

ROLE OF SIKH CHIEFS AND LANDED ARISTOCRACY IN THE REVOLT OF 1857

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SUPERVISORS' CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this thesis entitled "*Role of Sikh Chiefs and Landed Aristocracy in the Revolt of 1857*" submitted by Ramandeep Kaur for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of this university is an original work done under my supervision and has not been submitted elsewhere for any other degree. I consider it worthy of submission for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITISH AND PUNJAB CHIEFS AND SARDARS

In the dynastic History of Sikh States the erstwhile Princely States of Patiala, Nabha and Jind were collectively known as the Phulkian States after the name of their common ancestor, Phul. Little is known about the ancestors of Baba Phul. They remain shadowy figures and about most of them no objectively verifiable record exists. According to S.N. Banerjee, the Phulkian House traces its descent and lineage to Sri Krishna Chandra and it falls under the genus of Chandra Vanshi Rajputs of which the Yadavas formed the most illustrious branch.¹ On the basis of his extensive research, on the historical past of the ruling family of the Phulkian House, the researchers has divided its early history into four clearly marked periods. The first period begins with Sri Krishna and ends with Bhatti Rao. It covers approximately 1600 years and eighty generations of kings and heroes. The Yadavas, the descendants of Sri Krishna, leaving their original home in Saurashtra and Surasena migrated to the north-western part of the Punjab and a branch of the Yadavas established a kingdom with Ghazni as its headquarters. The founder of this kingdom is said to be Gaj who is considered to be the earliest known forefather of the descendants of the Phulkian States.² There is evidence that he flourished in the early part of the sixth century of the Christian era. The ruler of Kashmir won him over by marrying his daughter with him. From this wedlock one Salivahana or Salbahan was born.³ He is said to be unlucky and was defeated by the ruler of Khurasan. After his defeat he retreated towards Punjab and settled down in the area between the Ravi and the Chanab. In this region he founded a city in his name, called Salbhanpur. He was blessed with fifteen sons and the eldest of them was Baland who succeeded his father, Salbahan. The eldest son of Salbhan was Bhatti or Bhatti Rao.⁴ The advent of Bhatti Rao marks the end of the first period of the Phulkian dynasty.

With the coming of Bhatti Rao begins the second period in the Phulkian House. Bhatti Rao was a powerful Chief ruling over the territories conquered by him from the fourteen

¹ S.N.Banerjee, *History of Patiala Geography* (n.p), (n.d) p. 24, available in the Punjab State Archive Patiala.

² Dr. Kulbir Singh Dhillon, *British Impact of the Administration And Society of the Phulkian States 1900-1948*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis,1997, Punjabi University Patiala, p.2.

³ Atma Singh, *Darbar Patiala ate Sarkar Angrezi*, Patiala, 1938, p. 3.

⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 3-4.

Chiefs of the north west of the Punjab. He possessed an army of 60,000 horsemen and a large number of foot soldiers. His career as a chieftain covered the second quarter of the seventh century of the Christian era. After Bhatti, Deva Raja succeeded the throne. He was a gallant warrior and won many victories. Through his grand victory he won the Punwars and obtained possession of nine forts in Marwar. He was succeeded by Rawal Munda Rao and Munda Rao's son Rawal Vchera may be taken to have reigned from 999 to 1044. His successors were Dusanj Rao, 1044-1097 and Vijaya Rao, 1097-1147. The latter king was succeeded by his son, Bhoja Deva who had a short reign of some five years from 1147 to 1152. He was killed and succeeded by his uncle, Jaisal who presided over the political fortunes of the Bhattis from 1152 to 1167. Since the seat of power, Ludrava was in an open plain having no natural advantage for its defense, Jaisal raised a fort on the lower part of the Trikuta Hill which became his new capital under the name of Jaisalmer. Jaisal got himself crowned at the fort of Jaisalmer at an early age. He died in 1167. Jaisal was succeeded by his younger son, Salivahana II who had to struggle hard to retain power and was eventually killed in a scuffle. His elder son Vijala Deva also did not survive for long. Consequently the younger son of Salivahana II, named Rao Hans Raj succeeded to the Chiefship. Rao Hans Raj was constantly harassed by the fellow Rajput Chiefs. He had, therefore, to leave Jaisalmer in November 1185 for a more favorable environment.⁵

The departure of Rao Hans Raj from Jaisalmer towards the north east in 1185 marks the beginning of the third period of the history of the Phulkian House. Journeying north east and gaining followers on the way, he reached Bhatner which had been one of the strongholds of his ancestors. He succeeded in capturing the piece of land lying between Bhatner and Sirsa. Consequently from Sirsa he moved on to Hissar with the aim of extending his activities towards Delhi. However, it proved to be a futile venture mainly because the great Chauhan ruler Prithviraj was then at the height of his power and he resisted any attempts to breach his dominion from Delhi to Ajmer. However, the defeat and downfall of Prithviraj at the hands of Shihad-ud-Din Ghorī in 1192, acted as an advantage for Rao Hans Raj and relieved him of the danger from the Chauhans. Rao Hans Raj is said to have met the Ghorī King. The Ghorī King was impressed by the spirited attitude and martial appearance of Rao and permitted him to retain his possession acquired in his advances towards Delhi. It is said that he was also allowed to construct a fort at Hissar which was completed in August 1200, Later on, in 1211,

⁵ S. N. Banerjee, *A History of Patiala*, (n.p.) (n.d), pp. 27-28, Dr. Ganda Singh Collection in Punjabi University Patiala.

Itutmish appointed the Rao as Governor of Sirsa and Bathinda. Rao Hans Raj appears to have been "a man of capacity, a man in whose character there was a happy blend of caution and enterprise." He died in July, 1214. He was succeeded by his son, Rao Jundhar as the Chief of Hissar. Rao Jundhar and his four successors Bate Rao , Khimb Rao, Mangal Rao and Andhir Rao- flourished in the period which is covered by the reign of the Delhi Sultans from Itutmish to Ala-Ud- Din Khalji.⁶

With the advent and rise of Sidhraj or Sidhu, the son of Khiwa Rao, a new branch of the Phulkian House began to emerge. It is noteworthy that the fourth period of the history of the Phulkian House is connected with the Chiefs of this branch. Khiwa Rao had no issue from his Rajput wife. He married a second wife, the daughter of Basera a Jat Zamindar of Neli. The present study marriage was considered a disgrace by his Rajput relatives and Khiwa was ever afterwards, called *khot* which signified a nonconforming and unreliable person. From this marriage a male child named Sidhu was born. It was from this child that the Sidhu tribe derived its name. Sidhu, who according to the Rajput custom, was made to owe allegiance to the caste of his mother was a Jat. He had four sons from whom the family of Kaithal and Phulkian Chiefs descended.⁷ Brar Rao, fourth in descent from Sidhu, was a powerful Chief of the Jat clan. "He is one of the hero of the early annals of family and in respect of untiring energy, undaunted courage and tenacity of purpose he may be placed in the same category with Deva Raja of the tenth Century."⁸ He was succeeded by Six sons of whom the most notable were Dul and Paur. The members of the Faridkot House were the direct descendents of Dul and from Paur descended the House of Phulkian States.⁹ After this the Chiefs of these houses came to be known as the Sidhu Jat Clan of the Jats. After the tenth descendent of the tribal Chief Paur Rup Chand rose to the position of the Chief. He had two sons, Phul and Sandali. It is said that Phul and Sandali ,along with their uncle Kala visited Guru Har Rai (Six Guru of Sikh) at Gursur. In the presence of Guru, the young Phul patted his stomach. When the Guru asked the reason, Kala told him that he did so when he felt hungry. The guru is said to have blessed Phul by saying. "What matters the hunger of one

⁶ S.N. Banerjee, *A History of Patiala*, p. 5.

⁷ Lepel. H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, Ubner, Lahore 1873, pp. 2-3, see also Giani Gian Singh, *Tawarikh Guru Khasla* Part II, Khalsa Taract Society Amritsar, 1894, p.541.

⁸ Fauja Singh, R.C Rabra, *The City of Faridkot-Past and Present*, Punjabi University Patiala, 1976, p.10.

⁹ *Ibid*, p.11, see also Subhash Parihar, *Architectural Heritage of Sikh State Faridkot*, Aryan Books International, New Delhi, 2009, p.37.

belly, Phul would satisfy the hunger of thousands. The horses of Phul's successor would drink water from Jamuna and their *raj* would extend to it.”¹⁰ The prophecy came out to be true. Taken as a whole, the fourth period of the Phulkian clan comprised twenty generations commencing with Sidhu and terminating with Rao Rup Chand, the father of Phul. It coincides with the period which intervened between the end of Ala –Ud-Din Khalji's reign and middle of the reign of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan.¹¹

The appellation or name of the dynasty of Phulkian House is derived from Chaudhury Phul. This dynasty ruled over the States of Patiala, Nabha and Jind.¹² S.N. Banerjee writes that according to official note preserved among the Foreign office records Phul was born in 1619. Sardar Attar Singh and Sir Lepel Griffin, while accepting this date of Birth, place his death in the year 1652.¹³ According to a famous account related to his death it is said that he was made omissions in paying in his land revenue to the Mughals. When he was persuaded to make the payment by Faujdar of Sirhind, Phul devised a stratagem for saving himself. He resorted to the yogic practice of suspending his breath. The officials, taking the state of suspended animation for death, handed over body to the *Nawab* of Malerkotla who agreed to have it sent to the village of Phul. However, the people bearing the hearse were unaware of the realty and thinking it useless to carry dead body further, cremated it with due honors on the way.¹⁴

Phul had six sons. From the eldest, Tiloka, descended the family of Nabha and Jind and from the second son, Rama, the family of Patiala. The four other sons only succeeded to a small share of their father's possessions.¹⁵ In later years this family came to be bound with the sacred history or Sikhism when in 1696 A.D. Guru Gobind, the Tenth Guru and the founder of Khalsa, called upon Tiloka and Rama to bring their followers to fight against the hill Chiefs who were troubling the Guru at Anandpur. The autographed letter of the Guru sent

¹⁰ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p. 6, see also Giani Gian Singh, *Tawarikh Guru Khasla*, Part II, p. 546.

¹¹ S.N. Banerjee, *A History of Patiala*, pp. 2-3.

¹² *Patiala State, Head History*, Basta No. 3, File No. H-133-B, p.6, P.S.A.P, see also Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Patiala and its Historical Surrounding*, Punjabi University Patiala, 1967, p. 18.

¹³ S.N. Banerjee, *A History of Patiala*, pp. 2-3 & Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p.7.

¹⁴ Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Patiala and its Historical Surrounding*, p.18.

¹⁵ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p.3.

to this occasion dated 2nd Bhadson, Sambat 1753 (1696 A.D) contains these significant words: " I am very well pleased with the Your house is mine. (Tera ghar mera ghar hai)" ¹⁶

Baba Ala Singh was the grandson of Phul and son of Chaudhury Ram Singh. He assumed the leadership in 1714 after the death of his father. In the beginning his rule extended only over 30 villages. However, by the middle of the eighteenth century, he became the undisputed master of the entire region between Barnala and Patiala. He fought on the side of the Mughals in the battle of Mansurpur in 1748 against Ahamad Shah Abdali and in the battle of Panipat in 1761; Ala Singh helped the Maratha with food and fodder. In 1763, he laid the foundation of the Patiala Fort. ¹⁷

Ala Singh was great conqueror, an able administrator and a shrewd diplomat. He had pleased the Mughal Emperor, the Durrani invader and Dal Khalsa. According to Hari Ram Gupta, "Ala Singh may rightly be called Bismarck of the Sikhs." ¹⁸

Ala Singh died on 22nd August 1765 and was succeeded by his grandson Amar Singh. According to Griffin, He is most powerful ruler between the Sutlej and the Jamuna. He was popularly known as ' Bandi Chhor Raja' because he paid one lakh to Ahmmad Shah Abdali return for the release of hundreds of Indians who had been taken prisoners from Saharnpur and Mathura. Abdali conferred on Amar Singh the title of "Raja-i-Rajgan" in March 1767¹⁹ and he allowed him to mint his own coins. On the coins the Raja bore the following inscription²⁰:

Hukam shud az kadar-i-bechun o-Ahmed badshah;

Sikka zan ze sim-o-zar az auji-i-mahi ta bmah.

Nabha

¹⁶ Cited in Ganda Singh, *Patiala and East Punjab States Union: Historical Background*, Archives Department Patiala, 1951, pp. 43-44.

¹⁷ Basta No. 2, File No, H-67-B, *Patiala troops taking parts in wars and Battle from time to time*, p.5. & Mian Bashir Ahmed Fattooqi, *British Relations with the Cis- Sutlej States 1809-1823*, Languages Department Punjab, 1971, p.34.

¹⁸ Hari Ram Gupta, *History of the Sikhs*, Vol IV, Munshiram Manoharlal Delhi, 1984, p.154.

¹⁹ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 221 & see also Patiala State, Head History, Basta No. 3, File No. H-133-B, p.6, P.S.A.P.

²⁰ Fauja Singh, *Patiala and Its Historical surroundings*, p.19.

On the death of Tiloka Singh who was the eldest son of Chaudhari Phul Singh, his territory was divided between his sons, Gurdit Singh and Sukhchain Singh. Gurdit Singh's descendents founded the Nabha State. Gurdit Singh died in 1754 and was succeeded by his grandson, Hamir Singh 1754-1783. Gurdit Singh's only son Suratya had died in 1752. He had left two sons, Hamir Singh and Kapur Singh. Kapur Singh had married Raj Kaur, the widow of his younger brother, in accordance with Sikh custom of Karewa or *chaddar dalna*.²¹ Thus Hamir Singh became the owner of his grandfather's property like estate of Karparh and Sangrur. However Hamir Singh was the real founder of the Nabha State. He founded the town of Nabha in 1755 A.D. which became the headquarters of the State. This was followed by the conquest of Bhadson in 1759.A.D. At the famous battle of Sirhind in 1763 A.D., in which Zain Khan was killed, he joined Ala Singh of Patiala and played a prominent part along with other Sikh Chiefs. After the battle, he got Amloh as his share of the spoil.²² Afterwards, in 1776 A.D. when Mulla Rahim Dad Khan, the Governor of Sirsa and Hissar representing the Emperor of Delhi, was killed in a battle at Jind, he took possession of Rori, a Village near Sirsa.²³

In 1774 Raja of Jind Gajpat Singh invaded Nabha on a frivolous pretext, took Hamir Singh as prisoner by treachery and seized the town of Sangrur from his hands and also captured Amloh and Bhadson.²⁴ At this critical time Hamir Singh's shrewd wife, Rani Desu, came to his rescue. She got him released and recovered most of territories from Gajpat Singh with the help of the troops of her son in law Sahib Singh Bhangi. However, Sangrur was never restored and became the capital of Jind State.²⁵

Jaswant Singh, 1783-1840, succeeded his father Hamir Singh in December 1783. His step mother Rani Desu, became his guardian and regent because he was only eight year old at that time. She managed the affairs of the State quite successfully till her death in 1790.²⁶ After her death Jaswant Singh assumed the reins government and took the overall control of

²¹ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.381, see also Giani Gian Singh, *Twarikh-I-Guru Khalsa*, part II, Khalsa Taract Society, Amritsar, p. 630.

²² Kirpal Singh, *Life of Maharaja Ala Singh and His Times*, Khalsa College, Amritsar, 1954, pp. 66-67.

²³ Khalifa Sadadt Hussain, *History of Patiala* (English) being Translation of Twarikh—Patiala (Urdu) by Khalifa Syed Mohammad Hussain, Patiala,1928, p.765.

²⁴ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Provincial Series, Punjab Vol II, Calcutta, 1908, p, 326.

²⁵ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.382.

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 382-383.

the state in his own hands. During this time the relations between Nabha and Jind States had improved both states acted together against their common enemy George Thomas, the master of Hansi and Hissar. They also got help from the Marathas. Jaswant Singh sided with British. He refused to help the Holkar against the British when he halted at Nabha in 1805 A.D.²⁷

Jind

Tilok Singh, the eldest son of Chaudhri Phul Singh, had two sons , Gurdit Singh and Sukhchain Singh. The son of Sukhchain was Gajpat Singh (1763-1786) who was the founder of the Jind State. He also took part in the Sikh aggression of 1763-64 against the Afghan Governor of Sirhind, Zain Khan and received a large tract of country as his share of the spoil, including Jind and Safidon.²⁸ He made Jind his headquarters and also built a large brick fort there. In 1772, Emperor Shah Alam conferred the title of Raja on him through a Royal decree. From this time Gajpat Singh ruled as an independent Prince and coined money in his own name.²⁹ He was an intrepid ruler and brave warrior. He took part in more than thirty battles. He took Sangrur from the possession of Nabha. He not only overran Hissar, Hansi, Rohtak and Gohana but also laid the foundation of Panipat and Karnal. His most important possessions included Sangrur, Jind, Safidon and Kharkhoda.³⁰

Raja Gajpat Singh died in 1786. He was succeeded by his son Bhag Singh (1786-1819). The presence of George Thomas at Hansi, on the southern border of the Jind State was the perpetual threat for Bhag Singh and other Sikh Chiefs as well as Sardars in the neighborhood. Bhag Singh along with other Chiefs went to Delhi in 1801. He approached General Perron, commanding the northern division of the Maratha Army and with his help succeeded in dislodging George Thomas from Hansi. He was first of the Cis Sutlej Princes to seek an alliance with the British Government in 1803. He assisted Lord Lake through his operations against the Marathas prevented his nephew, Ranjit Singh, from espousing their

²⁷ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Provincial Series, Punjab Vol II, p.327.

²⁸ Behari Lal Dhingra, Chief Minister, Jind State, *A Brief Historical and Administration Sketch*, Time of India Press, Bombay n.d, p.3.

²⁹ Lepel Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p.285, see also *Punjab State Gazetteers*, Vol. XVII, Phulkian State, Patiala, Nabha & Jind, 1904, Lahore, 1909, p.215.

³⁰ *Punjab State Gazetteers*, Vol. XVII, Phulkian State, Patiala, Nabha & Jind, p. 215.

cause.³¹ Lord Lake recognized him 'a friend and ally' and rewarded him by the grant of the *parganas* of Bawana and Gohana.³²

Kapurthala

Kapurthala is said to have been founded by Rana Kapur, a Rajput immigrant from Jaisalmer, about the time of the invasions of India by Mahmud Ghazni, at the beginning of eleventh century. The veracity of this version is subject to doubt as Rana Kapur appears to be a mythical figure.³³ In fact, the traditions of almost every Jat tribe in the Punjab point to a Rajput descent. It is possible that Jats and Rajputs had probably a common origin.

The Kapurthala State entered into relations with the British during the first decade of the nineteenth century. At that time Fateh Singh Ahluwalia (1801-37) was the Chief of the State. In 1805, the Maratha Chief Jaswant Rao Holkar came to Punjab. He had been defeated by Lord Lake in his own country. The Maratha fugitive was anxious to form an alliance with the rising Sikh confederacies against the British Government. With this objective in view he marched towards Punjab. He tried to forge an alliance with the Sikh confederacies, which were emerging as formidable forces, against the British Government.³⁴ Initially, he tried to seal an alliance with Cis-Sutlej Chiefs but they showed no willingness to join him. Thereafter, he proceeded to Amritsar, where he met Ranjit Singh and Fateh Singh Ahluwalia. Ranjit Singh was at first inclined to help the Maratha Chief but due to influence exercised by Raja Bhag Singh of Jind and Sardar Fateh Singh Maharaja Ranjit Singh did not do so.³⁵ In the meanwhile, Lord Lake pursued Holkar in a ruthless manner. Disappointed in the hope of procuring assistance from Ranjit Singh, Holkar concluded a treaty with British Government and returned to his territories.

At the same time, a treaty of friendship and alliance was concluded by the British Government with Ranjit Singh and his ally Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia. This treaty was called the treaty of Lahore. It was the first treaty jointly signed by Fateh Singh Ahluwalia

³¹ Behari Lal Dhingra, *A Brief Historical and Administration Sketch*, Bombay, n.d., p.2

³² *Punjab States Gazetteers, Vol XVI*, Phulkian States, Lahore, 1904, p. 49.

³³ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.450.

³⁴ Kapurthala Record, Head History, Basta No 1, p. 5, P.S.A.P, see also *Memorial of His Highness the Maharaja of Kapurthala to The Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State For India In Council*, Calcutta 1868. P. 1.

³⁵ Kapurthala Record, Head History, Basta No. 1, p. 9, see also Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 475-76.

with British on 1st January 1806. The Sikh signatories agreed to make Jaswant Rao Holkar to withdraw to a distance of 25 km from Amritsar. They also promised never hereafter to hold any further connection with him or aid him with troops or any plans for seizing their possessions.³⁶

Fateh Singh who had acted as the Agent of Ranjit Singh in the agreement of this treaty was presented by Lord Lake with a Leopard as a mark of friendship, while he presented the English General with the hawk.³⁷

In this treaty Ranjit Singh and Fateh Singh were equally eminent but afterwards they were never regarded equal because it became evident that Fateh Singh was comparatively weak. He fell by degrees under the powerful spell of the Sukerchakia Sardar.³⁸ Ranjit Singh was at once a brave warrior, an ambitious Chief and a shrewd diplomat while Fateh Singh was constrained to play a second fiddle to him. As discussed above, in 1806, Fateh Singh and Ranjit Singh also entered into joint treaty with the British. The two Sardars consented to the following article of agreement concluded by Lieutenant Colonel John Malcolm, under the special authority of the honorable Sir George Barlow, the Governor General:

1. Sardar Fateh and Maharaja Ranjit Singh agreed they would cause Jaswant Rao Holkar to remove with his army to the distance of 30 km from Amritsar immediately and would never hereafter hold any further connection with him, aid him with troops or in any other manner whatever and they further agreed that they would not in any way molest torment those followers of Jaswant Rao Holkar's or troops who were desirous of returning to their homes in the Deccan, but on the contrary would render them every assistance in their power for carrying such intention into execution.

2. The British agreed that in case a pacification should not be affected between the British Government and Jaswant Rao, the British Army would move from its present encampment on the banks of the river Beas as soon as Jaswant Rao would march with his army to the distance of 30km from Amritsar and that in any treaty which might hereafter be concluded between the British Government and Jaswant Rai Holkar it would be stipulated that immediately after the conclusion of the said treaty, Holkar would evacuate the territories of the Sikhs and march

³⁶ *Gazetteer of the Punjab Provincial 1888-89*, Punjab Government, 1889, pp. 84-85.

³⁷ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 477.

³⁸ *Punjab State Gazetteer*, Vol XIV, Kapurthala State, Punjab Government Press, Lahore, 1908, p.5.

towards his own and that he would in no way injure and destroy such parts of the Sikh country as might lie in his route. The British Government further agreed that as long as the said Chieftains, Ranjit Singh and Fateh Singh, abstained from holding any friendly connection with the enemies of that Government or from committing any act of hostility on their parts against the said Government, the British army's would never enter the territories of the said Chieftains nor would the British Government from any plans for the seizure of their possessions.³⁹

After this treaty, the relation between Fateh Singh and the British Government remained friendly. In 1808 Metcalfe came at Khem Karan near Kasur. Ranjit Singh deputed Fateh Singh Ahluwalia along with Mohkam Chand to receive the foreign dignitary. After some negotiations between Ranjit Singh and Metcalf both entered into a treaty in 1809. Fateh Singh Ahluwalia was not a party to this treaty but he was present at Amritsar when this treaty was signed. Under the provisions of this treaty the river Sutlej was recognized as the limit of the British sphere of influence.

Faridkot

The Faridkot family had its provenance in the same lineage as the Phulkian Chiefs. They had a common ancestor in Brar who lived almost twelve generations before Phul. The Faridkot dynasty was founded during the reign of Akbar by Bhallan, who was appointed *Chaudhri* of the Brar Jat tribe by the Mughal Government. He subjugated the neighboring villages of Kotkapura, Faridkot, Mari, Mudki and Mukatsar. He died issueless and was succeeded by his nephew Kapura in 1643.⁴⁰

Sardar Hamir Singh was first independent Chief of Faridkot. His brother, Jodh Singh erected a new fort at Kot Kapura in 1766 and almost rebuilt the town. However, his oppression was so great that the inhabitants abandoned the city and the artisans, who had been renowned for their skill and industry, migrated to Lahore, Amritsar and Patiala. Raja Amar Singh of Patiala State was constantly engaged in hostilities with Jodh Singh. In 1767, the Raja Amar Singh was instigated by Jodh Singh's to launch an attack against Faridkot. Amar Singh marched to Kot Kapura with strong force and prepared to invade the fort. Jodh

³⁹ C.U. Aitchison *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, Calcutta, 1892, p.33.

⁴⁰ *Faridkot State Record*, Head Revenue, Basta No. 11. File No. 95, P.S.A.P.

Singh and his son went beyond the walls of the fort to meet the challenger and fall into an ambush laid by the Patiala troops. Jodh Singh was killed fighting gallantly to the last and his son Jit Singh was mortally wounded. Jodh Singh succeeded by his son, Tegh Singh.⁴¹

The end of Tegh Singh was also very tragic. He had been for long on very bad terms with his son Jaggat Singh. In 1806 Jaggat Singh set the house on fire in which his father was residing and a large quantity of powder was stored in the vaults beneath. The house was utterly destroyed and Tegh Singh killed by the explosion. The guilty son did not enjoy the lands of and possessions of the district for long. Maharaja Ranjit Singh had no intention of restoring it to the rightful owner. Maharaja Ranjit Singh annexed Kot Kapura and kept it for himself, giving five Jalal villages to the Raja of Nabha. The villages of Mudki, which Maha Singh had seized was also retained by Ranjit Singh leaving only villages Patli and Hukumantwala to Maha Singh⁴²

The relations between the Phulkian States and the British Government primarily were built on the fear of these powers from the growing strength of Maharaja Ranjit in the Punjab. The Phulkian rulers feared that with the growing power of Ranjit Singh they would be absorbed in the Raj of Lahore whereas the British wanted to confine the Raj of Maharaja Ranjit Singh to the northern banks of the Sutlej. The first foundation of an alliance was laid at the meeting between Lord Lake and the Chiefs of the Cis -Sutlej States in the spring of 1804 at a small Village called Tamak Lodha. At this time the Sikhs in the neighborhood of the Yamuna continued to be apprehensive of the intentions of the British and assisted the Rohillas and the Marathas against them. In order to give reassurance to these Sikhs an amnesty was proclaimed in the month of March 1805 by the British Commander-in-Chief to all those Sikhs in return for an assurance of peace and a promise that they would not indulge in any operations against the English. Thus, during this period there was a counterbalance of the British dictated by their self interest, and the campaigns of annexation carried out by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the year January 1809. Both of these were equally threatening to the Sikh chiefs :- "As the intelligence lately received of the favorable change in the aspect of affairs on the continent of Europe justifies a conviction that the project of France against the British possessions in India must, if not entirely abandoned, at least, be so far suspended,

⁴¹ Ganda Singh, *Patiala And East Punjab States Union*, Patiala 1951,p 66, see also *Faridkot State Record*, Head Revenue, Basta No. 11. File No. 95, P.S.A.P.

⁴² Griffin, Lepel H, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, London, 1873, p. 552, see also Ikram Ali Malik, *The History of the Punjab 1799-1947*, Research Society of Pakistan, 1970, p. 22.

as to render any extraordinary and immediate preparations for defense unnecessary, the views and intentions of Government under which your instructions of the 29th ultimo were framed are materially altered."⁴³ In the instructions of 29th December 1808, referred to above, colonel Ochterlony, had been told that it he was to concentrate on reconciling the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs to British protection by convincing them it was essential to their very existence. The protection was at first to be general but was to be defined later.

The establishment of the British power in the Cis- Sutlej States commenced from the treaty with Ranjit Singh on 25 April 1809. Through the articles of the treaty ⁴⁴ Maharaja Ranjit Singh engaged neither to commit nor suffer any encroachments on the possession or right of the Chiefs on the left bank of Sutlej. On the 3 May 1809 a Proclamation was issued extending the protection of the British Government to the Chief of Sirhind and *Malwa* without demand of tribute requiring service in time of war. The proclamation defined the relation of the protected States to the British Government in very general terms. The general scope of the proclamation of 1809 was to establish the Chiefs and consolidate their power in the States they held before they were received under the British protection.⁴⁵

Article 1- The country of Chief of Malwa and Sirhind having entered under the protection of the British Government, in future it shall be secured from the authority and control of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, conformably to the terms of the treaty.

Article 2- The country of the Chiefs thus taken under protection shall be exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government.

Article 3- The Chiefs shall remain in the exercise of the same rights and authority within their own possessions, which they enjoyed before they were taken under the British protection.

Article 4- Whenever a British Force, for purpose connected with the general welfare shall be judged necessary to march through the country of the said Chief – the Chief shall within his

⁴³ *Truth about Nabha*, Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, 1928 p. 8, see also T.B. Jervis, *Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab*, Cambridge University, London, 1845, p. 364.

⁴⁴ Article 2- The Raja will never maintain, in the treaty occupied by him and his dependent on the left bank of river Sutlej more troops than are necessary for internal duties of that territory, not commit or suffer any encroachment on the possessions or rights of the Chiefs in it s vicinity.

⁴⁵ Edward Thornton, Esquire., *A Gazette of the Territories under the Government of the East India Company and of the Native States of the Continent of States*, Vol IV, British Library, London, 1854, pp. 208- 209.

own possession, assist and furnish the British Force, to the full of his power, with the supply of grain and other necessaries which may be demanded.

Article 5- Should an enemy approach from any quarter for the purpose of conquering this country, friendship and mutual interest require that the Chiefs join the British Army with their forces and exerting themselves in expelling the enemy act under discipline and obedience.

Article 6- Any article brought by merchants from the eastern districts, for the use the army shall be allowed to pass by the Thanedars and Sardars of the several districts belonging to the Chiefs without molestation or demand of duty.

Article 7- All horses purchased for the use of the cavalry Regiments whether in Sirhind or elsewhere the bringers of which being furnished with sealed rehdarees from Residents at Delhi or officer commanding at Sirhind the several Chiefs shall allow such horses to pass without molestation or the demand of duty.⁴⁶

III

Proclamation addressed to the Sikh Sardars, etc, 22nd August 1811

On the 3rd of May 1809 an Ittalah- namah, comprising of seven Articles, was issued by the orders of the British Government, purporting that the country of the Sardars of Sirhind and Malwa, having come under their protection, Raja Ranjit Singh, agreeably to Treaty, had no concern with the possession of the above Sardars, that the British Government had no intention of claiming *peschcush* or *nuzzuranah* and that they should continue in the full control and enjoyment of their respective possessions. The publication of the above Ittalah-Namah was intended to afford every confidence to the Sardars that the British had no intention of controlling or annexing their lands and that those having possession should remain in full control of them. Several Zamindars and other subjects of the Chiefs of this region had made complaints to the officers of the British Government. In view the terms of the Ittalah- Nameh, the officers of the British Government did not attend or pay attention to these complaints. For instance on the 15th June 1811, Dellawer Ali Khan, of Samana,

⁴⁶ Cited in Translation of an Ittalah- Namesh addressed to the Chief of the country of Malwa and Sirhind on this side of the River Sutlej, 3rd May 1809, C. U. Aitcheson, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, Calcutta, 1892, pp. 68-69.

complained to the Resident of Delhi against the officers of Sahib Singh, for jewels and other property said to have been seized by them, who, in reply, observed, “ that the Kasba of Samana, being in the Omaldery of Raja Sahib Singh, this complaint should be made to him. On the 12th July 1811, Dusonda Singh and Gurmukh Singh complained to Colonel Ochterlony, Agent to the Governor General, against Sardar Churrut Singh, for their shares of property, etc, and in reply it was written on the back of the complaint that “ since during the period of three years no claim was preferred against Churrut Singh by any of his brothers, nor even the name of any co-partner mentioned and since it was advertised in the quiet and full possession his domains, their petition could not to be attended to.” These answers to complaints are intended as examples that every *Zamindar* and other Subjects were to understand that as per the terms of the proclamation the attainment of justice was to be expected from their respective Chief only, that they may not, in the smallest degree, swerve from the observance of subordination. It is therefore highly incumbent upon the Rajas, that it was made clear to them that they should consider their respective *Sardars* as the source of justice and that of their free will and accord they observe uniform obedience. Thus, according to the first proclamation, it was not the intention of British Government to interfere in the possessions of the *Sardars*. It was also proclaimed, that if someone has forcibly taken possession of the state of others or otherwise injured the lawful owners, it was necessary that before the occurrence of any complaint, the proprietor should be satisfied. In such cases the restoration of the prosperity was not to be deferred and in case of delays the inference of British authority would become requisite.⁴⁷

Patiala- Maharaja Sahib Singh died in 1813 and was succeeded by Maharaja Karam Singh who had greatly distinguished himself by his whole hearted and unswerving support to the British Arms in several expeditions. In 1814, the Gurkhas of Nepal encroached upon the British territory and when war was declared against them, Maharaja Karam Singh sent strong detachment of the State forces to serve in the Army led by Colonel Ochterlony. At the close of the war in recognition of his services, the British Government awarded 16 pargana in the Simla hill⁴⁸ on the payment of a *nazrana* of Rs. 2, 80,000 to Maharaja Karam Singh of Patiala,. Karam Singh’s Government was hampered by disputes first with his mother and later with his younger brother, Ajit Singh until Haryana boundary dispute demanded all his

⁴⁷ Proclamation addressed to the Sikh Sardar, 22nd August 1811, No XXI., C. U. Aitcheson, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, pp. 67-68.

⁴⁸ Basta No 1, File No. H-5-B, *A Short History of Patiala State*, p 2. P.S.A.P.

attention. The British had overthrown the Bhattis in the area of Hissar and Sirsa in 1803, but had neglected the country as barren and unprofitable. The Chief of Patiala began to encroach upon this area in 1835, and his hold was firmly established. When the attention of the British Government was drawn to the matter, the strip of country, more than a hundred miles long and ten to twenty miles broad was transferred from his possessions to those of the British Government. The government however listened to his protest and the question was re-opened. It was again shelved during the Sikh War and finally settled in 1856 when 41 villages were handed over to Patiala State.⁴⁹

The Gurkha War⁵⁰

The Gurkhas had become a source of trouble both to the British Government and the Patiala State. Under the directions of the Governor General's agent at Ludhiana the Patiala forces were engaged in repelling their encroachments. It was due to the action of the Patiala forces that the British Villages of Mandali and Bharowali, which had earlier been seized by the Gurkhas were taken.

During the campaign against the Gurkha the Patiala Infantry served with Colonel Ochterlony's force and a portion of his cavalry was made available for guarding the area consisting of the plains country near the foothills. Nalagarh and Taragrah were captured by the Patiala forces on the 5th and 8th November 1814. In recognition of the services of the Patiala force, The Maharaja of Patiala was granted sixteen parganas by the British Government.⁵¹

At the same time the rulers of Patiala had been quarrelling with their neighbors also. A small dispute with Nabha which started in 1807 had led to bloodshed. Thereafter there was acrimony and ill feeling between the two states which lasted for sixty years. Border dispute with Kaithal also lasted from 1838 to 1843 when Bhai Ude Singh of Kaithal died and the British Government proceeded to resume 4/5th of his territory. The quarrel with Nabha was further aggravated by the hostility of Raja Davinder Singh of Nabha towards Patiala and Jind.

⁴⁹ *Punjab States Gazetteers*, Vol XVII, Phulkian States, p.49.

⁵⁰ Edward Thornton, Esquire., *A Gazette of the Territories under the Government of the East India Company and of the Native States of the Continent of States*, Vol IV, London, 1854, p. 97-98.

⁵¹ Basta No. 1, File No.H-5-B, *A Short History of Patiala State*, p. 2.

Soon it had become almost a practice that in any dispute in Cis- Sutlej States Patiala was on side and Nabha on the Other.⁵²

During the Kaithal disturbance Patiala horsemen under Rahim Bakhsh, the Paymaster of the state, were sent to co-operate with the British troops. These troops surrounded Tek Singh, leader of the insurgents, who surrendered 4 elephants, 2 brass guns and other property.⁵³

During the First Anglo Sikh War 1845-46 Patiala contingent consisting of 2000 cavalry, 200 infantry, 200 Zamburchies (Camel riders with small guns mounted on Camel saddles) was sent in aid of the British Government. At the conclusion of the first Anglo Sikh war the state was awarded by the grant of Sanad and certain estates were taken from the Raja of Nabha and restored to Patiala.⁵⁴

In 1847, at request of Maharaja a Sanad or grant was conferred on him. This Sanad or grant bestowed on him for all future time the right to his ancient possessions and those granted by the British Government. The Chief or the Maharaja, under this Sanad was enjoined to do justice and to promote welfare of his subjects whereas the citizens were to consider the chief their rightful lord and master. The maharaja on his part relinquished for himself and successors all right to levy excise and transit duties and undertook to suppress Sati, Infanticide and slave dealing and to attend in person with his forces in case the Cis-Sutlej territories were invaded by an enemy. On the other hand the British Government gave up all claims to the tribute revenue or commutation in lieu of troops or otherwise. The Maharaja during this year received an additional grant of territory confiscated from the Lahore Darbar, amounting to Rupees 10,000, in consideration of his having given up customs and transit. This Sanad is -

No XXIV. Sanad to the Maharaja of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot dated 22nd September 1847

C.U. Aitcheson mentioned the term of Sanad as following :-

⁵² *Punjab States Gazetteers, Vol XVI, Phulkian States, p. 49.*

⁵³ Patiala Record, ,Head History, Basta No. 3, File No. H-133-B, p.6, P.S.A.P.

⁵⁴ Colonel G.B. Malleison, *The Native States of India*, Longmans, Green And Co., London, 1875, p. 335.

The Honorable Governor General having resolved to bestow certain lands on the Raja of Patiala as a mark of consideration for his attachment and services to the British during the Second War with the Lahore Darbar and Raja of Patiala having requested that he may at the same time receive a renewed assurance of protection and guarantee of his rights in his former possessions. The Governor - General is pleased to confer this assurance in the form of a Sanad or Grant that the Maharaja and his successors after him may, with perfect confidence, continue to exercise the same rights and authority in his possessions as heretofore.⁵⁵

The Maharaja's ancient hereditary estates, according to annexed schedule shall continue forever in the possessions of himself and his successors with all Government rights theretofore. The Chaharumains, feudatories, adherents and dependents will continue bound in their adherence and obligations to the Raja as heretofore. His Highness will exert himself to do justice and to promote the welfare and happiness of his subjects while they on their part, considering the Raja as their true and rightful lord, must be always zealous to promote the cultivation of their true and rightful lord, must obey him and his successors accordingly and pay the revenue punctually. The Maharaja will always be zealous to promote the interest of their lands and to testify their loyalty and obedience. The Maharaja has relinquished for himself and his successors for ever all right to levy excise and transit duties which have been abolished throughout the Patiala territory. His Highness also binds himself and his successors to the suppression of Sati, Infanticide and Slave dealing with his territories. If unknown to the Maharaja's authorities any persons should be guilty of these acts, the Maharaja's authorities will on conviction punish them with such severity as to deter others. The British Government will never demand from the Maharaja and his successors and their dependents above named anything in the way of tribute or revenue or commutation in lieu of troops, or otherwise. His Highness will ever continue as heretofore sincerely devoted to the service and interests of the British. The authorities will not entertain complaints of the Maharaja's subjects or dependents or interfere with the Maharaja's authority. Should an enemy approach from any quarter to this side of Beas or Sutlej for the purpose of conquering this country, the Raja will join British Army with his force and exert himself in expelling the enemy and act under discipline and obedience and in time of war place the resources of his Country at the disposal of the British Government. The Maharaja will engage his officers to repair the military road through his territory, for the passage of British troops from Ambala and other stations to

⁵⁵ Cited in No. XXIV Sanads to the Maharaja of Patiala, dated 22nd September 1847, C.U. Aitchison, *A collection treaties, Engagements and Sanads.*, p. 72.

Ferozpur Highness will also appoint encamping grounds for British troops at the different stages which shall be marked off so that there be no claims made hereafter on account of damaged crops.⁵⁶

Jind- Raja Bhag Singh (1786-1819) died in 1819 and was succeeded by his son Fateh Singh. Raja Fateh Singh was an ambitious man, but his period is very uneventful as he ruled for a very short period of three years. He died on 3 February, 1822 at the age of thirty three, leaving only son Sangat Singh who succeeded to the office.⁵⁷

Raja Sangat Singh- The installation ceremony of Sangat Singh was performed on 30th July 1822 at Jind.⁵⁸ His mother Sahib Kaur was appointed to work as Regent for him. In February 1826 A.D., Raja Sangat Singh paid a visit to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In 1827 A.D, Maharaja Ranjit Singh bestowed on him the grants of Antiana state. The British East India Company did not approve of the practice adopted by Maharaja Ranjit Singh to make grants to the Cis Sutlej Chiefs as any alliance with of Ranjit Singh with the chiefs made them insecure. In order to counteract against any form of proximity of Ranjit Singh with the Sikh Chiefs the Britishers decided that States under the British would give grants to the Cis -Sutlej Chiefs. It was, therefore decided by the Britishers that the states under the British should be directed to abstain from maintaining any connection or entering into any dialogue with Maharaja Ranjit Singh without a prior intimation to them or without their sanction. Raja Sangat Singh wanted to maintain good relations with Maharaja Ranjit Singh as had been done by his father Raja Bhag Singh. As such he did not pay any heed or adhere to the advice of the British. He had plans to visit Lahore Darbar again in 1834,⁵⁹ without obtaining sanction from the British agent at Delhi. On learning about his intention the British became annoyed. But before some action could be taken against him, the Raja fell ill at Bassian on 3 November 1834 and died the same day.⁶⁰

Raja Sarup Singh the second cousin of Raja Sangat Singh was accepted as the legal heir to the office by the Britishers. Accordingly, he succeeded to the *gaddi* or throne of Jind. However his claim to the entire estate was rejected and his title was confined to the territory

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 72-73.

⁵⁷ Giani Gian Singh, *Twarik Guru Khalsa*, Vol III, Sailkot, 1894, p.821.

⁵⁸ Lepel H. Griiffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.295.

⁵⁹ Giani Gian Singh, *Twarik Guru Khalsa*, p. 828.

⁶⁰ *Press Lists of old records in the Punjab Secretariat* Vol. V,p. 218, Punjab State Archive, Chandigarh Branch.

possessed by his great grandfather Raja Gajpat Singh.⁶¹ The entire state area was categorized in three groups. The area was ordered to be divided as under:-

1. Territory left by the Raja Gajpat Singh along with the office should go to Sarup Singh.
2. Grants of Lahore Darbar in favor of Jind State prior to the treaty of friendship of 1809 to be restored to Ranjit Singh.⁶² It inclined Talwandi, half of Mudki with total revenue of Rs. 9000.
3. Area acquired by Jind State after the treaty of Amritsar to be taken over by the Britishers.⁶³

Under this decision 322 Villages (The Pargana of Jind 140 Villages, Safedon 125 Villages, Asso Wadha 26 Villages, Balanwali 108 villages, Bhaunke 1 Village, Salwan 8 Villages, Sangrur 11 Villages) with an estimated revenue of Rs. 123600 came under Raja Sarup Singh. He was accession to the *gaddi* or throne was solemnized in a darbar/court in which Maharaja Patiala and Nabha Chiefs of other minor Phulkian houses and the British Agent were present.⁶⁴

Raja Sarup Singh made several representations to the British Agent at Delhi for the restorations for the restoration of lapsed grants. However, his representation did not succeed. He realized that he could earn more grants if he would act according to the wishes of the Britishers. Having made up his mind to work for the restoration of the grants, he did not hesitate to offer his services even against Lahore Darbar.⁶⁵

Early in the month of November 1845, Sarup Singh was called upon to send 150 camels for the use of the Sirhind Division. However, in spite of promises and repeated orders, he did not abide by this advice of the British. As a result a fine of Rs. 10,000 was levied upon him by Major Broadfoot, which was realized in the following year. After this warning the conduct of the Raja became quite satisfactory. Thereafter he did his best to provide supplies and carriage to the British. His contingent served with the British troops and a detachment sent by him accompanied the Patiala contingent to Ghumgrana under Captain Hay. This overture was

⁶¹ *Memoranda on Native States in India 1907*, Vol I, Government of India, p 254, P.S.A.P.

