8	- do -
10.	Intelligence of the Movements of Troops Towards Delhi	31 July 1857 65		- do -
11.	On State of Affairs at Peshawar	28 Aug. 1857	14-27	- do -
12.	The Chief Commissioner Praised for his exortions	25 Sept. 1857	47-50	- do -
13.	Items of Intelligence Connected with the Mutineers in the Punjab	25 Sept. 1857	51	- do -

<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Branch</u>
14.	Mutiny by the 3rd N.I. at Jullundur	25 Sept. 1857	11-15	Secret - do -
15.	Mutiny by the 26th N.I. at Misn. Mir	25 Sept. 1857	30-34	- do -
16.	Reinforcements Sent from Punjab to Delhi	25 Sept. 1857	30-34	- do -
17.	Operations of General Van Cortlandt against Bhutties	25 Sept. 1857	44-46	- do -
18.	Increase to the Establishment of the Government Bullock Train.	25 Sept. 1857	47-50	- do -
19.	Vakeel of the Nawab of Jhajjar in Attendance on the King of Delhi during the Rebellion	25 Sept. 1857	685	- do -
20.	Mutiny by the 10th Light Cavalry at Ferozepore	25 Sept. 1857	75	- do -
21.	Disarming of Regi- ments at Peshawar, Mutiny by the 55th N.I.	25 Sept. 1857	2-4	- do -
22.	Rohtak Destroyed by the Mutineers	25 Sept. 1857	102	- do -
23.	Column under Command of Nicholson to Reach Delhi	25 Sept. 1857	67	- do -
24.	Reinforcements under Command of Nicholson Proceeding to Delhi	25 Sept. 1857	111	- do -
25.	Arrival at Delhi of the Force under the Command of Nicholson	25 Sept. 1857	70	- do -
26.	Arrival of Nicholson at Delhi	25 Sept. 1857	66	- do -
27.	Attack on Murree from Adjacent Villages	30 Oct. 1857	69	- do -

<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Branch</u>
28.	Jind Troops Reached Delhi on 7th Sept., 1857	30th Oct. 1857	72	- do -
29.	Attack on the Plundering Tribes of Gugera	30 Oct. 1857	82	- do -
30.	The Siege of Delhi	30 Oct. 1857	95-96	- do -
31.	Delhi Assaulted	30 Oct. 1857	97-98	- do -
32.	Capture of Delhi	30 Oct. 1857	99-100	- do -
33.	Mutiny by 5th and 60th N.I.	30 Oct. 1857	666-667	- do -
34.	Disturbance at Murree Put Down	30 Oct. 1857	18-24	- do -
35.	Report of Disturbance at Murree having been put down	30 Oct. 1857	18-24	- do -
36.	Attack by Men of the Adjacent villages on Murree Repulsed	30 Oct. 1857	69	- do -
37.	Disturbance by men of the Neighbouring villages of Murree Put down	30 Oct. 1857	71	- do -
38.	Execution of the Mutineers of the 10th Light Cavalry at Ferozepore	30 Oct. 1857	1-6	- do -
39.	Particulars connected with the Mutiny of the 51st N.I. at Peshawar.	30 Oct. 1857	41-46	- do -
40.	Mutiny by the 51st N.I. at Peshawar	30 Oct. 1857	63-64	- do -
41.	Column under Command of Nicholson Reached Delhi on 14th of August	30 Oct. 1857	220-221	- do -
42.	Attack by Nicholson on Mutineers at Rajafgarh	30 Oct. 1857	61	- do -

<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Branch</u>
43.	Nicholson Severely wounded on Sept.15, 1857	30 Oct.1857	78	Secret
44.	Kharita Given to the Chief of Nabha for his Loyalty	Despatch to the Committee No:57 of 1857		- do-
45.	Conduct of Military Authorities at Ambala	Despatch to Secret Committee No.37 of 1857		
46.	Kharita Given to the Chief of Jind for Loyalty	Political Despatch to Secret Committee No.51 of 1857		
47.	Nawab of Jhajjar being under Arrest	26 March 1858	2-8	Secret
48.	Nawab of Jhajjar Guilty of Rebellion	30 April 1858	355-362	- do-
49.	Opinion Regarding the Abandonment of Peshawar	30 April 1858	55-75	- do-
50.	Property belonging to Nawab of Jhajjar declared Prize	11 June 1858	36-39	Political
51	List of European officers Killed during the Rebellion	25 June 1858	536-537	Secret
52.	State of Affairs at Panipat	28 June 1858	162-163	- do-