⁶² *Press List of Old record of Ambala*, Letter No. 639 dated 15 June 1857, p 602, Haryana State Archive of Panchkula.

⁶³ *Punjab States Gazetteers*, Vol XVI, *Phulkian State Gazetteer*, pp. 215-216.

⁶⁴ Foreign Department, Political Proceeding, 2 July 1858, Nos. 185-188, National Archive of India.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p.154.

highly praised by the British officers. A little later, a detachment sent by Sarup Singh accompanied the expedition to Kashmir, where Imamuddin Khan, the Governor, had revolted against Maharaja Gulab Singh. For these services the Governor General remitted the fine of Rs. 10,000 and sanctioned the grant of lands not exceeding in value Rs. 3000 a year. This was a gesture of appreciation of the Government towards Sarup Singh. A double allowance was granted to the troops who had served with the Kashmir force.⁶⁶ When the Second Sikh War broke out, Raja Sarup Singh was once again anxious to prove his fidelity to the Government and offered to lead his troops in person to Lahore. He was thanked fervently for his loyalty although for some reason the services of his troops were declined.⁶⁷ After the annexation of the Punjab, the Raja of Jind was one of the few chiefs permitted to retain independent powers, with the exception of the right of give capital punishment. He endeavoured to reform his administration following the English model, and to adopt the English system of revenue and police. However, these reforms introduced by the Raja were not altogether popular, especially among the wild tribes on the border. As a consequence, the peasants of Sujuarah a village on the Rohtak boundary rose in revolt and killed the tehsildar, who had been sent to measure the cultivated area of villages, with a view to making a settlement and to mark off the surplus waste lands into separate estates. The rebels of Sujuarah then called together the villages of the neighborhood belonging to the same clan, and threw up entrenchments arming and provisioning themselves for a siege. The Raja marched against the insurgents with his forces, but before attacking them as per the advice of the British Government, he issued a proclamation granting a free pardon to all concerned except the leaders of the revolt, if they agreed to withdraw quietly to their homes. This proclamation, and the presence of a strong force, had the desired effect and the majority of the insurgents dispersed. The leaders of the revolt finding themselves deserted fled and the revolt was brought to an end without the loss of a single life.⁶⁸

Nabha- During the Cis-Sutlej expeditions of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1807-08, the Nabha Chief Jaswant Singh remained his firm ally. In 1807, he received a grant of four villages of the Glumgrana estate and the district of Kannah from Ranjit Singh. However, the

⁶⁶ Lepel H, Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 352.

⁶⁷ A.C. Arora, *British Policy towards The Punjab States, 1898-1905*, Export India Publication, Jalandhar, 1982, p 67, see also *Punjab States Gazetteers*, Vol XVI, Phulkian States, Lahore, 1904, p. 216.

⁶⁸ Lepel H, Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 355.

recurring aggressions of Ranjit Singh beyond Sutlej naturally produced consternation and fear among the Malwa Chiefs and they turned towards the British protection for protection.⁶⁹

At this time Raja Jaswant Singh was ranked third among the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. First was the Maharaja of Patiala, with a revenue of upward of six lakhs of rupees, the Bhais of Kaithal were second, with a revenue of over two lakhs rupees and the third was Nabha with a revenue of one Lakh and a half. However, it is noteworthy that Sir David Ochterlony had formed a high opinion of Raja Jaswant Singh of Nabha and abilities. On one occasion he wrote to the Government, "Jaswant Singh was the principal Sardars under our protection is by far superior in manner, management and understanding to any of them I had yet seen. I had seen much of his country, which was highly cultivated and proved him to be mild and unimpressive a character seldom seen amongst them and was made more conspicuous by his lands being much mixed with the Raja of Patiala, where the contrast was very discernible."⁷⁰

At a later stage in an important development, the Phulkian Chiefs combined to oppose George Thomas. However, the Raja of Nabha was only an unimportant and peripheral member of the confederacy and at the battle of Narnaud in 1798 his troops hardly played a role. Again in 1801, the Raja joined with the principal Cis- Sutlej chiefs in their embassy to General Perron at Delhi but Nabha was included in the conditions finally agreed upon and consented to pay Rs. 9510 per annum as tribute to the Marathas on the defeat of Thomas. Jaswant Singh sided with the British when Holkar, the Maratha Chief was being driven northwards to Lahore and aided them with a detachment of riders. Lord Lake , in return for his loyalty, assured him that his possessions would not be curtailed and no demand for tribute would be made on him so long as his disposition towards the British remained unchanged. Raja Jaswant Singh was formally taken under the protection of the British Government in May 1809 A.D., with the other Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. In 1810 A.D. Raja Jaswant Singh of Nabha was granted special Sanad/grant, giving him a permanent right over his possessions. He also provided supplies for Ochterlony's Gurkha Campaign in 1815 and also helped the British in Bikaner in 1818. He always proved himself to be a faithful ally to the British when his assistance was required. At the time of the Kabul campaign of 1838 he offered the services of his troops to the Governor –General and advanced 6 *lakhs* of rupees towards the expenses of the expedition. He died in 1840 A.D. and was succeeded by his son Devindar, who however

⁶⁹ *Truth About Nabha*, Shiormani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, p. 41.

⁷⁰ *Punjab State Gazetteer*, Vol XVI, Phulkian States, p.61.

failed to carry on his father's policy of loyalty towards the British.⁷¹ As a consequence of his conduct during the first Sikh war, nearly one fourth of his territory was confiscated. Moreover, he was removed from his state and his son Bharpur Singh a boy of seven year of age was installed on the throne. Bharpur Singh attained maturity very shortly after the outbreak of the mutiny. During the critical time of mutiny he acted with exemplary loyalty to the British. He was placed in charge of the important station of Ludhiana and of the neighboring Sutlej ferries at the commencement of the outbreak. A detachment of 300 men from Nabha took control of the Nasiri Battalion. This battalion had been detailed to escort a siege train from Phillaur to Delhi but had refused to march. The British deputy commissioner with the help of a detachment of 150 Nabha troops opposed the Jalandhar mutineers at Phillaur and prevented their crossing the river. The Raja dispatched a contingent of about 300 men to Delhi which performed service for the British throughout the siege. Raja Bharpur Singh constantly enlisted new troops from amongst his own subjects, furnished supplies and transport, arrested mutineers and performed many other services characterized by loyalty towards the British. Further he also advanced a loan of two and half *lakh* Rupees to the government. After the mutiny his service was rewarded by the grant of divisions of Bawal and Kanti and he was subsequently allowed to purchase a portion of the Kanaud (Mahendragarh) sub division of Jhajjar. He was also formally granted the power of life and death over his subjects as well as the right of adoption and the promise of non-interference by the British in the internal affairs of his State. He was enlightened prince who devoted all his energies to the well being of his people.⁷²

Kapurthala – Position of Kapurthala state became highly precarious because it held territories both in the Cis and Trans Sutlej areas. The position of the state was delicate as the former territories of the Cis- were under the sphere of the British influence and later under that of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. As such, the Kapurthala Chief had often to perform a balancing act. Often he had to deal with the direct authority of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, whereas the influence of British was experienced only indirectly.

On a few occasions, however, the Raja of Kapurthala Fateh Singh, was brought into direct confrontation with the British Government. The British did not miss any opportunity

⁷¹ Cited in Paper from Harding to Secret Committee, 2 December. 1845, Bikramjit Harsat , *The Punjab Papers*, V.V. Research Institute, Hoshiarpur 1970, p. 123.

⁷² *Punjab States Gazetteers, Vol XVI, Phulkian States*, p. 218.

to assert their rights over Kapurthala as a Suzerain Power. The so called 'Kotila case' presents a clear instance of British intervention in the affairs of Kapurthala State. The Kotila fort situated in the centre of Sardar Fateh Singh's Cis- Sutlej territories was owned by a Pathan family as their ancestral property. Prior to the British connection with the Cis -Sutlej States Kotila was dependent for its protection on a number of States including Kapurthala, Patiala and Bilaspur. Such dependence was not uncommon for all the small Chiefs at that time. Small chiefs needed the patronage and protection of bigger Chiefs to protect them. The eldest representative of the Kotila family was Nihang Khan who was involved in a dispute with his younger brother Balwant Khan.⁷³ The latter sought the help of Kapurthala Chief, Fateh Singh Ahluwalia. Fateh Singh agreed to assist Balwant Khan on the condition that he would acknowledge the Ahluwalia supremacy. However, the Kapurthala Chief could not send forces for securing the fort of Kotila for Balwant Khan. The British authorities prevented him from interfering against Nihang Khan in 1813 and again 1819 and even warned him that they would act against him in case he sent his force to attack the fort. It is said that in June 1815 Fateh Singh Ahluwalia waived his claim of supremacy over the fort. From 1819 to 1822 Balwant Khan stayed at Kapurthala in the service of the Ahluwalia Chief. In the middle of 1822, however, he returned to Kotila supported by Ahluwalia troops, expelled his brothers and became the master of fort.⁷⁴ The Government of India ruled that the right of the Ahluwalia Chief over Kotila had become obsolete for he had ceased to get tribute from the Kotila Afghans and had also failed to afford them protection against the exaction and encroachments of other Sikh Chiefs. Fateh Singh was accordingly warned against attempting to exercise any intervention whatever in the affairs of the Kotila Chiefship. Nihang Khan was reinstated in his rights and the half share of Balwant Khan in the Kotila fort was forfeited to his elder brother.⁷⁵

Another matter in which the British authorities exercised repeated intervention was the question of the Chiefship of Bhirog vis-à-vis Kapurthala State. The Bhirogia estate consisting of about 100 villages was given by Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, as a reward for his

⁷³ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.486.

⁷⁴ Letter from Deputy Superintendent Ambala to Agent Governor- General, Delhi dated 9th August, 1822, N.A.I.

⁷⁵ Letter from Agent Governor General to Agent dated 30th April, 1824, N.A.I.

royal service to Mirza Singh. Mirza Singh had declined to obey the orders of the British Government on the ground that he owed allegiance to the Ahluwalia Darbar.⁷⁶

The British authorities were unhappy with the 'outrageous conduct' of the Bhirogia Chief and desired to take action against him. Fateh Singh was directed by David Ochterlony to confiscate the estate of the Bhirogia Chief. Accordingly, a force was dispatched by the Ahluwalia Sardar in 1817 under the command of Mir Nizam-ud-din. In the battle that followed both the sides suffered great losses. As the outcome of the battle the whole Bhirogia territory was taken over by the victors.⁷⁷ In the November 1817, however, David Ochterlony asked Fateh Singh Ahluwalia to withdraw his troops from Bhirog and reinstate Maha Singh on the plea that he was minor. However, Fateh Singh refused to restore the estate to Maha Singh in spite of the fact that the British Government expressed readiness to give assurance that Bhirog Chief should always acknowledge the supremacy of the Ahluwalia Chief. The Ahluwalia Chief was given warning in the strongest language by the British authorities that he should reinstate his vassal and withdraw his troops.⁷⁸

In 1825, however Maha Singh became rebellious and he refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the Ahluwalia Chief. He did not even care for the displeasure of the British Agent who was compelled to recommend attachment of the whole portion of the *Jagir*. After this the question was referred to the Government of India, which also held that the supremacy of the Ahluwalia Chief.⁷⁹ Accordingly, in July 1826, Fateh Singh sent his troops for punishment of his rival. At this time Maharaja Ranjit Singh intervened and asked the Ahluwalia Chief to stop hostile proceedings against Maha Singh and to take no action against him without his sanction. Apart from this he also ordered that in any expedition against the Bhirog Sardar the Lahore troops should be associated with those of Kapurthala. The British Government did not go any further to support the Kapurthala Chief but they made it very clear to Maharaja Ranjit Singh that they would not permit that the Lahore troops should be

⁷⁶ *Kapurthala – its Past and Present*, compiled by official Kapurthala, 1928, p. 9.

⁷⁷ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.482.

⁷⁸ *Letters from Captain in Birch to D. Ochterlony*, dated 1st November and 11th November, 1817, N.A.I

⁷⁹ Letter from Agent Governor General to Captain Murray dated 1st and 11st August 1825 and Letter from Captain Murray to Agent Governor General dated 13th and 16th August 1825. Letters from Metcalfe to Government of India, dated 31 December, 1825 and from the Government of India to Metcalfe, dated 9th December 1825 and 13 January 1826, N.A.I.

associated with those of Kapurthala. The British Government also made it very clear to Maharaja Ranjit Singh that they would not permit the Lahore troops to cross the Sutlej.⁸⁰

The Ahluwalia Chief was unhappy with the unfavorable intervention of Ranjit Singh and nursed grudge against the Maharaja. The affair provided a cause of estrangement in the relationship of the Lahore Darbar and the Kapurthala State. Hereafter the Kapurthala Chief began to develop proximity with the British authorities. In 1825, the relations of Maharaja Ranjit Singh Fateh Singh became strained to such an extent that there was a possibility of confrontation between the two. In the last week of December 1825, the Ahluwalia Chief was alarmed by the rumors that two battalions of the Lahore Army were advancing towards his territory. So he fled across the river Sutlej with the whole of his family and took refuge at Jagraon. Fateh Singh also sent confidential messages to seek British protection.⁸¹

The British authorities found it impossible to extend protection to the Kapurthala Chief in respect of his Trans Sutlej possessions, as under the Treaty of 1809 they had given the commitment that they would not interfere with Maharaja Ranjit Singh's possessions north of the Sutlej.⁸²

Metcalf in his letter to Murray dated 4th January 1826, wrote that although the British protection could not be extended on the Trans-Sutlej possessions of the Ahluwalia Chief but it could be extended and affirmed unhesitatingly in respect of his Cis- Sutlej possessions and that too only for the territories (1) which he had inherited from his ancestors (2) which he himself occupied along with Ranjit Singh on the basis of equality. However, for those territories even in the Cis- Sutlej regions which he had secured from Ranjit Singh only as a grant, the British could not guarantee him help.⁸³

On the basis of the distinction already drawn by Metcalf, the district of Jagraon and Naraingrah which had been granted by Maharaja to Fateh Singh was declared to be under the protection of Maharaja. British protection was extended to the rest of Ahluwalia possessions

⁸⁰ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, pp. 484-85.

⁸¹ R.R. Sethi, *The Lahore Darbar*, Punjab Government, 1950, pp.35-37.

⁸² A.C. Arora, *British Policy towards the Punjab States 1898-1905*, p.9.

⁸³ Cited in *Letter from Metcalf to Murray*, January 14, 1824, Record of the Intelligence Department of the North West Provinces of India, p. 232.

in the Cis Sutlej areas. It was not long before; however, reconciliation was brought about between the Chiefs which resulted in the restoration of the abandoned areas to Fateh Singh.⁸⁴

Thus, as a result of the developments discussed above, Fateh Singh returned home in 1827. The Ahluwalia estates were guaranteed for ever to him by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. However, in 1836, Maharaja Ranjit Singh confiscated Phagwara, one of the Sardar's earliest possessions. Fateh Singh had an expectation that the British Government would interfere in this matter in his favour. Although the British Government declined active interference, yet they expressed sympathy with the Sardar. After this Fateh Singh returned to the Jalandhar Doab and then lived at Kapurthala in peace and died in October 1837.⁸⁵

In 1838, Lord Auckland visited Punjab. The only momentous event during the six years of his office was the famous Afghan episode. Nihal Singh who was anxious to show his good will to the British Government got an opportunity during the First Afghan War. The Chief of Kapurthala along with Patiala, Bahawalpur, Nabha and Malerkotla offered assistance to the British Government. Nihal Singh rendered to the Britishers important aid in collecting supplies on their way to Kabul and some of his troops also participated in the Kabul expedition.⁸⁶

The First Anglo Sikh War broke out in 1845. All Sikh Chiefs did not prove faithful towards the British. Nihal Singh also failed to provide supplies from the Cis -Sutlej States which he was bound to do by proclamation of 1809. The British ordered him to cross the river of Sutlej and join the British immediately. However, he failed to do so.⁸⁷

In 31 November, news was received by Broadfoot that at the battle of Aliwal and then also at Budhowal the troops of the Ahluwalia Chief fought against the British.⁸⁸ Further Ahluwalia officials withheld the resources of Cis- Sutlej territories from the British Agent.

⁸⁴ *Kapurthala State, Its Past and Present*, Kapurthala 1928, p.11.

⁸⁵ S.M.Latif, *History of the Punjab*, Kalyani, New Delhi 1964, p.318.

⁸⁶ C.U. Aitchison, *a collection treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol IX, Calcutta 1892, p.136, see also S.M.Latif, *History of the Punjab*, New Delhi, 1964, p. 319.

⁸⁷ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.496.

⁸⁸ *Punjab, District Gazetteer*, Vol XIV A, Kapurthala State, p.6.

They did not provided any carriage or supplies to the British Army until the struggle came to an end. ⁸⁹

When Nihal Singh was questioned about his reluctance and inability to give help to the British, he stated in his defense that he had such sufficient warning as obliged him to join the British side. However, the British authorities did not believe his contention and said that it was a completely false statement. Major Broadfoot in his two letters written on 24th November and 30th November 1845 had issued an unambiguous warning to Nihal Singh that the British were going to be victorious and it would be prudent for a wise Chief like him to support the winning side. In his second letter he advised Nihal Singh to provide some military help in the nature of crossing the Sutlej. However, it is quite clear that the Sardar was unable to make up his mind. On 14th December, on the other hand, the news was received that the Ahluwalia subject and agents had joined the enemy. On the 19th however, the confidential agent returned with the news that the Chief was coming to join the British. This game of ambivalence continued in spite of the fact that Major Broadfoot and some of the military officers like Mr. Currie continued to write to Nihal Singh to come to their aid. Major Lawrence summed up the conduct of Ahluwalia Sardar in very apt words. According to him, the Sardar could have joined the British without any personal hazard. But he always feared his fate in the event of the victorious British army would forgive him. To the last the Chief of Kapurthala preferred to not take any risk and reposed faith in the clemency of British rather than to the justice of his own countrymen. "He, therefore gave us empty words and furnished them with guns and soldier."⁹⁰

After the first Anglo Sikh War the Governor General called Nihal Singh for an explanation for his noncommittal behavior during this war. Sardar Nihal Singh gave a detailed and elaborate defense. He offered the alibi that the mutiny of his troops and the restraint under which they placed him prevented his joining the English in the war. However, the British were not satisfied with this explanation. They argued that the Chief alone could have joined them even though his troops were not interested in this campaign. Otherwise also they had definite information that a part of the loot from Sir Harry Smith's division was sent

⁸⁹ *Foreign Department, Political Proceeding* 2 July 1858, Nos. 166-194, Letter from Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej States to Chief Commissioner of the Punjab dated 30 January 1858, para 8, No. 192. N.A.I.

⁹⁰ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.497-98.

by Ahluwalia troops to their Chief. This clearly showed that the Sardar was in complete command of his troops and actually shared their spoils.⁹¹

Major Lawrence, the Political Agent, in response to the explanation given by Nihal Singh gave the comments that Sardar Nihal Singh had no excuse for his conduct. Major Lawrence observed that the Chiefs and Jagraon area could have furnish important information to the authorities. However, the Chiefs did not furnish information voluntarily. Moreover, the information given by them was useless or it had been deferred so long that it was of no use. Sardar Nahal Singh tried to blame on Raja Lal Singh and Sardar Ranjodh Singh. He stated that the latter was responsible for the mutiny of the troops. Major Lawrence however could see through the game of the Sardar. In the Major's opinion the Ahluwalia Chief was not actuated by patriotism and did not give importance to his relationship with the British. He simply indulged in fence sitting and followed the policy which in his opinion would bring the least risk, whatever the result of the war. Major Lawrence found no excuse for Nihal Singh's conduct. He recommended that Rs.5,65,000 a year should be forfeited and escheated to the British Government.⁹²

The Government of India considered the proofs of Sardar Nihal Singh's misconduct and disaffection as most conclusive and could find no legitimate excuse for the course pursued by him. Accepting the recommendation of Major Lawrence, they ruled that the Cis-Sutlej States of the Sikhs be confiscated. It was also decided by the Supreme Government that the Kapurthala Chief would hereafter pay an annual tribute of rupees 1,31,000 in communication of military service.⁹³

After the bitter experience of the First Anglo Sikh War, the Chief of Kapurthala did his best to render assistance to the British Government in the second Anglo Sikh War 1848-49. His services were utilized to some extent in the form of carriage and supplies. Raja Nihal Singh furnished supplies for the troops proceeding to Multan. So at the end of campaign the Governor General paid him a visit at Kapurthala and created him a 'Raja'.⁹⁴

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.499.

⁹² *Letter from Major H.M. Lawrence, Agent Governor General to Secretary to Government of India*, dated 21 September 1846, H.S.A.P.

⁹³ *Letter from Government of India to Agent, Governor General*, dated 17 November 1846, P.S.A.P.

⁹⁴ S.M Latif *History of the Punjab*, p. 320, see also Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 502.

Faridkot

When the British Government demanded from Maharaja Ranjit Singh the restitution of all his conquests on the left bank of the Sutlej made during 1808-1809, he showed great reluctance to surrender Faridkot. He claimed that he had a special right firstly as Faridkot was a dependency of Kot Kapura which he had previously conquered. Secondly, he claimed that the owners had made a promise when it was besieged in 1807, that they would within one month, put themselves under his authority and that should they fail to do so, they would consent to undergo any punishment which he might think fit to impose upon them. As far as the first claim was concerned, it was clear that no right could be maintained on account of any connection between Kot Kapura and Faridkot. Ever since the division of the territory among the sons of Sukia, Faridkot had been independent, more powerful than Kot Kapura and in no way subject to it. Even had there been any connection such as that alleged, still it was well known that the Maharaja had seized Kot Kapura, before he had requested the assent of the British Government to the extension of his conquests beyond the Sutlej.⁹⁵

The second ground on which the Raja based his right was slightly more valid. However, the truth of this claim not be ascertained and the conduct of the garrison and forced retreat of Diwan Mohkam Chand seemed to contradict it. Nevertheless, the British Envoy offered to refer the claim of Faridkot being an old conquest for the decision of government. This proposal did not please the Maharaja, who told Mr. Metcalf that he must consult with the Chiefs of his army on the Sutlej, respecting the property of restoring Faridkot. The Envoy replied that he should consider the Maharaja moving to join his army on the Sutlej as a declaration of war and quit his court accordingly.⁹⁶

Diwan Mohkam Chand at this very time returned from Kangra where he had been debating with Raja Sansar Chand for the expulsion of the Gurkhas and took up his position at Phillaur commanding the passage of the Sutlej at its most important part, opposite the town of Ludhiana. His intention was of going in for a war with the British whom he hated. He did not wish his master to surrender Faridkot which had been made over to him as his *jagir*. His

⁹⁵ *Punjab State Gazetteers, Faridkot State* 1915, Lahore, 1917.p. 10, see also *Faridkot State Record*, Head Revenue, Basta No. 11. File No. 95, P.S.A.P.

⁹⁶ *Punjab States Gazetteers* Vol. XVI, Faridkot State, 1915, Lahore, 1917.p. 12.

influence from his experience and ability was very great with the Maharaja and it was Mr. Metcalfe firmness alone which at this time prevented a battle with the English.⁹⁷

Finally, Ranjit Singh with great unwillingness gave orders for the evacuation of Faridkot. However, Diwan Mokam Chand delayed compliance for as long as possible. He wrote to the Maharaja that a British officer had been appointed to proceed to Faridkot and that he wanted to occupy the place with British garrison. He urged his master to suspend his order until he could verify the information sent him. The British government had no intention of garrisoning the town, but they were determined that it should be surrendered to its original owner. Thus, the Resident of Delhi had decided to compel the restitution by force of arms. The hot weather was approaching. The authorities knew that the British army could not act in the field without great inconvenience in the hot weather. There was a feeling that the immediate march of troops on Faridkot would hasten its surrender. Ranjit Singh heeded the advice of Diwan Mohkam Chand a contest with the British would be unavoidable. At last the Maharaja avoided a collision with the English and on the 3rd of April 1809, restored Faridkot to Sardar Gulab Singh and his brothers. All obstacles to the completion of the treaty between Lahore and the British government were now removed and it was signed shortly afterwards.⁹⁸

After the reinstatement of Gulab Singh as the ruler of Faridkot, Fauja Singh resumed his charge as Minister or Diwan. He administered the affairs of the state with competence until Gulab Singh attained the age of majority. Because of British protection, the state was now free from any external dangers so that more attention could be paid to development work.⁹⁹

The revenue of Faridkot was at this time very small and uncertain. The country was entirely dependent on rain for cultivation. Moreover, rain was scant and in some years there was no rain. Wells were not difficult to sink but it was not worthwhile to dig wells as the water was from 90 to 120 feet below the surface. In a favorable season the estate yielded Rs.

⁹⁷ *Memoranda of Information regarding Certain Native Chiefs*, Vol-II, Punjab Government, p. 384.

⁹⁸ *Punjab States Gazetteers Vol. XVI*, Faridkot State 1915, Lahore 1917.p. 12.

⁹⁹ Fauja Singh, *The City of Faridkot- Past and Present*, Punjabi University Patiala, 1976, p. 23, see also Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, *Punjab Under the British Rule*, K.B.Publication, New Delhi, 1974, p.50.

14,000 or Rs 12,000 in a bad season Rs, 6000 and sometimes nothing. The number of villages, in the state, was about sixty.¹⁰⁰

Gulab Singh married two wives, one the daughter of a Sardar Gulab Singh Kaleka of Yamuna in Patiala and second, the daughter of Sardar Sher Singh Gill, of Golia in the Moga District. On 5 November, 1826 Sardar Gulab Singh, the Chief of Faridkot, was assassinated when walking alone outside the town of Faridkot. An investigation of the crime was held by the Political Agent, Captain Murray. Sahib Singh. A younger brother of murdered chief was suspected on the ground that sword with which the murder had been committed, belonged to him. But there was no direct evidence against him or anyone against else and therefore the matter had to be dropped.¹⁰¹

Gulab Singh had left one son, a boy named Attar Singh, nearly four year old. There was the custom of primogeniture in the Faridkot family. According to this custom, Attar Singh was acknowledged as Chief by the British Government, the administration of affair remaining until he should reach his majority, in the hands of Fauja Singh. Fauja Singh was the brother of Gulab Singh and during the lifetime of their brother had lived with him and enjoyed the estate in common. Another brother of the Late Chief, Mehtab Singh, was living, but his mother had been divorced by Sardar Mohr Singh and he was not entitled to inherit the legacy. The young Chief, Attar Singh died in 1827.¹⁰²

The new Chief Sardar Pahar Singh was a liberal- minded and able man and immensely improved his territory, more than doubling the revenue in twenty years. He founded many new villages. He had a reputation for justice and liberty. His good reputation induced large number of cultivators to emigrate from Lahore and Patiala to his territory. At that time, a large portion of the State was desert when he acquired it. The Journal of Captain Murray, written in 1823, described the country as a vast sea of sand, with no vegetation except pilu, or other desert shrubs which added little to the life of the landscape. However, the soil, although sandy, only required water to produce magnificent crops of wheat. In old days a canal from the Sutlej had been dug by a man called Firu Shah, from near Dharamkot, half way between Firozpur and Ludhiana. The canal passed by Kot Isa Khan at Mudki and irrigated the country

¹⁰⁰ *Punjab States Gazetteers* Vol. XVI, Faridkot State, p. 13, see also Harbans Singh, *Faridkot Riyast Da Itihas*, People From Bargari, Faridkot, 2014, p.34.

¹⁰¹ Fauja Singh, *The City of Faridkot*, p. 23.

¹⁰² Griffin, H. Lepel, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 562.

to some distance. Sardar Pahar Singh was not rich enough to make Canals, but he dug many Wells and induced the peasants to dig others, and set an example of moderation and benevolence which might have been followed with great advantage by other and more powerful Chiefs.¹⁰³

The initial years of Pahar Singh's Chief ship were not peaceful. According to the custom of the family, his brother Sahib Singh took up arms against him and gave him so much trouble that the Chief begged the assistance of English troops to restore order. When he did not get assistance from the British he was compelled to accept assistance from the Raja of Jind, Although such an arrangement was highly irregular as one of the conditions of British protection was that no state should interfere in the internal affairs of another However, on the death of Sahib Singh , everything went on well and Sardar Pahar Singh was able to carry out his reforms without any further interruption, excepting occasional quarrels with the office of Lahore Government commanding at Kot Kapura. Kot Kapura was only six or seven miles to the South of Faridkot, and as the ancestral possession of his family, Pahr Singh would have been very glad to obtain.¹⁰⁴

Pahar Singh gave maximum attention to cultivation of friendly relations with the British. He rendered assistance to the British during their war with Afghanistan. When the First Anglo Sikh war broke out in 1845, and when a large number of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs were indifferent or hostile, he attached himself to the English and made best efforts to collect supplies and carriage and furnish guides for the army. On the eve of the battle of Firozshah he remained loyal and did excellent service. He was rewarded by a grant of half the territory confiscated from the Raja of Nabha. His share, as estimated in 1846, was worth Rs. 35,612 per annum.¹⁰⁵

Pahar Singh was richly rewarded for these services. He was prudent and sided with the British and assisted them by furnishing means of transport, provisions and guides for the Army. The title of Raja was conferred upon him in recognition of these services during Sutlej Campaign and the ancestral Estate of Kotkapura was also restored to him in exchange

¹⁰³ Subhash Parihar, *Architectural Heritage of Sikh State Faridkot*, Aryan Books International, New Delhi, 2009, p.37.

¹⁰⁴ Griffin, Lepel H ,*The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 565.

¹⁰⁵ C.U. Aitchison, *A collection of Treaties, Engagements And Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, p 63, see also Colnel G.B. Malleeson,, *An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India*, p.341.

for villages in Pargana Sultankhanwala. Raja Pahar Singh died in April 1849 in his fiftieth year and was succeeded by his only surviving son Wazir Singh, then twenty one year of age.¹⁰⁶

In 1850, government directed attention to the adjustment of the accounts in connection with the transfer of territory, and ordered an enquiry into *muafis*. The boundaries of the district were revised and corrected in 1853 and Rs,19,998-1-0 were found to be drawn in excess by the State. In return, therefore, some villages in *pargana* Mukatsar including Bajewala assessed at Rs 60 were resumed by the Government. *Mauzas* Ghaimara and Misriwala Harchuka assessed at Rs. 604, which had been given to the State in 1850 in exchange for Mauza Tutawala and Saupwali, also lapsed to government. Thus the State remained in possession of territory yielding Rs 50,630. It was decided that *muafis* should be resumed from time to time and when the revenues of resumed *jagirs* were found to be equal to the revenue of a village should be made over to government and the *muafis* should in return lapse to the State.¹⁰⁷ However, in 1862 an arrangement was made by which in the event of a *jagir* being resumed, the State should, on payment of 20 times the *muafis* revenue, receive the resumed *muafi*.¹⁰⁸

During the Second Sikh War of 1849, Wazir Singh served on the side of the English. During the Mutiny of 1857, he seized several mutineers and handed them over to the English authorities. He placed himself and his troops under the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozpur and guarded the ferries of the Sutlej against the passage of the mutineers.¹⁰⁹

Landed Aristocracy is a category of nobility in various countries over history for which landownership was part of their noble privileges. Their character depends on the country in India, *Jagirdar* and *Zamindar* were the landed aristocracies which formed India feudalism.¹¹⁰

Jagirdari- a feudal system of political and revenue administration based on *jagir*, lit fief or grant of land received from the sovereign or a vassal owing fealty and obedience to him. Sikhs who after the fall of Sirhind in early 1764, started occupying territory, did not

¹⁰⁶ *Investiture Ceremony of His Highness Farzand-i-Saadat Nishan-I- Hazrat-I-Kasr-I-Hind Brar Bans, Raja Harinder Singh Sahib Bahadur Ruler of Faridkot State*, Lahore, n.d, p 24

¹⁰⁷ *Punjab States Gazetteers*, Vol XVI A, Faridkot State, 1915, p. 15.

¹⁰⁸ *Ambala Division*, File No 2, East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Proceeding 1862, H.S.A.P.

¹⁰⁹ *Mutiny Records*, Correspondence, Punjab Government, Lahore, 1911, p. 148.

¹¹⁰ Oxford English Dictionary, p.631, see also Joginder Singh, *Sikh Leadership*, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1999, p.19.

automatically take to the Jagirdari System in vogue since the Sultanate and the Mughal periods. Heads of various Sikh *misl* and lesser *Sardar* or commanders had under them vast tracts of land, but their holding were not *jagirs* in the sense that they were owed to no sovereign above them. As the legend on the coins first struck by the Sikhs in 1765 signifies, they considered themselves part of the collective body called the Panth – Panth which derived its sovereignty from the Guru. According to anonymous author of a contemporary work, *Haqiqat- I- Bina wa Uruj-I-Firqa- Sikkan*, even he who had only two horses and acquired a single village on his own *jagir* did not owe allegiance to anyone else. Stray instances however are not lacking of the Chiefs of Sikh *misl*s giving *jagirs* to persons serving them in civil or military capacity but *jagirdari* as a system of service *jagirs* or revenue free land grants in lieu of salary for services became a distinctive feature of Sikh revenue administration only under Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780-1839). According to figures given by Henry T. Prinsep, Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab and Political Life of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, over 42 percent of the total revenue from land was alienated by the Maharaja in favor of all kinds of *Jagirdars*. Some of the *Jagirdars* of the former Chiefs were also taken into service and paid through *Jagirs*. Most *Jagirs* other than some dharmarth *jagirs* which were taken in perpetuity, were temporary, usually for the lifetime of the grantees¹¹¹. The *Jagirdar* was taken the right to collect revenue either in cash or kind as it might suit the convenience of the cultivators. A fixed part of revenue, normally 12.5 percent was payable to the State. Judicial powers, both civil and criminal were vested in the *Jagirdar*, but he could not interfere with traditional preparatory rights of the cultivators. Condition of grant were laid down. For instance in the case of military *Jagirdar*, the portions for personal service and for the maintenance of a specified number of horsemen were distinctly mentioned. Though one and the same person could be asked alternatively to perform civil and military officers was generally clear. Thus while Avitabile was essentially a civil administrator, Ventura was military commander. Instance were also there of a *jagir* granted to more than one person with their individual shares severally fixed. This was a legacy from the old *pattidari* system.¹¹²

Under the British Raj, the old Aristocracy of Maharaja Ranjit Singh's times produced moderate leaders of the Sikh associations and organizations in the last quarter of nineteenth and early twentieth century's. The notable families from which these sprang up were the Majithias, Attariwalas, Sandhanwalias, Ramgarhias and Bhais and Bedis. Often these leader

¹¹¹ Ed, Harbans Singh, *The Encyclopedia of Sikhism*, Vol III, Punjabi University Patiala, 1997, p. 318.

¹¹² Indu Banga, *Agrarian system of the Sikhs*, Delhi, 1978, p.24.

were called 'natural leaders' by the British officials and later on , by contemporary and recent writers and leaders. However, when the British officials used this concept they implied those persons who were 'superior to the rest of population because of families to which they belonged and special privileges were hereditary.' By virtue of their privileged background, they were superior in rank and intellect. Therefore, they were called natural leaders.¹¹³

The state policies in pre and post annexation period largely determined the position and status of these leaders. In the pre annexation period, the process of disintegration of the old Aristocracy began when the contest for power among Maharaja Ranjit Singh's successors and Darbari took an ugly shape. The weak and incompetent successors failed to keep the reigns of administration in their hands and used Darbari and subsequently the Khalsa Fauj for their petty ends. The civil strife led to administrative breakdown. The Darbaris got divided into communal and caste groups. Each successor of Maharaja Ranjit Singh created his or her own group of Sardars and patronized it and punished his or her opponents. Thus shaking the foundation of social hierarchy of Darbaris. Factional politics, manipulations and conspiracies compromised the public image of the Darbaris.

The British intervention before the First Anglo Sikh War and dictation of Lahore and later the treaty of Bhairowal (1846) led to territorial disintegration of the Kingdom of Lahore. The hill territories between the Beas and the Indus including Kashmir and Hazara were taken away from his Kingdom. The hill territories between the Beas and the Indus including Kashmir and Hazara were taken away from this kingdom of Lahore. Kashmir and Hazara were taken away from this Kingdom. Consequently, the Sikh Sardars lost their service and inam *jagirs* in this area. However, serious battering of Sikh Sardars and *Jagirdars* took place when the British began to dismantle the *Jagirdari* system and disbanded the Khalsa Fauj- the mainstay of the Sikh power and position . we can only assess the misfortune of the Sikh Sardars and *Jagirdars* under the British rule when we compare their position during Maharaja Ranjit Singh.¹¹⁴

Overall the attitude of the British Government towards the Sikh Chiefs and Landed Aristocracy from 1809-1857 had been on the whole very reasonable. It can be said that the diplomatic calculations of a wider policy determined their approach. The Governor General of East India Company during this period had been absorbed first in dealing with the

¹¹³ Joginder Singh, *Sikh Leadership*, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1999, p.19.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.20

Gurkhas, Marathas and Pindaries and then with the Frontier States of Sindh and the Punjab. Under these circumstances, it was thought essential to retain the friendship and fidelity of these Chiefs. During 1809-1845 British Government did not interfere in their internal administration except when they were requested to do so or when intervention was thought to be inevitable to solve a specific issue. However, after 1845, British policy towards most of petty Cis Sutlej Chiefs underwent a great change. The reason was that in the course of First Anglo Sikh War the Cis Sutlej Chiefs and even the Raja of Kapurthala and Nabha had sympathy with their Sikh brothers and many of them openly supported them against the British. After the war British Government followed the policy of punishing disobedience and rewarding obedience. Most of petty Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were deprived of their police jurisdiction. It was decided that they would no longer raise the contingents but pay a fixed sum to government annually. Some were even deprived of the parts or all of their territories. During the Second Anglo Sikh War, Sikh Chiefs voluntarily and willingly offered the services and till 1857 Sikhs Chief were loyal towards the British.

CHAPTER 2

MILITARY POSITION OF BRITISH AND NATIVE WEST INDIA

In the revolt of 1857 the main actors were the sepoys. They formed an overwhelming majority of the British Army in those times. They shared the glory of victories in many campaign along with the British troops. The British troops were only a small percentage of the British Army India. The defense of the Indian Empire was the collective responsibility of both the Native and British forces. The British Branch of the Indian army consisted of a part of the Queen's Army and of additional British troops, recruited by the English East Company on its own. Between 1842 and 1845 the East Indian Company recruited a British Army of 4333 soldiers for service in India. These soldiers were recruited from London, Liverpool, Dublin, Cork and Edinburgh. Out of the entire British Army recruited like this British or White Army London alone supplied 52 percent of the recruits.(1) the British troops belonging to the Queen's army but serving in India were paid by the English East India Company itself. The company also maintained a native army for each of three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. Each of these units was under its own Commander-in -Chief and each possessed some peculiarities of organization. Though separate in organization, they fought in large military operations with unity in the manner of soldiers belonging to a single Army. ¹

On the eve of great Mutiny the establishment of the companies of the **British Army** was as under:

	Cavalry	Artillery	Infantry	Total
Bengal	1,366	3,063	17,003	21, 432
Madras	639	2, 128	5,941	8,708
Bombay	681	1,578	7, 101	9,360
Local force and contingents	
Military police	
Total	2,686	6,769	30,045	39, 500

Native Army

¹ Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya, *The sepoy Mutiny, 1857. A Social Study and Analysis*, Bookland Private Ltd Calcutta, 1957, pp.55.

	Cavalry	Artillery	Sappers and Miners	Infantry	Total
Bengal	19,288	4,734	1, 497	112,052	137,571
Madras	3,202	2,407	1, 270	42,373	49,928
Bombay	8,433	1,997	637	33,861	44,928
Local Forces and contingents	6, 796	2, 118	..	23,640 Unclassified	32,554, 7,756
Military police	38,977
Total	37,719	11,256	3,404	211,926	311, 714

Grand total of the British and Native Troops = 350,538,

Thus it is immensely important fact related to the composition of the British army that the native troops outnumbered the Europeans by nearly eight to one.²

This is important event affected deeply the living conditions especially of the Sikhs who dominated the rank and file of Khalsa Army. It is obvious then that the break -up of Maharaja Ranjit Singh” Army had significant repercussion on the Sikhs as a whole and their part played during the revolt of 1857. Therefore , the consequence of this measure must be assessed with due regard to later events. The first step of drastically cutting down the strength of the huge army had been made after the first Anglo Sikh War under the terms of the treaty of Lahore. However. The decisive defeat inflicted on the Sikhs in February 1849 scaled the fate of Khalsa Army.³

The disbandment of the *Jagirdari* Fauj was closely connected with the investigation of the service the resumptions of feudal *Jagirs* and with the mustering and pensioning of the retainer which remains to dealt with now. This process was much protracted by probing into large number of interwoven service and personal *Jagirs*.⁴ When at last completed, a relatively small and loosely organized body was removed which was none the less apt to become a rallying centre for discontented groups. In contrast, the disbanded the regular army could be effected more quickly, as the majority of the soldiers had participated in the anti British

² *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. IV, Clarendon Press Oxford 1909, pp. 337-338.

³ Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Military System of the Sikhs during the period 1799-1849*, Motilal Banarisidass, 1964, p.165, see also Sita Ram Kohli, *Catalogue of the Khalsa Darbar Records*, Vol I, Punjab Government, Lahore, 1919, p.3.

⁴ Ganda Singh (Ed), *Private Correspondence Relating to the Anglo Sikh Wars*, Amritsar , 1955, p.165.

Struggle and was therefore deprived of all claims for pensions.⁵ For their brave and desperate fight for independence they were punished by throwing them out of employment and making forfeit former claims. Thus after annexation, their way back to their villages was the sole escape from starvation for the major part of Khalsa troops. They were forced to join their families in the countryside and resume agricultural pursuits. That part of the army which refrained from joining anti British actions was summoned to Lahore for being mustered. Under the guidance of Lieutenant able-bodied officers and men were selected for new formations while the superannuated were pensioned off. At the same time those retainers of *Jagirdari* Foj who had not joined the insurgents were mustered and either pensioned or included in the new local forces. On 20 September 1849 Dalhousie following conveyed the orders to the Board on the abolishment of the Sikh *Jagirdari* Horse: “No Chiefs in Punjab should be permitted to entertain *Jagirdari* Horse. Intimation should be made them that the money heretofore allotted to the maintenance of *Jagirdari* Horse must henceforth be paid into the Treasury and that they are released from the obligation of maintaining such Horse. All sowars who may be considered eligible for employment in the Mounted Police in respect of bodily strength, equipment, age and character, could be retained on Rs. 20 per mensem. All who were considered ineligible on the grounds are unwilling to serve should be dismissed with either pension or gratuity.” The dissolution of the feudal contingents was important on political as well as financial grounds. The maintenance came to Rs. 24 per month for each horseman and exceeded the cost of the British Irregular Cavalry by 20 percent, while their efficiency was estimated by Sir Robert Montgomery as being two and a half times that of the latter. The saving was to be allotted for the payment of ordinary police horsemen.⁶

The mode and amount of pensions granted to former Khalsa soldiers admit an interesting insight into the British policy of appeasement. Generally, the rate of pensions was higher in the Punjab than elsewhere. As a rule, it corresponded to former pay and years of service, but also in this matter both Board and Supreme Government were remarkably elastic. The disbandment of the Sikh *Jagirdari* Horse provides an instructive example of how far the British would go in their policy of rewarding “loyal” people and penalizing the “rebels.” Moreover, like in their readiness to favour the masses at the expense of the few provided political considerations would permit it.⁷ In their letter of 3 August 1849 to

⁵ *Paper Relating to the Punjab 1847-1849*, Harrison and Sons, London, 1849 p.214, Dr Ganda Singh Collection in Punjabi University Patiala.

⁶ *Foreign Political Consultation*, 29 September, Nos.56-58, National Archives of India, New Delhi, see also Dolores Domin, *India in 1857-59*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1977, p.89.

⁷ *Press List Old Records*, Vol.XI, pp.289, Dr. Ganda Singh Collection in Punjabi University Patiala.

Governor General the Board admitted that the disbandment of the feudal contingents in the Jalandhar Doab had benefited the *jagirdars*. This was unjust, the Broad had to confess, as the *jagirdars* possessed his *jagir* but the retain nothing. In the Punjab proper measure should therefore be taken in the interest of the latter. Accordingly, it was proposed that their pension for those unfit or unwilling to serve in the new units to be equal to one third or one fourth of their “dismounted pay”, for upwards of 7 years service gratuities amounting to 12 month’ pay and for service during the second Anglo Sikh War to 6 months’ pay. In keeping with this conciliatory line the Broad recommended in April 1850 that the pensions of 69 former soldiers of the Darbar army amounting to Rs. 26,000 per annum should be continued at favorable terms and 10 of the *jagirdar* pensioners confirmed in their *jagir* of Rs. 6,140 while the rest should be replaced by cash pensions. Dalhousie sanctioned the proposals “assuming that the *jagirs* are for life.”⁸

The news of outbreak of mutiny at Meerut on 10 May 1857 combined with ruthless massacre of Europeans in Delhi was flashed to Punjab on the 11 May 1857. It was received the next day, on 12th May at Lahore and conveyed to the Chief Commissioner at Rawalpindi. The British Agent at Delhi telegraphically communicated to all stations, “The Sepoys from Meerut came in this morning all the burnt down.”⁹

In another telegram another message was sent which read: “The mutineers cut off communication with Meerut taken possessions of the Bridge and the boats several officers killed and murdered.”¹⁰

The fall of Delhi at the hands of the Meerut sepoys led to a great rebellion all over the Northern India. In this connection Gorden writes “Below Delhi the British power had almost disappeared and few points held were like islets on the face of the dark waters of rebellion which had deluged the land.”¹¹ An important aspect of the political situation of this time was that in this crisis, it is generally believed that the Punjab alone was peaceful. Most of the rulers of Punjab remained faithful to the British. Some of the historians have gone to the extent of saying that Punjab stood like rock during these crisis. According to Khilnani, “the new Province under the firm grip of John Lawrence was to prove the springboard for the

⁸ Dolores Domin, *India in 1857-59*, p.100.

⁹ *Mutiny Report*, part II, Punjab Government Press, Lahore, 1911, p.221, Punjab State Archives of Patiala, see also *The Annals of Indian Administration*, J.C. Murray Serampore, 1857, p.8.

¹⁰ *Public Correspondence ,Punjab Mutiny Report*, 1857, Vol IV, Chronicle Press,1859, p. 48.

¹¹ General Sir John Gorden, *The Sikhs* ,William Blackwood And Sons, London, 1897,p.270.

recovery of the British power.”¹² In response to the crisis General Anson wanted to move on Delhi at once but he was prevented from doing so by the want of transport, dearth of supplies and general state of unpreparedness for war of the Army Departments. At the same time he had the support and loyalty of the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs of princely states like Patiala, Jind Nabha, Karnal. These rulers kept the roads open and protected the communications with the Punjab. On the 17th May the advance of the British forces began with the dispatch of a small column down the Grand Trunk Road. However, it soon became clear that the Bengal Sepoys were not a very big challenge as a large number of them were removed from the force under various pretexts. After some time the main body of the British army, including the siege train, reached Alipore on 6th June. The safety of Ambala had been provided by a wing of the 2nd Europeans, a detachment of Patiala troops, and the loyal native Company 1/7 Ben. A handed over its 9- pounder equipment to 3/3 Ben. H.A., in exchange for the 6-pounders of the troop. In a setback to the British forces General Anson died of Cholera on May 27 at Karnal and was succeeded in command by Major- General Sir H. Barnard, commanding the Sirhind Division. On 7th June Barnard was joined by Wilson with the Meerut Field Force.¹³

It was quite strange that the British who had conquered Punjab only eight years before this major political crisis found supporters and loyalists only in the Punjab. The support of the rulers of Punjab was very crucial for the British. The mutiny broke out in Meerut on 10th May, 1857 and its news reached Ambala on the 12th. Mr. Douglas Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala, sent a letter through Imam Ali, the Vakil of Patiala State, requesting Maharaja Narinder Singh to come to Ambala for consultation. The Maharaja reached Jasmeli, near Ambala early in the following morning. On the behalf of the Chief Commissioner, Punjab, Mr. Forsyth, requested that the army of the Maharaja Patiala should occupy Thanesar and guard the lines of communications on the Grand Trunk Road from Ludhiana to Delhi.¹⁴

Mr. Barnes says, “The station of Ambala was left with four weak companies which consisted of about 250 men of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, 5th Regiment Native Infantry and some six-pounder guns, to man which there were only native artillery men.” A redoubt was erected, with the church in the centre and the remaining residents were concentrated in the

¹² N.M. Khilnani, *Punjab Under the Lawrence*, Punjab Government, Shimla, 1951, p.136.

¹³ John William Kaye, *A History of Sepoy War in India 1857-58*, Vol III, W.H. Allen, London 1876, p. 123, see also J. Royal Roseberry III, *Imperial Rule in Punjab*, Manohar Publication, New Delhi, 1987, p.180.

¹⁴ *East Punjab Government, Delhi Division, Judicial department*, 1858, File No 6, Accession No. 8209, p. 4, Haryana State Archives Panchkula, see also Mcleod Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt*, A.D. Innes, London, 1897, p.85.

house around. The army consisted mainly of irregular officers. The magazine, the treasure and commissariat/departmental stores were located in the redoubt. The siege train came down from Phillour under a guard of horse and foot soldiers provided by the Raja of Nabha and accompanied by a detachment of the 9th Irregulars placed under the charge of Lieutenant Campbell. The ammunition was carried by a party of the district police. It can be said that throughout the campaign against the mutiny the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the charge of contingents provided by the Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States. Their troops protected British stations and patrolled the grand trunk road from Ferozpur and Phillor till the boundary of Delhi. The safety of this province was almost completely dependent on the loyalty of the Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States. The Raja of Jind with Captain McAndrew with a small but disciplined contingent acted as the vanguard of army and stayed in advance of the rest. When the first detachment of Europeans reached Karnal this little band proceeded twenty-two miles further to Panipat, quitting the country, securing the road and collecting supplies and in this manner they advanced boldly to a place within twenty miles of Delhi. A detachment of the Jind troops seized the bridge at Bhagpat and this enabled the Meerut force to join the Head Quarters. A party of the Jind sawors with Captain Hodson at their head rode into Meerut and restored communication with that station. On the other hand, the troops of the Maharaja of Patiala guarded Thanesar and Ambala and the safety of Ludhiana was entrusted to the Raja of Nabha and the Malerkotla Nawab. Thus it can be said that services provided by the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs form an important part of the history of the British campaign against the mutiny in Meerut. In this context, Barnes wrote "I feel under the deepest obligations to them and the Governor General in the gazette announcing the fall of Delhi has declared that they shall not be without their reward."¹⁵ Mr. Barnes further states "The requirement of the army became incessant and the road was thronged with carts laden with every variety of stores. A bullock train was suggested by Mr. Forsyth to be carried on their district officers. This arrangement proved defective in practice for the want of a general superintendent in charge of the whole line." Analyzing the situation, Mr. Barnes obtained leave from the Chief Commissioner to organize a Military Transport Train under the supervision of Captain Briggs who was an able and zealous officer of great experience. Mr. Briggs made great efforts at a time when the Britishers were feeling drained and had almost lost courage. It was a time when there was no assistance from either the Ganga Doab or the Delhi territory. The army commissariat also could not give any help. Carts that reached Delhi never come back and there was imminent danger of dead lock. However, all these difficulties

¹⁵ *Punjab Records*, part II, Punjab Government, 1911, p.6, see also *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, General & Political Department*, 1857, File No 30, Accession 3201, p. 3.

were overcome by Captain Briggs. His Jurisdiction extended from Ferozpur to Delhi which comprised 265 miles. A train of 30 wagons a day from each of the important stations of Ambala, Ludhiana and Karnal and 14 wagons per day from Ferozpur were arranged. In this way provisions in the form of ordnance and ammunition were safely and regularly supplied to the army. The sick and the wounded were transported from the camp to Ambala. These train remained in operation from 22nd July to middle of October. The scheme was eminently successful, owing to the skill, tact, and indefatigable energy of Captain Briggs. Captain Briggs expressed acknowledgement and obligation to the Civil authorities of the Cis- Sutlej States who gave the utmost support to British Government. In those times, the cost of train was 97,317 rupees and the train was able to fulfill the purpose and objective for which it had been deployed.”¹⁶

In the light of the immense importance of the support of the Cis -Sutlej States Mr. Forsyth wrote to the Maharaja of Patiala and Rajas of Nabha and Jind in order to summon them. It was very important for the British to secure of the grand trunk road and the loyalty of the native Chiefs was the necessary for saving the treasuries from mutiny. The British treasures were under the sepoy guards at the time of the outbreak of the mutiny. Mr. Barnes promptly issued instructions to his district officers in accordance with which the Ambala treasures of Rs. 3,50,000 was placed under the 1st Fusiliers and the Thanesar money of Rs 1,000,000 was sent to the same guard. Mr. Ricketts also sent Rs.1,50,000 to the care of the 2 companies of the 8th Queen’s regiment at Phillour. Major Marsden at Ferozpur placed his treasure in the entrenchment where it was guarded by the 61st Regiment. Only the Shimla treasury remained under a guard of the natives.¹⁷

Danger was looming over this district from both north and south. In order to avert the threat of incursion of the mutinous troops from Lahore large ferries on the Sutlej were placed under guarded and the boats from the small ones to sent to Hureeki. Besides this in order to save the British from the approach of the wild tribes from Sirsa, General VanCortlandt raised a levy of 500 Sikh soldiers. This force subsequently united with the troops of Raja Jwahur Singh. They collectively constituted 5000 men of all arms and were placed under the command of the Chief Commissioner amounted and performed excellent services in Sirsa and Hissar.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Punjab Mutiny Report 1857-58*, Vol IV, Chronicle Press, Lahore, 1859, p.12.

¹⁷ Sir William Muir, *Record of the Intelligent Department of the During Mutiny of 1857*, Vol II, Edinburgh 1902, p.192.

¹⁸ Sir Charles Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence* , Clarendon Press Oxford, 1892, p. 78.

In another development connected with the mutiny, Major Marsden received information that a person called Fakir Sham Das was collecting followers with for subversive action against the British. He promptly moved against the rebel and coming upon him by surprise attacked and completely defeated him although he lost several men. Sham Das himself was arrested and executed. The intervention of Major Marsden was extremely important in the preservation of the peace of the district in the absence of which the entire region would have risen in revolt. In the western division 157 extra men were entertained in the police establishment and the feudal Chiefs provided help in the form of 200 horsemen and 40 foot soldiers. In the action that followed every highway robber was executed at once. This display of severity and the actions of General VanCortlandt's men contributed in strengthening the position of the civil authorities.¹⁹

In a major development, on the 11 July the 10th Light Cavalry was dismounted and disarmed purely as a precautionary measure. However, on the 19th August the soldiers of the Cavalry carried out a raid in an attempt to take away the horses. They were successful in cutting loose about 50 horses and seizing every pony or horse they could find in the station including many horses belonging to the officers these men rode in the direction of Delhi. With the help of Indian horse keepers of artillery they also attacked the guns. However, they were unable to seize the guns as they were repulsed. However, these mutineers were successful in killing 3 officers of the 61st regiment and wounded 3 more. They also hacked to death Mr. Nelson the Veterinary Surgeon of their regiment. Finally, 142 mutineers were captured by the British and out of these 40 were executed and the remainder were transported or imprisoned. In the Jail, 18 persons including the Newab of Rania who had been captured by Mr. Ricketts in the Ludhaina district were hanged. As part of the retaliation, the siege train was dispatched from the arsenal on August 18th and more than 2,000 cartloads of munitions of war were sent to Delhi during the siege.²⁰

The Station of Ambala was left with four very weak companies of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, the 5th Regiment Native Infantry and some 6 pounder guns. The British had only Native Artillerymen to guard these guns. A redoubt was erected with Church in the centre and the remaining residents were concentrated in the houses around. A militia consisting of irregular officers was given the charge of the magazine and the treasure. The commissariat stores were all lodged in the redoubt which was garrisoned by a company of the Fussiliers. Throughout the campaigns the most important military stores were constantly sent down

¹⁹ *Government of India, Foreign Department, Chief Commissioner of Punjab 1854-55, 56-57*, Punjab Government Press, Lahore, 1858, p. 46-47, P.S.A.P.

²⁰ *Punjab Correspondence, Punjab Mutiny Report*, p. 17-18, P.S.A.P.

under the charge of contingents furnished by the Chief of the Cis- Sutlej states. As stated above, the troops of the Cis- Sutlej States protected the British stations and patrolled the Grand Trunk Road of Ferozpur and Phillor till the border of Delhi. When the first detachment of Europeans reached Karnal the troops of the Cis- Sutlej chiefs had progressed 22 miles beyond Panipat. They quelled the rebellion and secured the main road and like this advanced within 22 miles of Delhi. A detachment of Jind troops seized the bridge at Bhagpat and thus enabled the Meerut and opened the communication with that station. The troops of Maharaja of Patiala guarded Thanesar and Ambala and the safety of Ludhiana was entrusted to the Raja of Nabha and the Malerkotla Newab.²¹

Patiala

When the news about the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut reached Patiala, the Maharaja placed himself at the head of all his available troops and marched the same night to Lahsimbli a village close to Ambala. He sent his elephants, camels and other carriage to Kalka for the transport of European troops to Ambala from the hill stations of Kasuali, Dagshai and Sabathu. From Jesomli he marched to Thanesar and placed there a force of 1300 men with four guns for the protection of district.²²

The Commissioner of the Cis- Sutlej States wrote that his straightforward and loyal conduct was of infinite importance to our cause at that time. The minds of the common people were greatly agitated and disturbed because of the various rumors about the cartridges, about the adulteration of flour and other subtle designs of the British to desecrate the purity of their caste. When the Maharaja of Patiala, placed himself at the head of his forces on the side of the British, the reports began to be discredited. The Maharaja was quite orthodox and enjoyed the trust of the people. His support at the time of the crisis was of unmatched importance to the English troops as it played an important role in pacifying the people.²³

Thanesar, Karnal and the station of Ambala were held by Patiala troops who also guarded the Grand Trunk Road from Karnal to Phillor. The Maharaja constantly expressed his wish to lead the contingent to Delhi but he was dissuaded from doing so by both the Commander-in-Chief and the Civil Authorities.²⁴

²¹ *Mutiny Report*, Punjab Government Records, Vol. VIII, part 1, p. 173, see also V.S. Suri, *The Punjab and re-capture of Delhi 1857*, Journal of the Punjab University Historical society, Vol, VI, December, 1940, pp.98-105.

²² *Patiala Record, Head History*, Basta No. 3, File No H-133-B, p.7, P.S.A P.

²³ Basta No 2, File No H-67-B, *Patiala troops taking parts in wars and Battle from time to time*, p.2.

²⁴ *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1909,p. 511, see also *Mutiny Report*, part II, p.234.

On 1 June 1857, news came from Patiala that the two native regiment sent to assist the English had joined the mutineers and had begun fighting with the English. It was reported that the whole of the Patiala force was hostile to the English; the soldiers openly remonstrated with the Maharaja for sympathizing with the English. It was believed that when the natives were fighting in defense of their religion the Maharaja was not justified in supporting the British. They reminded him that he had gained nothing by his behavior during the Punjab war.²⁵

Military activities of Patiala troops during the above uprising were extended to the following part of country:

1. Delhi, Karnal, Thansear, Jagadhri, Saharnpur, Ambala and Hill tracts.
2. Hissar, Rohtak, Sirsa, Fazilka, Bathinda.
3. Gwalior and Dholpur
4. Thanesar.

A detachment of 1763 men and 490 followers with 4 guns was employed for the defense of Thanesar and the adjoining posts of Indri, Rajowand, Kaithal and Karnal. Thanesar was then an important station from the strategic point of view as the British troops coming down from Simla, Dagshai, Kasuli and other hill stations had to pass through that district. The insurgents from Jalandhar, Ludhiana and Saharanpur had also passed through Thanesar on their way to Delhi. Moreover, Thanesar was also in the centre of 'Banger' tract where people were notorious for their violent behavior. As such the presence of a strong force was necessary in Thanesar from the British point of view. In order to control the district and the lines of communication effectively, 100 sowars and one company of infantry under the command of Sardar Partap Singh and Captain Macandrew proceeded on 15 May to occupy Karnal cantonment. This detachment made a small piquet on the Grand Trunk Road to keep it safe from the plunders.²⁶

On 20 May 1857, report was received that bands of Banger villagers intended to break open the local jail. In order to prevent this 50 sowars and one company of Infantry and two guns were posted at the jail and 30 sowars were posted on the routes leading to Thanesar. From 24 May to 2 June, Patiala forces remained engaged in carrying out reconnaissance of the surrounding Country with small mounted detachments. In the course of these

²⁵ Charles Theophilus Metcafe, *Two Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi*, Archibald Constable & Co. ,Westminster, p.77.

²⁶ Mutiny Records, part 1, p.37, see also *Foreign Secret Consultation*, 5 June 1857, File No. 105, 1857, From Chief Commissioner Punjab to Government of India , p.29, N.A.I.

reconnaissance, a detachment of 25 sowars under Captain Macandrew, was able to rescue some Europeans coming from Rohtak side.²⁷

On the 4 June, 1857, a force of 318 Sowars, 385 Infantry, 2 guns, 173 followers and 4 battalions under the command Sardar Partap Singh, with Dharm Singh and Kumdan Gajja Singh in charge of cavalry and infantry respectively, proceeded to Karnal on their way to Delhi. A detachment of 50 Sowars, one company of footmen, 1 guns and 12 musketeers were placed under the command of Kanwar Dip Singh.²⁸ (brother of Maharaja Narinder Singh)

A detachment of fifty sowars, one company of footmen, 12 musketeers and 1 gun, assisted by Sardar Baswa Singh, Ghamand Singh and Imam Bakhsh marched out to Habri and quelled the riots there. At the same time peace was also maintained at Rajwand and Kaithal by the posting of 23 Sabres respectively.²⁹

On 9th June a detachment under Sardar Partap Singh and Captain Macandrew joined the Delhi Force was engaged in conducting reconnaissance in the neighboring country and Yamuna river side to prevent the rebels from collecting in the villages.³⁰

The search of village of Burddi by small column of 50 Patiala sowars also resulted in the arrest of mutineers. On 11 June a detachment of 20 sowars and 2 companies of footmen under Dasandha Singh, was dispatched to form a post at Harsauli. On the 13 June, 50 sowars under Sardar Mohar Singh and Mr. Louis were dispatched to Baghat as it was anticipated that some mutineers would arrive there.³¹

On the 14 June the whole of Patiala force under Partap Singh proceeded to the Jumna Ford to prevent the crossing of the river by Gujjar insurgents. The next two days were spent in escorting supplies from Meerut and Bhagpat to Delhi.³²

On the 19 June the whole force joined the war zone in Delhi and two days later they were ordered to occupy a strong position at Bakhtawar and carry out reconnaissance in the area. Colonel Dharm Singh of the Patiala Army with 100 sowars crossed Jumna in the dark and conducted reconnaissance on the east bank of the river in search of the insurgents.³³

On 26 June the whole force moved to Harsauli where they remained as escorts to the wounded soldiers, Government treasury, ammunition and a moveable column guarding the

²⁷ *Foreign Department, Political Consultations*, 20 May 1859, Nos. 74-75, N.A.I., New Delhi.

²⁸ Basta No 2, File No H-67-B, *Patiala troops taking parts in wars and Battle from time to time*, p.3

²⁹ *Punjab State Gazetteers*, Vol. XVII, Phulkian States: Patiala Nabha, Jind, 1909, 216.

³⁰ *Patiala Record*, , *Head History*, File No. H-133-B, Basta No. 3, p.6

³¹ *The Punjab Gazette* published by order of the Chief Commissioner, 28 June 1857, Punjab State Archives, Chandigarh Branch.

³² Colonel G.B.Malleson, *The Native State of India*, Longmans, Green London, 1875, p.334.

³³ *Ibid*, pp. 334-35.

Grand Trunk Road from Delhi to Karnal. On the 20th June, 100 sowars under Colonel Dharam Singh and Mr. Clare and Mr. Hay visited the rebel villages and arrested a number of insurgents.³⁴

On 12 August, it was found necessary to form a moveable column at Thanesar in order to maintain law and order in the neighboring areas. This column along with a detachment of British troops was instrumental in assisting in surrounding and disarming a Poorbia battalion moving to Delhi.³⁵

20 September five sowars were detailed to dismantle the bridge of Upper Jumna canal to Rothak. These sowars remained at this place for over a month. On 4th October Colonel Dharm Singh and command Garjja Singh with a force of 80 sowars and 80 footmen searched the villages of Naina and arrested three men.³⁶

Karnal, Ambala, Jagdari, Sharnpur and Hill Station

The force furnished by the Patiala State was also employed in maintaining peace and order and in acting as escorts for supplies and ammunition required by the Delhi Field Force. During this period Risaldars Himat Khan and Lahna Singh with a force of 400 footmen maintained law and order in the hill Stations of Simla, Kasuali, Garkhal and Sirmor State. The road from Ambala to Simla was also kept open and safe from interference by insurgents.³⁷

Bathinda And Ferozpur

Besides the Thanesar region the Patiala state played an important role in helping the British at other places like Bathinda and Ferozpur. Colonel Daya Singh, commandant 3rd Cavalry Regiment was deputed by the Patiala State to take the command of troops at Bathinda and to enlist soldiers in accordance with the needs of the emerging situation. Consequently 1000 sowars and footmen were enlisted in a move to protect Bathinda. It is significant to note that help of the Patiala Forces was also sought by the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozpur in order to quell disturbance at Jaito and Dabrikhana. A detachment of 250 sowars and 250 footmen with one gun proceeded to the disturbed area and stormed Dabrikhana after a sharp encounter.³⁸

³⁴ *The Punjab Gazette published by order of the Chief Commissioner*, 28 June 1857, see also Navtej Singh, *The Patiala Army*, unpublished thesis in Punjabi University Patiala, p. 32.

³⁵ *Punjab Gazette*, 28 June 1857. p. 3, P.S.A.C.

³⁶ *Ibid.* p.4.

³⁷ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p. 49.

³⁸ *Punjab District Gazetteers, Ferozpur District*, 1915, Punjab Government Lahore, 1916, p. 44, see also Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.198.

50 sowars and 40 footmen under Sardars Jiwan Singh and Nihal Singh were deputed for service with deputy Commissioner of Sirsa.³⁹ On 9th June the Cavalry stationed at Firozpur and 50 footmen under Sardar Charat Singh and Dharm Singh were detailed for service with Deputy Commissioner of Sirsa.⁴⁰

However, on the 10th June the cavalry stationed at Firozpur mutinied. Once again the help of the Patiala forces was sought. The Patiala detachment at Firozpur had an encounter with some insurgents and mutineers. Several men of the Patiala force were killed and wounded in this encounter. Assessing the crisis, Daya Singh with 250 Patiala sowars took up the pursuit and saved Patiala territory and its neighborhood from being affected by the aggression of the mutineers.⁴¹

On the 29th September 100 sowars and footmen with one gun and 6 Camel sowars were detailed for duty at Bangla Fazilka in order to help the civil authorities there. These forces played a vital role in restoration of peace and order at Firozpur and Sirsa guards.⁴²

To quell the disturbance in the Sirsa district a detachment consisting of three officers, 74 footmen, 160 sowars and 20 followers under Resaldar Jati Khan, was also dispatched.

Hansi and Hissar

On the 5 of June 1857 Resaldar Dal Singh with 532 sower, 707 footmen, 324 followers and two guns, proceeded from Patiala to Hissar district in order to crush the mutiny in Hissar and deal with the insurgents there. The force reached Boha on the 10th of June. Dal Singh and his men stopped at Boha for four days and then moved on to Kularian. Thereafter, the contingent under Dal Singh halted at Akalgarh for two days. On reaching Tohana the forces were successful in quelling the revolt taking place there in the span of a day. Later, the forces returned to Rattia on the 7th July under the orders of General Van Courtland and stayed there for next 15 days. From Rattia the forces moved to Barwala to provide protection to the neighboring village lying in the vicinity. Thus, the forces were successful in brining the disturbances to an end and in restoring peace besides securing the safety of the lives and property of the common people. The column halted at Barwala for 19 days.⁴³

On 16th August the forces of the Maharaja of Patiala returned to Narwana. Once in Narwana they received urgent orders from the General Officer Commanding, Hissar that they should march to Hansi at once. The column immediately set off for Hansi and reached there

³⁹ *Memoranda on Native States in India 1909*, Superintendent Government, Calcutta 1909,p.384,P.S.A.P.

⁴⁰ *Punjab District Gazetteers, Firozpur District*, 1883-84, Punjab Government Lahore,1884, p.42.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, pp. 43-44

⁴² *Ibid*, p.45.

⁴³ *Punjab District Gazetteer of Hissar 1883-84*, Arya Press, Lahore, 1884, p. 39.

the next day. There it halted for a month and worked to deal with the revolt and retaining peace and order.⁴⁴

In yet another move against the mutiny on 17th September the forces of the Maharaja of Patiala under General Van Courtland left Hansi for Rohtak. Sardar Dal Singh and Captain Berry with 200 sowars surrounded a rebel village in that district and also seized some arms.⁴⁵

On the 19 September 200 sowars under Sardar Chanda Singh and Kharak Singh Deradars with five musketeers their headmen were also brought into the service of the British. Later, on 30th September the forces under General Van Cortland marched back to Hansi, leaving a detachment of 100 sowars, 200 footmen and two guns under Malik Nizam-ud-Din at Rohtak for helping the civil authorities if there were further incidents of rebellion. Permanent posts of 50 sowars each under Sardar Lal Singh were also established in the villages of Bahi and Mahan respectively.⁴⁶ On 13th October 400 footmen and 20 musketeers under Kumedan Badr-ud-Din proceeded to Jhajjar for service in aid of the civil authorities there.⁴⁷

Information was received that the insurgents of Jalandhar had left Ludhiana for Malerkotla. In response to the information two moveable columns were dispatched one of 700 sowars and footmen with one gun under General Rahim Bakhsh Khan, Sardars Ude Singh and Bir Singh to pursue them in the direction of Malerkotla and the second of 600 sowars under Khalifa Mohammad Hussain and Lala Shugan Chand in the direction of Banur on the Grand Trunk Road. These columns chased the rebels marching to Delhi through Gherachori and Sunam and arrested 47 men of the 45th regiment. 400 footmen and 20 musketeers were dispatched under Kumedan Badr-ud-Din on the 13th October to join the Haryana Field Force. Of these, 260 footmen were attached to the detachment under Captain W.J.F. Stafford for action against the Jodhpur Legion and other rebels.⁴⁸

In February 1858 the strength of the force at Jhajjar was increased to 600 foot and 400 horse. The strength was further doubled in view of the impending threat. This contingent

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 68.

⁴⁵ *District Gazetteer of Rohtak*, 1910, Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1911, p. 32.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 78-79.

⁴⁷ *East Punjab Government, Delhi Division, Military Department*, File No 15, Accession No 8204, p.4, H.S.A.P.

⁴⁸ *District and State Gazetteers of the Undivided Punjab*, Vol. IV, S.R. Publication, Delhi, 1985, pp. 220-225

remained stationed at Jhajjar throughout the year under the apprehension that peace and order could be disturbed.⁴⁹

Under Maharaja Bhag Singh a small but less organized force was being maintained by Jind State. Maharaja Bhag Singh of Jind State was one of the foremost of those who offered their allegiance to the British Government and joined Lord Lake in his pursuit of Jawant Rao Holkar in 1805. Jind forces earned praise from Lord Lake for coming to the help of the British during the first major insurrection against the British Empire. However, Fateh Singh and Maharaja Sangat Singh, the son and grandson of Raja Bhag Singh did not contribute significantly in military services to the British Government and their reigns were largely uneventful.⁵⁰

Military Services under Maharaja Sarup Singh

It is significant to note that in response to the Revolt of 1857, Raja Sarup Singh brought about a number of changes in the organization of his forces, which were formerly a mass of unorganized groups of people in a largely irregular state. He formed these into Regiments as follows;

1. Sherdil Artillery- it was raised in 1838 with 2 guns. The number was raised to 4 during the Revolt of 1857.
2. Suraj Mukhi Infantry -it was raised in February 1837 and consisted of 600 officers and men with 40 followers and loading camel for its transport.
3. The Akal Cavalry- A cavalry regiment named Akal was raised in 1845 with 200 sowars.

Katar Mukhi Local Infantry- it was raised in 1857 with 600 men.⁵¹

Like the Maharaja of Patiala, the Raja of Jind also marched in person with about 800 men and joined the British against the native rebels.

The Raja of Nabha and his brother remained at Ludhiana for six months rendering their services to the British. The troops employed by him at various places in the service of the Government were as below-⁵²

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.226.

⁵⁰ *Punjab State Gazetteers, Vol. XVII, Phulkian States: Patiala, Nabha & Jind*, 1909, p.217.

⁵¹ Stuart Beatson, *A History of the Imperial Service Troops of Native Troops of Native Troops*, Sang-e-Meel, Calcutta 1903, p.51.

At Ludhiana at the service of the Deputy Commissioner	300 Sowars, 15 Camel guns, 400 Foot soldiers, 25 Artillery men, 2 Guns, 10 Hurkaras, 6 Kardars, 250 Camels, 200 Camp followers, 10 Hackeries
At Ferozpur	100 Sowars, 20 Foot soldiers 2 Hurkaras
Personal escort with the Raja himself at Ludhiana	100 sowars and foot soldiers, 8 Orderlies, 10 Kardars, 250 camp followers 50 Camels, 10 Hurkaras
Between Delhi and Karnal at Panipat, Lursowli and elsewhere	150 Sowars 140 Foot Soldiers 8 Officers, 50 Camp followers 4 Hackeries, 32 Camels Magazine stores
At Ambala	20 Sowars, 20 Foot soldiers 2 Shutter Sowars 5 Hurkars
At Lahore	13 Sowars, 2 Shutter Sowars, 2 Hurkaras

The region of Jalandhar Doab occupied a strategic place in the geo-politics of the Punjab. Kapurthala and Faridkot two important states of region also sided with the British. Wazir Singh, the ruler of Faridkot state was not only an unwavering ally of the British during the second Anglo Sikh War but also remained a firm supporter of afterwards. According to the contemporary British official documents: “ In the mutiny he placed himself under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozpur and assisted in guarding the Sutlej ferries against the passage of the rebel troops. He also sent a detachment to Sirsa. He personally attacked a notorious rebel, Sham Das destroyed his stronghold.⁵³

Raja Wazir Singh sent horse and guns to Sirsa.

Guns	2
Horse	1 ⁵⁴

⁵² *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 2 July 1858, File No.167, pp. 16- 31, N.A.I, New Delhi.

⁵³ Lepel H. Griffin, *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*, Vol. II, Lahore 1940, pp..464-465.

⁵⁴ C.U. Aitchison, *A collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, Calcutta 1892, p. 49, see also Mutiny Report , part 1, p.228.

Raja of Kapurthala received the information of the outbreak at Delhi and Meerut. He also marched towards Jalandhar with every available soldier at his disposal. He was also accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and his Chief advisors. He remained at Jalandhar at the head of his troops throughout the summer seasons. His loyalty to the British can also be judged from the fact that he relinquished the comforts of his palace life at Kapurthala and stayed at Jalandhar. His troops guarded the Civil Station of Jalandhar as well as the Jail and Civil Treasury.⁵⁵

He send his army during the revolt of Revolt of Sialkot:-⁵⁶

100	Cavalry
200	Infantry
2	Guns

The total number of Kapurthala troops employed by the Raja of service of the British from May to November 1857:-⁵⁷

1200	Infantry
200	Cavalry
5	Guns

List of Jagirdars of Ludhiana District who provided Footmen and Sowars in rendering services at Ludhiana during the revolt of 1857 (May To October)

⁵⁵ From Commissioner and Superintendent Trans Sutlej States to Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Punjab, 30 January 1858, Foreign Department, Political Proceedings, 2 July 1858, Nos. 312-314.

⁵⁶ *Mutiny Report*, p.129.

⁵⁷ From Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Punjab to Secretary to Government of India, 8 April 1858, Foreign Department Political Proceeding, No.191, para 4, N.A.I.

No	Names of Jagirdars	Annual Jumma of Jagir	Amount of annual commutation paid to Government in the lieu of sowars and footmen	Number of Footmen	Number of Sowars
1	Sardar of Budhour	Rs. A.P. 43,799 0 0	Rs. A.P. 5,443 2 0	..	20
2	Sardar of Mukoudh	70,999 0 0	8, 875 0 0	..	52
3	Sardar of Basant Singh	15, 773 0 0	1, 972 0 0	..	18
4	Sardar of Ludra	22,282 8 0	2,785 0 0	..	15
5	Jagirdars of Kotla Budla	6,700 0 0	818 0 0	..	4
6	Sardar Chimun Singh of mangut	3,038 0 0	960 0 0	3	2
7	Chowdries of Lulton	3, 232 0 0	768 0 0	30	..
8	Jagirdars of Jubbo Mazra	9, 623	1,143,00	..	6
9	Bhai Kan Singh of Tugal mafidar	903 00	4
10	Rai Eman Buksh of Raikot	2,400 0 0	--	--	
11	Jagirdar of Kotla Ajnair	3,725 0 0	1,384 0 0	--	2
12.	Dal Singh and Hamir Singh of Rojowal and Bija	1,472 8 0	274 0 0	--	1
13	Sikh Kothies of Goherrian	5, 729 0 0	680 0 0	--	4

14	Suproon Singh of Bargreen	4,870 0 0	432 0 0	4	4
Total		1,94,292 0 0	25,534 20	42	149

	Date from which the Jagirdar placed his men under order s of Deputy Commissioner Ludhiana	Date on which their services were dispensed with.	Amount of communication for six month which has been remitted by order of the commissioner cis Sutlej states	Locality where Station
Sardar of Budhour	20 th May 1857	15 th October 1857	2,712 0 0	10 sowars at Thana Raikote, 10 Sowar at Chuki Raipur
Sardar of Mukoudh	50 Sowars on 17 th May 1857, 2 Sowars on 29 th June 1857	15 th October 1857	4437 0 0	10 sowars at Puckhowal, Dehlon, Chokie Koom, 8 Sowar Kohara, 4 Sowar Dadheri, 10 sowar thana Sanehwal
Sardar Basant Singh	26 May 1857	15 October 1857	986 0 0	4 Sowar at Chunki Belapure, Herian, Sumrala and 2 Ludhian
Sardars of Ludran	17 May 1857	15 October 1857	1,392 0 0	All thana at Jaguraon and Sardar in person
Jagirdar of Kotla Budhla	6 and 8 July	15 October 1857	409 0 0	At Tehsil Sumarla
Sadar Chimun Singh mangut	22 June 1857	„	480 0 0	At Tehsil Ludhiana
Chowdries of Lulton	18 June 1857	„	384 0 0	At Tehsil Ludhiana
Jagirdar of Jabbo Mazara	10 July 1857	„	571 4 0	At Tahsil Sumar La
Bhai Khan	4 July	„	„	At Tehsil

Singh (Mafidar)				Pakhawal
Rai Eman Singh (pensioner)	17 May	„	„	A Thanna Raikote
Jagirdar Kotla Ajnair	11 and 16 August 1857	„	692 0 0	1 at Tehsil Samrala and 1 at Khanna
Dal Singh and Hamir Singh of Rajawal and Bija	11 th August 1857	15 October 1857	137 0 0	At Tehsil Samarala
Sikh Kothies of Gohherian	4 August 1857	„	340 0 0	At the Khanna
Bhai Sanporun Singh	25 July 1857	„	216 0 0	10 Sowars at Thana Machiwara, 10 Foot at Tehsil Ludhiana with Jagirdars in person
	Total		12, 756 4 0 ⁵⁸	

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Sardar Basant Singh	26 May 1857	15 October 1857	986 0 0	4 Sower at Chunki Belapure, Herian, Sumrala and 2 Ludhian

⁵⁸ *Mutiny Report*, part 1, pp. 123, 124, 125.

Sardars of Ludran	17 May 1857	15 October 1857	1,392 0 0	All thana at Jaguraon and Sardar in person
Jagirdar of Kotla Budhla	6 and 8 July	15 October 1857	409 0 0	At Tehsil Sumarla
Sadar Chimun Singh mangut	22 June 1857	„	480 0 0	At Tehsil Ludhiana
Chowdries of Lulton	18 June 1857	„	384 0 0	At Tehsil Ludhiana
Jagirdar of Jabbo Mazara	10 July 1857	„	571 4 0	At Tahsil Sumar La
Bhai Khan Singh (Mafidar)	4 July	„	„	At Tehsil Pakhowal
Rai Eman Singh (pensioner)	17 May	„	„	A Thanna Raikote
Jagirdar Kotla Ajnair	11 and 16 August 1857	„	692 0 0	1 at Tehsil Samrala and 1 at Khanna
Dal Singh and Hamir Singh of Rajawal and Bija	11 th August 1857	15 October 1857	137 0 0	At Tehsil Samarala
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	Total		12, 756 4 0 ⁵⁹	

Mr. Forsyth was actively engaged at Ambala in facilitating the movement of the troops. On the other hand, Mr. Barnes also remained at Ambala and tried to galvanize the troops by giving them guidance and leadership. Moreover, Mr. Barnes communicated with headquarter acting as the representative of the Chief Commissioner. It is important to note that he exercised an extraordinary influence with the Native Chiefs. Thus it can be said that every effort was being made with greatest foresight and promptness to ensure that the rebellion was crushed. The episode was also marked by the fact that as it was mainly a sepoy mutiny they did not receive active support of the community. The whole native community consisting of

⁵⁹ *Mutiny Report*, part 1, pp 123, 124, 125.

traders, artisans and government employees remained ⁶⁰ aloof and non committal. No help and supplies were provided by anyone. On the other hand, this was seen as an advantage by the civil authorities who continued to work assiduously on each post.⁶¹

The Punjab Infantry was mainly composed of Muhammadans from independent countries like Kabul, Kandahar and Swat beyond the Punjab frontier. There were also trans-Indus Muhammadans from Peshawar and Kohat as well as Cis- Indus Muhammadans. The Punjab Infantry also contained Sikhs, Gurkhas, Hindustani, the Dogra Rajputs (occupying the Jammu hills) and the Rajputs residing in the hills between the Ravi and the Sutlej. According to evidence, Hindus and Muhammadans occupying the lowest strata of the society were excluded from the infantry branch of the Punjab Army. Moreover, there were no Christians in the Punjab Infantry. Originally there were a few Eurasian Christians employed as fifiers and buglers in the Punjab Infantry. However, subsequently they were removed from the infantry. The Punjab Cavalry was composed of Brahmins, Rajputs and Pathans. As far as the districts of recruitment were concerned, Haryana and Rohtak furnished the Muhammadan and Rajput Sepoys; Delhi, Meerut, Gurgoan and Rohilkhand provided the Pathans Sepoys, Brahmin recruits were supplied principally by Oudh, Kanpur and Allahabad. People belonging to the marginalized castes such as sweepers, Gujars, barbers were, also, excluded from the Punjab Infantry.⁶²

The Punjab Army had also its Artillery branch which was mainly composed of Sikhs, Punjabi Muhammadans and a few Hindustani. The Sikhs recruits came from Amritsar and Cis-Sutlej states. The Muhammadans of the Punjab Artillery were recruited from the Jhelum area, Lahore, Rawlpandi and Jullundur while the Hindustani sepoy were enlisted mainly from Oudh.⁶³ In 1883, at the time of his retirement from the Viceroyalty in the beginning of 1869 Lord Lawrence acknowledged the contribution of Indian soldiers in quelling the mutiny in the following words: "I repay sympathy and good will. Without aid of people we could never have weathered the storm of 1857. However the great heroic exertions of our own countrymen in those evil days, they were overmatched in struggle and could never maintained themselves against the overwhelming odds to which they were opposed had they not been zealously aided by the efforts of loyal native soldiers who fought and suffered for us in those terrible times. From the Punjab alone I estimate that from first to last not fewer than eighty thousand native soldiers were engaged on our side during the mutiny. In the siege

⁶⁰ Coolier- mean Day Labouer

⁶¹ Rev.J. Cave Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi*, p 241.

⁶² Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya, *The Sepoy Mutiny 1857*, p.83.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 84.

of and storm of Delhi in particular, it is difficult to say how great was the benefit we derived from those service.” This testimony of the contribution of the Indian soldiers coming from John Lawrence is of great historical importance as points to the fact that the British would have been unable to deal with the mutiny if the native princes and their armies did not support them. Similarly Lord Northbrook in his famous Birmingham lecture, delivered in the autumn of 1880 observed: " The Native troops raised in the Punjab under Edwards and Nicholson, supported by the courage and the wisdom which have made the name of John Lawrence dear to his fellow countrymen gave at a most critical movement assistance and support, without struggle before Delhi might have had very different result.”⁶⁴

Lahore, 2nd September, 1857

Ordnance Department

On the recommendation of the official Principal Commissary of Ordnance of Ferozpur and with the concurrence of the Major General Commanding in Upper Provinces, Captain C.Dumbleton, of the late 10th Light Cavalry was appointed to officiate as Deputy Commissary of Ordnance in the Ferozpur Magazine.