Other Relevant original Records(Foreign Department)

<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Nos.</u>	<u>Branch</u>
1.	25 June 1857	243	Secret
2.	26 June 1857	162-163	- do-
3.	31 July 1857	307-309	- do-
4.	31 July 1857	314-318	- do-
5.	31 July 1857	323-324	- do-
6.	31 July 1857	1-8	- do-
7.	31 July 1857	27-29	- do-

<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Nos</u>	244 <u>Branch</u>
8.	31 July 1857	65	Secret
9.	25 August 1857	14-27	- do -
10.	28 August 1857	1-6	- do -
11.	28 August 1857	58-84	- do -
12.	28 August 1857	57	- do -
13.	28 August 1857	92-102	- do -
14.	28 August 1857	86-88	- do -
15.	25 Sept. 1857	18	- do -
16.	25 Sept. 1857	11-16	- do -
17.	25 Sept. 1857	100-103	- do -
18.	25 Sept. 1857	5-8	- do -
19.	25 Sept. 1857	58	- do -
20.	25 Sept. 1857	60	- do -
21.	25 Sept. 1857	64	- do -
22.	25 Sept. 1857	114	- do -
23.	25 Sept. 1857	220-221	- do -
24.	25 Sept. 1857	667-668	- do -
25.	30 Oct. 1857	1-6	- do -
26.	30 Oct. 1857	12	- do -
27.	30 Oct. 1857	18-24	- do -
28.	30 Oct. 1857	30-34	- do -
29.	30 Oct. 1857	38-40	- do -
30.	30 Oct. 1857	49-50	- do -
31.	30 Oct. 1857	59	- do -
32.	30 Oct. 1857	61	- do -
33.	30 Oct. 1857	62	- do -
34.	30 Oct. 1857	70-71	- do -
35.	30 Oct. 1857	73-74	- do -
36.	27 Nov. 1857	7-13	- do -

<u>S.No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Nos.</u>	245	<u>Branch</u>
37	27 Nov.1857	35-42		- do-
38	27 Nov. 1857	177-180		- do-
39.	27 Nov.1857	407-408		- do-
40.	27 Nov. 1857	410-411		- do-
41.	18 Dec.1857	49-50		- do-
42.	18 Dec.1857	292-293		- do-
43.	18 Dec.1857	381-383		- do-
44.	18 Dec.1857	403-407		- do-
45.	18 Dec.1857	446-452		- do-

Original Records (Military Department)

1. H. R. Ambala No.15.
2. H. R. Ambala No.21.
3. H. R. Ambala No.29.
4. W/268.
5. Progs. 3rd July 1857, No.367/73
6. Progs.3rd July 1857, No.379/82
7. Progs. 10th July 1857, Nos.201-202.
8. Prog. 17th July, 1857.
9. Prog.24th July,1857.
10. Progs. 7th August, 1857.
11. Progs. 14th August,1857.
12. Progs.21st August, 1857.
13. Progs. 28th August,1857.
14. Progs. 4th Sept., 1857.
15. Progs. 11th Sept., 1857.
16. Progs. 18th Sept., 1857.
17. Progs. 25th Sept., 1857.
18. Progs. 9th Oct.1857.
19. Progs. 16th Oct.1857.

19. Progs. 16th Oct. 1857
20. Progs. 23rd Oct. 1857
21. Progs. 30th Oct. 1857
22. Progs. 6th Nov. 1857
23. Progs. 13th Nov., 1857
24. Progs. 20th Nov., 1857
25. Progs. 27th Nov. 1857
26. Progs. 4th Dec., 1857
27. Progs. 14th Dec., 1857
28. Progs. 18th Dec., 1857

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