20th Punjab infantry

With the Concurrence of the Major General Commanding in the upper Provinces, Sepoy Dheean Singh, 1st Company 41st N.I. was transferred to the 20th Punjab infantry at Ferozpur.

Patiala and Jind Contingents

The following scale of allowances was sanctioned for the officers attached to the Jind and Patiala Contingents, with the Delhi Field Force-

Lieut. Colonel, Dunsford, 59 th N.I.	Pay and Allowances of his rank and 300 rupees staff, per mensem
Lieut. G. Lewin, 1 st Madras Fusiliers	Pay as Asst. Commissioner and deputation Allowance
Lieut. C.S. Lane 26 th Regiment Native. Infantry	Pay and Allowances of rank, and 167 rupees staff, per mensem.

List of Jagirdars

⁶⁴ *The Tribune*, Saturday, 8 September 1883, p 4.

Ambala Divison Record Military Department 1858⁶⁵ (Jagirdars)

Name	District
1. Mehtab Singh	Patiala
2. Wazir Singh	Ludhiana
3. Hari Singh	Patiala
4. Khazan Singh	Nabha
5. Dhyian Singh	Ferozpur
6. Soondhur Singh	Ferozpur
7. Nadun Singh	Nabha
8. Gurbakhs Singh	Nabha
9. Jeetu Singh	Nabha
10. Bodh Singh	Patiala
11. Bela Singh	Faridkot
12. Khajur Singh	Faridkot
13. Dyan Singh	Ludhiana
14. Khazan Singh	Ludhiana
15. Heera Singh	Patiala
16. Khan Singh	Ambala
17. Gurdas Singh	Ambala
18. Synah Singh	Sangrur (Jind)
19 Heera Singh	Ludhiana
20. Kaulah Singh	Patiala
21. Wazir Singh	Ambala
22. Heera Singh	Ambala
23. Jeetan Singh	Patiala
24. Mull Singh	Ludhiana
25. Khan Singh	Patiala
26. Wazir Singh	Patiala
27. Suojan Singh	Patiala

⁶⁵ Ambala Division , Military Department 1858, p. 21, H.S.A.P.

28. Kapur Singh	Patiala
29. Synah Singh	Patiala
30. Kalook Singh	Ludhiana
31. Bussa Singh	Ludhiana
32. Nihal Singh	Sangrur(Jind)
33. Jhuggut Singh	Sangrur
34. Bola Singh	Sangrur
35. Jewan Singh	Ludhiana
36. Khan Singh	Ludhiana
37. Dharm Singh	Patiala
38 Juggat Singh	Patiala
39. Nahan Singh	Nabha
40. Kalan Singh	Nabha
41. Pehara Singh	Ludhiana
42. Surej Singh	Ambala
43. Shangra Singh	Ambala
44. Nutha Singh	Nabha
45. Soondhura Singh	Nabha
46. Joh Singh	Ambala
47. Dhara Singh	Ambala
48. Ghundeela Singh	Ludhiana
49. Narain Singh	Sangrur
50. Nehal Singh	Sangrur
51. Jeewan Singh	Patiala
52 Dall Singh	Patiala
53. Odek Singh	Patiala
54 Dharm Singh	Patiala
55. Jhuggat Singh	Patiala
56. Buryram Singh	Patiala
57. Bungah Singh	Nabha
58. Jowahir Singh	Nabha
59. Khoshal Singh	Sanguru (Jind)
60. Dewa Singh	Faridkot
61. Kundhar Singh	Ludhiana

62. Gulab Singh	Ludhiana
63. Khoshal Singh	Patiala
64. Jathu Singh	Ferozpur
65. Sukha Singh	Ludhiana
67 Buta Singh	Ambala

There were five theatres of the rebellion i.e. Punjab, Delhi, Oudh, Eastern and Central India. Of these five Punjab never became a theatre of real serious warfare at all though the outbreak of mutineers and occasional local rising had to be suppressed by troops.⁶⁶ The events that took place in Punjab were less appalling in their character, than those which marked the course of the mutiny in the other parts of India.⁶⁷ However, the role of Punjab was very important and had a great bearing on the war. Punjab was second to no province of India-if indeed, it did not occupy the most prominent position. First and foremost Punjab was the base for the operations at Delhi and then as the source of the of the huge native army that aided the British to quell the revolt.⁶⁸

The Chiefs and native princes who proved faithful were rewarded and Governor General said, "These true hearted Chiefs, faithful to engagement have shown trust in the power honor and friendship of the British Government and they will not repent it."⁶⁹ In acknowledgement of their services Maharaja of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot and Kapurthala were rewarded and were conferred with titles. Along with rewards, the principle of compensation for the plundered and destroyed property was also introduced. Finally, the Punjab government dealt with the mutineers in a stringent manner. They were disbanded and sent off to their own homes. The rebellion was completely quelled in Punjab and approximately 15,000 soldiers were killed in the political disturbance caused by the mutiny. Punjab Government formed a special irregular corps, called the *Wafadar Paltin* or faithful regiment of those sepoy (36th Native Infantry and 61st Native Infantry Jalandhar, 3rd Native Infantry at Phillor) who had remained faithful when their regiments mutinied.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Lieut. General McLeod Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt* , A.D. Innes, London, 1897, p.132.

⁶⁷ Rev.J.Cave Brown, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol I, William Blackwood and Sons, London, 1861, p.10,

⁶⁸ Lieut. General McLeod Innes, *The Sepoy Revolt* , p.132.

⁶⁹ Rev.J.Cave Brown, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, pp.236-237.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.262.

The Punjab was garrisoned by 59,656 troops of whom 35,900 were sepoys, whose sympathies lay with rebellious brethren. Of the remaining 23,756 troops, 10,326 were European and the rest were Punjabi irregulars.⁷¹ Out of twelve European regiments seven were contained at each extremity of the province, namely either in Shimla hills, north of Ambala or in the Peshawar valley. Thus, there were only five regiments Ambala or in the Peshawar valley. Thus there were only five regiments stationed at Ferozpur, Lahore, Sialkot, Jalandhar and Rawalpindi. Most of the vital military centers like Attock, Kangra, Phillor were held by Hindustani troops.⁷² The Punjab had been annexed only nine years earlier and Sikh feudal elements were still licking the wounds of their defeat. It was therefore held in subjugation by a large proportion of the sepoys, while the revenues were collected and the laws administered in a great measure through the medium of Hindustani officials.⁷³

Thus it would appear that from the military point of view, the position of the Punjab was precarious. There was a danger that the European troops might be overwhelmed by the Sepoys who held most of the magazines and arsenals. But there was, however, one relieving feature for the British. There was deep antagonism between the Hindustani troops and the Punjabi.⁷⁴ The people and soldiery of the Punjab regarded the Hindustani troops as an army of occupation and detested them ever since the first Anglo-Sikh War.

Politically the province was completely pacified. All influential Chiefs, who "might have become the centre of disaffection"⁷⁵ were either exiled or had died by this time. The new landed Aristocracy was enjoying solid benefits under the new regime. The agriculturists were therefore in a very happy frame of mind. They were flourishing and there was general comfort and prosperity everywhere. After a decade of disorder, the people had settled down to serene pursuits and all that they desired now was a tranquil atmosphere. They had no particular grievance and hence there was no desire for change. The paternal administration of John Lawrence had won their confidence and disarmed their fears for the future. Politically settled the disbanded Khalsa army by providing improved means of agriculture and to remove the sense of foreign rule among the masses. After the annexation of Punjab paid special attention towards the development of agriculture.⁷⁶

⁷¹ *Mutiny Reports*, Part II, p.328.

⁷² *Ibid*, p. 333.

⁷³ *The fourth Punjab Administration Report* (1856-58), Punjab Government, Lahore 1858, p.149. P.S.A.P.

⁷⁴ *Mutiny Report*, Vol.VII, part II, p.359.

⁷⁵ *The Fourth Punjab Administration Report* (1856-58), p. 49.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 50.

CHAPTER 3

BRITISH POLICY AND PROGRAMS TOWARDS OF PUNJAB CHIEFS AND SARDAR

The policy of the British towards the native states constitutes one of the most important chapters of their imperial strategy in India. It is clear that the British as part of their policy allowed these states to retain as distinct political entity. This is a fascinating field of investigation for historians and political scientists alike. It is quite true that modern Indian historiography has concentrated on British India, the history of Indian states, which formed one third of the sub continent, remains largely ignored. During the past years, however studies of great historical and scholarly importance have emerged. These studies have tried to unravel the complex phenomena of the internal tensions and multi-dimensional forces operating within the Princely States.

By the time Lord Dalhousie abdicated the office of the Viceroy, the British Dominion in India had reached its logical limits. From the west to the east, its extended from the Indus to the Irrawaddy and from the north to the Sutlej from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean. The British governance operated under a dual mechanism over these vast conquered territories.¹ On the one hand, it brought to an end the political and social instability which prevailed in the country in the eighteenth century. They also ascertained the establishment of peace and security and created conditions for the political unification of the Indian people. On the other hand, the British carved out an empire unparalleled in its geographical dimensions, wealth and resources. This ushered in an era of the hegemony of the British all over the world. The adventure which had commenced for the attainment of wealth and power had at last culminated in success unparalleled in history.²

This extraordinary phenomenon of British expansion unfolded in three phases. In its first phase, the East India Company entered into armed conflict with its European rivals. In the second phase the East India Company established its trade monopoly and established political supremacy in India. In the third phase, which began with the battle of Plassey the

¹ Bisheshwar Prasad, *Bondage and Freedom: History of Modern India*, Vol I, Rajesh Publications, New Delhi, 1977, p. 23.

² Tara Chand, *History of Freedom Movement in India*, Publication Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Delhi, 1967, p. 35.

Company blended commerce with conquest and in both achieved unprecedented success. It gained a vast territory endowed with abundant natural resources and inhabited by teeming millions of patient, hardworking and docile peasants and artisans. It is evident that Bengal was among the first regions to come under British control. The revenue earned from Bengal created fresh possibilities for further conquests. The early conquests also prepared the ground for more investment in the lucrative overseas trade. Thus as a result of the two pronged strategy adopted by the British with the help of a modest capital subscribed by its shareholders and with a minimum cost in men, the English East Company brought under its sway the greater part of India.³

Consequently the Company gave up its exclusively commercial character and compensated itself by further expansion of its dominions through establishment of political domination. Throughout the long period of the history of the East India Company, the profit motive had been an important factor in the conflict with the European powers and the wars with the highly self indulgent and prodigal Indian princes. Besides, the attraction of political dominion was irresistible for the British. They realized that the native rulers were no match for them and they could acquire new territories with ease. This acted as an incentive to bring more and more of the fertile Indian territories under British rule.⁴

Thus under a long drawn process aggressive wars were waged by Lords Hasting, Ellenborough and Dalhousie. Most of the times, the mismanagement and primitiveness of the native rulers acted as the justification of the annexation. Moreover, appropriation of territories was carried out by refusal to recognize the adoption of heirs by the British suzerainty. It is evident that they were prompted by the desire for greater dominion. Disraeli asserted that the English policy was “to increase the revenue of our dominions by increasing our dominions themselves.”⁵ Metcalf explained the policy in the following words “Any acquisition of territory in the centre of India would contract the extent of frontier to be defended or approximately the connections between the forces of Bengal and those of the other Presidencies or give a surplus of revenue available for the payment of a military force without the chance of involving us in any embarrassment beyond those which we are already

³ Sir Alfred Lyall, *The rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, University of California, 1920, p. 57.

⁴ Bisheshwar Prasad, *Bondage and Freedom: History of Modern India*, Vol I, p.28

⁵ Disraeli ‘s speech in the House of commons delivered on 27 July 1857, vide Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CXLVII, column 449, Haryana State Archive Panchkula.

exposed. So for, therefore, from contemplating an increase of territory as an evil to be avoided we ought to desire it, whatever it can be justly obtained as the source of safety and power.”⁶ Thus, it is clear that the desire for more and more territories overlapped with the lust for revenue as well as the need for security. The more powerful the empire the less would be the need to defend the borders at different places. Dalhousie, the Chief architect of the policy of ‘Lapse’ had himself written on the 30 August 1848 “I cannot conceive it possible for anyone to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which present itself for consolidating the territories that already belong to us by taking possessions of States that may lapse in the midst of them for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities which may be made a means of annoyance.” Thus “he proclaimed the principal of extinguishing the native rulers on every opportunity that offered.”⁷ As stated above the British policy of expansionism was equally propelled by the consciousness of the weakness of the native rulers and princes and the flaws of feudalistic regimes.

Lord Dalhousie also gave the control of the Frontier Force to the Civil Government of the Punjab. The force was a creation of his own based upon an idea of Sir Henry Lawrence and starting from a nucleus which Sir Henry had formed in 1846. Lord Dalhousie later expanded it into a frontier force which was always in motion and in the state of preparedness. The frontier force mainly consisted of the saddled trooper and the foot-soldier. This force was a formidable and extremely strong wall of steel. Lord Dalhousie massed over 50,000 regular troops as an army of occupation in the Punjab. His masterful arrangements made Sir Charles Napier envious who complained that he had no patronage and but little voice in the defense of the Punjab.⁸

However, Lord Dalhousie faced serious difficulty due to the ineptitude and the inability of Sir Henry Lawrence to implement the Governor General’s orders. It is evident that Lord Dalhousie was not content with disarming the common people and raising a frontier force. Rather, he was determined that the local Chiefs of the Punjab should be effectively deprived of the power and should be made incapable of doing any mischief. Most of these Chiefs had got their lands from the previous Sikh Government on condition of rendering military service under a feudal dispensation. Thus, these rulers could not expect a

⁶ Kaye, J.W., *Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe*, Vol I. Cambridge University Press, London, 1854, p. 53.

⁷ Kaye and Malleon, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol I, Cambridge University Press, 1897, p.53.

⁸ Sir William Wilson Hunter, *The Marquis of Dalhousie* , Oxford Cleardon Press 1895, p.95.

sympathetic attitude from the British powers. They had fought the British fiercely with the help of means and the resources placed by the native government at their disposal. While Lord Dalhousie did give rewards to individuals on personal merit or for showing loyalty. However, was destroyed the entire class of the chiefs who acted as the support system for the Sikh rulers of Punjab.⁹

Although, John Lawrence heartily concurred with the Governor General and accepted the policy laid down but desired to modify it in practice. Lord Dalhousie frankly told him that he could not permit this. He would give the Native Chiefs nothing except 'their lives and their subsistence'. 'Nothing' 'he said to Sir Henry was granted to them but maintenance. The amount to be paid as maintenance was negotiable but their property of every kind had to be confiscated to the State. Lord Dalhousie wanted that these Chiefs should be placed somewhere under surveillance. Their property was also to be attached till their destiny was decided. As per the injunction of Lord Dalhousie "If they run away, our contract is void. If they are caught, I will imprison them. And if they raise tumult again I will hang them, as sure as they now live"¹⁰

The British had learnt important lessons from the first and the second Anglo Sikh wars. Mainly the mutiny of 1857 the Punjab could be crushed and the native British troops stationed in Punjab could be used for the siege of Delhi because the powerful Sikh Chiefs who had fought against the British in 1848 had been completely decimated by Dalhousie.¹¹ If Sir Henry Lawrence's policy of selective marginalization had been adopted the British could have received a setback during 1857. Lord Dalhousie clearly foresaw that the Punjab under annexation would not be entirely secure without ensuring the Sikh artillery was impaired and debilitated. Thus, Lord Dalhousie insisted upon the absolute dismemberment of the Sikh Confederacy. However, there were aspects of mercifulness in his policy which were aimed at the permanent safety of the province. This was reflected in the arrangements regarding *jagirs*. While the chiefs were disarmed they were not deprived of their life and property as this would lead to social instability. John Lawrence reported to the Governor General after the allocation of *jagirs* had been carried out the Chiefs showed great satisfaction as the allocations exceeded all expectation. A Sikh Sardar remarked to Lawrence they had got more

⁹ Sir William Wilson Hunter, *The Marquis of Dalhousie*, Oxford Clarendon Press 1895, p.95.

¹⁰ G.D. Oswell, *Rulers of India*, Research Publication, Delhi 1972, p.49.

¹¹ Y.B. Mathur, *British Administration of Punjab (1849-75)*, Surjeet Book Depot, Delhi n.d, p.2.

than Maharaja Ranjit Singh would have ever given them and that too free of all service.¹² Thus, it can be said that Punjab was both safe and supportive of the British during the Mutiny, it was because the policy adopted by Lord Dalhousie had a balance of firmness tempered by consideration and rigorously enforced curtailment of power by Lord Dalhousie. Henry Lawrence as head of the Lahore Board was made to implement the policy in this way.

The annexations significantly enhanced the revenues of the Company. However, the expenses also increased. The Directors became apprehensive of their dividends and therefore floated some measures of economic austerity. However, while putting these measures in place and practicing economic frugality little attention was paid to the consequences. The measures included the stoppage or reduction of the pensions of the Indian Chiefs. In one of the most important examples of this reduction of expenses, the annuity of Rani Jind Kaur, the dowager queen of Maharaja Ranjit Singh was reduced from 15000 pound to 1200 pounds. Thereafter, the pensions of Nana Sahib, the adopted son of Peshwa Baji Rao II and of Laxmi Bai, the Rani of Jhansi were terminated and titular sovereignty of the house of Karnatak and Tanjore was brought to an end.¹³

The Punjab was first province of the British in India in which the Non Regulation System was practiced. This system was specifically aimed at providing a cheap and efficient administrative mechanism. Such a mechanism would accelerate economic and social development in order to make the province a source of revenue generation. Besides this, this administrative mechanism offered a very simply and uncomplicated way of governance suitable for the socio economic conditions prevailing in the Punjab. This mechanism was also aimed at hastening the transformation which the province was destined to undergo. Besides it guaranteed the personal control of the Governor General over the province as it was based on a closely centralized administrative hierarchy. It was in this principal of a complete unitary structure in which Punjab differed essentially from the other North Western Provinces. In the other North Western Provinces the judicial and executive powers formed different systems and this had led to the process of breaking up and decay of the village communities. As a result, the traditional property relations were altered with the ready support of the regular civil court which as John Lawrence put it, was “ruining the people in the North Province and

¹² Joginder Singh, *Sikh Leadership*, Guru Nanak Dev University Amritsar, 1999, pp. 18-19

¹³ Tara Chand, *History of Freedom Movement in India*, p.37.

will do the same where ever it is introduced.”¹⁴ Although nominally the proprietor could make use of the right to expel a tenant in practice such as a decision was hardly taken because it was above all his labour that guaranteed the solvency of the proprietor.¹⁵

During the process of the first regular settlement this customary right of the proprietor to expel the tenant was sanctioned by the British officers. Up to 1855 the twelve years rule was the common criterion for granting the status of hereditary cultivators. Generally, the proprietors did not resist the entry of their tenants into Record of Rights as *Maurusi*, i.e. “the perpetual occupancy which was perfectly understood to be involved in the term Mouroose.”¹⁶ Under the prevailing circumstance, with money rates replacing rate in kind and due to rapidly falling prices for cereals from 1851-52 onwards, many proprietors preferred to unburden themselves of the liability to pay revenue to a foreign power. Under these circumstances the executive revenue officers acted in favor of the tenants.¹⁷ Appeals to the higher courts on the district or division level were frequently rejected as many examples testify.¹⁸ Moreover, later inquiries undertaken by Mr.Prinsep in the Amritsar Division at the beginning of the sixties confirmed that a few people availed themselves of the rights to file a suit against the occupancy tenants. According to Prinsep’s estimations only 300 out of some 50,000 proprietors litigated.¹⁹ The Punjab Civil Code enacted that the rent could not be interested during the term of a settlement officer with the necessary guiding rules. The tenants were qualified as “the most important class” in the Directions for Settlement Officers. The British authorities tried their best to protect the tenants from rack renting and loss of their secured right by money lenders and *banyas*. This in turn led to several significant consequences. Thus in section XXI, para 13 of the Punjab Civil Code the occupancy tenants were given the privileges normally only possessed by proprietors. These privileges were related to cutting timber, digging wells and making gardens. The only pre condition was that these privileges had to be listed properly in the Record of Rights.²⁰ In case of disagreement

¹⁴ *Selections from Records of Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies*, “Papers connected with Queen of Tenant Right in the Punjab”, Lahore, 1869, p. 180, Punjab State Archive Chandigarh.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.79.

¹⁶ Ganda Singh (Ed), *The Punjab Past and Present* , Punjabi University Patiala 1974, Vol-III, p.21.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.23.

¹⁸ *Papers connected with the Question of Tenant Right in the Punjab*, Punjab Government, Lahore 1869, p.155. H.S.A.P.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.181.

²⁰ D.G.Barkley (Ed), *The Non Regulation Law of Punjab*, Punjab Government, Lahore, 1871,pp.160,269.

the courts were to be approach.²¹ On the whole, the Civil Code only sanctioned *jure* which had naturally growing up during the past two centuries shaped considered by the Sikh movement.

Under Ranjit Singh it was a common custom that oppressed and aggrieved people of the villages complained at Lahore or helped themselves. So while the first regular settlement was still in progress reliable figures were rarely available. Under such circumstances the people protested strongly against the payment of intolerably high rates. This prompted the officers to act on their discretion and lower the sum. Generally the earlier revenue demands were decreased by 25 percent.²² However, on account of rapidly falling prices at the beginning of the fifties and in spite of rich harvest the peasant found it very difficult to sell their crops. Protests were general and the provincial government had to take notice of these protests. The government recommended giving speedy relief whenever necessary.²³

At first the rate was fixed at one third of the gross produce. However, this demand proved to be much too high and the Board reduced it to one fourth and even less. The third Administration Report 1854-56 declared the average rate to be fixed at one fifth which would decrease according to proper yields up to one-eighth.²⁴ Furthermore it was admitted that “one fifth or 20 percent on income may appear to be a high rate of taxation as compared with European countries” This was clearly indicative of the exploitative dimensions of the colonial government. The Chief Commissioner tried to justify by this rate through his justification that it is low as compared with Asiatic countries.²⁵

However, it can be said that as far as British India was concerned the Punjab peasantry was burdened with the lowest per head land taxation in the middle of the eighteen fifties. After this the land taxation went on increasing. Based on the figures given in the Report on the Census of the Punjab taken in 1855, the table shows the data as follow²⁶;

Province	Rs.per head of land tax
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²¹ *Ibid*, p.269.

²² *Report on the Administration of the Punjab from 1854-55, to 1855-56*, Punjab Government Press, Lahore ,1858, pp.25-26.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 26-27.

²⁴ *General Report on the Administration of the Punjab from 1854-55 ton 1855-56*, pp. 26-27, P.S.A.P.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 28.

²⁶Selections from the Records of the Government of India, No XI. Report on the Census, taken on the 1st January 1855, of the population of the Punjab Territories, Calcutta, 1856, p. 20.

Punjab	1.34
North Western Provinces	1.65
Madras	1.50
Bombay	1.97
Bengal	0.96 ²⁷

Besides this comparative moderation in the Government demand the British officers made use of some traditional features of the village system to protect the peasant proprietor from the money lender. Although considerably relaxed under the Sikh regime, English officers revived and enforced the principle of joint responsibility for the revenue demand.²⁸

Historical evidence suggests that the relation of the Cis-Sutlej states with the British Government had been more and less intimate from the time of the conquest of Delhi by Lord Lake in 1803. However, the real foundation and basis of the political relation between them was laid on 25 April 1809 when the British Government signed a treaty with Maharaja Ranjit Singh. As per the terms of this treaty of the British Government undertook to abstain from any interference with the territories of Ranjit Singh north of the Sutlej and Ranjit Singh agreed neither to “commit nor suffer encroachments on the possessions or rights of the Chiefs to the south of Sutlej.”²⁹

Moreover, it was by the proclamation of 3rd May 1809 that the Cis-Sutlej Chief of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Malerkotla, Faridkot, Kalsia on their own volition and entreaty were taken under the protection under the company against the ‘authority and control’ of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. This arrangement was to be the basis of the political dynamics of Punjab till the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. During the three years before 1809, Maharaja had led repeated expeditions to the Cis- Sutlej region. As the most powerful sovereign of the times he had posed a serious threat to the existence of these several small Chiefships. It would be impertinent to claim that the Cis- Sutlej Sikhs Chiefs were ignorant of the imperialistic designs of the British. It was a period when Lord Minto was the Governor General. The

²⁸ *General Report on the Administration of the Punjab* from 1854-55 to 1855-56, Punjab Government, 1859, p.31.

²⁹ Sir William Lee Warner, *The Native States of India*, Macmillan and Company, London, 191. p. 87.

period of Lord Minto from 1807-13, and that of his two immediate predecessors, George Barlow and Cornwallis, has been described as ‘the stationary period’³⁰ in the history of the rise and expansion of British dominion in India. This period that fell between the reign of Wellesley and the reign of Hastings. The reign of Wellesley was also an important period of British expansion in India. The two Governors General pursued a ‘clearheaded’ policy which was quite authoritarian. They played a significant role in the extension of British supremacy in India. This period was marked by the implementation of a less vigorous and more considerate policy towards the Native States. The British administrators after Wellesley and Hastings applied their energies and efforts towards consolidating the enormous gains which had been acquired by the spirited policy and measures of Wellesley. As a result of this they deliberately avoided any further conquests and annexations.³¹ On these grounds it can be said that Minto did not have any plan to extend the western frontier of the British Empire. However, given the stature of Maharaja Ranjit Singh he was definitely conscious of the urgent need to take effective measures for the defense and security of the Empire the other side of the Sutlej. As stated above Ranjit Singh, had been aggressively launching repeated expeditions to the Cis-Sutlej region and there were apprehensions that he might conquer the entire area between the Sutlej and Yamuna and emerge as a potential rival in the area contiguous with the British. Moreover, it is also true that with the defeat and expulsion of Sindhia from the region the British Government had succeeded as the legitimate suzerain of the Cis -Sutlej Chiefships. It was in the logical scheme of things that in the prevailing circumstances the British protection would be imperative for the several Chiefs of the region.

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Apart from the assurance of permanent protection against the impending threat of Ranjit Singh’s there were several strategic advantages offered by the alliance between the British and the Cis -Sutlej Chiefships. The British allowed the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs free exercise autonomy and authority within their territories and did not in any way reduce their status as Chiefs. As per the agreement, in return for all the British protection Cis -Sutlej Chiefs were obliged to provide the British force with supplies of grains and other amenities whenever the

³⁰ Sir Alfred Lyall, *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, Research Society of Pakistan., p.270.

³¹ S.R.Bakshi, *British Diplomacy and Administration in India*, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1970, p.133

³² A.C Arora, *British Policy towards Punjab States 1858-1905*, Export Indian Publication, Jalandhar,1982, p. 42.

British were engaged in general warfare. The Chiefs were also bound to allow the European articles intended for the use of army to pass through their territories without any obstruction of levies. The British Army with their forces would have free access to the land and the resources in case of attack from an enemy for the purpose of conquering the country. It was specifically laid down that they would be exempted from the payment of any pecuniary tribute.³³ It is evident that these terms were obviously quite favorable to the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs in comparison to the terms of many previous treaties between the governments of Wellesley before Minto and of the Government of Hastings. As per the conditions laid down in the treaty there was not requirement of any Subsidiary force which was to be maintained by the Native Chiefs. Moreover there was not condition pertaining to the strength of the contingents with which each of the chiefs was to join the British Army. The object of the government of Minto was apparently no more than “to establish an autonomous and loyal confederacy of the Chiefs who would be helpful to the protecting power in difficult times.”³⁴ It was considered to be equally in the interest of the British Government, as in that of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, that their dominions should be protected from encroachments by Ranjit Singh and it was felt that “this bond of common interest would be materially weakened and confidence and attachment would give place to jealousy and aversion if our interference in their concerns should impose upon them obligations of a nature to place them in a condition of absolute dependence upon our authority and of subjection to our control.”³⁵ It is also significant to note that no treaty or written agreement, based on mutual negotiations, was concluded between the British Government and the individual Cis- Sutlej States. Based on the above facts it can be said that overall the relations of Cis- Sutlej states with the British Government remained cordial from time to time of the conquest of Delhi by Lord Lake in 1803. It is opined that the general Proclamation of 3 May 1809 issued “for the satisfaction of the Chiefs of the country of Malwa and Sirhind” was a unilateral action on the part of the British Government, which placed the British relations with States on a peculiar footing.³⁶

The internal discords and mutual rivalries among the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs were very common and often gave rise to hostilities between them. In light of this fact, the British

³³ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, Calcutta, 1892, pp. 156-57.

³⁴ K.N.Panikkar, *British Diplomacy in North India*, Associated Publication House, New Delhi, 1968, p. 105.

³⁵ Letter From Edmonstone to Ochterlony, 10 April.1809, *Punjab Mutiny Report*, II, p.90.

³⁶ K.N. Panikkar, *British Diplomacy in North India*, p. 106.

authorities considered it essential to issue another Proclamation on 22 August 1811. Through this second proclamation the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs were also accorded protection against mutual usurpations. As per this proclamation it was decreed that if Chiefs encroached upon the estate of one another, the British Government would intervene and compel the offending party to return the revenues to the lawful proprietor of the estate from the date of the objection. It would also be incumbent on the offending party to pay compensation for the losses which the inhabitants of place might have suffered. Apart from this a penalty could also be levied on the offender according to the circumstances of the case as adjudicated by the British Government.³⁷ As a concomitant outcome of this proclamation, the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were guaranteed protection against one another. This proclamation also brought the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs individually under the British authority. Prior to this proclamation the British control was only in the nature of a general and collective one.³⁸

It is significant to note that before the Cis- Sutlej States were brought under British protection by government of Minto, the Muslim petty Chiefships of Pataudi, Loharu and Dujana, as also Jhajjar, Dadri, Bahadurgah, Farrukhnagar and Ballabgarh, had already been brought under the British protection. The founders of these small States were originally *Jagirdars* of the Mughal Empire. They had sided with Lord Lake against the Marathas. In recognition of the services rendered by them, their States were either confirmed to them by the British Government on condition of fidelity and military services by the sanads of 1806. It is apparent that as part of the diplomatic strategy of Lord Lake's policy the British did not want to venture out too far and it was considered expedient to form a series of independent protected principalities between the British border and the Sikh States beyond.³⁹

During the First Anglo Sikh War two British officers who happened to be two brothers Henry and John Lawrence had become permanently attached to the affairs of the Punjab. Both were personally selected by the Governor General, Harding for duties in the Punjab. Henry was summoned from Nepal and appointed Political Agent to the Governor General during the First Sikh War and John was made Commissioner of the Jalandhar Doab after the

³⁷ *Punjab Mutiny Report*, part II, Punjab Government Press, Lahore 269-71, see also C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, Calcutta 1892, pp. 157-58.

³⁸ S.N.Rao, *Cis-Sutlej Sikh States 1800-1849*, Unpublished Thesis Punjab University, 1953, pp 138-39.

³⁹ Lepel H Griffin, *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*, (revised edition) Punjab Government, Lahore 1940, p. 568.

defeat of the Sikhs in 1846. As mentioned above Henry's rather liberal attitude toward the defeated Sikhs made him popular with the Sikh Darbar and John's administrative initiative and capabilities won him the affection of the peasants. As Commissioner, John promptly introduced a temporary land settlement and a low assessment of the land tax. It has been discussed above that under him the policy of abolishing the *jagir* or feudal grants and distributing land among the tillers was introduced. John Lawrence was also a reformist and worked towards social evil and orthodoxies like the eradication of infanticide and sati. Meantime, Henry Lawrence was busy at Lahore. His watchfulness thwarted the *Wazir's* intrigues with the governor of Kashmir. It was partly owing to the trust in him that the Sikh *Sardar* entreated for the aid of British for protection of their minor King, Dalip Singh.⁴⁰

One of the consequences of the annexation of the Punjab in March 1849 was that several petty Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were deprived of their entire civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction. In this way they were reduced to the position of ordinary subjects of the British Government. On the other hand the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Malerkotla, Faridkot and Kalsia as also those of Mamdat, Dialgarh and Raikot were allowed to keep their status intact and exercise their rights and authority. The States of Dialgarh and Raikot however, later on lapsed to British Government and Mamdot was annexed in 1856 for gross misgovernment of the Chief.⁴¹

Thus, it can be contended that through a gradual process the Company had established a firm grip over the Punjab States including the Phulkian Chiefships. The British intervention in the internal affairs of the Phulkian States before 1857 was occasional rather than systematic and uniform. However, on the occasions when they interfered in their internal affairs they betrayed authority and even with the show of force. Some important indications of the Paramount status of the British emerge during this period. It is apparent that the Supreme Government had begun to assert its rights as a Paramount Power to decide authoritatively the questions of succession in the Phulkian States to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chief themselves and to intervene with the object of preventing misgovernment in the States and to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs.

⁴⁰ Administration During Dalip Singh's Minority, in Parliament Papers, XLI 1847, pp.173-174, Punjab State Archive Chandigarh Branch

⁴¹ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1873, p.209.

The position of the Kapurthala State was quite peculiar. Some territories of Kapurthala State fell in the Trans Sutlej area and some in the Cis-Sutlej region. Its Chief, Fateh Singh Ahluwalia was a friend and ally of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In 1806 both of them jointly concluded a treaty with the British. However, with the passage of time Ranjit Singh began to treat the Fateh Singh as his vassal.⁴² In 1809 the Cis-Sutlej territory was secured to Fateh Singh under general Proclamation of that year. In 1825, however, the Ahluwalia Chief abandoned his Trans Sutlej possessions as a result of rupture with Maharaja Ranjit Singh and migrated to the Cis-Sutlej territory. He sought a guarantee of his Trans Sutlej possessions from the British. Thus the British authority could not concede without antagonizing the Maharaja. However, they did accord protection to the Cis-Sutlej estates of Fateh Singh and also helped in bringing out friendly reconciliation between the two Chiefs which resulted in the restoration of Trans Sutlej possessions to the Ahluwalia Sardar.⁴³

Thus several Sikh and Muslim States had come under British protection, British Government began gradually to assert its rights as a Paramount Power and exact military and other obligation from them as necessitated by the prevailing circumstances and conditions from time to time. The Company's policy towards these States may, broadly and briefly, be reviewed under four heads;

1. Intervention in the internal affairs of the States
2. Resumption of territories of the States.
3. Prevention of intimacy between the Cis-Sutlej Sikh Chiefs and Lahore Darbar.
4. Exaction of military obligation from the States.

Intervention in the internal affair of the States

Although under the Proclamation of 1809 the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs had been assured free exercise of the rights and powers enjoyed by them hitherto. However, it is evident that despite this assurance the British Government habitually interfered with the internal affairs of the princely States on one pretext or the other. On the first hand, British Government intervened on the grounds of the maladministration in the States. For instance, during 1811-1813 there was gross misgovernance in the Patiala State owing to the growing imbecility of

⁴² *Kapurthala Record, Head History*, Basta No. 1, p. 5, see also *Memorial of His Highness the Maharaja of Kapurthala to The Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State For India In Council*, Calcutta, 1868. p 1.

⁴³ *Kapurthala Record, Head History* , Basta No. 1, p. 6, P.S.A.P.

Raja Sahib Singh and the rapacity of his advisers. Political Agent Ochterlony visited the Patiala State twice. On his first visit he gave suggestions to Raja Sahib Singh for improving the administration of his state. On the second occasion, he visited to proclaim Rani Aas Kaur, a woman of great ability and administrative acumen, as Regent and Administrator of the State.⁴⁴ Similarly the British authorities had to intervene in the Jind State due to the perceived mismanagement in the Jind State under the Raja Sangat Singh during 1822-1834. Raja Sangat Singh had no son and in the absence of a clear descendent or heir the question of escheat arose. There were several collateral claimants to the throne. Order was finally passed in 1837 in favor of Raja Sarup Singh. As an interim measure the British authorities sent a native official temporarily to look after the administrative affairs.⁴⁵ It may, however, be observed that the cases of intervention of such a nature were very few. On the one hand it is true that that company's Government genuinely desired to see that the administration of the States should be carried on in a responsible manner without any arbitrary and whimsical tendencies.⁴⁶ At the same time that it was not the British policy during the Company's period to impose completely illegitimate and unreasonable authoritative interference in the internal affairs of the States. However, some time the British authorities had some ulterior motive. The examples of British intervention in Patiala and Jind alluded to above should be seen as aberrations rather than a reflection of the policy.

Most often the British intervention was exercised for resolving questions and disputes about succession in the States. In 1810 the British Government intervened in the Malerkotla succession to support the claim of Wazir Khan against Rahmat Ali Khan and ruled that principal of primogeniture should in future determine the succession in the State.⁴⁷ In 1812-13 the British authorities set aside the will of Raja Bhag Singh of Jind by which he nominated his younger son, Partap Singh, as his successor in preference to the elder one, Fateh Singh and afterwards resolutely suppressed the rebellions and designs of Partap Singh.⁴⁸ In the 1820 the British turned down the claim of Ajit Singh to the throne of Patiala against Maharaja

⁴⁴ *Patiala Record, Head History*, File No. H-133-B, Basta No. 3, p.6, see also Cited in Letter From Ochterlony to Edonstone, 9 March 1811, *Punjab Mutiny Report*, part II, pp. 246-52.

⁴⁵ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 130-38.

⁴⁶ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, pp. 160, 260.

⁴⁷ Lepel H. Griffin, *Chiefs And Families of Note in the Punjab*, (revised edition) Lahore,1940, p.532.

⁴⁸ *Punjab States Gazetteers*, Vol XVI, Phulkian States: Patiala, Nabha & Jind Lahore, 1904, pp. 216-17.

Karm Singh who in accordance with rule of primogeniture was considered legitimate Chief.⁴⁹ Likewise the British intervention was exercised to bring about reconciliation between Raja Jaswant Singh of Nabha and his eldest son, Kanwar Ranjit Singh.⁵⁰

The British authorities also intervened with the objective of arbitrating settlements of disputes that occurred between Chiefs at different points of time. For instance, in 1819 when a dispute arose between the *Zamindar* of Kowlasheri a village of Patiala and those of Phulisheri a Nabha Village, the British arbitration settled the matter in favor of Nabha.⁵¹ Likewise in 1828 the British Government authoritatively decided the old dispute between Patiala and Nabha over the Village of Doladhi.⁵²

The British intervention was also exercised in the matters of the Chiefs vis-à-vis their feudatories. In 1817 the Kapurthala Chief, in compliance with the wish of Ochterlony, confiscated the estate of his feudatory, the Bhirogia Chief on account of the intemperate behavior of Bhirogia Chief towards the British. However, later Ochterlony ordained the Kapurthala Sardar to restore the state to Maha Singh who was 13 year old Bhirogia Chief.⁵³ In 1822 the British Government authority intervened to install Nihang Khan as the Chief of the Kotila fort. Kotila fort was a feudatory estate under the supremacy of the Kapurthala Sardar. The younger brother of Nihang Khan, Balwant Khan was ousted from the estate. It is important to note the Balwant Khan who had previously been appointed the Chief of the estate with support of the Kapurthala Sardar. This is proof of the extent of the British intervention in the matters of succession and heredity. The authorities also intervened during 1827-1838 to resolve the particularities related to the nature of relations between the Nabha Raja and his feudatories of Lidhran and Sonthi.⁵⁴ Since 1807 the Sonthi Sikhs were believed to be the feudatories and dependants of Nabha. However, the Sikhs had started making efforts to shake off the oppressive over lordship of the Nabha Chief and attain independence. Lord Canning decided to interfere and settle the dispute between Sonthi Sikhs and Nabha Chief.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 219.

⁵⁰ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 389-92.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 154.

⁵² *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and principal Officials of the Punjab Native States*, Lahore, 1918,p 21, P. S.A.P.

⁵³ *Kapurthala State, Its Past and Present*, Kapurthala, 1928, pp.11-12.

⁵⁴ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 392-96.

He persuaded the Chief of Nabha to agree to pay Rs. 5,000 a year to the Sonthi Sikhs Rs. 5,000 a year.⁵⁵

On September 1852 Kapurthala Raja Nihal Singh died. But before his death on 11 July 1852, he executed a *wesseatnama* or will in which he bequeathed his throne to his elder son Kanwar Randhir Singh. He further added that his two other sons from second wife, Kanwar Bikram Singh and Suchat Singh should each be given a estate of net value of one lakh of rupees without any sort of Government nazrana. It was also stated therein that the criminal jurisdiction of all three states should be wielded by the heir apparent, but if the two younger brothers be dissatisfied the criminal jurisdiction of their estates might be taken over the British Government.⁵⁶

About two months after the execution of the will, Raja Nihal Singh died on 13th September 1852. He was succeeded by the British Government. The new Chief was quite astute and discreetly won over his two younger brothers to avoid the partition of state. On 17 September 1852 his younger brothers signed an agreement as per which they solemnly affirmed that they would accept any arrangement which their brother Raja Randhir Singh would chalk out to administer the affairs of the State. They also wrote a Khureeta to commissioner of Trans Sutlej States stating that they wanted to live together with their brother and would not consent to the division of the estate as provided in the will on the ground that “the measure is calculated to reduce the principal to insignificance.” This Khureeta was forwarded to the Board of administration on 5 October 1852.⁵⁷

The Board of administration was in a dilemma about the proper way to proceed with regard to Kapurthala. John Lawrence, the senior member of the Board who had intimate connections with the State of Kapurthala wrote three minutes in which he expressed his view point very strongly. He proposed to resume lands such as Phagwara and also to resume the Police and criminal power exercised by the late Raja. He was in favor of the partition of the state among the brothers as provided in the will. However, the other two members expressed their disagreement to all the proposals on the ground of policy and good faith. In the absence of consensus the numerous minutes written on the subject by the members of the Board were

⁵⁵ *Foreign Department, Part A, April, 1861, Nos. 50-52. N.A.I, New Delhi.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid, p..53.*

⁵⁷ *Kapurthala State, Its Past and Present, Kapurthala, 1928, pp.13-14.*

forwarded to the Government of India for the final decision upon the points on which the Board could be agree.⁵⁸

The Governor General in Council after a comprehensive scrutiny all these minutes decided that the Kapurthala State should remain undivided. However, it was resolved that if any differences or discord should arise among the brother, the will of the late Raja should be implemented. In such a scenario the shares of younger brothers would be separated from the Raja's. The other point of Henry Lawrence came in the form of a ruling that the Raja might be persuaded but not compelled to give lands in lieu of *nazrana*.⁵⁹ This ruling was given before the Mutiny. It was evidence that policy of Government of India in its dealing with the Native States had become as clear as well as consistent.⁶⁰

Thus it is clear that the Company intervened in the internal affairs of the Punjab States mainly to prevent misgovernance or to decide questions of succession or to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories. However, it is important to state that the British intervention in the internal affairs of the States throughout the Company's tenure was occasional and incidental rather than normative and indispensable. The Company apparently did not formulate any well defined or consistent policy or principles in the matters pertaining to intervention in the internal affairs of the States. Such matters were left for the Crown after 1858. In fact the British administration during the Company's period were more concerned about such diplomatic intervention as could give them control the much desired territories or portions of territories of Native States on one pretext or the other.⁶¹

(b) Resumption of Territories of the States

As far as the resumption of territories of the states was concerned the company's administration generally abided by the principal of abandoning 'no just and honorable accessions of territory' to the British Empire in India. The representatives of the company were often on the lookout for legitimate excuses of confiscating the territories of Native States on one pretext or the other. As the British were experts in the matters of modern state their diplomatic acumen contrived the famous doctrine of lapse. According to this important

⁵⁸ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, p.135.

⁵⁹ *Foreign Department, Political Consultations*, 4 March 1853, Nos. 522-525, N.A.I., New Delhi.

⁶⁰ C. L. Tupper, *Indian Political Practice*, Vol II, p.49.

⁶¹ A.C Arora, *British Policy Towards Punjab States 1858-1905*, Jalandhar, 1982, p. 37.

piece of legislation the British would confiscate a State on failure of natural male heirs. During the period from 1824 to 1834⁶² a good many minor States in the Cis-Sutlej region lapsed to the British Government of William Bentinck. William Bentinck instructed Clerk to convey to the rulers of Patiala, Kaithal, Jind and Nabha to understand that “they should be willing to pay tribute on the understanding that should they not do so the Government would take advantage of all lapses as the only means of reimbursing itself for expenses incurred in protecting the States between the Sutlej and Jumna.” The tribute proposed to be demanded was 1/8 of the revenue of each State. This demand was not only exorbitant but also plainly unjust and was in violation of the Article 56 of the Proclamation of 1809. The article clearly decreed that Cis-Sutlej Chief would be exempted from paying any monetary tribute to the British Government. Looking at the arbitrary nature of the proposal all the four Chiefs rejected the proposal outright after deliberating over it in a joint meeting at Bhawnigrah.⁶³ Consequently the British authorities decided to apply the doctrine of lapse to these Chiefships also. Consequently, in November 1834 when Raja Sangat Singh of Jind died without any male issue; the British authorities after lot of deliberations recognized the claim of Sarup Singh as a senior collateral only to that portion of the Chiefship (comprising the district of Jind and Safidon) which had been the possession of Gajpat Singh, the common ancestor. The remaining territories of the State, comprising Ludhiana, Morinda, Bassia, half share in Mudki and Jandiala lapsed to the British Government.⁶⁴ This was obviously done as a punishment for refusal of the principal Cis-Sutlej Chiefs to pay tribute. In 1843 when Bhai Udae Singh, the Chief of Kathial died without any male heir, the state was annexed by the Government of Ellenbrough.⁶⁵ Thus, it is quite clear much before Dalhousie, the doctrine of lapse was being applied in many cases of the Cis-Sutlej States of the Punjab. Apart from confiscation of State territories by the application of the doctrine of lapse; the British authorities also availed of all other opportunities to resume the territories of the States. There was a prolonged Haryana Bhattia boundary dispute between the Patiala State and British Government which continued for about two decades. The British authority finally settled the dispute in 1856. Their decision involved a considerable territorial loss to the Patiala State.⁶⁶ The Company also confiscated the territories of the States on the ground of disloyalty to the Paramount Power. After the

⁶² S.N. Rao, *Cis-Sutlej Sikh States 1800-1849* p.197, Unpublished Thesis, Panjab University, 1953.

⁶³ *Patiala Record, Head History*, File No. H-133-B, Basta No. 3, p.6

⁶⁴ S.N. Rao, *Cis-Sutlej Sikh States*, 1800-1849. p. 98.

⁶⁵ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp.237-45.

⁶⁶ S.N.Banerjee, *A History of Patiala*, Vol I, p.5, Dr. Ganda Singh Collection, Punjabi University Patiala.

First Anglo Sikh War, the British Government absorbed many petty Cis-Sutlej Sikh States that were found to be disloyal to the Crown and that had supported the enemies of the British. Apart from this the British also confiscated portions of the territories of some principal states whose loyalty was thought to be doubtful.⁶⁷ In 1835 when Newab Sham-ud-din Khan of Laharu was executed for complicity in the murder of Mr. William Fraser (Delhi Resident), the British Government took advantage of the opportunity and confiscated the Firozpur *pargana* of the State and allowed his successor to succeed only to a portion of the States.⁶⁸

From the above mentioned instances it will have been obvious that the Company seized all the opportunities to resume the territories of the States either by the application of the doctrine of lapse or by arbitrary decisions about disputed lands or on grounds of disloyalty to the suzerain. It was, indeed, the predominant characteristic of the policy of the successive Governors General of the period to confiscate the territories of the States on one pretext or the other. Where diplomacy failed, they frequently applied force to achieve their object. For the main problem before the British administrators was to extend the British supremacy throughout the country. When, as a result of annexation of large portion of the Country by 1857, the existence of remaining Native States could be assured by the British Government under the crown.

(c) Prevention of Intimacy between the Cis-Sutlej Sikh Chiefs and Lahore Darbar

During the 19th century most of the Cis-Sutlej States were under the rule of Sikh Chiefs and there was quite a lot of cultural affinity between them. The Lahore Chief like all these Chiefs had fought together for and in the name of Khalsa. They identified with one another on grounds of common religion and all had a sense of pride in the common religious heritage. In fact most of them received inspiration from the lives and scarifies of guru Gobind Singh and Banda Singh Bahadur. Though the repeated Cis-Sutlej expeditions of Ranjit Singh placed the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs under the British protection yet the common religious and cultural ties between these Chiefs and the Lahore Maharaja could not be unceremoniously broken. Almost everyone one of these Chiefs had agents and *Vakils* at Lahore Darbar. In fact a large number of Sikhs belonging to the Cis-Sutlej region had joined as soldiers in the army of Maharaja

⁶⁷ A.C Arora, *British Policy towards Punjab States 1858-1905*, Jalandhar, 1982, p 40.

⁶⁸ Lepel H. Griffin, *Chiefs And Families of Note in the Punjab*, p. 564.

Ranjit Singh.⁶⁹ Apart from this there were extensive matrimonial relations between the family of Ranjit Singh and those of certain Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. Moreover, the Sikh Chiefs of the Malwa region considered it their religious and pious duty to pay regular periodic visits to Amritsar which is considered to be the Mecca of Sikhs. These visits created the possibility of coming into contact with the Maharaja who acted as their host and welcomed his fellow Sikhs on their pilgrimage. Chiefs who visited Amritsar were accorded due honor commensurate with their rank and position as rulers. On the same lines there was a close connection between Raja Sangat Singh of Jind and the Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In 1826, when the young Chief Sangat Singh went on a pilgrimage to Darbar Sahib in Amritsar; he was escorted honor to Lahore, where the Maharaja received him very with great ceremony. The two Sikh Chiefs thereafter undertook a pilgrimage to the Hindu pilgrimage of Jwala Mukhi. The Jind Raja was presented *nazrana* by the Lahore officials and on the eve of his departure. He was also granted a *jagir* in the Jalandhar Doab by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In the year 1827 Raja Sangat Singh again visited Lahore and like the earlier occasion this time too some additional *jagir* in the Trans Sutlej area were bestowed on him. Apart from this he was granted by the Maharaja with three villages in the of Cis-Sutlej area in lieu of *nazarana* of Rs. 30,000. One of these three Villages was Aitiana which was held by one Baba Ram Singh whom Ranjit Singh claimed as his vassal. The British authorities, however, did not recognize this claim. When Raja Sangat Singh forcibly ousted Ram Singh in May 1828, the latter made representation to the British Government.⁷⁰

Raja Sangat Singh once again visited Lahore and his acceptance of *Jagirs* from the Maharaja Ranjit Singh was considered objectionable by the British authority. They decided to bring this 'connection and allegiance' to an end. The Raja was issued a fiat to relinquish immediately the possession of three villages and to restore Aitiana to Ram Singh. At same time, the supreme Government issued a stern warning to the Raja that as a protected dependent of the British Government; he was not free to enter into correspondence or negotiations with the foreign ruler. Moreover, it was communicated to the Raja that the purchase of any estate from the Chief of Lahore without approval of the British authority was

⁶⁹ T.B. Jervis, *Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab*, Cambridge University London 1845, p 364 see also Giani Gian Singh, *Tawarikh Guru Khalsa*, part II, Khalsa Taract Society, Amritsar 1894, p. 541.

⁷⁰ *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and principal Officials of the Punjab Native States*, Lahore, 1918,p 19, P. S.A.P, see also Edward Thornton, Esquire., *A Gazette of the Territories under the Government of the East India Company and of the Native States of the Continent of States*, Vol IV, London, 1854, pp. 208- 209.

‘highly indelicate and improper’. Though the Jind Raja was allowed to retain the Trans Sutlej *jagirs* that had been granted to him by the Maharaja, the British Government issued a general order in 1829 by which the protected Chiefs were prevented from accepting any *jagir* from the Lahore Darbar. In 1834 when Sangat Singh, in response to a special invitation from Ranjit Singh proceeded towards Lahore in connection with celebration of the Dusehra Festival, he was called back by orders of British authorities from Bassian. The young Chief badly disillusioned on receiving the orders on 2 November 1834 that he completely despondent. So next day he was dead. At that time his age was nearly 24 year old.⁷¹

Despite their highly desperate efforts, the British authorities failed to bring about complete severance of relations between the Cis-Sutlej Sikh Chiefs and the Lahore Darbar. It is believed that even during the first Anglo Sikh War, a good many of these Chiefs gave support, either tacitly or openly to the Lahore Darbar as against the Paramount Power⁷²

It is on record that the Chief of Kapurthala Fateh Singh played an important and prominent role in the expansion of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s empire. There was hardly any important campaign in which he did not accompany the Maharaja and extended support to him. Fateh Singh also had gained a lot in terms of prestige as well as territories which were granted to him as his share. However, it is true that Fateh Singh was not treated an equal footing by the Lahore Chief. He was made conscious of his place as a subordinate Chief. As early as 1810 there was a marked change in the attitude of the Maharaja towards Fateh Singh. The Maharaja of Lahore had started dictating him in matters which were related to Fateh Singh’s realm of administration and jurisdiction. The Maharaja began to dominate him to an extent that he foisted his will on him and forced him to abide by his orders. In 1813, Maharaja Ranjit Singh had ascertained from a reliable source the strength of Fateh Singh’s army and came to know that he had maintained a force of 3500 horse and foot soldiers. The Maharaja gave instructions that he would inspect the Ahluwalia contingent on the Dussehra Day.⁷³

⁷¹ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p.323-28, see also Edward Thornton, Esquire, *A Gazette of the Territories under the Government of the East India Company and of the Native States of the Continent of States*, Vol IV, London 1854, pp. 211- 219.

⁷² A.C Arora, *British Policy towards Punjab States, 1858-1905*, p. 40.

⁷³ N.K. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, Calcutta 1960, p.67 , see also *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and principal Officials of the Punjab Native States*, Lahore, 1918, p. 19

In 1825-26 the mutual distrust between the two leaders reached a high point and Fateh Singh grew suspicious of Ranjit Singh's designs. Fearing action against him he fled across the Sutlej with the whole of his family to Jagraon. Maharaja Ranjit Singh annexed all his territories in the North of the Sutlej.⁷⁴

In the aftermath of the succession, Fateh Singh sent his confidential servants to Murray at Ambala and to Wade at Ludhiana and made entreaty for British protection. The British preferred not to get involved in the situation and refused to interfere on his behalf. They argued that they did not have any justification for interfering with Maharaja Ranjit Singh's affairs on that side of the river of Sutlej.⁷⁵ On the other hand the Maharaja was pained to hear that his erstwhile friend had sought refuge with the British out of fear for him. He sent his personal envoy to reassure Fateh Singh that his fears were unfounded and baseless. In 1827 Fateh Singh returned to his home place of Kapurthala. The Ahuwalia estates were guaranteed to Fateh Singh and Ahluwalia Chief was loaded with presents. Sardar Fateh Singh passed remaining years of his life in peace at Kapurthala.⁷⁶

When during the time of Maharaja Kharak Singh and Maharaja Nau Nihal Singh, the Kapurthala Chief Nihal Singh continued to face troubles from Amar Singh, he went to Lahore to represent his cause. He tried to win over the favour of the Maharaja, requesting him that he should be installed as the Chief of Kapurthala in place of Amar Singh. He made an appeal that at least half of the territories of the Kapurthala State should be given to him. But before Maharaja Sher Singh could make any decision, Amar Singh was drowned in the river Ravi while he was enjoying a trip.⁷⁷ The repeated representations and appeals both by Nihal Singh and Amar Singh to the Lahore Darbar are reflective of the fact that the Maharaja of Lahore was virtually regarded as suzerain by the Kapurthala Sardars. It will not be wrong to say that the Kapurthala State was subordinate alliance with Lahore Darbar. This equation lasted throughout the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. There had also been a great affinity between the people and soldiers of the two Sikh rulers. Kapurthala Chief was not allowed to send supplies to the British and on the other hand his soldiers sided with the forces of Lahore Darbar against the British in the battles of Aliwal and Budhowal. During the second Anglo

⁷⁴ R.R. Sethi, Lahore Darbar, Punjab Government, 1950, p.32, see also *Gazetteer of the Punjab Provincial 1888-89*, Punjab Government, 1889, pp. 84-85.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p.32.

⁷⁶ S.S. Seetal, *The Sikh Misals and the Punjab States*, Lahore Book Shop, 1981, p.85.

⁷⁷ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of The Punjab*, p.492

Sikh War however the Kapurthala Chief helped the British Government. As a matter of fact, the position of Kapurthala State, had been a peculiar one. It had territories both in the Trans and Cis-Sutlej areas. Its Chief had been ally of Lahore Darbar. During the period of Maharaja Ranjit Singh the Kapurthala Chief was practically under the protection for his Trans Sutlej possessions. But in respect of Cis-Sutlej possessions he had been under the protection of the British since 1809.⁷⁸

(d) Exaction of military obligation from the States.

In lieu of protection extended to them, the Punjab Chiefs were required to furnish, in proportion in their respective means, carriage, supplies and troops to the Company at the requisition of the latter in any emergency. In accordance with these obligations, the various Chiefs of the Punjab States rendered necessary material assistance to the British Government during the wars into which the Company was involved from time to time. For example, during the Gurkha War of 1814-15 the Maharaja of Patiala helped the British Government with his troops. Apart from him the Nabha and Malerkotla Chiefs rendered assistance with carriage and supplies. In return for his unflinching and unswerving support, the Patiala Chief was rewarded with grant of sixteen *paraganas* in the Simla Hills.⁷⁹ In the 1826 Nawab Faiz Talab of Pataudi took part on the side of the British in the siege of Bharatpur.⁸⁰ When the Company was involved in the First Anglo Sikh war of 1838-42; the Chiefs of Patiala, Bahawalpur, Nabha, Kapurthala and Malerkotla rendered great assistance to the British Government. The Maharaja of Patiala advanced an amount of thirty lakhs of rupees.⁸¹ The Sardar of Kapurthala provided supplies for the British troops on their way to Kabul and some of his troops participated in the Kabul of the 1842.⁸² The Raja of Nabha offered the services of his troops and advanced six lakhs of rupees towards the expense of the expedition, the

⁷⁸ *Past and Present Kapurthala*, 1928, p. 29, see also *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and principal Officials of the Punjab Native States*, Lahore, 1918, p. 19

⁷⁹ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, II p 283 and see also *Gazetteer of the Punjab Provincial Volume 1888-89*, Punjab Government, 1889, p. 102.

⁸⁰ Lepel H. Griffin, *Chiefs And Families of Note in the Punjab*, p.560.

⁸¹ C.U. Aitchison, *A treaties Engagements and Sanads relating to India And Neighboring Countries*, p.117.

⁸² *Kapurthala Record, Head History*, Basta No 1, p. 5 and see also *Memorial of His Highness the Maharaja of Kapurthala to The Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State For India In Council*, Calcutta 1868. p 1.

services of his troops could not, however, be utilized but the Raja was thanked for the friendly spirit which had prompted the offer.⁸³

During the first Anglo Sikh War of 1845-46, all the Sikhs Chiefs did not prove faithful to the British Government. Almost every village in the Cis-Sutlej region had some relations in the Sikh Army of the Lahore Darbar and so “the hearts of the Sikh population in our protected States were with the men of their own tribe and sect and decidedly averse to the British Government.”⁸⁴ At the larger level the Sikh Chief by and large had sympathies with Khalsa Army. Spurred by their personal interests and security which were deeply dependent on the success of the British, the Chief of Patiala, Jind and Faridkot, of course, evinced their loyalty to the British cause and rendered all possible assistance to their Paramount. But the other Chiefs kept on showing doubtful vacillation. Some were clearly hostile to the British. The Raja of Nabha withheld supplies and neglected to attend to the requisition of the Agent to the Governor General. The Chief of Kapurthala also failed to furnish supplies from his Cis-Sutlej States and his troops fought against the British at Aliwal and Budhowal. Many petty Cis-Sutlej Chief of Malerkotla, however, assisted the Sikhs with their troops in various battles of the war.⁸⁵

After the close of the war the British Government rewarded obedience and punished disobedience. Whereas the Chief of Patiala, Jind, Malerkotla and Faridkot were rewarded with additions in their territories, the other Chiefs had to suffer because of the penalties for what was perceived as their disloyal conduct. Raja Davinder Singh of Nabha was deposed and one fourth of the territory of the State was confiscated. The Chief of Kapurthala was deprived of his Cis-Sutlej estate. The petty Chiefships of Ladwa Ropar and Anandpur were liquidated and the whole of their territories confiscated by the British authorities. Many petty Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej region were deprived of their sovereign power. It was ruled that in lieu of military service which they were bound to render, they would be required to pay a commutation tax at the rate of 12 percent of their respective

⁸³ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 396, see also *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and principal Officials of the Punjab Native States*, Lahore, 1918, p 19

⁸⁴ Lepel H.Griffin, *the Rajas of the Punjab*, p.192, see also W.W.W Humbley, *Journal of a Cavalry officers including in memorable Sikh Companion of 1845-46*, London, 1854, p. 139.

⁸⁵ *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and principal Officials of the Punjab Native States*, Lahore, 1918, p 21, P. S.A. P.

income. In the case of the Kapurthala Chief the commutation in respect of his Jalandhar Doab estates was fixed at Rs. 1,31,000 per annum. Patiala, Nabha, Jind Malerkotla, Faridkot Kalsia also petty States of Mamdot, Dialgarh and Raikot, (which afterwards lapsed to the British Government) were exempted from this rule. After the war the government fixed the contingents of sowars in addition to forces which the rulers were bound to supply in war. These had remained unfixed from 1809-1846. Supplies of men and material were to be furnished for general duty from time to time by various Cis-Sutlej but now their size and number definitely fixed. Patiala was henceforth to furnish 100 sowars and Faridkot 10 sowars. In regard to the obligation of Nabha, it was decided that the revenue from the portion of the confiscated territory of the State, which was retained by the British Government, would be appropriated to an extent that was sufficient for 100 sowars and 133 infantry. The Sikh Chiefs, including the Phulkian Chiefs, were obliged to renounce forever the right to levy excise and transit duties in their territories. It was made obligatory for them get approval and consent of their respective Commissioner for giving capital sentences.⁸⁶

When the Second Anglo Sikh War 1848-49 broke out, the Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot offered their services to the British Government which were utilized to some extent in the form of carriage and supplies.⁸⁷ The *Nawab* of Bahawalpur rendered valuable assistance in suppressing in Multan outbreak. He was rewarded by the grant of life pension of rupees eight lakhs sanctioned for the service of troops.⁸⁸ After the annexation of the Punjab, Dalhousie Government deprived many petty Chiefs of all civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction, reducing them to the position of ordinary subjects of the British Government in 'possession of certain exceptional privileges.'⁸⁹ But the Sikh Chief of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Faridkot and Kalsia as also the Muslim Chiefs of Bahawalpur, Malerkotla, Pataudi, Laharu and Dujana were allowed to exercise, their usual rights and authority.

⁸⁶ *Foreign Department Secret Consultation* 26 December 1846, Nos. 1280-1313, N.A.I. & Lepel. H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp.184-200, 496-502, see also C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighboring Countries*, p. 122.

⁸⁷ *Foreign Department Secret Consultation* 30 June 1849, Nos.40-49, N.A.I, see also Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, pp. 354,502

⁸⁸ *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*, p.532, see also *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and Principal Officials of the Punjab Native States*, Lahore, 1918,p 19.

⁸⁹ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p.199.

After the revolt of 1857 there was a gradual change in the British policy towards all native states in respect of military matters. The main reason for this change was evidently the great concern of the Crown's Government for security and defense of the Indian Empire. The experience of 1857-58 had come as a very big learning experience for the British statesmen who were at the helm of Indian affairs in the following years. They began to focus their attention with a renewed vigour on the ways and means of ensuring in future stability of the British Empire in India. In terms of policy formulation they arrived at certain significant decisions having a bearing for the socio-political future of the next few decades. The most important among these decisions was the plan of a thorough reorganization of the military system of India. In accordance with this scheme artillery as a norm was hereafter to be comprised exclusively of the Europeans. The number of native sepoys in the army was considerably truncated and the strength of the European soldiers was increased. In 1864 out of a total strength of 2, 05,000 men in the army 65,000 were Europeans. There was an overall decrease of about 40 percent in the total strength but an increase of 60 percent in the number of European troops.⁹⁰ The military reorganization within the territory of British India was not considered to be adequate safeguard for the security of the British Empire. As per the assessment and according to the experience of the mutiny it was clear that the British empire could be threatened from outside by the Native States or by some foreign power. It was therefore considered essential to exercise some sort of control over the arms and armies of the Native Chiefs and to seek their co-operation in any eventually of foreign invasion. The British Government had expressed its commitment to protect the Native Chiefs not only from foreign invasions but also from internal revolts. After 1858, it had also abandoned the policy of any further annexation of the Native States which implied. This was important to prevent more wars between the Native States and the British Government. In return for the prospect of abiding peace British Government required that the Native Chiefs should not trouble and challenge the military defense of the Empire. Moreover, they were expected to render active co-operation in improving and augmenting the efficiency of the imperial Army and that they should dispense the responsibility assigned to them.⁹¹

In certain Native States the law of primogeniture was definitely established which greatly mitigated the possibility of succession disputes between Chiefs and their brothers and collaterals. But in other Chiefships disputes for succession were very frequent. The basic

⁹⁰ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1901, p.345.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 347.

cause giving rise to such disputes was that no definite law of succession was prevalent in those states. Sometimes the eldest son succeeded to the Chiefship after the death of ruler and sometime claim of younger son was asserted in preference to that of the elder. This was the biggest reason for disputes. The Maharaja and Rajas ruling the states were often polygamous. They had several issues from various consorts and concubines. Under the circumstances the Chiefs true to human nature developed personal likes and dislikes which led to conflicting claims and counter claims. It was not uncommon for a Chief to execute a will nominating a favorite son from a favorite wife as his successor. The claim of such a son was contested by the other who considered his claim to be more legitimate in accordance with the custom of the Chiefship. In certain cases the will of a chief provided for partition of the state among his sons or for the grant of definite annual allowances in terms of land or revenue to a son or collaterals which also led to disputes. It also happened that the brothers, step brother and collaterals were often jealous of one another. The installation of one however valid his claim was not tolerated by others who took recourse to intrigues and conspiracies against the succeeding Chief. On other occasions a Chief after his installation treated his brothers and collaterals in a cruel and callous manner which provoked feelings of vengeance among them. The Muhammadan law of private propriety and the invocation to the questions of succession and for divisions of political property among the brothers and collaterals of the Chiefs also frequently provided the cause of dispute. As discussed above, it is also important to observe that the British authorities under the East India Company interfered rarely in the question of succession in the Native States unless they had some ulterior motive to push forward their own interests.⁹²

After the assumption of Government of India by the crown a great change took in the British policy. The British authorities were no longer interested in take advantage of the succession matters for the purpose of acquiring territories and they became genuinely interested in settling the succession disputes in the states to their satisfaction. The British Government therefore evolved definite policy for putting an end to such disputes and thereby securing peace and order in the States.

The upshot of the above discussion in that by 1857 the Company had established a firm grip over the Punjab States. According to Griffin policy of British policy towards the Sikh States was “uniformly liberal, enlightened and just.” And that there “were in the whole

⁹² A. C. Arora, *British Policy towards Punjab States*, p.49.

of India no native princes who had such reason to be faithful to the British Government and who had received such unmixed advantage from their connection with it, as those of the Cis Sutlej.”⁹³ There is no doubt that the Chiefships had been protected by the Proclamation of 1809 against the ambition of Lahore and by the Proclamation of 1811 from one another. These Chiefships enjoyed a prolonged period of peace and security and almost free exercise of Civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction in their respective territories subject to the authority of the British Agent or Resident. It was a period when Maharaja Ranjit Singh had absorbed all the petty independent States to the north of the Sutlej except Kapurthala. These Chiefships in the south of the Sutlej had survived and thrived under the British Government and had no more obligations to fulfill than to remain loyal and support their paramount with their forces at the time of war. But it would be too simplistic to say that the attribute the Chiefships thrived under the British because of their innate generosity, goodness and liberality. The British imperialists were very clever imperialist and to treat them as liberal and generous would be simple and puerile. It was actually the diplomatic calculations of a wider policy which weighed with the British Administrators. Governor General of the company during all this period had been absorbed first in dealing with the Gurkha, Marathas and Pindaris and then with frontier States of Sind and the Punjab. They were haunted by the external danger from France in early stages and from Russia afterwards. Under these circumstances, it was thought expedient to retain the friendship and fidelity of the Principal Chiefs of this region. Dalhousie, as has been pointed out already had reduced many Cis-Sutlej Chiefships to level of *Jagirdars* but even this arch imperialist did not think it advisable to alienate the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs of some consequence. Thus, the British attitude was not uniformly just or an unmixed blessing towards these states, as claimed by Griffin. The British authorities had intervened authoritatively, if occasionally, even with show of force in the internal affairs of these states to assert their rights as a Paramount Power. They imperiously prevented the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs Chiefs from having intimate relations with Lahore Maharaja despite the cultural and religious ties between Chiefs of both sides of the Sutlej. They had even confiscated portions of the territories of these states either on the plea of failure of natural male heirs, as in the case of Jind or on grounds of disloyalty. In the case of Nabha and Kapurthala the territories were confiscated by their arbitrary decisions about lands in dispute. On the other hand in the case of Patiala, they had forcibly annexed, against the wishes and sentiments of these Chiefs, one of their brethren States Kathial by the ruthless application of the doctrine of lapse. They also

⁹³ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas Of the Punjab*, p.400.

taught the lesson to the chiefs that they could secure their rights and territories through loyalty and that for any act of disloyalty they would be punished by the British Government. The petty Muslim Chiefs of Pataudi Lahoru and Dujana were, however, allowed more or less uninterrupted exercise of their rights in their small estates. But when Nawab Sham-ud-din of Lahoru was considered guilty of complicity in the murder of high British official, his lands were confiscated. Although the policy and attitude of the Government different from state to state was different, yet it may be said on the whole that in the middle of the 19th century the indications of the Paramount Power had begun to emerge. Government had asserted its rights as a Paramount Power to decide authoritatively the questions of succession in the States, to settle dispute between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chiefs themselves. They had also arrogated the right to intervene with the object of preventing misgovernment in the states and to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs.

CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL JUNCTURE AND TIMELY HELP OF PUNJAB CHIEFS AND SARDARS

The developments taking place during the mutiny of 1857 in the Punjab can be understood as a reflection of the fact that the situation in Punjab was very different from that which existed in the rest of India. It can be said that the Sikhs could have used this opportunity to use this episode to recover power. However, the unfortunate fact was that the Sikhs were leaderless. Maharaja Dalip Singh had renounced Sikhism and was assiduously trying to convert himself from a Punjabi prince into an English country gentleman. Sher Singh Attariwala was living under surveillance at Calcutta on a pension granted by the British. Bhai Maharaja Singh and Dina Nath were dead. Bedi Bikram Singh to whom Sikhs looked for guidance as descendant of Guru Nanak was interned in the Village of Una.¹

India after downfall of the Mughal passed through a process of disintegration. Multisided fight amongst the princes and some foreign power had resulted in the formation and proliferation of Princely States and big Zamindars. There was a conspicuous absence of any big and powerful ruler who could unite Punjab and offer resistance to the British. On the other hand the British in the process of the territorial expansion concluded treaties with Indian princes and gave them the guarantee of their existence if they accepted their dominance. Thus, it can be said that like the rest of India, the Punjab had broken up into several parts. During the eighteenth century also, Punjab was like an agglomeration of numerous political entities. Rise of Ranjit Singh in the North and the expansion of the British on the south had been a challenge to the existence of the Cis-Sutlej states. The Cis-Sutlej princes chose the British over the native King. When the Punjab was annexed to the British Empire in 1849 after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Indian Princes and Zamindars were allowed to retain their states and the entitlements. As a few of these princes remained loyal to the British like Maharaja of Gwalior in the central India, it was generally said that the princes by and large supported the British and their success in suppressing the revolt of 1857 is attributed to their assistance.²

¹ Khuswant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 101.

² Hari Singh, *The Punjab during the revolt of 1857*, p. 34, unpublished M.A. Dissertation in Punjabi University Patiala, 1974.

As brought out in the earlier chapters, during the revolt of 1857-58, Punjab did not only remain calm but also helped to crush one of the most serious challenges to the British authority that they ever faced in the history of their rule in India. As stated above this was primarily made possible due to the ground realities and the political scenario in Punjab which was highly suitable for the British. There was a deep rooting and fierce sense of autonomy among the Punjabis; they felt a deep antagonism against the Hindustani powers. The People of Punjab regarded the Hindustani occupation and detested them ever since the First Sikh War. It is important not to disregard the fact that the revolt of 1857 was an army revolt, the disbanded soldiery and the martial classes of the Punjab could have perceived it as their opportunity to get liberated from the British yoke.³

However, due to strategic reasons the province remained peaceful. All influential Chiefs who might have become the centre of disaffection against the British were either in exile or had died. There was no unifying force that could bring the anti British elements together. Moreover, the new regime had given to the people social security and in collective sense there was no incentive for the people to cultivate conditions of political instability and anarchy. In the absence of agitators and popular leaders, the masses had become apathetic and did not make efforts for political change. Moreover, in the North West, Afghanistan which would have behaved differently a decade earlier had no interest in fomenting trouble which it could easily have created among the Muslim tribes in trans- Indus districts of the Punjab. One-time great enemy of the British, Dost Muhammad, the King of Afghanistan was feeling indebted to the Government of India for the material aid it had given to him for fighting the Persian threat He looked upon the British as a friendly power.⁴

In terms of territorial expansion in Punjab by 1849, the British had advanced their frontier to Attock and established a firm grip over the Punjab states included the Cis-Sutlej Chiefships. Though the British intervention in the internal affairs of the Cis- Sutlej states before 1857 was “occasional and incidental rather than systematic and uniform”⁵ but whenever they intervened, they did so authoritatively and even with a show of force. With the passage of time the power and authority of the British began to grow and because of this Supreme Government had asserted in these states its rights as a Paramount Power to decide

³ Y.B. Mathur, *British Administration of Punjab 1849-75*, Surjeet Book Depot, Delhi n.d, p.5.

⁴ S.S.Bal, *British policy towards the Punjab 1844-49*, New Age Publishers, Calcutta, 1971,p 3.

⁵ A.C. Arora, *British Policy Towards the Punjab States 1858-1905*, Export India Publication, Jalandhar 1982, p. 10.

the questions of successions to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chiefs themselves.⁶ Intervention was also exercised to prevent misgovernment in the States or to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs.

On the basis of regional division the Punjab of those times can be divided into three divisions, the North West, the Central and Southern Punjab. The North Western region at that time was dominated by the Muslim Chieftains and tribal Shiekhs. They were openly hostile and defiant towards the British. On the other hand the Central Punjab had negligible number of States, but Southern strip i.e. the Cis- Sutlej area was governed by the Sikh Chieftains who had remained loyal to British even during Ranjit Singh's reign. In the Southern Punjab i.e. the present Haryana, there was hardly a place where British authority prevailed during the revolt. It is relevant to mention that Hilly States were not loyal to the British. In the emerging crisis, majority of the Princes observed the situation very closely. While summing up and describing the attitude of Indian States, Holmes has aptly observed "Finding the Supreme Government seriously overwhelmed from all sides the protected Sikh Chiefs had occasion to weigh the case on its merits before they had cast the die. They would not have adopted an attitude of passive neutrality. But the protected Sikh Chieftains of Cis- Sutlej States, in the face of unparalleled temptation and provocation, showed little hesitation to cast their lot with the company."⁷ It is clear from this statement that the princes of the various Princely States of Punjab besides those of Cis- Sutlej States, did not vacillate in helping the British. As discussed in the earlier chapter the contribution of Cis- Sutlej States towards the protection of the British Empire is well known.

The scanty material relating to this problem is proof of the fact, that the role of Sikh Aristocracy in the uprising was of minor importance. Chiefs of the Punjab had lost much of their former economic and political power.⁸ With feudal contingents dissolved and respective *jagirs* resumed, they were deprived of the means which could have made them potentially either contravenes of the British or powerful allies capable of rendering them substantial help in the State of emergency. This result of Dalhousie's policy led to contradictory conclusions among historian. The controversies centered round the question whether the reduced power of the feudal lords had positive or negative effect on the British struggle against the

⁶ *Ibid*, p.19.

⁷ Public Correspondence *Punjab Mutiny Report*, Vol IV, Chronicle Press, Lahore, 1859, p. 123, see also J.H., Gorden, *The Sikhs*, William Blackwood and Sons, London, 1904, p. 84.

⁸ *Punjab Mutiny Report*, p. 122.

insurgents of Hindustan. The biography of Lord Dalhousie and Sir Henry Lawrence are representatives of two conflict standpoints. W.W. Hunter came to the conclusion that Punjab could be denuded of European and reliable Punjabi troops to such a degree only on the ground that “powerful Sikh Chiefs, who had fought so splendidly against us in 1848, had been so sternly broken up by Dalhousie.”⁹

The Revolt of 1857 can be described as one of the greatest uprisings that took place in India against the British occupation. The threat to the empire received a very prompt and strong response from the British. John Lawrence who later became the Viceroy of India was a leading British officer who played a major role in crushing the revolt. He was at Rawalpindi at the time of the revolt and wasted no time to strike against the disaffected elements. He took ruthless measures to deal with those who had sympathies for the mutineers. The prompt and stern punishments meted out to those who showed even slightest sympathy with rebel cause. The unrelenting attitude of officers like Lawrence spread awe and terror throughout the province. The officials were ordered to instantly hang anyone who was found participating in the Mutiny.¹⁰ In the Punjab, within three days after the fall of Delhi, most of the forts, arsenals, treasures and strategic positions were swiftly transferred to the care of British Forces. The Vernacular press was put under surveillance and postal censorship was introduced.¹¹

British observers that in the region between the Yamuna and Sutlej particularly south of Ambala Division the inhabitants “had great sympathy with the mutineers... Sirsa Hansi, Panipat and Muzaffarnagar had no administration. The Civil employees of these areas had either fled away or were killed by the mutineers.”¹²

Due to its proximity to Delhi, District of Gurgaon was the first to be affected by the developments in Delhi. During this time Gurgaon was inhabited by several feudatory tribes and races employed in agriculture. The various communities living in Gurgaon were engaged in mutual rivalries. The Meos, the Mohammadan community was at war with the Khan Yadavs. The Jats known as Surat, the Pathans and the Rawats dominated the region of

⁹ W.W. Hunter, *The Marquis of Dalhousie*, Oxford, 1890, p. 118.

¹⁰ Montgomery to Sir Charles Raikes, 18 August, cited in the *Records of the Intelligence Department of Government of North West Vol 1* William Muir, William Coldstream, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 491.

¹¹ *The Tribune*, Saturday, 27 September 1888, see also *Mutiny Reports*, part II, Punjab Government Press, 1911, p. 201.

¹² G.D. Oswell, *Rulers of India*, Research Publication, Delhi, 1972, p.45.

Palwal. These tribes were generally involved in petty activities such as mutual conflict or plundering the neighborhood of Delhi by forming bands.¹³

The District of Rohtak was largely inhabited by the Jats and Rajputs. A larger number of them were employed in the British Army. When the mutiny broke a great sense of agitation arose among these soldiers. The whole area consisting of warlike communities was profoundly stirred on the May 23, 1857. When an emissary of Delhi King by the name Tafzal Husain reached Bahadurgarh with a small force; the Tehsildar and the British official fled away from their posts to Gohana. Once the representatives of the empire had fled away common people and the Jat and Rajpur soldiers set the prisoners free from the jails and burnt the court building and the record office.¹⁴ The king's soldiers accumulated nearly 2 lakhs of treasure and came back to Delhi leaving the people to act as they wished. The rebels looted and burnt the custom bungalow and rendered a large number of Europeans homeless.¹⁵

It is said that the Ranghars and Gujhars hoisted the Mohammedan green flag and unruly mobs created a lot of commotion in the District till the month of September. However, in July 1857, the Raja of Jind tried to restore order in the region although he was not successful. In the overall climate of lawlessness and anarchy fierce feuds among the various communities began to take place. In the given set of circumstances, the King of Delhi issued a proclamation to the people of Rohtak to put a stop to unlawful activities as well as to mutual conflicts. This proclamation also had no effect on the people as they had no common leader to guide them. The government suffered a loss of 3,50,000 rupees worth of treasure and Rs.9000 worth of stamps. In the long drawn process of destruction and rampage that lasted for months most of the government buildings and records were destroyed. In the process, the British forces also launched a process of retribution and a large number of rebels were shot and hanged.¹⁶

As far as the Hissar District was concerned it can be said that the whole area was affected by the revolt of 1857. The District was a site of large scale violence owing to the fact that the detachment of Haryana Light Infantry and 14th Irregular Cavalry stationed at Hissar, Hansi and Sirsa mutinied when they received the news of capture of Delhi by the Indian

¹³ *Public Correspondence, Punjab Mutiny Report* Vol-IV, p. 10.

¹⁴ *District Gazetteer of Rohtak*, 1910, Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1911, p. 33.

¹⁵ *East Punjab Government, Delhi Division, Judicial department*, 1858, File No 3, Accession No. 8207, p.4 Haryana State Archives Panchkula, see also *Mutiny Report*, part 1, Punjab Government, 1911, p. 146.

¹⁶ *Punjab Mutiny Report*, p.201.

rebels. At the same time, disturbances began to brew in the villages. The rebels killed most of the European residents at Hissar, Hansi, Sirsa and looted the treasury and also broke open the jail of Hissar. In all 23 Europeans were murdered, 13 of them escaped. The district Gazetteer observed, “The massacre formed one of the darkest episodes of the mutiny.”¹⁷

The whole rural area was under the sway of the revolt. The British officer at Hissar who had to seek shelter in jungles reported that, “The Villagers of Hissar District principally concerned in plunder and riot are Ranghars and Jat Villages.”¹⁸ In order to divert attention from the seriousness of the threat to the British government as a result of the revolt of the soldiers, some British soldiers tried to impart a communal color to the violence. It was alleged that Muslims were looting the property of Hindus who in an attempt to protect their lives had fled to Bikaner.¹⁹ It is evident that during the mutiny some powerful communities collectively posed a challenge to the British. In Hissar, the Ranghars and the Purchaders and Bhattis of Sirsa took advantage of the subversion of British rule and revolted against the British authority. Thus, it can be said that the whole district was plunged into utter anarchy and confusion. According to records approximately, 500 Bhatti valiantly fought against the British forces led by General Von Cortlandt, on 18 June. On the following day, the Bhatti and Purchaders again tried to check the advancing British forces near river Ghaghar. In the battle that ensued the Bhattis and Purchaders were defeated.²⁰

On the other hand in Sialkot, when the mutinous soldiers began disturbances, the Zamindars and the peasantry stormed into the city and plundered whatever they could lay their hands upon. The European houses and shops were burnt. However, it was quite strange that no harm was done to any public or private buildings. The British shot 24 rebels to death. Six *lambardars* of neighboring villages were hanged and a total fine of 7500 was collected.²¹

¹⁷ *East Punjab Government, Delhi Division, Judicial Department, File No 5, Accession No. 8209, p. 3, H.S.A.P, see also District Gazetteer of Hissar, 1883-84, Arya Press, Lahore, 1884, pp. 34- 35.*

¹⁸ *Foreign Secret Proceeding, Hissar Government of North West Province, 5 June, 1857, File No. 103, p. 31, N.A.I, New Delhi.*

¹⁹ *District Gazetteer of Hissar, p. 37.*

²⁰ *Ibid, pp. 37-38.*

²¹ *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, General and Political Department, 1857, File No. 68, Accession No 2382, p.4, see also District Gazetteer of Sialkot, 1883-84, Civil And Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1884, p. 33.*

It is significant to note that revolt had its impact up to the Muree hills. On the hearing the news of general revolt, the people of Muree hills also showed signs of restiveness. Suspecting their intentions, the Deputy Commissioner invited the tribal Chiefs and kept them as hostages. This illegal confinement of the tribal chiefs incited the peoples and 300 men of the Dond tribe attacked Muree on 2 September 1857. However, the attack was repulsed by Lieutenant Bracken and Captain Robinson. After the defeat of the tribal groups as a part of punitive action the British burnt 17 Villages, 27 persons were punished 15 of whom were sentenced death,²²

As discussed above at the time when the British approached the Sikh Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States for assistance during the crisis of 1857 these chiefs faced a dilemma. These Chiefs had two options before them. The first was to honour their obligation of faithfully rendering help to British or dishonour the agreement that bound them to give help to the British during any emergency. However, it is evident that the Sikh Chiefs of Cis- Sutlej States believed that the British would surely crush the mutineers. Thus, the Chiefs opted for the first option as they could foresee that not only would the mutiny be crushed because of the disproportionate power of the British in comparison with the natives, the Chiefs would also become entitled to further favors and rewards from their suzerain. In other words, the Sikh Chiefs were convinced that if they were disloyal to the British they would be treading on the road to self destruction. Any disloyalty or breach of faith towards the powerful suzerain would inevitably make them the targets of British retribution. Thus they responded to the British call for help with great promptness. It is clear that they did not wish to be accused of any breach of trust. The Patiala ruler's instantaneous decision to send troops to Ambala when required to do so by the district officer of Ambala showed that he simply followed the rulers of pragmatism and avoiding falling foul of the political masters i.e. the British disloyalty. In fact, the ruler of Patiala went so far to prove his fidelity by revealing to the commissioner of Ambala Division that he had received a letter from a King of Delhi inciting him to rise against the British.²³ The Raja of Jind was also driven by the same pragmatism. When he heard the news of the outbreak of mutiny in Delhi, he instantly took up arms against the rebels and on his own initiative and dispatched a messenger to the British authorities at

²² *District Gazetteer of Rawalpandi 1883-84*, Civil And Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1884 ,pp. 46-47.

²³ *Punjab Government to Government of India, 23 May 1857, Mutiny Report*, part 1, p. 59, see also Rev.J. Cave Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol I William Blackwood and Sons, London,1861, pp. 224-25.

Ambala for advice on further action²⁴. It can be said that the same considerations of common sense and pragmatic choice acted as the main reason behind the support of the smaller Chiefs of Nabha and Faridkot. The loyal conduct of Sikh *Jagirdars* of the Cis- Sutlej area also left little doubt as to their self interested motives. It would be wrong to draw any broad generalizations about the motives of these *Jagirdars* who had lost many of their rights since the Sutlej campaign of 1846. It is enough to take note of the fact that many of them must have felt greatly gratified that the British had approached them for help. On the other hand an equally strong sense of frustration and disappointment was expressed by those who were not asked to render any services to the British.²⁵ It is quite clear that given the mighty political power of the British, the Princes, *Jagirdars* and rulers were competing with one another to prove their usefulness towards them in this time of crisis. In other words, it can be said that their prime considerations for coming out strongly on the side of the British during the sepoy mutiny was to show themselves in a favorable light and ensure the continuity of their rules.

Osmond Barnes (British Army) in his analysis of the mutiny writes “The requirement of the army became incessant and the road was thronged with carts laden with every variety of stores. A bullock train was suggested by Mr. Forsyth to be carried by their district officers. This arrangement proved defective in practice for the want of a general superintendent in charge of the whole line.” In response to the emerging situation, Mr. Barnes obtained permission from the Chief Commissioner to organize a Military Transport Train under the supervision and control of Captain Briggs, an able and zealous officer with great experience. The efforts and contribution of Captain Briggs were recognized by the British Government. The outbreak of the mutiny the various parts of the country had drained the courage and resources of the British. There was assistance available to them from either the Ganga Doab or the Delhi territory. The army commissariat was also largely helpless. Carts that reached Delhi never come back and there was imminent danger of dead lock. Evidence suggests that all these difficulties were overcome by Captain Briggs. His Jurisdiction extended from Ferozpur to Delhi, comprising 265 miles. A train of 30 wagons a day from each of principal stations of Ambala, Ludhiana and Karnal and 14 wagons a day from Ferozpur were arranged. The same number was deployed on the return journey. In this way reinforcement and ammunition was safely and regularly supplied to the army as a way of dealing with the

²⁴ Rev. J.Cave Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, p.239.

²⁵ G.C. Barnes, *Reports on the Events in the Cis- Sutlej Division*, Mutiny Report, part 1, p.8, see also Cave Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, p.222.

demand for such things. The sick and wounded were comfortably transported from the camp to Ambala.²⁶ The train was in full operation from 22nd July to the middle of October. Moreover, it can be said that this scheme was eminently successful, owing to the skill, tact, and indefatigable energy of Captain Briggs. It can be said that Captain Briggs was conscious of his obligation to the Civil authorities and the Cis- Sutlej States who gave British Government their utmost support. The cost of train was 97,317 rupees. It can be said that the train performed the function for which it was deployed²⁷

During the disturbance of 1857-58, no prince of India showed greater loyalty or rendered more conspicuous service to the British government than the Maharaja of Patiala. He was the acknowledged head of the Sikhs and his hesitation or disloyalty would have been a huge setback to the British. On the other hand, his ability, character and high position could have made him the most formidable leader to lead the forces against the Government. However, as discussed above like the other princes he demonstrated gratitude and loyalty towards the British. Without even an *iota* of hesitation he placed his whole power, resources and influence at the disposal of the English and during the darkest and most doubtful days of the mutiny.²⁸ He never for a moment wavered in his loyalty, but, on the contrary, increased his overtures of friendship towards the British. When the news of the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut reached Patiala and there was a threat from the native troops at Ambala, the Maharaja placed himself at head of all his available troops and marched at the head of his forces with his elephants, camels and other such resources to Kalka. His prime objective was to transport the European troops to Ambala from the hill stations of Kausli, Dagshai and Sabathu. From Jesmoli he marched to Thanesar and deployed a force of 1300 men with four guns there to provide protection to the district.²⁹

The mutiny broke out in Meerut on 10th May, 1857 and its news reached Ambala on the 12th May. Mr. Doughlas Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala, sent a letter through Imam Ali, the Vakil of Patiala State, requesting Maharaja Narinder Singh to come to Ambala for consultation. The Maharaja reached Jasmeli, near Ambala early in the following morning. On the behalf of the Chief Commissioner, Punjab, Mr. Forsyth, requested the army

²⁶ *Punjab Mutiny Report*, Vol IV, Lahore, 1859, p.12.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p.14.

²⁸ Basta No 2, File No. H-67-B, *Patiala troops taking parts in wars and Battle from time to time*, p 3, P.S.A.P.

²⁹ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.214.

of the Maharaja of Patiala to occupy Thanesar and guard the lines of communications on the Grand Trunk Road from Ludhiana to Delhi.³⁰

Dholpur

John Lawrence wrote a letter to Sir William Muir on 4th October:

“You know how well the Maharaja of Patiala and Raja of Jind have obeyed. The Maharaja of Patiala wants to send down 500 men or so, to help to put Dholpur in order. I told the *Vakil* that I would write and ascertain the state of affairs at Dholpur and enquire whether Fraser was agreeable to this measure before I could say anything. Perhaps you will kindly let me have the necessary information.³¹”

As a consequence of the decisions of the British government to enlist the support of the Maharaja of Patiala, the Maharaja sent a force of 2000 men and 2 guns to Dholpur. Out of these 300 horses and 600 foot were moved to Gwalior. Besides this, the Maharaja took the responsibility of guarding all the ferries on the Chambal river collected supplies for the British Army and a detachment of 500 of his troops served under General Napier in the action at Alipur.³² At the request of Chief Commissioner the Maharaja sent a force 600 foot and 200 horses to Jhajjar. However, later this strength was doubled to maintain law and order at Jhajjar. At the request of Chief Commissioner the Maharaja also sent 820 infantry and 207 horsemen to Oudh. The Patiala Contingent employed in the British action during 1857 mutiny consisted of 8 guns 2156 horsemen, 2856 infantry with 156 officers.³³

Evidence shows that Osmond Barnes was firmly determined to keep down this rising disaffection of the native population under check. With this objective in mind he used every available resource and dispatched troops wherever there was perception of threat. He sent Levien to guard the banks of the Chambal River, where every ferry was closed. Only the ferries which were very important for communication were allowed to ply. The ferries were strongly held and guarded by police and Patiala troops. Lieutenant Person started for Kaithal

³⁰ *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, General Political Department, File No. 23,1857, Acc. No. 2611, p. 4, H.S.A.P.*

³¹ *Letter from John Lawrence to Sir William Muir, Record of intelligence Department, Mutiny of 1857, Vol.II Edinburgh, 1902, p. 273.*

³² *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, General & Political Department, 1857, File No. 153, Accession No. 1425, p.8.*

³³ *Patiala State, Head History, Basta No. 3, File No. H-133-B, p. 6, P.S.A.P.*

and Captain M'Neile, the Deputy- Commissioner of Thanesar after arranging for safety of that station under a powerful body of Patiala men, also advanced towards the field. Mr. G. Ricketts was deployed at Ludhiana. He made untiring efforts in leading his men and tried his best to maintain order in one of the most disturbed cities.³⁴

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief Commissioners he sent a request to the Maharaja of Patiala, begging him to come as near as possible to Ambala. The Maharaja was told that Barnes wanted to communicate with him immediately on his arrival from Kasuli. The Patiala chief received the letter that night and acted promptly. Within eighteen hours of the dispatched of the letter the Maharaja was encamped at Lohsimbly some eight miles from Ambala. Mr. Forsyth hastened to meet the Maharaja under special orders telegraphed from Sir John Lawrence. The Maharaja had an escort of about 1000 men, horsemen and foot soldiers. A short meeting with Mr. Forsyth was enough. The Maharaja immediately dispatched a detachment under his brother Kour Dalip Singh to Thanesar. Thanesar was very close to the grand trunk road between Amabla and Karnal. The Maharaja himself waited at his camp near Ambala to see Mr. Barnes and also to have an interview with the Commander- in- Chief.³⁵

Service of Patiala Army during these campaigns was acknowledged by the British Government and the Governor- General, Lord Canning, issued a Sanad to the ruler of Maharaja of Patiala.³⁶ The Sanad given to the Maharaja of Patiala read as under:

Khureeta from Governor General to the Maharaja Narinder Singh 12 August 1857

“It is well known that, since the time when General Sir David Ochterlony extended the protection of British Government to Raja Karm Singh of Patiala, there has been unbroken friendship and cordiality between the British Government and Patiala State.

Your Highness gave convincing proof of your good faith and loyalty during the Sutlej and Punjab Campaigns. Another opportunity has now presented itself and Your Highness's State and the friendship which has formed of old subsisted between them, has not failed to avail yourself and render still more conspicuous your loyalty and zeal by the supply of troops

³⁴ *Ibid*, p.7.

³⁵ *Mutiny Report*, p.210.

³⁶ S.N.Bannerjee, *History of Patiala* , Vol 1, p.48, Dr.Ganda Singh Collection in the Punjabi University Patiala.

and money for the purpose of quelling the present disturbance and also by personally joining the army. This conduct has gratified me very much. The zealous fulfillment by you of your engagement will not be forgotten of Your Highness and I beg you to accept my warmest thanks for the sincerity of your attachment and devotion to the British Government.”³⁷

According to Punjabi Poet Khazan Singh in his poetry observes that the strong measures taken by Cis- Sutlej Chiefs and John Lawrence to prevent disaffection were not enough to frighten the masses and soldiers. To prove his point, he has referred to the revolt of soldiers at various cantonments in the Punjab and the way they were butchered by the British Army. He also refers to the spread of disaffection in the *Banger* region, where inhabitants of the villages were sacked with the help of the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs.³⁸

ਏਥੇ ਆਉਣ ਦੀ ਏਨ੍ਹਾਂ ਮਜ਼ਾਲ ਕੀ ਸੀ। ਜੇ ਨਾ ਲਿਆਂਦੇ ਨਾਭਾ ਪਟਿਆਲਾ ਸਿੰਘੇ॥

ਮਦਦ ਏਏ ਦੀ ਫਤੇ ਪੰਜਾਬ ਕੀਤਾ। ਜੇਹੜੇ ਬਣੇ ਨਾ ਨਿਮਕ ਹਲਾਲ ਸਿੰਘੇ॥

ਏਨਾ ਕਰਮ ਕੀਤਾ ਵੀਰੋ ਬਹੁਤ ਭੈੜਾ। ਐਸਾ ਕਰੇ ਨਾ ਕੋਈ ਚੰਡਾਲ ਸਿੰਘੇ॥³⁹

ਜਦੋਂ ਸਨ ਸਤਵੰਜਾ ਵਿਚ ਗਦਰ ਹੋਯਾ। ਆਇਆ ਪੰਥ ਨੂੰ ਬਹੁਤ ਜਵਾਲ ਸਿੰਘੇ॥

ਨਾਭਾ ਪਤੀ ਨੇ ਕੀਤਾ ਸੀ ਵਫ਼ਾਦਾਰੀ। ਸਗੋਂ ਖੁਸ਼ ਗਿਆ ਪਖੇਵਾਲ ਸਿੰਘੇ॥

ਅੱਜ ਮੁਲਕ ਆਜ਼ਾਦੀ ਵਿਚ ਖੇਡਣਾ ਸੀ। ਕਰਦੇ ਪਿਯਾਰ ਜੇ ਗਦਰ ਦੇ ਨਾਲ ਸਿੰਘੇ॥⁴⁰

Jind

After the annexation of the Punjab, the Raja of Jind was one of the few Chiefs who were permitted to retain independent powers. Except for the right to give capital punishment, the Raja of Jind full autonomy and power. He showed himself deserving of the privileges

³⁷ *Mutiny Report*, part 1, p.309, see also C.U. Aitchison, *A Collections of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, Calcutta, 1892, p.19.

³⁸ Shamsheer Singh Ashok (ed), S.G.P.C. Amritsar, 1947, stanzas 44-48.

³⁹ ਪੰਥ ਅੱਗੇ ਪੁਕਾਰ, ਜਨਵਰੀ 1914, ਕੇਸਰ ਸਿੰਘ, ਪੰਨਾ-95.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.96.

granted to him as he endeavored to reform his administration in accordance with English model and to adopt the English system of revenue and police. However, it can be said that the reforms initiated by the Raja were not altogether popular, especially among the wild tribes on the border. The peasants of Sujuarah a Village on the Rohtak boundary rose in revolt and killed the Tehsildar, who had been sent to measure the cultivated area of villages, with the view to making a settlement and to mark off the surplus waste lands into separate units. They then called together the villagers of the neighborhood belonging to the same clan and threw up entrenchments, arming and provisioning themselves for a siege. Thus, it can be said that even before the mutiny the relationship between the Raja of Jind and his subjects were not cordial.

When the mutiny broke out in May 1857 Raja Sarup Singh, the Raja of Jind was not behind the Maharaja of Patiala in showing active loyalty to the British. When the news of the revolt at Delhi reached him at Sangrur, he at once collected all his troops and marched towards Karnal on the 18th of May. At Karnal he undertook the responsibility of the defense of the city and cantonments. His contingent did not exceed 800 men but it was immensely orderly and well disciplined and his presence at Karnal gave confidence. This helped in providing security to Karnal and saved the station from plunder. From Karnal the Raja sent a detachment to secure that station and the bridge of boats at Bhagpat, twenty miles north of Delhi. With the help of this bridge of boats the forces were able to cross the Jumna and join Sir H. Barnard's Column at Meerut. The town of Panipat which was in a state of utter commotion was restored. The Jind force marched in advance of the British columns and helped the British in recovering Sumbhalka and Rai securing the road and collecting supplies for the army.⁴¹

Raja Sarup Singh was the first to march against Mutineers at Delhi.⁴² He did not even wait for the summons from government to show his fealty towards the British. He even sent a messenger to Ambala for instructions and in the meanwhile collected all his troops. However, the request of Barnes reached him. As discussed above he led his troops to take control of Karnal and the main road. The Raja of Jind was accompanied by Captain M 'Andrew who had been deputed from Ambala. They seized each post on the road on the way to Karnal. It can be said that the Raja was draining his own territory in order to supply the wants of the British Army. It is evident that the commissariat was completely crippled by the suddenness

⁴¹ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 305.

⁴² *Ruling Chiefs*, Lahore 1901, p 35,P.S.A.P.

of the outbreak. The Raja of Jind proved to be a model of unfaltering loyalty towards the British. He was very prompt in choosing his side in the mutiny. There was no indecision or wavering in taking the decision. The mutiny had placed the British in a desperate position and the Raja committed himself to stand or fall with British government and tried his best to keep his pledge. His contribution of securing the bridge of boats over the Yamuna at Baghput was very vital because it was a link for communication with Meerut. Moreover, his troops took part in the engagement at Badli- Serai. His services to the British are distinguished by the fact that he was always in the midst of the struggle and arguably the only Chief present in person. His main duty was to guarding the rear. However, he was often seen among his men posted on the ridge. It can be said that he placed everything at stake for the final success of government and in the hour of that success and in the words of Lord Canning “he did not repent the trust he had placed in its power, honor and friendship.”⁴³

It is quite apparent that Raja of Jind had given utmost for evidence of his allegiance and devotion. About the middle of July, at a time when the British government was faced with a deep crisis, he sent a letter to the Chief Commissioner. In the letter he once again showed solidarity with the British and pledged to provide aid to them. He also gave an assurance to the Commissioner that he was with the British with all the resources and means at his disposal. Throughout the course of the mutiny he was anxious that his troops should take part in the assault of Delhi. His loyalty towards the British was by no means less than the Maharaja of Patiala. It can be further added that his realm was large; the boundaries of his territory were dangerously close to the sites of mutiny in the Delhi Districts. During this period he met Mr. G.C. Barnes personally. During this interview, the Commissioner thought for a while, drew a piece of paper toward him and after show of elaborate calculation apprised the Maharaja that if the state could hold out until the 30th August all was safe. According to the Commissioner, if the British were able to quell the revolt they would emerge stronger than ever. The Maharaja departed highly pleased and redoubled his efforts.

44

The administration of the district of Rohtak was passed on to the Raja of Jind during the most disturbed period. As part of this plan the head men of the villages and Zamindars were directed to pay their revenue to him. The receipts issued by the Raja were to

⁴³ Rev.J. Cave Browne, *the Punjab and Delhi in 1857* Vol II, London ,1861, p. 240, see also *Mutiny Report*, p. 92.

⁴⁴ Frederic Cooper, *Crisis in Punjab*, H Grecoy, Lahore, 1858, p. 101.

be treated as sufficient acknowledge of payment. After the fall of Delhi, Sarup Singh returned to Suidon. He led twenty five men for service at the Larsowli Tehsil and the same number at Delhi and sent a detachment of 200 men with General Van Cortlandt to Hansi and 110 men under the command of commandant Khan Singh to Jhajjar with Colonel R. Lawrence. Beside these, 250 Jind troops remained stationed at Rohtak and 50 at Gohana about twenty miles to the north.⁴⁵

It can be said that the service of Raja Sarup Singh were most valuable for the British. The Commissary- General, Colonel Thomson, C.B., acknowledged importance of the timely supplies sent by him. Due to the problems at commiserate; the quantity of stores had been extremely insufficient for the troops. General Wilson, in his dispatch of the 22nd of September, announcing the fall of Delhi, brought to notice that “the admirable services performed by the Jind Raja and his troops who were not only to have discharged harassing during in the constant escort of convoys, but to have aided the General on more than one occasion in the field and finally to have participated in the capture and assault of Delhi.” The Governor General, in his notification of the 5th November 1857, declared that the steady support of the Raja of Jind called for the marked thanks of the Government.⁴⁶

The significance of the role of the Raja of Jind in quelling the mutiny and in the capture of Delhi can be accessed from the fact that G.Barnes, C.S. commissioner Ambla sent a letter to C. Thornhill, C.S. Agra in which he wrote “we are unable to send any Patiala Horse to Meerut. But I have sent the Raja of Jind and Capt. M ‘Andrew to Panipat with orders to feel his way down as close to Delhi as he safely can. The Commander-in-Chief will not move onwards without his siege train, which I am getting up from Phillor with Police and Political escorts..... “I suggest to Le Bas to send an Asst. to Muzaffarnagar ... Mr. Richards has been sent, as the district is utterly disorganized. All is quiet here in the Punjab. Our Cis- Sutlej Chiefs behaved with great spirit and loyalty.”⁴⁷ The letter of appreciation issued to the Raja of Jind is reproduced below:

Mutiny Report Showed that;- Translation of Khureeta (letter) from Governor General to Raja of Jind and Nabha-12 August 1857

⁴⁵ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of Punjab*, p. 355.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 356.

⁴⁷ *Letter from Ambala to Agra, Records of The Intelligence Department of the Government of the North West Provinces of India, Mutiny of 1857, Vol II, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 275.*

“I have learned with much gratification that under the influence of your loyal feeling towards this government, you have at this time of revolt rendered aid to it by supplying troops and have also personally led the troops and have also personally joined the army to assist in quelling the disturbances caused by the insurgents and have thereby fulfilled the engagements entered into by you with British Government. This praiseworthy conduct and faithful regard for the engagements entered into by you with this state has afforded a strong proof of the firmness of your attachment and devotion to this government, in return for which I offer my warmest thanks and acknowledgement to you. Your valuable services and your steadfast adherence to the British Government have not only entitled you to commendations, but will tend to promote the prosperity and advance the interests of your state. Your laudable conduct will not be forgotten by the Government. Consider me as ever anxious to hear of your good health and continue to gratify me from time to time with accounts thereof.”⁴⁸

Nabha

When the mutiny broke out, Raja Bharpur Singh put in tremendous efforts to make amends for the decisions of his father particularly in showing loyalty to the British.⁴⁹ He rendered services to the British Government in an open show of support for the British.⁵⁰ Raja Bharpur Singh replaced his father on the throne as a minor and attained his majority a few months after breaking out of the mutiny of 1857. At this critical time he acted with utmost loyalty and intelligence and his service were considered to be as praiseworthy by the British as those of the other Phulkian Chiefs.⁵¹

Just like the other Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, the Raja of Nabha on hearing the news of the disturbances at Delhi proceeded from Nabha with all available forces towards Ambala. However, on his way, he was directed by the commissioner to march to Ludhiana. The Raja Bharpur Singh remained at Ludhiana in person throughout the campaign and played an

⁴⁸ *Mutiny Record*, part 1, p. 311.

⁴⁹ Colonel G.B. Malleson, *An Historical Sketch of Native States of India*, Longmans, Green and Company, London 1875, p. 339.

⁵⁰ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collections of Treaties, Engagements And Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, Calcutta, 1892, p. 58.

⁵¹ *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, Judicial Department*, 1858 File No 22, Accession No.2439, p.5, H.S.A.P.

important role in protecting the city. He deployed contingents of his troops for the protection of the roads between Ludhiana and Nabha and Ambala, Ludhiana, Nabha and Firozpur.⁵²

The Raja also sent his troops to Panipat, Ambala and Firozpur. At the same time a letter from the Commissioner Cis- Sutlej was received by him. Through this letter the Commissioner asking for a loan of three lakh rupees. However, later the amount was revised to two-and-a half lakhs which Raja remitted to Ambala. He also remitted 14,000 rupees to Ludhiana and 1,000 rupees to Firozpur.⁵³ He dispatched 14 horse men with one officer five shutter sowars for service at Lahore. He also sent 10 horse men to the Deputy Commissioner Ambala and 6 sowars to the Commissioner for duty with those officers.⁵⁴ The most important service rendered by the Raja of Nabha was to provide an escort for the Siege Train ordered from Phillaur to accompany the Field Force under the Commander-in-Chief to Delhi. The heavy guns and the ammunition, comprising a train of some hundred wagons were taken in safety from Phillaur to Karnal by the Nabha troops.⁵⁵

11th June 1857 Mr. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana wrote a report to Sir Johan Lawrence. In this report Mr. Ricketts described the incidents at Phillor in the following words: "I received my first intelligence of the outbreak at Jalandhar by electric telegraph message from Ambala. I received no warning whatever from those miserable people in high positions in Jalandhar. I sent down orders to have all ready to cut away the Phillor Bridge, which was done by Thornton, Assistant Commissioner, who was at Phillor ... just in time, as the mutineers had arrived in force on the parade ground at Phillor. The officers of 3rd Native infantry had to bolt as hard as they could to the fort and the men of 3rd Native Infantry almost to a man joined the mutineers. Thornton galloped over here with this intelligence and as the Sikhs, 4th Regiment were in camp here, I went to Rothney, Commanding Officers, asked him for 3 companies to go and take possession of the head of the Phillor ghaut, under his 2nd in command and a company for fort here and a body for the treasury and I sent York of 3rd Native Infantry, in command here, to look after his men and then I went off as hard as I could with a few sowars at the Phillour Bridge to see what was going on. I must add I ordered 2 guns belonging to the Nabha Raja, 100 matchlock men and 50 sowars down to the bridge also. On getting there I got ferried over, walked on to Phillor

⁵² *Foreign Political Proceedings*, 2 July 1858, File No. 168, pp. 11-12, N.A.I, New Delhi.

⁵³ *Foreign Political Proceeding*, 4 July 1858. File No 170 p. 9, N.A.I, New Delhi.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.13.

⁵⁵ *Mutiny Report*, part 1, p. 28.

and sent men on tatoes both up and down the river to close all the ghauts, bringing the boats over to this side. At Phillor I heard the mutineers had left in a body and had gone to a ferry about miles higher up and the Cavalry to another ferry higher up again at the Villages of Kureana and Lussarah.⁵⁶

The Raja of Nabha provided timely and quick services to the British in terms of men and provisions. This is further brought out by the fact that on the request of the Deputy Commissioner the Raja of Nabha sent fifty horse sent to escort 600 disarmed sepoy from Ludhiana to Ambala. On arrival at Ambala, the commissioner Cis- Sutlej States divided them into batches of 300, sent one under escort to Thanesar and other to Saharanpur. In compliance with the orders of the commissioner, the Raja furnished 535 Camels. He offered the service of another 450 camels which he committed to send if required.⁵⁷ In the last week of August 1857, the Raja communicated to the Chief Commissioner that he wanted to volunteer and fight the mutineers at Delhi but his services were declined by the Chief Commissioner as at this time he was very young.⁵⁸

As pointed out, Raja Bharpur Singh was anxious to march to Delhi at the head of his troops. He wanted to help the British in the same manner as the Raja of Jind had done. This was not allowed. He was very young and such service could not be entrusted to an inexperienced and callow youth. A detachment, however of 300 men performed good service at Delhi under Sardar Didar Singh throughout the siege.⁵⁹

In addition to this the Raja enlisted many hundred new troops during the mutiny. He furnished supplies and carriage and also arrested mutineers marching through his State and performed every service required of him with utmost loyalty and good will. Moreover, as discussed above he also extended financial help when money was urgently wanted by advancing a loan of two and half lakhs of rupees.⁶⁰

Captain H.R. James wrote letter to government that Punjab acknowledging the role of the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs in bringing the mutiny under control. He asserted that the situation was

⁵⁶ Mutiny Report, part 1, pp. 133-34, see also *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, Judicial Department*, 1858, File No. 22, Accession No.2439, p.4, H.S.A.P.

⁵⁷ *Punjab Administration Report of 1857-58*, Lahore, 1858, pp. 213.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 214.

⁵⁹ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Raja of the Punjab*, p.371.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 372.

quiet. He further wrote that the people are loyal and obedient and the conduct of the common people is dependent on the Chiefs and *Jagirdars* especially those of Cis- Sutlej States.⁶¹

Sardar Sobha Singh of Kalsia and his son Lehna Singh along with their troops placed themselves at the disposal of British Government. They assisted in guarding some ferries on the Yumuna and furnished troops for patrolling the main roads between Kalka, Ambala and Ferozpur. A contingent of 100 men was also dispatched to Oudh to quell the rebellion there.⁶²

As far as the trans- Sutlej territory was concerned there was the raja of Kapurthala State Raja Randhir Singh was very prominent ruler. Randhir Singh and his brother Kanwar Bikram Singh took an active part in assisting the British Government.⁶³

In an approach markedly different from the approach of the Sikh Chiefs who had displayed conspicuous loyalty and rendered meritorious services to the British cause, the only Muhammedan Chief of the Cis- Sutlej region, the Nawab of Malerkotla exhibited a lackadaisical attitude during the mutiny. Nawab Mehbub Ali Khan and his son, Sikandar Ali Khan proceeded to Ludhiana along with their troops. There was a general perception that troops which were occasionally employed for patrolling the roads were characterized by reluctance. The Muslim Chiefs and their people in the Punjab had clear sympathies with the rebels. In a significant move to check the powers of the chiefs whose loyalty towards the British was suspected, the junior chiefs of the Malerkotla House, were deprived of their independent jurisdiction and their authority was transferred to the Nawab.⁶⁴

Kapurthala

When the mutiny of the Bengal Army broke out in 10 May 1857, Raja Randhir Singh availed the first opportunity of evincing his loyalty towards the British Government. As per the agreement, he was, as vassal of the crown, bound to render all possible aid to the Government in times of difficulty. However, as per the terms of the agreement, military service could not be demanded from him, as he paid annually a tribute of Rs. 1,32,000 in return for being exempted for such service. However, at the first intimation of the outbreak at Delhi and Meerut, the raja marched into Jalandhar with every available soldier. He was

⁶¹ *From Chief Commissioner of the Punjab to Government of India, Foreign Department, Mutiny Records, Correspondence, Part 1, p. 89.*

⁶² *District and State Gazetteers of the undivided Punjab, Kalsia State Vol VII-A, 1904, Lahore, 1908, p.3.*

⁶³ *Ruling Princes and Chiefs, Notables and principal officials of the Punjab Native States, Government of Punjab, Lahore, 1918, p 11, P.S.A.P.*

⁶⁴ *Foreign Department, Political Consultations, 7 May 1858, File No. 182, Nos. 12.*

accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and his Chief advisers. He remained at Jalandhar throughout the hot season at the head of his troops. The raja volunteered to send a portion of his troops to Delhi and this offer was not not accepted as their presence was required at Jullundur. On the night of mutiny at this town, his troops guarded the civil station, the jail, and the treasury and he placed the whole of his cavalry under the British officer, General Johnstone for the pursuit of mutineers.⁶⁵

In July, the mutiny at Sialkot made it important to strengthen the Station of Hoshiarpur. The Raja at the behest of the authorities, dispatched 200 infantry, 100 cavalry and 2 light guns and this force remained at Hoshiarpur till the following November. Prince Bikram Singh was as a loyal and energetic as his brother. Their example was followed by the officers and troops. Although they camped at Hoshiarpur for six months in the neighborhood of a large town there was not violation of discipline and their conduct was most exemplary.⁶⁶

It can be said that the region of the Jalandhar Doab was not very severely affected by the mutiny. The inhabitants of this region were prosperous. They were chiefly agriculturist and did not show any desire to rise against the government. However, the Government was nevertheless made very strong in both the Jalandhar Doab and in the Cis-Sutlej with the help of the rajas and princes. Raja Randhir Singh could easily have withheld the tribute which he might have deducted for pay of troops which he was not legally compelled to supply. However, he paid the tribute to the British. Like other Chiefs, Princes and *Jagirdars* of Punjab he wanted to show himself in a good light by not appearing to increase the difficulties of the Government. The force of the Raja employed during this time consisted of 1200 infantry, 200 Cavalry and 5 guns. The supreme Government sanctioned a gratuity of Rs. 12,000 to this force in the November 1857. This was equivalent to a month's pay to each officers and soldier.⁶⁷

It should be remembered that the Raja took the side of government without hesitation and without having had time or opportunity to ascertain what were the intentions of the great Cis- Sutlej Chiefs. After the movable column had been sent to Delhi, the only reliable force in Jalandhar Doab was the force of Raja Randhir Singh. It is quite apparent that the Raja did not waver in his loyalty at a time when Delhi was holding out against the British. It was time when so many friends of the Crown had turned their back on the British. The Raja

⁶⁵ *Kapurthala State, Its past and present* , Kapurthala, 1928, p. 48, see also *The Tribune*, 31 July, 1897, p.5.

⁶⁶ *Mutiny Report*, part II, p. 135, see also Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 569-570.

⁶⁷ *From Major Edwards John Lake to Robert Montgomery, Mutiny Record*, part I, pp. 159-160.

showed great eagerness to lead his men on active service. His offer to lead his men was genuine and that this was proved by his subsequent conduct.⁶⁸

After the fall of Delhi the government was determined to disarm the population of the Jalandhar Doab and this measure the Raja carried out in his own territories with the utmost readiness. The services of the Raja Randhir Singh were most cordially acknowledged by the Government of India.⁶⁹

Kanwar Sochait Singh, younger son of the late Raja Kapurthala, was yet another important royal supporter of the British during the mutiny. On receiving the report of the mutiny he left for the headquarter of Hoshirpur District. During the operations he took his house adjacent to that of the Deputy Commissioner. Like this he also showed that he was anxious to support the British. He remained with Colonel Abbott throughout the crisis and his retainers were employed on various miscellaneous duties. He also had to incur considerable expense, entertaining an additional number of horsemen and foot men to the emergency.⁷⁰

Jagirdars of Jalandhar Doab showed loyalty and good feeling by supplying horsemen and footmen at the requisition of the local authorities during the entire tenure of the crisis.⁷¹

Faridkot

It is significant to note that during the Second Anglo Sikh War of 1849, Wazir Singh had served on the side of the English. During the Mutiny of 1857, he seized several mutineers and made them over to the English authorities. When Firozpur revolt took place the 57th Native Infantry declared that it was the decision of his regiment to refuse the Enfield cartridge if proffered to them. In this context Cave Brown mentions that "Raja of Faridkot showed himself loyal and eager in our cause". As the mutiny broke out he hastened to Firozpur on receiving the first news of mutiny at that station. He sent 25 of his men with General Von Cortlandt, who served at Sirsa and elsewhere. He seized several fugitive sepoys escaping through his territory and handed them over to the British authorities. His troops also accompanied Major Marsden, when that officer went to Seytokee in the Nabha territory to quell an insurrection. Evidence shows that Major Marsden spoke highly of the alacrity and

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.165.

⁶⁹ *Memoranda On Native States in 1909*, Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1909, p. 85.

⁷⁰ *Punjab Mutiny Report*, part 1, p.162.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp. 162-163.

zeal displayed by the Raja and his men. ⁷²Along with his five horsemen and 2 guns he personally joined the force sent against the rebel, Sham Das. The Raja also contributed a sum of rupees 35,000 as loan to the Government.⁷³

The Trans Sutlej Sardars who had lost their kingdom to the British in 1849 looked upon the sepoy rising as a possible way of restoring their social and economic status which had been gradually sinking lower and lower after the annexation of the Punjab. During the eight years between annexation and the outbreak of the sepoy mutiny the *Jagirs* of many leading landed aristocracy families had been reduced by the Government. Some Sardar families lost their land altogether. Moreover, they were not employed in public offices. Public offices during those eight post annexation years were monopolized by the Hindustani in the Punjab's civil and revenue departments. This trend was irksome to some British officials. Montgomery the Judicial Commissioner used to express his disgust with the Hindustani's preponderance in the Punjab civil service by describing it as "the Hindustani Raj."⁷⁴

The eagerness of the Sikhs to help the British was clear to the Judicial Commissioner when he asked the *Jagirdars* and Sardars for help during the first week of the mutiny.⁷⁵ This was the first positive proof that the Sikhs badly wanted to get into the good books of their British rulers. The extraordinary zeal and devotion with which the British were actually helped by the Sikhs was integral to their desire to regain lost prestige. Loyalty and support was shown particularly by those surviving Sikh families who had suffered heavy losses socially and economically. This was the most conclusive proof that sheer prudence and self interest were motives the loyal behavior of the Sikhs during the uprising of 1857.

The Sikh *Jagirdars* and Big Zamindars who opposed the British Government in Anglo Sikh Wars had been punished by the Government. Notably, most of the *Jagirdars* who helped the British in the revolt of 1857 were awarded *Jagirs* and honors. The Nalwa family from Gujranwala district had lost their lands after annexation of Punjab. However, the service rendered by Sardar Jawahir Singh at Delhi who was the son of the Sikh general Hari

⁷² Cave Brown, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol II, p.247.

⁷³ C.U. Aitchison, B.C.S., *A collection of Treaties, Engagement and sands Relating to India and neighboring Countries*, Vol-IX, Calcutta, 1892, p. 64.

⁷⁴ Cave Browne , *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, p .272.

⁷⁵ *Punjab Government to Government of India, May 19,1857, Punjab Government Report, Mutiny Report*, part 1, p.43.

Singh Nalwa, restored the Nalwa family to prominence among of the Sikh aristocracy.⁷⁶ The *Jagir* of Cheema family (Amritsar), had also been confiscated after the annexation of Punjab. The *Jagir* was given back to its leaders, Sardars Hardit Singh and Jai Singh, who served in 1857 with distinction as the Cavalry officers under the British Government.⁷⁷ Raja Surat Singh Majithia was removed to Benares after 1849 and he showed loyalty towards Government and rendered great military service in India. Surat Singh was granted a valuable *Jagir* and he was also allowed to return in the Punjab in 1861.⁷⁸ Sardar Gulab Singh (Attari) had also been removed to Bengal after Second Anglo Sikh War. He also performed eminent service during the revolt. In recognition of his loyalty and good services a generous *Jagir* was bestowed upon him in India and he was permitted to return to Punjab.⁷⁹ Factually, it can be said that the policy of liberal land grants pursued by the government had the effect of resurrecting socially practically every Sikh family that had fallen into obscurity because of its participation in the Second Anglo Sikh War of 1848-49. In other districts and area of Trans Sutlej Punjab, the loyal and helpful behavior of the Sikh leaders such as Raja Tej Singh in the Lahore district, Jawahir Singh in the Jammu Hills the Chief of Kapurthala State and numerous small Sardars lent further support and active help to the British during the sepoy mutiny of 1857. All these Sikh leaders were rewarded with rewards and recognition.⁸⁰

The interest shown by the Government in the welfare and prosperity of the Sardars and *Jagirdars* was a direct consequence of the renewed attitude towards Landed Aristocracy. Government had learned a few lessons from the sepoy rebellion and perhaps the most significant of all was the realization that its policy of degrading and destroying the Sikh Chiefs and aristocrats was a flawed policy. Historically it can be said that this policy which had been introduced and popularized in the Punjab the civil servants such as John Lawrence belonged to the Thomason School of Administration. The course of the mutiny had proved beyond question that the Sardars and *Jagirdars* were very resourceful asset. There was a realization that the aristocratic families could provide much needed help during an emergency. They had immense influence and control over the peasantry which remained firm and loyal towards the Sardars. As such the British realized that it was wrong on their part to look for help and leadership among lower classes, merchants and money lenders. The

⁷⁶ *Gazetteer of the Gurdaspur District*, 1883-84 Punjab Government Lahore, 1884, p. 40.

⁷⁷ *Gazetteer of the Gujrawala District*, 1883-84, Punjab Government Lahore, 1884, p. 15.

⁷⁸ *Gazetteer of the Amritsar District*, 1883-84, Punjab Government Lahore, 1884, p. 28.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 26-27.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.33.

leadership and loyalty exhibited by the leading Sikh families during the crisis of 1857 had therefore radically changed Government's attitude towards them. Owing to their experience during the mutiny the British adopted a new policy of nourishing ties with influential Sikh families. The wisdom of Canning's policy of attaching the Sikh aristocracy to Government through honour and patronage met with the full support of the Home Government. While congratulating Canning on his successful visit to the Punjab the Secretary of State for India Wood echoed Canning's own views:

“We reduce the natural gentry and person of hereditary and family influence to raise the mere moneylenders and traders. The latter cannot help us. The former are all indifferent if not against us. We must endeavour to enlist on our side the classes naturally possessing influence in the country. You may be assured therefore of my support.”⁸¹

Raja of Chamba also helped British Government. He afforded protection to ladies and children at the hill sanitarium of Dalhousie. He also captured thirty of Sialkot mutineers and made over local authority of Kangra.⁸²

As stated above, Mr. Forsyth was actively engaged at Ambala in facilitating the movement of the troops, while Mr. Barnes also remained there. Both the officers did their best to instill vigour and energy among their men and maintained hourly communication with the headquarters. They acted as the representatives of the Chief Commissioner. It was their main achievement that they exercised an extraordinary influence with the native Chiefs. Thus every effort was being made with foresight and promptness to engage the native Chiefs in quelling the mutiny. The whole native community from money banker to the petty Chief tradesman, from the Government contractor to the common coolie⁸³ stood aloof.⁸⁴

Translation of Khureeta to Native Chiefs, which was written by G.F.Edmonstone to Chief Commissioner Punjab;

He wrote to John Lawrence that “I have the gratification of announcing to highness that Delhi, the focus of the treason and revolt which for four months have harassed Hindustan and

⁸¹ *The Indian Administration of Lord Canning*, London, 1878, p. 49, P.S.A.P.

⁸² *Mutiny Record*, part I, p. 161.

⁸³ Coolier- mean Day Labour

⁸⁴ Rev.J. Cave Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi*, p. 241.

the stronghold in which the mutiny Army of Bengal has sought to concentrate its power has been wrested from the rebels. The mutinous soldiers and those who leagued with them have doubtless found encouragement to commit acts of faithlessness and rebellion in the delusive belief that India was weakly guarded by England and that before the Government could gather together its strength against their ends would be gained. They were undeceived. Before a single soldier of the many thousands who were hastening from England to uphold the supremacy of British Power has set foot on these shores the rebel force where it was strongest and most united and where it had the command of unbounded military appliance had been destroyed and scattered by an army collected within the limit of North Western Provinces and the Punjab alone.

The work had been done before the support of those battalions which had been collected in Bengal from the forces of the Queen in China and in Her Majesty's Eastern Colonies could reach Major General Wilson's Army and it was by the courage and endurance of that gallant army alone by the skill, sound judgment and steady resolution of its brave Commander and by the aid of the Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Jammu and others who had been true to their allegiance that under the blessing of God, the head of rebellion had been crushed and the cause of loyalty humanity and rightful authority vindicated."⁸⁵

There were many newspapers at the international which provide information about revolt in India. They carried exclusive stories about the role of the Sikhs, the native princes and rajas and the Sikh aristocracy in quelling the revolt. For example in Australia, according to The "Argus" newspaper, there was a story by Captain Griffith which threw light on the fact that without the help of Sikhs it was not possible to prevent revolt in Delhi. According to the story the Sikh community proved to be a hidden treasure for the British.⁸⁶

"Wagga Wagga Express" wrote in a story titled "A hero of great Mutiny" that in 8 years under the regime of Lawrence the Punjab had been rendered orderly, loyal and prosperous. It further stated that the Punjab Frontier Force, a body of 1200 men which kept the mountain

⁸⁵ Translation of Khureeta to Native Chiefs, which was written by G.F.Edmonstone to Chief Commissioner Punjab, Mutiny Report, part II, p.127.

⁸⁶ *The Argus*, 14 May 1910, Saturday, p. 6, Australia Newspaper.

tribe in order was perhaps the finest body of Native troops which ever followed British officers into battle.⁸⁷

Poet Khazan Singh wrote Jagnama Delhi in 1858 on the subject of the mutiny. Not much is known about the career of Khazan Singh. However, based on the internal evidence of the ballad, we can presume that he belonged to the Patiala region. Firstly, the language used in the ballad is *Patialvi*. Secondly he has concentrated more on the measures taken by the ruler of Patiala to maintain law and order in his dominion besides helping the British in quelling the revolt.⁸⁸ It is in the Punjabi Language and contains one hundred and one stanzas.

According to Khazan Singh, the 'religion' became the sole cause of revolt against the British in 1857. He asserts that British authorities at London had resolved to proselytize the Indians. In this pursuit they tried to turn the British Indian Army into Christians. Under this scheme, the greased cartridges imbued with the flesh of both pig and cows were introduced into the Army. However, this resolution was conveyed to Lord Canning who came to India in February 1856. On reaching Calcutta a meeting of the high official was called at Fort William and the decision of the British authorities at London was conveyed to them. They unanimously agreed to execute the scheme without changes.⁸⁹

In his detailed account, Khazan Singh voices the opinion that the strong and repressive measures taken by the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs and John Lawrence to prevent disaffection were not enough to frighten the masses and soldier likes. To prove his point he has referred to spread of disaffection and revolt in the *Banger* region where inhabitants of the village Balha and Kar-Sindhu refused to pay revenue. Both these villages were sacked with the help of Cis- Sutlej Chiefs.⁹⁰

According to English officers and men who witnessed and actively participated in the events of 1857, the Sikh army, with the exception of very small number was disbanded. People were disarmed. All military grants given by Maharaja Ranjit Singh were abolished. The *Jagirdars* who could have provided leadership in the struggle for fight for freedom had thus been deprived of their lands and source of influence and income. Except Tej Singh, no other *Jagirdar* was left with any substantial mean of wealth. Moreover the relatives of

⁸⁷ *Wagga Wagga Express*, 23 November 1901, p. 6, England Newspaper.

⁸⁸ Shamsher Singh Ashok (ed), *Parchin Varan te Jangname*, S.G.P.C., 1947 ,p.307.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 348.

⁹⁰ David Ross, *The Land of the Five Rivers and Sindh*, Lahore, 1882 (reprint 1916), pp.174-176, see also Shamsher Singh Ashok, *Parchin Varan te Jangname*, p. 44-48.

erstwhile ruling class consisting of the royal widows, retainers, were all given pensions. As they have been converted into pensions which were received on a yearly basis they had a clear vested interest in helping the rulers.⁹¹

The reasons for the support rendered by the Landed Aristocracy and Princely states like Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala, Faridkot to the British has been a matter of serious discussion for very long. Writers and thinkers have also dwelt on the issue as to why support of the rulers is interpreted in terms of the religion professed by its rulers. One of the last letters of Nana Sahib of Bithoor gives a very different perspective on the issue. In this letter he addressed to his countrymen. In this letter dated 7th Sudi of Kartik, Samvat 1915 (1858) he wrote that “This was the defeat of the entire country not mine. It was because of Gurkhas, Sikhs and the princely order.”⁹² It happened to be Hindus and ‘princely order’ which supported the British. They also belonged to Hindu and Islamic faiths”

As discussed above throughout the entire course of the sepoy mutiny the Sikh rajas and princes extended active support to the British Government. Their loyalty and eagerness to help besides their martial character and their experience in modern warfare made them the favorite soldiers of the British authorities. It is apparent that during the crisis the Sikhs were recruited in the Punjabi troops at a much higher proportion as compared to their number in the total population of the province consisting of the Hindus or Mohammedans. The Sikh contingents of Patiala Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala, Faridkot and Landed Aristocracy comprised almost seven thousand men which were at the disposal of the British. This preferential recruitment of the Sikhs during the crisis paid off for the British because the Sikh bore the brunt of the toughest campaigns against the mutineers.⁹³

Not only did the Sikhs sacrifice their lives for the British but they also gave them provisions and cash for conduct of the war against the rebels. Providing materials was of course not much within the resources of the common agriculturist Sikhs belonging to the lower classes. This task was performed by the Sikh Chiefs and Landed Aristocracy . To relieve the authorities of the shortage of funds the Rajas of Patiala and Nabha alone made voluminous contributions. The commissioner of Ambala, G.C. Barnes felt obliged to these

⁹¹ S.S Thorburn, *Punjab in Peace and War*, p.164.

⁹² Cited in D.N. Chaturvedi, *Remember Us Once in a While*, Government of India, 1998, p.15.

⁹³ Dr. Jagjivan Mohan Walia, *The Mutiny of 1857*, p.81 .

rulers for their material support. On one occasion he wrote, “more would have been furnished but it was not required.”⁹⁴

Finally to speculate whether without the men, provisions and money contributed by the Sikhs during the sepoy mutiny the British could pull through this crisis would be a difficult almost unanswerable proposition because the course and outcome of a war cannot predicted with accuracy and certainty. However it could be said from the foregoing analysis that during the crisis of 1857 the British sorely needed active help from the Sikhs and they received it to their utmost satisfaction.

⁹⁴ *Mutiny Report*, p.385.

CHAPTER - 5

REWARDS AND CONCESSIONS

After rebellion of 1857-58 the British Government conferred several rewards on the Sikhs leaders and rulers. These rewards were much more than simple and perfunctory acknowledgements of the services rendered by them in the time of crisis. The Sikh Princes and Landed Aristocracy were liberally rewarded according to their rank and the services they had rendered. In the recognition of their services and as a distinct religious community, the Sikhs were appreciated by the British rulers and commended for their role in saving the British rule during the mutiny of 1857-58. As a result of this recognition the Sikhs were elevated to an unrivalled place among the native communities of the Punjab. The government after the Sepoy rebellion had enough resources at its disposal to give high rewards from the confiscated estates of the rebels. A section of the ruler who did not prove loyal to the British fell into distrust and disfavor and their possessions were used by the government to reward the Sikhs handsomely.¹

In the wake of the mutiny, the Sikh princes of Cis-Sutlej states received the most high recommendation and favors from the government. Apart from the timely and enormous help in terms of men and material provided by the princes to the British during crisis, their faithfulness and loyalty had provided the British with tremendous political and strategic advantages over the rebels. The strategic advantage provided by the Sikh princes had helped the British retain control of the whole territory between the Sutlej and Yamuna rivers. This area was of inordinate importance to the British rulers for dispatching reinforcements to Delhi. Thus, it can be said that the military and political facets of the alliance of Cis-Sutlej princes had proved extremely useful to the British.²

As noted above, the Sikh Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej region displayed unflinching loyalty and rendered invaluable services to the British Government during the revolt of 1857-58. It was in the context of this testimony of faithfulness that British Government formulated their new policy towards the several Chiefships of this region and more especially towards Sikh States.

¹ *Punjab administration Report , 1856-58*, Punjab Government, Lahore, 1858, p.492, Punjab State Archives Patiala.

² *Ibid*, p.498.

Before giving an account of the exceptionally benevolent treatment of the British towards the principal Sikh States in recognition of the services rendered by them, it is important to note that after the revolt of 1857-58, there was a marked shift in the general policy of the British Government towards all the Native States in India. In August 1858, by the passing of the Act purportedly for installing a better Government in India the East India Company was abolished. The government and revenue of India together with the paramount right over the Indian States were transferred to the British Crown. Thus, the British through this fiat established direct governance in India. The Queen's Proclamation was issued few months later. The new policy was proclaimed in clear terms. As part of this new policy towards the all the Native States in general they were placed under the direct political rule of the Queen. However, it was made clear that treaties and engagements of the Princes and Chiefs with British Government would be upheld. This was clearly indicative of the fact that the Government of India under the Crown would not go violate the previous agreements with the states. Limited autonomy of the states would continue and in asserting or extending the scope of its paramountcy the British would not dishonor earlier treaties. Queen expressed her earnest wish for the prosperity and social advancement of the Princes and People of India which could be secured by internal government.³

In accordance with the policy announced in the Queen's Proclamation Lord Canning was appointed the first Governor General and Viceroy under the Crown. He dispatched to Secretary of State the proposal related to the right of adoption to be conceded to the Native States. The proposal made and principles enshrined in this draft were immensely important. It was on the basis of these principles that the British Policy towards the Native States would evolve. The momentous events of 1857-58 had an important place in the considerations of the British in finalizing the new policy of direct rule.⁴

Firstly, the Governor General deliberated on the controversial aspects of the British policy. Adequate consideration was given to some previous cases to show that the policy of the British Government regarding adoption of heirs by the Native Chiefs had not been clear and coherent. This had led to ambiguity and mistrust in the minds of all the Native Chiefs.⁵

³ *Punjab Gazette*, Wednesday, 3 November 1858, Punjab State Archive, Chandigarh Branch.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Despatch to Secretary of State for India*, No. 43-A of 30 April, 1860, P.S.A.P.

Secondly, he expressed his opinion that it would be appropriate for the British to dispel all doubts for the minds of the Native Princes and Chiefs. In order to do this the British authorities should make their policy about adoption plain and certain. This was important because the British had now established themselves as the unquestioned rulers and Paramount Power in all India. The last vestiges of the Royal House of Delhi had gone and the last pretender to the *gaddi* of Peshwa had disappeared and. He added, “There is reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never existed before and which is not only felt but eagerly acknowledged by the Chiefs.”⁶

Thirdly, the Governor General had a clear consciousness that the question of succession should be made clear to the chiefs as their insecurities could be attributed to it. Every Chief above the rank of *Jagirdar* should be clear that that the Paramount Power desired to see the ascendancy and rise of the British government. As far as the question of succession was concerned the British policy stated that on failure of natural heirs, the adoption of a successor according to Hindu Law and customs or in a legitimate manner according to Muhammadam Law would be recognized. Nothing would disturb the arrangement made under the new policy so long as the Chief remained loyal to the Crown and faithful to faithful to the fealty towards the crown. According to the Governor General such an assurance would reassure every Chief and give them confidence in the British Government.⁷

At the fourth level the Governor General observed that the proposed policy will not prevent the Government of India from taking action against abuses in a Native Government that may pose a threat to any part of the country. In case of the prospect of political instability or disturbance in any part of the country the British authorities would have a right to assume temporary charge of a Native States.⁸

Fifthly, he emphatically held that after the installation of direct rule the British would forsake their policy of extending the British rule. Rather, the British Government would exercise their rule within the present limits of their Empire. There was no incentive for bringing more and more territories under them. Instead of conquering territories and dislodging native chiefs

⁶ A.C Arora, *British Policy towards the Punjab States 1858-1905*, Export Indian Publication, Jalandhar, 1982, p.39.

⁷ *Ibid*, p.40.

⁸ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, London, 1873, p.293.

they would bring the various Chiefs under their suzerainty. Taking the responsibility of more territories would make it difficult for them to discharge the already existing duties in respect of administration of justice public work. He therefore pleaded for the maintenance of the Native States. And lastly the Governor General emphasized the need of treating the Native Chiefs with consideration and generosity. He remarked that in the event of any danger from an external enemy or any other emergency, "One of our best mainstays will be found in these Native States" During the crisis of 1857-58 they had "served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave."⁹

The Secretary of State approved of the recommendations made and the principles laid down in the Governor General's Dispatch. Accordingly, Adoption Sanads were issued individually to a large number of Native Chiefs of India, including the Chiefs of Punjab in 1862.¹⁰

As a reward for their unswerving loyalty and services during the mutiny of 1857-58 the Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala Jind and Nabha were granted some extraordinary concessions. These rewards and concessions cemented the relationship of their Chiefs with the British. It is significant to note that the initiative for acquiring such concessions had come from the three Chiefs themselves. It is quite clear that the chiefs had an ulterior political motive in helping the British. It was not without any purpose that they had been supporting the British so very ardently and enthusiastically. Maharaja Narinder Singh of Patiala, Raja Sarup Singh of Jind and Raja Bharpur Singh of Nabha, despite the feelings of mutual rivalry came together in the common interest to rescue the British. They put their minds together and prepared a "Paper of Requests." This paper was submitted for consideration of the British government at a very appropriate time, when the services rendered by the Chiefs were still fresh in the minds of British authorities. The paper contained eight requests in all.¹¹

The first request of the Phulkian Chiefs was that they should be granted power of issuing capital punishment on their subjects without the prior approval of the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States. The Phulkian Chiefs had been deprived of their right to give death punishment to their subjects after the First Anglo Sikhs War in 1847 without the approval and

⁹ A.C. Arora, *British Policy Towards the Punjab States*, p.17.

¹⁰ *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Provincial Series, Punjab, Vol II, Calcutta, 1908, p. 78.

¹¹ A.C Arora, *British Policy towards Punjab States 1858-1905*, p. 37.

consent of the commissioner or British agent. The Chiefs viewed this as a serious truncation of their right. This violated of their independence and autonomy and a very serious denial of their rights as rulers the wake of the Sutlej campaign. In their attempt to circumvent this rule the either abstained from giving death punishment or practiced utmost secrecy such cases. They were determined not to refer the case to the British agent. From 1847 to 1856 the Maharaja of Patiala did not refer a single case to the British agent of the Commissioner Cis-Sutlej States. On the other hand, the Raja of Jind referred only two cases. It was in the light of the opposition of the native rulers that the Commissioner recommended the removal of this restriction. He expressed the opinion that the rule had been a cause of discomfiture to him. No criminal was brought before him and the cases were presented in such a manner that he was unable to use his discretion and had to concur in a sentence death. There was no way in which the Chiefs could be prevented from exercising their powers put people to death secretly. The Commissioner also alluded to the fact that during the events of 1857-1858 he had authorized the Phulkian Chiefs to execute the heinous criminals without sending the case to him. The Chief Commissioner agreed with the Commissioner and the request of the Chiefs should be accepted. There was a realization that the Chiefs attached great importance to this concession. The Raja of Jind had told him he would hardly care to accept the grant of Dadri unless the power to execute criminals was given along with that. The Government of India accepted the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner and the Commissioner and bestowed the power of inflicting capital sentences on the Chiefs. The Chiefs could pass death sentences without references to the Commissioner.¹²

The second representation of the Phulkian Chiefs was related to the possibilities of an infant succeeding to the three Chief ships. It was in the case of an infant succeeding to the throne a Council of Regency consisting of three of the most venerable figures and trustworthy ministers of the state would be selected by the Commissioner with the advice of the other two surviving Phulkian Chiefs. It was further that outsiders and relatives of the infant heir should not be included to this Council. According to the representation made by the Chiefs the two surviving Phulkian Chiefs, should have the power in conjunction with the Commissioner to choose the members of the Council of Regency. It is quite significant that although the Phulkian Chiefs were old rivals but their interests converged in dealing with the British and in other matters of common interest. They placed great emphasis on reserving for themselves

¹² Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of The Punjab*, p.225.

the decisions about nomination of members of Regency Council. They did not trust the outsiders in the selection of members. Secondly, the members of the Council of Regency were to be chosen from the loyal ministers. It was believed that the loyal and faithful members would be able to run the administration efficiently. Thirdly, the strangers and relatives of the infant rulers were to be excluded from the Council. The exclusion of strangers was sought with the objective of preventing the British from giving entry to their own nominees in the Council.¹³ Moreover, the proposal of the exclusion of relatives of the infant ruler was dictated by the fact that usually there were many widows and line of relatives from the mother's side. The indiscriminate inclusion of such people could lead to intrigues. This had already happened during minorities of some Chiefs of Patiala Nabha. The Commissioner considered the request as it was dictated by common sense. He remarked that it had always appeared to him essential to employ the hereditary ministers for the management of Native State during the minority of heir, adding significantly: "It is a mistake to introduce a nominee of our own or to engraft on the native system any of our own institutions and customs. They cannot take permanent root and will produce only hybrid results prejudicial to good government."¹⁴

Third request was that in the absence of a male survivor in the direct line of inheritance, the reigning Chiefs should be permitted to adopt a successor from among the descendants of their common ancestor, Baba Phul. The fourth request was that in case of sudden death of any of three Chiefs without leaving a male issue and without having adopted a successor, the two surviving Chiefs would be entitled to nominate the successor from among the descendants of Phul. However, the policy related to the adoption of heirs by the native princes was not clear and consistent. The court of Director had written in 1834, "Whenever it is optional with you to give or to withhold your consent to adoption, the indulgence should be the exception not the rule and should never be granted but a special mark of favor and approbation."¹⁵ As far as the policy of adoption formulated by British Government towards Phulkian States was concerned it suffered from various inconsistencies. In the earlier years as part of a traditional custom the widows had the right of succeeding their deceased husbands and the custom of *Chaddar Dalna* or *Karewan* was quite common

¹³ Lee Warner, *The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, Macmillan and Company, London, 1904, p. 148.

¹⁴ *Truth about Nabha*, Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, 1924, p. 39.

¹⁵ Lee Warner, *Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, pp.148-49.

among the Phulkian families. However, the British Government declared that the succession was to remain with male heirs in the families of Patiala. Jind and Nabha abandoned this custom altogether.¹⁶ It is a well known fact that the Phulkian Chiefs were polygamous. However, historical evidence suggests that they did not generally have many sons and sometime they had none. These Chiefs were often plagued by the apprehension that their states would one day be annexed by the British Government. In 1834, when the Raja Sangat Singh of Jind died without a son, the British authorities wanted to annex the whole of Jind. However, they relented and recognized the right of Sarup Singh to the Chiefship. However, the ruler was not allowed to succeed to all the territories but only to those which had been in the possession of his ancestor Gajpat Singh. Similarly in March 1843 when the Bhai of Kaithal died without any son, the British Government escheated the State and allowed next claimant to succeed only to a small portion of the territories.¹⁷ These cases had become a cause of insecurity and anxiety for the Phulkian Chiefs. According to the Griffin, "The Cis Sutlej Chiefs lived in a perpetual fear that one portion of their possessions in the event of heir dying childless, would pass to distant kinsmen with whom they were at constant feud, while the most ancient and dearest loved portion would become an escheat of the British Government which threatened in course of time to absorb them all."¹⁸

Considering the representation of the Chiefs, the secretary of State stated that if such a situation arose, the selection should be made by the Governor General of India in consultation with surviving Chiefs. By *sanads* of 5th May 1860 issued to the three Phulkian Chiefs, the power of adoption was granted to each of them and his successors forever under Clause III.¹⁹ It was thus ordained that in case any one of the Chiefs should be suddenly

¹⁶ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Law of Inheritance to Sikh Chiefship*, Panjab Government Press, Bahawalpur, 1970, p.18.

¹⁷ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.348.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.226.

¹⁹ Clause III- As an additional Royal Favour and having regard to the loyalty and devotion of the Raja Sahib Bahadur the powerful Government desires that this territory should always remain under the sovereignty of this family. Therefore, the power of adoption is granted for ever to the Raja Sahib and his successors so that in case there is no lineal descendant, they may, for the purpose of perpetuating the line of Chiefship, adopt a successor, according to their own choice from among the descendants of the Phulkian family. The powerful Government also grants permission that in case, may God forbid, the Raja on the masnad should suddenly die, without leaving a lineal descendant or an adopted successor, the Maharaja Sahib of Patiala and Raja sahib Bahadur, may select a successor from among Phulkian family and place him on the masand. In that case nazarana to the extent

without a son and without having adopted heir, the two surviving Chiefs, in consultation with the Commissioner might select a successor from among the family. However, a clause was added to the effect that in such cases a *nazarana* consisting of one of third of the income of the State for one year would be paid into the treasury of the British Government. The condition of the payment of *nazarana* was considered to arbitrary and unjustified, yet the Phulkian Chiefs on the whole agreed to it as the power of adoption conceded to them was more important than awarding as a new territory the reward for their loyalty. It may be observed that Phulkian Chiefs were not the first to be granted the right of adoption, as in November – December 1858 such as privilege had already been conceded to the Chief of Rewa, Gwalior, Jaipur and Chirkari. Nevertheless, the three Phulkian Chiefs were among the first few get this privilege and the adoption *Sanads* were issued to most of the Native States in March 1862.²⁰

Their fifth request made by the three chiefs was that that women should not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of the state. They should not be allowed to use the excuse that the chief was young to interfere in the matters of the state. Moreover, it was the supplication of the Chiefs that no complaint made by the women of the families of the Chiefs should be entertained by the British Government. In response to this supplication the Commissioner observed that exclusion of women from the council of Regency as well as from participation in public affair was desirable and correct. He recommended that the government might give an assurance to the Chiefs that it would neither receive nor consider any complaints from the women of the royal houses. Moreover, the government undertook that it would not interfere on behalf of women except on human grounds. As a matter of fact the British administration did play a role in the case of the two sisters in law of the raja of Faridkot. Their dispute had come before the supreme Government. However, in principle the Government of India accepted this request of Phulkian Chiefs.²¹

The Sixth request was that the British Government should give a commitment that it would never interfere on behalf of relatives, connections and dependants of the Chiefs. As the

of one third of the income of the State for one year will be paid into the treasury of the British Government by the Nabha state.

²⁰ A.C. Arora, *British Policy Towards the Punjab States*, p. 39.

²¹ *Foreign Political Consultation*, 27 May 1859, File No. 87, From Secretary to government of India to Secretary to government of Punjab, N.A.I, New Delhi.

context of this request the perspective adopted by the Commissioner and Chief Commissioner was that the Government should give a commitment never to interfere on behalf of relatives, connections and dependants of the Chiefs. It was undertaken that the government would not interfere on behalf of the relatives and dependants unless it was very unavoidable. This view point was corroborated and upheld by the Governor General in Council. The seventh request of Phulkian Chief was that they should be issued *sanads* which act as a guarantee that to them and to their heirs they would continue to retain the hereditary possessions together with the territory bestowed upon them by the British Government under the hand and seal of the Sovereign of Great Britain. The Commissioner recommended the acceptance of this request on the ground that Chiefs “would highly appreciate the honors and feel double confidence in the government”. Although the Commissioner held the view that it would be advantageous to accede to the request the Secretary of State for India expressed disagreement. He expressed fear that if this request of Phulkian Chiefs was granted, similar request of Sindhia, the Holkar and even of lesser Chiefs would also have to be complied with. He emphatically remarked “I strongly deprecate leading the Chiefs to think that when any substantial act of justice or favor is done to them, more force and sanctity will be given to the act by its being done in England than by its being done by Queen’s representative in India.”²²

Therefore, he recommended to Her Majesty’s Government that the request should not be accepted. The Cis-Sutlej Chiefs should not be made to believe that their possessions and rights were secure under the guarantee and hand of Queen’s Representative. This could have adverse consequences for the government. The Secretary of State recognized the validity of the agreement given by the Governor General and declined to recommend the grant of *Sanads* to the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs under the hand and seal of the Queen.²³

The eighth and final request of the Phulkian Chiefs was that no claims against their subjects should be heard in the Civil Courts situated in the British territory. According to the rule prevailing at that time no claims were entertained in the British courts other than on occasions when the cause of action fell in the British territory. The commissioner observed that the subjects of the Native States freely resorted to the British courts to prosecute claims against the parties resident in the British territories and such they enjoyed a great advantage over the people living in the British territories. The commissioner was of the opinion that the

²² A. C Arora, *British Policy towards Punjab States*, p. 41

²³ *Punjab Gazette*, Wednesday, 3 November 1858, p 1.

request should not be conceded and he gave the opinion that he was not in favor of any change in the existing system. In this matter the Governor General also expressed concurrence with the Commissioner and it was decided that that no change was necessary in the existing system in relation to the claims against the subjects of the native Chiefs.²⁴

It is clear that some of the requests made by the Phulkian Chiefs were not accepted. Yet most of them which appeared reasonable enough to the British authorities were accepted. The *Sanads* of 5th May 1860 issued individually to the three Chiefs formally contained the concessions granted to them in response to their 'Paper of requests.' These *Sanads* also defined the respective titles and territories of the Chiefs in a systematic manner. Renewed assurances were given in relation to the acquired and ancestral possessions to the effect that the chiefs would have sovereignty over their possessions in accordance with the ancient customs. Moreover, the Chiefs were given an assurance that the British government would not entertain any complaint against them from their subjects, *Jagirdars*, dependents, relatives etc. The Chiefs were guaranteed minimum autonomy under which and there would be no unwarranted interference in their internal management and household affairs of their States. Moreover, it was testified that the British Government would uphold their honor and dignity. Apart from clearly defining the powers and privileges of the Chiefs it was decreed that the Chiefs would ensure the welfare and happiness their subjects by all possible means. They would redress the grievances of the oppressed and eradicate all inhuman and primitive practices of female infanticide sati and slavery. Moreover, above all they were required to owe fealty to the British government. They provide assistance supplying men, arms, grain, carriage etc. whenever the need arose. They were also bound to arrange to supply the necessary materials required for the construction and repairs of road on payment and concede lands free of charge required for construction of rail road or imperial roads.²⁵

Thus, on the basis of the above discussion it may be concluded that the foundations of the new policy towards the Native States in general and principal Sikhs States of the Punjab in particular was formulated during the viceroyalty of Lord Canning. In the aftermath of revolt of 1857-58, this policy was based upon the lessons which British authorities had learnt from the native insurgency. It reflected the sentiments and fears of the Home Government. The policy also bore the imprint of the personality of Queen Victoria, the

²⁴ *Foreign Political Consultations*, 27 May 1859, No.87,para 32. (NAI)

²⁵ A.C Arora, *Phulkian Chiefs Paper of Requests* (1858), April ,1971, Punjab History Conference, pp. 227-246.

Empress, Lord Derby, the Prime Minister and Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India. Above all, it was an outcome of astute political abilities of Lord Canning, the First Viceroy of India in the direct British rule. The policy took into prominent consideration the highly commendable services rendered by the Sikh Chiefs during the Crisis of 1857-58.²⁶

As discussed above it was a time when the Government of India altered its policy and resolved to abandon the policy of extension of the British Empire of India. It was resolved that the non-annexation of the Native States was, indeed, a *sine qua non* policy. This shift in policy towards the native states and Chiefs was not a result of any righteousness on the part of the government. On the other hand, it was based upon pragmatism. Canning was convinced that as the British were enjoying a secure level of political domination and control it was no more desirable to carry out any further accession of territory. They had already a very bitter experience in the revolt of 1857-58. It was moreover decided that the dependence on the Indian sepoys would be reduced. There was a realization that they did not have sufficient European force and it was perilous for them to have a large army consisting of native troops. Therefore, it would be a calculated risk to undertake the task of any fresh annexation. The financial position of the Government after the crisis was also not satisfactory the number of British officers also stood depleted. Under the circumstance the friendliness and fidelity of the princes and Chiefs was considered to be a requisite safeguard.²⁷

As an arrangement of quid pro quo with the Native States and ensuring the loyalty of their rulers, the British government promised to respect the rights, dignity and honors of these Native rulers. However, the *Sanads* in response to the collective request of the three chiefs can be seen as the mark of the greatest concession to the Native Chiefs. It was a defining feature of the new policy. The hallmark of this new policy was the assurance that the British Government would perpetuate their regimes and ensure the continuance of the royal houses. The *Sanads* granted individually to each one of them in fulfillment of their demands. There were some British officials; however who did not subscribe to the logic of granting Adoption *Sanads* to all the Native Chiefs. Griffin, for instance, opined: As it is the indiscriminate grant of the right of adoption by Lord Canning, making the Government an earthy providence whose favors are conferred alike on the just and the unjust has deprived it forever of the power of rewarding loyalty and devotion most splendidly and of most effectively punishing

²⁶ *Punjab Gazette*, Wednesday, 3 November 1858.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

treason.²⁸ Griffin's comments bear the implication that the British has guaranteed the perpetuation of the rule of the native chiefs without discerning the merits of the individual rulers.

However, Lord Canning was firmly convinced of the imperative necessity and undoubted wisdom of granting adoption *Sanads* to all the Native Chiefs above the rank of *Jagirdars*. He was able to convince the Home Government about his view. From a historical perspective, there is little doubt that the grant of adoption *Sanads* to a large number of Native Chiefs in 1860-62 was right. It went a long way in winning the confidence and good will of the Native Chiefs. This measure of the British also strengthened the possibilities of the security of British Empire in India after the great crisis of 1857-58.²⁹

Out of all the Sikh princes the Maharaja of Patiala, Narinder Singh, was accorded the greatest consideration by the government. It was observed that not only did he provide timely and prompt help to the British but his attitude was a proof of unswerving loyalty. He was the "acknowledged head, not only the Malwa Sikhs in the Cis-Sutlej States, but also of the Rajas and petty Chiefs in the adjacent hill" The British could not fail to notice that his example was readily followed by other princes. There was a feeling that if he had dithered or shown signs of hesitation or even indifference, the British would have suffered great losses. The Maharaja of Patiala had placed himself with men and money at the disposal of Mr. Barnes. He went to the troubled district of Thanesar. Thereafter, he took his place in the army at Delhi and set an example for all the rest of the Chiefs. The Maharaja of Patiala also made efforts to prove that the imputations against government about the greased cartridges the adulteration of flour with bone and were wrong and there was not conspiracy to desecrate the caste of Hindus. His support was prompt and unwavering acted as a bulwark for the European troops. He was instrumental in defending Ambala, Saharurpur, Karnal even Rohtak and Hissar and contributed five lakh of rupees for the British.³⁰

²⁸ Lepel H. Griffin, *Ranjit Singh*, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1892, p.60.

²⁹ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collections of Treaties, Engagements And Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, Calcutta, 1892, p. 52, see also *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, General Political*, File No 182, Acc. No. 2631, p.4.

³⁰ *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, Military Department*, File No.2, Reward for services during mutiny, p.6, see also Rev.J. Cave Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol II, William Blackwood and Sons, London,1861, pp. 236-237.

As a reward for his faithfulness a tract of land, called the Narnoual territory, which was confiscated from the rebel *nawab* of Jhajjar, was granted the Maharaja of Patiala. This territory was valued for revenue at two lakhs of rupees per year and was given to the Maharaja “on condition of good behavior and service, military and political, at any time of general danger or disturbance.”³¹ This particular grant of land to the Patiala ruler was dictated by political consideration in the view of the Punjab Government. It was thought to be desirable to acknowledge the services of the friendly Sikh Chiefs against the troublesome Mohammdan Rajput tribes.³² In addition, the Maharaja was given back the family estate of Bhadour which government had taken over because of a jurisdictional dispute. The estate was very small in value but its return was much desired by Maharaja because of his sentimental attachment with family possessions. The confiscated palace in Delhi of Queen Zeenat Mahal, King Bahadur Shah’s favorite wife, was also conferred on the Maharaja and a substantial addition was made to his honorary titles.³³

The Maharaja Narinder Singh’ was honored with the title of Farzand-i- Khas-i- Daulat-i-Inglishia, Mansur-i- Zaman-. Amr-ul- Umara, Sri. Thus the hereditary title of the Maharaja of Patiala become “ Farzand-i-khas-i-Daulut-i-Inglishia Mansut- i- Zaman, Amir – ul- Umara, Maharaja Dhiraj Rajehwar Sri, Maharja – i- Rajagan-Mahinder Bahadur.”³⁴

General Wilson, in his dispatch on the assault of Delhi 22nd September bore testimony to “ the loyal services and great assistance” rendered by the Maharaja. The Governor General declared that this loyal and constant co-operation merited “the marked thanks of Government,” and added, “these true- hearted Chiefs, faithful to engagements have shown trust in the power honor and friendship of the British Government and they will not repent it.”³⁵

No XXV. Translation of the Sanad given to His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala, Nabha, Jind by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General.

³¹ Lepel H.Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.239, see also *General Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies*, Lahore, 1859, p. 30.

³² *Punjab administration Report* , 1856-58, Lahore, 1858, p. 492.

³³ Cave- Brown, *Punjab and Delhi 1857*, Vol I, p. 238.

³⁴ *Patiala State, Head History*, Basta No. 3, File No. H-133-B, p. 6, P.S.A.P.

³⁵ *Ibid* , pp. 6-7, see also Crave Brown, *The Punjab and Delhi*, p. 288.

Since the establishment of British authority in India, His Highness the present Maharaja of Patiala, Nabha, and Jind have always been steady in their fidelity in the accession of fresh honors, dignity and territory. More recently His Highness the present Ruler of Patiala has surpassed the former achievements of his race by the constancy and courage he evinced during the mutiny of 1857-58. In memory of this unswerving and conspicuous loyalty, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in India has conferred additional honors and territory upon the Maharaja for himself and his heirs forever and has graciously acceded to His Highness desire to receive a *Sanad* or grant under the hand and seal of the Viceroy guaranteeing to the Maharaja the free and unreserved possession of his ancient territories as well as of those tracts bestowed on his Highness and his predecessors at various time by the British Government. It is accordingly ordained as follows:-

Clause 1. His Highness the Maharaja and his heirs for ever will exercise full sovereignty over his ancestral and acquired dominions according to annexed list. All the rights, privileges and prerogative which His Highness enjoys in his hereditary territories, he will equally enjoy in his acquired territories. All feudatories and dependents of every degree will be bound to render obedience to him throughout his dominions.

Clause 2. The powerful British Government will not demand or exact anything on account of *nazarana*, land revenue, administrative or criminal cases, compensation on account of troops etc., or on any other plea whatever, in the present and future, from Maharaja Sahib Mahindar Bahadur, his successor, dependants, brothers, *Zaildars*, *Jagirdars*, Feudatories except as provided in clause III.

Clause 3. The British Government cordially desires to see the noble house of Patiala perpetuated and his heirs forever, whenever male issue may fail, the right of adopting a successor from among the descendants of the Phulkian family. If however, at any time any Maharaja of Patiala should die without male issue and without adopting a successor, it will still be open to the Raja of Nabha and Jind, in concert with the commissioner or Political Agent of the British Government, to select a successor from among the Phulkian family, but in that case a nuzzurah or fine equal to one third of the gross annual revenue of the Patiala State shall be paid to the British Government.

Clause 4. In 1847 the British Government empowered the Maharaja to inflict capital punishment after reference to the Commissioner. It now removes the restriction imposed by his reference and invests his highness with absolute power of life and death over his own

subjects. With regard to British Subjects committing crime and apprehended in his territory, the Maharaja will be guided by the rules contained in the Dispatch of the Honorable court of directors to the Madras Government No. 3 dated 1st June 1863. The Maharaja will exert himself to execute justice and to promote the happiness and welfare of his people. He engages to prohibit sati, slavery and female infanticide throughout his territories and to punish with the utmost rigor those who are found guilty of any of these crimes.

Clause 5. The Maharaja will never fail in his loyalty and devotion to the Sovereign of Great Britain.

Clause 6. If any force hostile to the British Government should appear in this neighborhood, the Maharaja will co-operate with the British Government and oppose the enemy. He will exert himself to the utmost of his resources in providing carriage and supplies for the British troops, according to requisitions he may receive.

Clause 7. The British Government will not receive any complaints from any of the Subjects of the Maharaja, whether *Mafidars*, *Jagirdars*, relatives, dependents, servants or other classes.

Clause 8. The British Government will respect the household and family arrangements of the Maharaja and abstain from any interference.

Clause 9. His Highness the Maharajah will as heretofore furnish at current rates, through the agency of his own officers the necessary materials required for the construction of rail- roads, railway Stations and imperial roads and bridges. He will also freely give the land required for the construction of rail- roads and imperial lines of road.

Clause. 10. The Maharaja and his successors etc. will always pursue the same course of fidelity and devotion to the British Government and the Government will always be ready to uphold the honor and dignity of the Maharaja and his house.³⁶

Maharaja Narinder Singh's name will always be remembered for works of public utility, his philanthropic acts and his large permanent grants holy places in different parts of India. In the famine of 1861 he distributed grain worth Rs, 14, 40, 000 among his subjects

³⁶ C.U.Aitchison, B.C.S., *A collection of treaties Engagements And Sanads relating to India And Neighboring Countries*, Vol IX , Calcutta, 1892, pp.73-74.

and officials and granted agree remissions in revenue. He framed rules and regulations for the conduct of business of the various departments of his State.³⁷

Maharaja Narinder Singh, K.S.I., member of supreme Legislative Council, died on the November 13, 1862. His eminent services to the British Government during the tumultuous time of revolt were acknowledged. The enlightened nature of his internal administration brought prosperity and contentment to all his subjects and rendered his government worthy of initiation by surrounding states. In his death the government had lost a wise, great and trusty feudatory. As the heir of the Maharaja heir was minor, it was imperative to appoint Regent in accordance with the rules framed for the administration of the Cis Sutlej chieftainships. During the minority of their rulers a council of three ministers had been selected, in consultation with the neighboring of Jind and Nabha.³⁸

Ratified by his Excellency the Viceroy and governor General of India at Calcutta on the twenty- sixth day of March 1873. Similar engagements were entered into by the Chiefs of Jind and Nabha.³⁹

Maharaja Sarup Singh of Jind was second only to the Patiala Chief in terms of the help rendered to the British during the Sepoy rising. He himself led his troops and participated in the struggle for cause of Government. Quite significantly he decided to help the government even before any formal request was made to him by authorities. Moreover, throughout the siege of Delhi the Raja not only gave men and provisions to the field force but also remained personally in the vanguard. His loyalty to the Britishers won him the following grants:⁴⁰

1. Area of Dardri, which had been held by a Nawab before it lapsed to the British East India Company. It brought him a revenue of one lakh and three thousand.
2. Thirteen villages of Karnal with total revenue of Rs.13813.

List of village

³⁷ *Patiala State, Head History*, Basta no 3, File No. H-133-B, p 7, P.S.A.P.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 8.

³⁹ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements And Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries* Vol- IX. Calcutta, 1892, pp. 85-86.

⁴⁰ *Papers selected from former and present records in the possession and favour of Highness of Jind*, Letter No. 100 from Captain MC Neile to Raja Sarup Singh of Jind dated 15 July 1858, p.135, P.S.A.P.

Name of the Villages	Annual income
Bhaurdpura	342-00
Atupura	431-00
Bulabgarh	406-00
Kalran Khas	3023-00
Dodra	483-00
Kouli	425-00
Gungtai	700-00
Dhurmghar	404-00
Boozurugh	1021-00
Sohujpura Khurd and Kulan	1189-00
Muwai	1200-00
Mukrouli	1360-00
Shanpur	350-00
Total	13813-00

3. A house worth Rs. 6000/- confiscated from Shhzada Mirza Abu Balkar, in Delhi. Later on , in 1867,Badrukhan and Bhen Baddi were also given to him.⁴¹

Besides these grants, he became entitled to a salute of 11 guns. An honorary title ‘ Fuzund Dilbund Rasikh-ul-Itiqad Daulat –i-Englishia Raja Sarup Singh Bahadur’ was also conferred upon him. Nineteen more villages falling in Budhwana area were given to Raja Sarup Singh to be added to Dadri *Pargana* in lieu of Nazarana.⁴² In this way, the Jind State which was founded by Gajpat Singh touched the zenith during the rule of Raja Sarup Singh. He is died on 26 January 1864.

Nabha- Because of the geographical position of his state Raja Bharpur Singh the Chief of Nabha, did not play as prominent apart during the disturbance of 1857 as the more power chiefs of Patiala and Jind. However, it is important to note that the Commissioner and

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.136.

⁴²*East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, Military Department, File No.2, Reward for services during mutiny, pp.6-7*

Superintendent of Cis-Sutlej States wrote a letter of commendation for the Raja of Nabha to the Chief Commissioner Punjab that the Raja of Nabha Raja behaved with great dignity and rendered valuable assistance to Government at a most critical time. It was recommended⁴³ that following rewards be conferred upon him-

1. A grant of territory taken from the Ludhiana or Ferozpur District and not exceeding value of thirty thousand rupees per annum was given to him and his male heirs forever.
2. His *khillat* for Governor General was increased from seven pieces to fifteen pieces. This placed him at the same footing as the Raja of Jind.
3. He was entitled to a salute of nine guns on visiting any of the large military stations of the British or the Darbar of Governor General.

The Chief Commissioner forwarded the letter of the Commissioner to the Supreme Government strongly recommending that the rewards suggested by the Commissioner be granted to the Raja.⁴⁴

The Governor General in Council appreciated the services rendered by the Raja of Nabha and ordered that following rewards be given to the Raja:

1. The division of Bawal and Kanti in the Jhajjar territory was conferred on the Raja and his heirs in perpetuity on condition of loyalty of service military and political in time of difficulty and danger.
2. A salute of eleven guns would be allowed to the Raja and on the occasion of his visit to the Darbar it would be increased to 15 pieces and his state visits to the Governor General. The honorary titles of the Raja were increased to Farzand-Arjumad- i-Akidat Paimad –i-Inglistia, Brar-bans, Sirmor Raja Bharpur Singh Malwinder Bahadur.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Foreign Political Proceedings, Letter from Commissioner and Superintendent Cis -Sutlej States to Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Punjab 2 July 1858, No.167, p.10. N.A.I, New Delhi.*

⁴⁴ *Foreign Political Proceeding, Letter from Chief Commissioner Punjab to Secretary to Government of India, 23July 1858, No. 169, N.A.I, New Delhi.*

⁴⁵ *Foreign Political Proceeding, 5 July 1858, Letter from Secretary, Government of India in Foreign Department to Chief Commissioner of Punjab, File No.169, p.28.*

In the immediate wake of the British success in the mutiny, the three Phulkian Chiefs, namely, the rulers of Patiala, Jind and Nabha were also granted a number of concessions which they had cherished for very long. As discussed above, these included the right to inflict capital punishment. This right had been forfeited from the Chiefs after the first Sikh war. Secondly the government also allowed them some degree of autonomy in relation to the appointment of a council of Regency. It was felt that burden to run the state would be too much for the Phulkian women. The members of the harems were largely uneducated and illiterate. The three Chiefs had the government to exclude women from participating in the affairs of their states. This request of the chiefs was granted. However, a related request of the Chiefs that the complaints from the female relatives and other dependents of the Phulkian Rajas should not be entertained was not acceded to. The most desired of all concessions and privileges solicited in the petition of three Phulkian rulers was the right of adoption in default of a male issue. This right was also granted. All these privileges were confirmed by Governor- General, Canning, in private durbar held at Ambala on January 18, 1860 and a few month later, as desired by the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, sanads of grants of territories and special concessions were given to them.⁴⁶

Apart from the three Chiefs the Government gave suitable rewards to the numerous smaller Sikh Chiefs and *Jagirdars* in the Cis-Sutlej who rendered useful and loyal services to government during the mutiny. The titles and honors of Faridkot Raja, who had zealously helped the Ferozpur authorities in suppressing local mutinies, were increased. Moreover, he was also relieved from feudal obligation of making his contingent available to the Ferozpur district authorities. The Sikh *Jagirdars* of the Cis-Sutlej had most willingly provided men for various police duties during the mutiny and therefore government, in acknowledgement of their services, remitted the assessed land rent for that year and permanently reduced the assessment to one half.⁴⁷

In return of the services rendered by him honorary additions were made to the titles of Raja Wajir Singh. On the 21st April 1863 the Sanad (XLI) was conferred upon the Raja. The Sanad was similar to the Sanads conferred on the Maharaja of Patiala and the Rajas of Jind and

⁴⁶ *East Punjab Government Civil Secretariat, Ambala Division, Military Department, File No 2, Rewards for service during mutiny, p.5, H.S.A.P.*

⁴⁷ Cave-Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol II, pp. 245-247.

Nabha. However, it differed from them in the sense that the Sanad did not confer any new rights or privileges on the Raja. The right of adoption was conceded to him by the Sanad.⁴⁸

Raja Wazir Singh Died in April 1874 and was succeeded by his only son Bikram Singh. Bikram Singh was thirty year of age. In the Afghan war of 1878 the Raja placed his troops at the disposal of the British Government and they were employed in the Kuram Valley. In 1884 the Raja ceded to the British Government full jurisdiction over the lands in his territory occupied by the Rewari- Ferozpur Railway. In 1886 a postal convention was concluded with the British Government similar to that made with Patiala. No contingents were to be furnished for general service and no tribute was to be paid by the State to the British Government. Faridkot was placed under the political jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Jalandhar Division.⁴⁹

No.XLI. Sanad granted to Raja Wazir Singh of Faridkot dated 21st April 1863.

Since the establishment of British Supremacy in India Raja Wazir Singh and his ancestors have given proofs of loyalty to the British Government and received rewards in the accession of fresh honor, dignity and territory. More recently the present Chief of Faridkot evinced his adherence to the cause of the British Government during the Mutiny of 1857-58, in consideration of which service the British Government has out of the Royal grace and condescension, remitted the service of ten sowars hitherto furnished by the Raja has added to the forms under which he is officially addressed, has increased the *khillat* to which he is entitled and raised the number of guns by which he is to be saluted to the number of eleven and has graciously acceded to the Raja desire to receive a Sanads or grant under the hand and seal of the Viceroy, confirming and guaranteeing to the Raja and his heirs for ever possession of his ancient hereditary territory as well as the territory acquired by the Raja from the British Government.⁵⁰

Kapurthala – For the meritorious services rendered to the British authorities during the revolt of 1857-58, Raja Randhir Singh of Kapurthala Chief and his brother Kanwar Bikram Singh were also rewarded liberally.

⁴⁸ *Memoranda On Native States in 1909*, Calcutta, 1909, p.375, P.S.A.P.

⁴⁹ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements And Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries* Vol- IX. Calcutta, 1892, pp. 64-65.

⁵⁰ Cited in *Ibid*, No.XLI. Sanad granted to Raja Wazir Singh of Faridkot dated 21st April 1863, p. 106.

On year's tribute of the Raja was entirely remitted. Moreover, for the future his annual tribute was reduced by Rs. 25,000. A *khillat* of Rs. 15,000 was also bestowed upon him. A salute of eleven guns was assigned to him and honor title of "Farzand Dilband Rasikh-ul-Itikad" was conferred upon him.⁵¹ For his service in Oudh in 1858, some valuable talukdari lands in that province were conferred upon him. These lands comprised the Bundi and the Bithauli Estates on the Ghagra in Baharich and Barabanki. The revenue of these Estates was Rs. 59,950.⁵² Afterwards he was given the additional titles of 'Daulat-i-Inglishia and 'Raja -i-Rajagan' in respect of his Oudh states.⁵³

On the 17 October 1864 Raja-i-Rajan Randhir Singh was granted the Insignia of the Most Exalted order of the Star of India at an investiture held specially for the purpose which was attended by the Maharaja of Kashmir, Patiala, Jind, Faridkot and other Ruling Chiefs of the Punjab. The Raja-i-Rajan was the first Punjab Prince to receive this badge of honor from Her Majesty the late Queen Victoria. Viceroy Lawrence delivered a speech and acknowledged the great services rendered by Randhir Singh. The Viceroy declared that the raja was held in high esteem by the Imperial Government. In his speech Lord Lawrence said as follows:-⁵⁴

"Raja Randhir Singh of Kapurthala, it is with much satisfaction that I find myself empowered by Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of England to confer on you so great a mark of Her favor as that of the Star of India. This honor has only been granted on personal merit. It rejoices me to install you among the chosen number. Your grandmother, Sardar Fateh Singh was a Chief of considerable renown. He was the well known leader of the Ahluwalia Confederacy and companion in arms of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Your father, Raja Nihal Singh, was an old friend of mine when you were yet a youth. When he passed away, Your Highness succeeded to his duties and responsibilities and has worthily discharged them. When the Mutiny of 1857 broke out you were one of the foremost Chiefs of this country to do your duty and range yourself on the side of the British Government. After the

⁵¹ Government of India to Chief Commissioner of the Punjab 2June 1858, Foreign Department Political Proceeding, 2 July 1858, Nos.191-192, see also Khureeta to Raja of Kapurthala in the Mutiny Report, part II, p.298, N.A.I, New Delhi.

⁵² *Foreign Department Political Proceeding A*, March 1861, Nos.63-64, N.A.I, New Delhi.

⁵³ *Kapurthala State, Its Past and Present* , Kapurthala, 1928, p.12

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.13.

fall of Delhi, Your Highness headed your troops, conducted them to Oudh and there assisted in recovering that Province. For those service you received at the time much praise and liberal rewards and now to crown all, you are about to obtain a most signal mark of honor from Her Majesty the Queen of England and India. In the name, then of the Queen and by Her Majesty's commands I now invest you the honorable Insignia of the Star of India, of which Most Exalted Order Her Majesty's has been graciously pleased to appoint you to be a Knight Grand Commander. I have addressed you in Hindustani, in order that the Princes and Chiefs present may the more readily participate in this ceremony and that your relatives and friends may be more highly gratified otherwise I should have spoken in English, for I know that you thoroughly understand my language. This circumstance, no doubt, has operated as a bond of union between Your Highness and my countrymen."⁵⁵

A garden at Naraingarh, in the Ambala district which had been resumed by the British Government after the confiscation of the Cis- Sutlej estates after the first Anglo Sikh War was also restored to the Raja.⁵⁶

Owing to the 'great and timely' services provided by the Raja of Kapurthala to the British Government during the revolt of 1857, the British rewarded him by setting aside the will of his late father. He was given full authority in the whole of his territory.⁵⁷

Raja Randhir Singh cherished the aspiration of ruling on the estates in Bari Doab which had been resumed by the British on the death of Raja Nihal Singh. He also wanted a grant of full jurisdiction over these estates. The Lieutenant Governor decided to grant his request. However, the Government of India refused to restore the jurisdiction over these estates to the Raja which had been under the British jurisdiction for the last many years.⁵⁸ One of the most important privileges conferred upon the Raja of Kapurthala was the right of adoption granted by the *Sanad* of 5 March 1862. But this privilege was not exceptional because of similar *Sanads* were given to most of the Indian Chiefs in March 1862.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ *Past and Present of Kapurthala State*, Kapurthala, 1928, p. 28.

⁵⁶ C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements And Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries* Vol- IX. Calcutta, 1892, p. 73.

⁵⁷ *Foreign Department Political Consultation*, 15 October 1858, Nos. 459-62, N.A.I, New Delhi.

⁵⁸ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 519-535.

⁵⁹ *Memorial His Highness the Maharaja Kapurthala*, Calcutta, 1893, p.5, N.A.I, New Delhi.

The Governor General also considered that Kanwar Bikram Singh who was the brother of Raja Randhir Singh also deserved reward and therefore directed that the title of 'Bahadur' with a 'Khillut' of investiture worth Rs. 5,000 conferred upon him.⁶⁰

Later, in 1878-79 that state furnished a contingent of 500 infantry, 100 Cavalry and 3 guns, which served during the campaign of that year in Afghanistan. In 1883 an Act of the Legislature, No.X of that year, was passed to confirm and give effect to an award made by the Viceroy and Governor General regarding certain matters in dispute between the Kapurthala State and Sardar Bikram Singh, in connection with a grant of land Oudh received by the Sardar from the British Government in recognition of his service.⁶¹

No.LXXIX, translation of a Sanad granting the estates of Boundi and Bithowlee to Raja Ranbir Singh Bahadur of Kapurthala, 15th April 1859.

Whereas it appears from the report of the Chief Commissioner of Oudh that during the disturbance Raja Ranbir Singh Bahdur Ahluwalia from loyalty to the British Government came in person to Lucknow at their head of troops and rendered valuable service, as a mark of satisfaction, I hereby confer upon Raja Randhir Singh Bahadur the Zamindars of Boundi and Bithowlee at half revenue in insurance tenure, on the condition that in time of difficulty and danger the Raja shall render military and political service. It is understood that this grant confers on the Raja only the rights enjoyed by the former proprietors of the above Zamindars and nothing more. A Khillat of the value of The Rupees 10,000 is bestowed upon the Raja.⁶²

Raja Randhir Singh died on the 2nd April 1870. He was on his way to England. After his death he was succeeded by his eldest son, Kharak Singh who was 21 year old. However, soon afterwards the successor exhibited signs of insanity. In 1874 he was termed incapable of looking after the administration. The administration was handed over to a Council composed of the Wazir and the Diwan of the State and an officer in the service of the British Government. This arrangement did not work properly and in 1875 to appoint a British officer was appointed as Superintendent of the State. Kharak Singh died in 1877 and his only son

⁶⁰ Lepel H. Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p.162

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 164-65.

⁶² *Ibid*, p. 169, see also Ambala Division, Military Department, 1862, File No 2, *Rewards services during the Mutiny*, p.4.

when he attained maturity was invested with full power of government on the 24th November 1890.⁶³

All smaller *Jagirdars* or petty Rajas were in possession of the lands at the base of the range of the Himalaya Hills up to the Yamuna. These petty rulers had entered the Malwa region of Punjab from the Majha for conquest and plunder during the declining years of the Mughal Empire. After the British occupation of Punjab, these *Jagirdars* had been paying an assessment of some 12 percent upon their estates. They were never encouraged to build their armies and provide feudal service to the British system. Though individually they were of little importance or power, these chiefs were quite powerful collectively. The British asked them in the end of May to supply contingent in lieu of payment. These *Jagirdars* responded to the call of the British promptly responded and were instrumental in guarding the British against the local population. Thus their services needed to be acknowledged. Thus, the government commended their role and contribution for having at least kept their own estate quiet and as reward remitted the whole assessment for 1857 and granted a permanent reduction of one half. This reward satisfied these Rajas as the Rajas as not played a very active role on behalf of the government.⁶⁴

During the Sepoy rebellion the Sikh Sardar and *Jagirdars* in the trans-Sutlej Punjab had rendered service to Government according to their means. Thus, as stated above they were rewarded with honors and *khillats* or cash. Moreover, the government also extended generous land grants to Sikh officers when their services were terminated. Through this liberal policy of the British, the economic status of several aristocratic Sikh families in the Punjab was further improved. Punjab Singh, for example was a cavalry officer who earned distinction for bravery during the Delhi and Oudh Campaigns. He was granted an estate valued at four thousand rupees per annum and an additional 700 acres in Amritsar district.⁶⁵ Sardar Nand Singh and Makhan Singh, who came to the aid of the British in 1857 as personal advisers of the Chief Commissioner, received a grant of two villages in the Punjab.⁶⁶ Sardar

⁶³ *Past and Present of Kapurthala State*, p. 49, see also *Memorial of His Highness the Maharaja of Kapurthala to The Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State For India In Council*, Calcutta, 1868, p. 5.

⁶⁴ Rev.J. Cave Browne, *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol II,p.247, see also Colonel G.B. Malleon, *An Historical Sketch of The Native States of India*, Longmans Green, London, 1875, p. 345.

⁶⁵ *Gazetteer of the Gujranwala District*, 1883-84, Punjab Government, Lahore, 1884, pp. 40.

⁶⁶ *Gazetteer of the Amritsar District*, 1883-84, Punjab Government , Lahore, 1884, p. 28.

Nihal Singh Chachi , according to whose advice John Lawrence decided to recruit old Sikhs and who fought valiantly against the Mohammedan rebels of Gogaira, received a *Jagir* of six thousand rupees.⁶⁷ Another cavalry officer, Sardar Bishan Singh, renowned for his intrepid disposition was given a village as *jagir* in Gujarat district. He also received further land grants in Jhelum district.⁶⁸ Hira Singh of Talwandi performed duty as a cavalry officer was given a grant of 50 acres near Nurpur in Kangra district.⁶⁹ There were many other Sikh aristocrats whose loyalty and services during the mutiny were recognized by the British authorities. *Sanads* granting the right of adoption were also given to Sardar Shamsheer Singh, Sandhanwalia and Raja Tej Singh. Raja Tej Singh died in December 1862 and was succeeded by his adopted son, Raja Harbans Singh, who has also died, and was succeeded by his adopted son, Sardar Bakhishish Singh.⁷⁰

There were some Sikh families that had opposed the British in the Second Sikh War. However, as they showed loyalty towards the the Government during the Sepoy rebellion they were also liberally rewarded. For example, the Nalwa family of Gujranwala district had lost its land after annexation of Punjab in 1849 but as a reward for the loyalty shown by Sardar Jawahir Singh during the crisis in 1857 the British restored the Nalwa family to prominence among the Sikh Aristocracy. Jawahir Singh was the son of the Sikh general Hari Singh Nalwa.⁷¹ The *Jagir* of the Cheema family of Amritsar had also been forfeited in 1849. The *Jagir* was restored to Sardar Jai Singh and Hardit Singh, because in 1857 both brothers served the British as cavalry officers.⁷² Raja Surat Singh Majithia, who was expelled and sent to Benares after the annexation also exhibited loyalty to Government and rendered service during revolt of 1857 Hindustan, was granted a valuable *Jagir*, in 1861. He was also allowed to return to the Punjab.⁷³ One of the surviving Sardar of Attari, Gulab Singh, who was removed to Bengal after the second Sikh War, also performed eminent service during the

⁶⁷ *District and State Gazetteers of the Undivided Punjab*, Vol. IV, S.R. Publication, Delhi, 1985, p. 319.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.320.

⁶⁹ *Gazetteer of the Gurdaspur District*, 1883-84, Punjab Government, Lahore, 1884, p. 40.

⁷⁰ Trans-Sutlej Jagirdars with Adoption Sands, C.U. Aitchison , *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries*. Vol. IX, Calcutta 1892.p 168.

⁷¹ *Gazetteer of the Gujrawala district* 1883-84, p. 15.

⁷² *Gazetteer of the Amritsar District*, 1883-84, p. 28.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

Mutiny. He performed service as Captain in the British army. In recognition of his royalty and able services a generous *Jagir* was bestowed upon him and like Surat Sing Majithia he was also permitted to return to the Punjab.⁷⁴ The policy of doling out liberal land grants adopted by the British had the effect of resurrecting the social and economic status of many Sikh families that had slipped into obscurity because they had opposed in the Sikh War of 1848-49.

The approach of the Government leading to the welfare and prosperity of the Sardar and *Jagirdars* was a manifestation of the new outlook of the authorities towards the Sikh aristocracy. Government had learned a few lessons from the sepoy rebellion. There was a realization that its policy of suppression and forfeiture which was adopted by the earlier civil servants under John Lawrence was a flawed policy. The Mutiny of 1857 had established the fact that the Sardar and *Jagirdars* could act as an important asset and support for the British. The British were clearly mistaken in ignoring and punishing the Sardar and seeking the help of the lower classes. This had become apparent to local authorities during the mutiny. The leadership and loyalty exhibited by leadership and loyalty exhibited by the leading Sikh families during the crisis of 1857 were instrumental in transforming the orientation of the Government. The new policy was formulated around the need to preserve and nourish the aristocratic Sikh Class⁷⁵ The wisdom of Canning's policy of attaching the Sikh aristocracy to government through honors and patronage met with full support of the Home Government. These sentiments found a clear expression in the words of the secretary of state for India, Wood, on his visit to Punjab: "We reduce the natural gentry and persons of hereditary and family influence, to raise the moneylenders and traders. The latter cannot help us. The former are all indifferent if not against us. We must endeavour to enlist on our side the classes naturally possessing influence in the country. You may be assured therefore of my support."⁷⁶

Canning was also fortunate in that the administration of the Punjab was headed at this time by a distinguished civil officer, Montgomery. Montgomery was strongly in favor of extending patronage to the Sikh aristocracy. Montgomery was the judicial Commissioner in the Lawrence administration and replaced John Lawrence as Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab in January 1859. He was a strong supporter of Canning's liberal policy towards the

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 30.

⁷⁵ *Mutiny Records* correspondence, Lahore, 1911, p. 128.

⁷⁶ Earl Canning, *Rulers of India*, Oxford, 1891, p.196.

Sikh aristocracies. Montgomery was convinced that the native aristocracy could act as an important link between foreign rule and the immense population of Punjab. Montgomery could see that Canning's new policy was highly expedient. Montgomery carried it out with genuine devotion and commitment. In the new situation Dalhousie was John Lawrence as a person who was a faithful and able executor of his policy of weakening the Sikh aristocracy; Canning discovered in Montgomery an efficient subordinate to enforce in the Punjab his post- mutiny policy of rehabilitating and upholding the Sikh Aristocracy.⁷⁷

It can indeed be said that at a pragmatic level Canning's policy of conferring special honors and rewards on the Sikh Chiefs and Sardar was the right policy for the British. The inordinate desire of the Sikh gentry for honors continued to rise even after Canning. So the British exploited this fact to their full political advantage. They organized ceremonial durbars, by appointing Sikh leaders to the Legislative Council of India set up in 1861. The British kept making additions to the salutes and titles of the Sikh princes and by conferring prestigious honors and titles like the star of India on the Princes. The honors and titles of the second and third order were conferred on the Sardar and *Jagirdars*. It is evident that these honors and titles were valued by the Sikh gentry. They acted as testimony that the government was interested in their welfare. Moreover, they always coveted these honors. They were always desirous of getting new honors and they remained loyal towards the Government during time of emergency. Especially during last two decades of the 19th Century the Government faced challenges on the North West Frontier from Pathan tribes like the Madda Khels. During such crisis the Sikh Princes and Sardar demonstrated their willingness to serve the crown in the hope of securing rewards and honors. During these frontier disturbances the Imperial service troops of the Sikh princes proved extremely useful to Government and in recognition of the loyal services of the Sikh princes it bestowed special honors on them.⁷⁸

Apart from enacting the policy of giving rewards for special services during periods of emergency the British also began to take a keen interest in the financial and educational health of the loyal Sikh aristocracy. During the post –mutiny years the Sikh aristocratic families depended extensively on patronage and assistance of the district officers and political agents.⁷⁹ For the purpose of educating the princes and the landed aristocracy and training

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 202-203.

⁷⁸ *The Tribune*, 15 November 1898.

⁷⁹ Joginder Singh, *Sikh Leadership*, Amritsar, 1999, p. 24.

them for leadership the Aitcheson Chiefs College was founded in 1885 at Lahore. These measures no doubt stabilized and gratefully served as great bulwark of the crown to the last day of its rule in India. Canning's political wisdom was thus evident in his vision that the British would be at a great advantage if they followed a policy of attaching to the crown the traditional leaders of the Punjabis.

Government also rewarded the loyalty of the Sikhs during the sepoy rebellion of 1857 by reserving a very generous share of employment for them in the Police, Civil and Revenue Department of the Punjab. During the pre Mutiny years the non Punjabis had enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the junior administrative jobs in the Punjab. There was resentment in the Sikhs about this. The Mutiny however, turned the situation in the favor of the Sikhs. A large number of apostate non-Punjabis were removed from the department of the Punjab administration. This suddenly created new opportunities of employment for the Sikhs. The joining of Haryana and Delhi to the Punjab in the late 1858 widened this scope further. As a result of the altered circumstances the Sikhs found now employment opportunities in the Civil services, especially in the police departments, of other provinces as well. Within in few years of the sepoy mutiny it was common to find the Sikhs in the civil police of India's distant and off-shore administrative unit of the Andaman Islands.⁸⁰ The opportunities for employment in the Civil service also contributed during the course of the last half of the 19th century to the prosperity and preservation of the separate identity of the Sikhs.

It was in this context that Sikh Chiefs and Sardar had to aggressive policies of new rulers. The uprising of 1857 gave an opportunity to them to retrieve their old position. Sardar Raja Singh Majithia, Sardar Ajit Singh Attariwala and Sardar Baksheesh Singh Sandhanwalia, organized their militia and put it at the disposal of local officials. On the recommendation of his subordinates, the then Commissioner recognized their 'valuable service' and gave them '*sanads*' of appreciation, 'inams' and titles. Subsequently, the then Lieutenant Governor under the revised policy of the Raj, appointed them as Honorary Magistrates, Extra-Assistant Commissioners and provincial Darbari. However several members of the landed aristocracy were not lucky enough to consolidate their respective estates. Their untimely death left their minor successors in a state of uncertainty and financial crisis. Recognizing their political relevance, the colonial officials came to their rescue. The

⁸⁰ *The Tribune*, Thursday 15 August, 1912.

institution of court of Wards took over the management of family estates of Sunder Singh Majithia, Arur Singh and Bedis Gurbakhsh Singh and Harbans Singh. These and several other families were resurrected in late nineteenth and early twentieth century's.⁸¹

Under the title of Faraand-Arjumand-I-daulat-i-Ingaia Brar-bans, Shrimore Raja Bharpur Singh Balvinder Bahadur rendered and displayed worthy and conspicuous services. His service to the crown clearly surpassed his previous achievements. Therefore, in recognition of such services, the British government, by way of royal favor and Kindness, conferred on the Raja Sahib Malvinder Bahadur some territory and additional title for perpetuity. The Raja Sahib Bahadur had applied for renewal of the *Sanad* regarding his ancestral territory as well as in relation to the territory granted to him by the powerful government. In response to this request the Viceroy and Governor General approved the grant of the *Sanad* by way of treaty with conditions given below;- "According to the list annexed to this *Sanad* the Raja Sahib Bahadur and his successors will , in the present and future time, exercise sovereignty, with peace in mind and in perfect security, in accordance with ancient custom, over his ancestral territory with all powers and rights, internal and external." ⁸²

Thus, it can be said that the loyalty of the Punjabi princes and rich Zamindars was decisive in saving the Punjab and rest of India for the British. They helped to maintain order in the Punjab, kept the roads leading to Delhi open for movement of troops, armies and treasuries and supplied money, men and munitions to the British.⁸³

Of all the Punjabis, the role of the Sikhs in suppressing the uprising was the most significant. Sikh soldiers defended English establishments and families in places such as Allahabad Benares, Lucknow, Kanpur, Arrah and other centre of the revolt. The Meerut and Delhi mutineers had proclaimed the restoration of Mughal rule. In a historical sense the Sikhs were antagonistic to the Mughals as they had been brought up on tales of Mughal atrocities against their forefathers. The British exploited the anti Mughal sentiment of the Sikhs. A new version of sau sakhi prophesying a joint Anglo Sikh conquest of Delhi was circulated. Thus due to such reasons the Sikhs eagerly joined the Company's forces marching towards Delhi.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Joginder Singh, *Sikh Leadership* , Amritsar, 1999, p. 21.

⁸² *Truth about Nabha* , 1924 , Amritsar, 1990, pp. 29.

⁸³ Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs* , p. 102.

⁸⁴ Bosworth Smith, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, p. 53.

As brought out above the Sikh were handsomely rewarded for their services with grants of territory and palatial residence, honors and titles.⁸⁵

The rewards conferred by Government upon the Sikhs did not fall short of their expectations. As a martial community the Sikhs always had strong instinct for self – preservation. After 1857 the British had learnt to trust the Sikhs. The Sikh princes were rewarded with many honors and generous accretion to their principalities, through liberal land and the *Jagirdars* were once again elevated in society and those Sikh families which were ruined by annexation were rehabilitated. As in the days of the Sikh kingdom the Khalsa again became the unrivalled contender for the honors of the soldiering profession. The Sikh hakims (civil officials) came to occupy important positions as became *kotwals* and *tahsildars*. The land grants in the largest canal colony gave a renewed vigour to the Sikh Community whose consciousness of its distinct identity through an ambitious literary and educational also received moral and financial help from the crown. But all this may be summed up by saying that efforts of the crown during the post-mutiny years to safeguard and promote the vital interests of the Sikhs can be understood as the reward that it gave to the Sikhs for their loyalty and sacrifices during the Sepoy mutiny.

By way of conclusion it can be said that the association of the most prominent Sikh leaders with the British during the mutiny of 1857 was a strategic decision in the light of the altered circumstances in the state of Punjab after the end of the rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. The Sikh leaders had to weigh the advantages in the context of the declining and debilitated Mughals on the one hand and the powerful British on the other. The support to the British during the biggest challenge to the British power was instrumental in restoring the community in terms of their economic and social status; as they were restored to their socially prestigious positions through liberal grants of land, property, estates in addition to honors and titles.

⁸⁵ Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol II, p.110.

CHAPTER-VI

CONCLUSION

In the dynastic History of Sikh States the erstwhile Princely States of Patiala, Nabha and Jind were collectively known as the Phulkian State after the name of their common ancestor, Phul. The fourth period of the history of his Phulkian House is connected with the Chiefs of Khiwa Rao had no issue from his Rajput wife. He married a second wife, the daughter of Basera a Jat Zamindar of Neli. From this marriage a male child named Sidhu was born. It was from this child that the Sidhu tribe derived its name. Sidhu, who according to the Rajput custom, was made to owe allegiance to the caste of his mother was a Jat. He had four sons from whom the family of Kathial and Phulkian Chiefs descended. Brar Rao, fourth in descent from Sidhu, was a powerful Chief of the Jat clan. He was succeeded by six sons of whom the most notable were Dul and Paur. The members of the Faridkot House were the direct descendents of Dul and from Paur descended the House of Phulkian States. After this the Chiefs of these houses came to be known as the Sidhu Jat Clan of the Jats. After the tenth descendent of the tribal Chief Paur Rup Chand rose to the position of the Chief. He had two sons, Phul and Sanadali. It is said that Phul and Sandali ,along with their uncle Kala visited Guru Har Rai (Six Guru of Sikh) at Gursur. In the presence of Guru, the young Phul patted his stomach. When the Guru asked the reason, Kala told him that he did so when he felt hungry. The guru is said to have blessed Phul by saying. “What matters the hunger of one belly, Phul would satisfy the hunger of thousands. The horses of Phul's successor would drink water from Jamuna and their raj would extend to it.” The prophecy came out to be true. Taken as a whole, the fourth period of the Phulkian clan comprised twenty generations commencing with Sidhu and terminating with Rao Rup Chand, the father of Phul. It coincides with the period which intervened between the end of Ala –Ud-Din Khalji's reign and middle of the reign of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan. The appellation or name of the dynasty Phulkian House is derived from Chaudhury Phul. This dynasty ruled over the States of Patiala, Nabha and Jind. Phul was born in 1619. Phul had six sons. From the eldest, Tiloka, descended the family of Nabha and Jind and from the second son, Rama, the family of Patiala. In later years this family came to be bound with the sacred history or Sikhism when in 1696 A.D. Guru Gobind, The

Tenth Guru and the founder of Khalsa, called upon Tiloka and Rama to bring their followers to fight against the hill Chiefs who were troubling the Guru at Anandpur. Baba Ala Singh was the grandson of Phul and son of Chaudhury Ram Singh. He assumed the leadership in 1714 after the death of his father. By the middle of the eighteenth century, he became the undisputed master of the entire region between Barnala and Patiala. Ala Singh died on 22nd August 1765 and was succeeded by his grandson Amar Singh.

On the death of Tailok Singh who was the eldest son of Chaudhari Phul Singh, his territory was divided between his sons, Gurdit Singh and Sukhchain Singh. Gurdit Singh's descendents founded the Nabha State. Hamir Singh was the real founder of the Nabha State. He founded the town of Nabha in 1755 A.D. which became the headquarters of the State. This was followed by the conquest of Bhadson in 1759.A.D. Jaswant Singh 1783-1840 succeeded his father Hamir Singh in December 1783. His step mother Rani Desu, became his guardian and regent because he was only eight year old at that time. She managed the affairs of the State quite successfully till her death in 1790. After her death Jaswant Rai assumed the reins government and took the overall control of the state in his own hands.

Tilok Singh, the eldest son of Chaudhri Phul Singh, had two sons , Gurdit Singh and Sukhchain Singh. The son of Sukhchain was Gajpat Singh (1763-1786) who was the founder of the Jind State. He made Jind his headquarters and also built a large brick fort there. In 1772, Emperor Shah Alam conferred the title of Raja on him through a Royal decree. From this time Gajpat Singh ruled as an independent Prince and coined money in his own name. He was an intrepid ruler and brave warrior. Raja Gajpat Singh died in 1786. He was succeeded by his son Bhag Singh (1786-1819). He was first of the Cis Sutlej Princes to seek an alliance with the British Government in 1803.

Kapurthala is said to have been founded by Rana Kapur, a Rajput immigrant from Jaisalmer, about the time of the invasions of India by Mahmud Ghazni, at the beginning of eleventh century. In fact, the traditions of almost every Jat tribe in the Punjab point to a Rajput descent. It is possible that Jats and Rajputs had probably a common origin. The Kapurthala state entered into relations with the British during the first decade of the nineteenth century. At that time Fateh Singh Ahluwalia (1801-37)

was the Chief of the State. In 1806, Fateh Singh and Ranjit Singh also entered into joint treaty with the British.

The Faridkot family had its provenance in the same lineage as the Phulkian Chiefs. They had a common ancestor in Brar who lived almost twelve generations before Phul. The Faridkot dynasty was founded during the reign of Akbar by Bhallan, who was appointed *Chaudhri* of the Brar Jat tribe by the Mughal Government. He subjugated the neighboring villages of Kotkapura Faridkot, Mari, Mudki and Mukstar. He died issueless and was succeeded by his nephew Kapura in 1643. Sardar Hamir Singh was first independent Chief of Faridkot. His brother, Jodh Singh erected a new fort at Kotkapura in 1766 and almost rebuilt the town. However, his oppression was so great that the inhabitants abandoned the city and the artisans, who had been renowned for their skill and industry, emigrated to Lahore, Amritsar and Patiala.

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promise that they would not indulge in any operations against the English. Thus, during this period there was a counterbalance of the British dictated by their self interest, and the campaigns of annexation carried out by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the year January 1809.

The establishment of the British power in the Cis- Sutlej States commenced from the treaty with Ranjit Singh on 25 April 1809. Through the articles of the treaty Maharaja Ranjit Singh engaged neither to commit nor suffer any encroachments on the possession or right of the Chiefs on the left bank of Sutlej. On the 3 May 1809 a Proclamation was issued extending the protection of the British Government to the Chief of Sirhind and *Malwa* without demand of tribute requiring service in time of war. The proclamation defined the relation of the protected States to the British Government in very general terms.

Maharaja Sahib Singh of Patiala died in 1813 and was succeeded by Maharaja Karam Singh who had greatly distinguished himself by his whole hearted and unswerving support to the British Arms in several expeditions. In 1814, the Gurkhas of Nepal encroached upon the British territory and when war was declared against them, Maharaja Karam Singh sent strong detachment of the State forces to serve in the Army led by Colonel Ochterlony. At the close of the war in recognition of his services, the British Government awarded 16 paragana in the Simla hill on the payment of a *nazrana* of Rs. 2, 80,000 to Maharajas Karam Singh of Patiala. The Gurkhas had become a source of trouble both to the British Government and at the Patiala State. It was due to the action of the Patiala forces that the British Villages of Mandali and Bharowali, which had earlier been seized by the Gurkhas were taken.

Raja Bhag Singh (1786-1819) died in 1819 and was succeeded by his son Fateh Singh. Raja Fateh Singh was an ambitious man, but his period is very uneventful as he ruled for a very short period of three years. He died on 3 February, 1822 at the age of thirty three, leaving only son Sangat Singh who succeeded to the office. The installation ceremony of Sangat Singh was performed on 30th July 1822 at Jind. His mother Sahib Kaur was appointed to work as Regent for him. In February 1826 A.D., Raja Sangat Singh paid a visit to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In 1827 A.D,

Maharaja Ranjit Singh bestowed on him the grants of Antiana state. It was, however, decided by the Britishers that the states under the British should be directed to abstain from maintaining any connection or entering into any dialogue with Maharaja Ranjit Singh without a prior intimation to them or without their sanction. Raja Sangat Singh wanted to maintain good relations with Maharaja Ranjit Singh as had been done by his father Raja Bhag Singh. As such he did not pay any heed or adhere to the advice of the British. He had plans to visit Lahore Darbar again in 1834 without obtaining sanction from the British agent at Delhi. On learning about his intention the British became annoyed. But before some action could be taken against him, the Raja fell ill at Bassian on 3 November 1834 and died the same day. Raja Sarup Singh the second cousin of Raja Sangat Singh was accepted as the legal heir to the office by the Britishers. Accordingly, he succeeded to the *gaddi* or throne of Jind. When the second Sikh War broke out, Raja Sarup Singh of Jind was once again anxious to prove his fidelity to the Government and offered to lead his troops in person to Lahore. After the annexation of the Punjab. The Raja of Jind was one of the few chiefs permitted to retain independent powers. During the Cis-Sutlej expeditions of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1807-08, the Nabha Chief Jaswant Singh remained his firm ally. In 1807, he received a grant of four villages of the Glumgrana estate and the district of Kannah from Ranjit Singh. However, the recurring aggressions of Ranjit Singh beyond Sutlej naturally produced consternation and fear among the Malwa Chiefs and they turned towards the British protection for protection. Jaswant Singh sided with the British when Holkar, the Maratha Chief was being driven northwards to Lahore and aided them with a detachment of riders. Lord Lake, in return for his loyalty, assured him that his possessions would not be curtailed and no demand for tribute would be made on him so long as his disposition towards the British remained unchanged. Raja Jaswant Singh was formally taken under the protection of the British Government in May 1809 A.D., with the other Cis-Sutlej Chiefs.

Position of Kapurthala state became highly precarious because it held territories both in the Cis and Trans Sutlej areas. The position of the state was delicate as the former territories of the Cis were under the sphere of the British influence and later under that of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. As such, the Kapurthala Chief had often to perform a balancing act. On a few occasions, however, the Raja of Kapurthala Fateh

Singh, was brought into direct confrontation with the British Government. In 1825, the relations of Maharaja Ranjit Singh Fateh Singh became strained to such an extent that there was a possibility of confrontation between the two. In the last week of December 1825, the Ahluwalia Chief was alarmed by the rumours that two battalions of the Lahore Army were advancing towards his territory. So he fled across the river Sutlej with the whole of his family and took refuge at Jagraon. Fateh Singh also sent confidential messages to seek British protection. The British authorities found it impossible to extend protection to the Kapurthala Chief in respect of his Trans Sutlej possessions, as under the Treaty of 1809 they had given the commitment that they would not interfere with Maharaja Ranjit Singh's possessions north of the Sutlej. Fateh Singh had an expectation that the British Government would interfere in this matter in his favor. Although the British Government declined active interference, yet they expressed sympathy with the Sardar. After this Fateh Singh returned to the Jalandhar Doab and then lived at Kapurthala in peace and died in October 1837. The First Anglo Sikh War broke out in 1845. All Sikh Chiefs did not prove faithful towards the British.

When the British Government demanded from Maharaja Ranjit Singh the restitution of all his conquests on the left bank of the Sutlej made during 1808-1809, he showed great reluctance to surrender Faridkot. He claimed that he had a special right firstly as Faridkot was a dependency of Kot Kapura which he had previously conquered. Secondly, he claimed that the owners had made a promise when it was besieged in 1807, that they would within one month, put themselves under his authority and that should they fail to do so, they would consent to undergo any punishment which he might think fit to impose upon them. As far as the first claim was concerned, it was clear that no right could be maintained on account of any connection between Kot Kapura and Faridkot. Ever since the division of the territory among the sons of Sukia, Faridkot had been independent, more powerful than Kot Kapura and in no way subject to it. Even had there been any connection such as that alleged, still it was well known that the Maharaja had seized Kot Kapura, before he had requested the assent of the British Government to the extension of his conquests beyond the Sutlej.

In the revolt of 1857 the main actors were the sepoys. They formed an overwhelming majority of the British Army in those times. The British troops were only a small percentage of the British Army India. The defense of the Indian Empire

was the collective responsibility of both the Native and British forces. The British Branch of the Indian army consisted of a part of the Queen's Army and of additional British troops, recruited by the English East Company on its own. Between 1842 and 1845 the East Indian Company recruited a British Army of 4333 soldiers for service in India. These soldiers were recruited from London, Liverpool, Dublin, Cork and Edinburgh. Out of the entire British Army recruited like this British or White Army London alone supplied 52 percent of the recruits. The company also maintained a native army for each of three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. Thus it is immensely important fact related to the composition of the British army that the native troops outnumbered the Europeans. The fall of Delhi at the hands of the Meerut sepoys led to a great rebellion all over the Northern India. An important aspect of the political situation of this time was that in this crisis, it is generally believed that the Punjab alone was peaceful. Most of the rulers of Punjab remained faithful to the British. At the same time he had the support and loyalty of the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs of princely states like Patiala, Jind Nabha, Karnal. it soon became clear that the Bengal Sepoys were not a very big challenge as a large number of them were removed from the force under various pretexts. It was quite strange that the British who had conquered Punjab only eight years before this major political crisis found supporters and loyalists only in the Punjab. The support of the rulers of Punjab was very crucial for the British. It can be said that throughout the campaign against the mutiny the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the charge of contingents provided by the Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States. Their troops protected British stations and patrolled the grand trunk road from Ferozpur and Phillor till the boundary of Delhi. The safety of this province was almost completely dependent on the loyalty of the Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States. On the other hand, the troops of the Maharaja of Patiala guarded Thanesar and Ambala and the safety of Ludhiana was entrusted to the Raja of Nabha and the Kotila Nawab. Thus it can be said that services provided by the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs form an important part of the history of the British campaign against the mutiny in Meerut. In this context, It was a time when there was no assistance from either the Ganga Doab or the Delhi territory. Captain Briggs also expressed acknowledgement and obligation to the Civil authorities of the Cis Sutlej States who gave the utmost support to British Government. In the light of the immense importance of the support of the Cis Sutlej States Mr. Forsyth wrote to the Maharaja of Patiala and Rajas of Nabha and Jind in order to summon them. It was very

important for the British to secure of the grand trunk road and the loyalty of the native Chiefs was the necessary for saving the treasuries from mutiny. The British treasures were under the sepoy guards at the time of the outbreak of the mutiny. In the western division 157 extra men were entertained in the police establishment and the feudal Chiefs provided help in the form of 200 horsemen and 40 foot soldiers. When the news about the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut reached Patiala, the Maharaja placed himself at the head of all his available troops and marched the same night to Jesomli a village close to Ambala. He sent his elephants, camels and other carriage to Kalka for the transport of European troops to Ambala from the hill stations of Kasuali Dagshai and Sabathu. From Jesomli he marched to Thanesar and placed there a force of 1300 men with four guns for the protection of district. his straightforward and loyal conduct was of infinite importance to our cause at that time. The minds of the common people were greatly agitated and disturbed because of the various rumors about the cartridges, about the adulteration of flour and other subtle designs of the British to desecrate the purity of their caste. When the Maharaja of Patiala, placed himself at the head of his forces on the side of the British, the reports began to be discredited. The Maharaja was quite orthodox and enjoyed the trust of the people. His support at the time of the crisis was of unmatched important to the English troops as it played an important role in pacifying the people. Thanesar, Karnal and the station of Ambala were held by Patiala troops who also guarded the Grand Trunk Road from Karnal to Phillor. The Maharaja constantly expressed his wish to lead the contingent to Delhi but he was dissuaded from doing so by both the Commander-in-Chief and the Civil Authorities. Patiala forces remained engaged in carrying out reconnaissance of the surrounding Country with small mounted detachments. Besides the Thanesar region the Patiala state played an important role in helping the British at other places like Bathinda and Ferozpur. Colonel Daya Singh, commandant 3rd Cavalry Regiment was deputed by the Patiala State to take the command of troops at Bathinda and to enlist soldiers in accordance with the needs of the emerging situation. It is significant to note that help of the Patiala Forces was also sought by the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozpur in order to quell disturbance at Jaito and Dabrikhana. However, on the 10th June the cavalry stationed at Ferozpur mutinied. Once again the help of the Patiala forces was sought. The Patiala detachment at Ferozpur had an encounter with some insurgents and mutineers. Several men of the Patiala force were killed and wounded in this encounter. On the 5 of June 1857 Resaldar Dal Singh proceeded from Patiala to

Hissar district in order to crush the mutiny in Hissar and deal with the insurgents there. . On reaching Tohana the forces were successful in quelling the revolt taking place there in the span of a day. the forces were successful in bringing the disturbances to an end and in restoring peace besides securing the safety of the lives and property of the common people. Under Maharaja Bhag Singh a small but less organized force was being maintained by Jind State. Maharaja Bhag Singh of Jind State was one of the foremost of those who offered their allegiance to the British Government and joined lord Lake in his pursuit of Jawant Rao Holkar in 1805. Jind forces earned praise from lord Lake for coming to the help of the British during the first major insurrection against the British Empire. Raja of Kapurthala received the information of the outbreak at Delhi and Meerut. He also marched towards Jalandhar with every available soldier at his disposal. He was also accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and his Chief advisors. He remained at Jalandhar at the head of his troops throughout the summer seasons. His loyalty to the British can also be judged from the fact that he relinquished the comforts of his palace life at Kapurthala and stayed at Jalandhar. His troops guarded the Civil Station of Jalandhar as well as the Jail and Civil Treasury. Mr. Barnes exercised an extraordinary influence with the native Chiefs. as it was mainly a sepoy mutiny they did not receive active support of the community. The whole native community consisting of traders, artisans and government employees remained aloof and non committal. No help no and supplies were provided by anyone. The Punjab Army had its Artillery branch which was mainly composed of Sikhs, Punjabi Muhammadans and a few Hindustani. The Sikhs recruits came from Amritsar and Cis-Sutlej states. The Muhammadans of the Punjab Artillery were recruited from the Jhelum area, Lahore, Rawlpandi and Jullundur while the Hindustani sepoys were enlisted mainly from Oudh. This testimony of the contribution of the Indian soldiers is of great historical importance as points to the fact that the British would have been unable to deal with the mutiny if the native princes and their armies did not support them. In acknowledgement of their services Maharaja of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot, Kapurthala, Karnal were rewarded and were conferred with titles. Along with rewards, the principle of compensation for the plundered and destroyed property was also introduced. Finally, the Punjab government dealt with the mutineers in a stringent manner. They were disbanded and sent off to their own homes. The rebellion was completely quelled in Punjab and

approximately 15,000 soldiers were killed in the political disturbance caused by the mutiny.

The policy of the British towards the native states constitutes one of the most important chapters of their imperial strategy in India. It is clear that the British as part of their policy allowed these states to retain as distinct political entity.. By the time Lord Dalhousie abdicated the office of the Viceroy, the British Dominion in India had reached its logical limits. The British carved out an empire unparalleled in its geographical dimensions, wealth and resources. This ushered in an era of the hegemony of the British all over the world. This extraordinary phenomenon of British expansion unfolded in three phases. In its first phase, the East India Company entered into armed conflict with its European rivals. In the second phase the East India Company established its trade monopoly and established political supremacy in India. In the third phase, which began with the battle of Plassey the Company blended commerce with conquest and in both achieved unprecedented success. It gained a vast territory endowed with abundant natural resources and inhabited by teeming millions of patient, hardworking and docile peasants and artisans. It is evident that Bengal was among the first regions to come under British control. The early conquests also prepared the ground for more investment in the lucrative overseas trade. The early conquests also prepared the ground for more investment in the lucrative overseas trade. the Company gave up its exclusively commercial character and compensated itself by further expansion of its dominions through establishment of political domination. the attraction of political dominion was irresistible for the British. They realized that the native rulers were no match for them and they could acquire new territories with ease. This acted as an incentive to bring more and more of the fertile Indian territories under British rule. Thus under a long drawn process aggressive wars were waged by Lords Hasting, Ellenborough and Dalhousie. Most of the times, the mismanagement and primitiveness of the native rulers acted as the justification of the annexation. the desire for more and more territories overlapped with the lust for revenue as well as the need for security. the British policy of expansionism was equally propelled by the consciousness of the weakness of the native rulers and princes and the flaws of feudalistic regimes.

However, Lord Dalhousie faced serious difficulty due to the ineptitude and the inability of Sir Henry Lawrence to implement the Governor General's orders. It is

evident that Lord Dalhousie was not content with disarming the common people and raising a frontier force. Rather, he was determined that the local Chiefs of the Punjab should be effectively deprived of the power and should be made incapable of doing any mischief. Most of these chiefs had their lands and fiefdoms from the previous Sikh Government on condition of rendering military service under a feudal dispensation. Thus, these rulers could not expect a sympathetic attitude from the British powers. They had fought the British fiercely with the help of means and the resources placed by the native government at their disposal. While Lord Dalhousie did give rewards to individuals on personal merit or for showing loyalty. However, he destroyed the entire class of the chiefs who acted as the support system for the Sikh rulers of Punjab. The British had learnt important lessons from the first and the second Anglo Sikh wars. Mainly the mutiny of 1857 the Punjab could be crushed and the native British troops stationed in Punjab could be used for the Siege of Delhi because the powerful Sikh Chiefs who had fought against the British in 1848 had been completely decimated by Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie clearly foresaw that the Punjab under annexation would not be entirely secure without ensuring the Sikh artillery was impaired and debilitated. Thus, Lord Dalhousie insisted upon the absolute dismemberment of the Sikh Confederacy. While the chiefs were disarmed they were not deprived of their life and property as this would lead to social instability. Thus, it can be said that Punjab was both safe and supportive of the British during the Mutiny, it was because the policy adopted by Lord Dalhousie had a balance of firmness tempered by consideration and rigorously enforced curtailment of power by Lord Dalhousie. The annexations significantly enhanced the revenues of the Company. The Punjab was first province of the British in India in which the Non Regulation System was practiced. This system was specifically aimed at providing a cheap and efficient administrative mechanism. Such a mechanism would accelerate economic and social development in order to make the province a source of revenue generation. Besides this, this administrative mechanism offered a very simple and uncomplicated way of governance suitable for the socio economic conditions prevailing in the Punjab. This mechanism was also aimed at hastening the transformation which the province was destined to undergo. Besides it guaranteed the personal control of the Governor General over the province as it was based on a closely centralized administrative hierarchy. Historical evidence suggests that the relation of the Cis Sutlej states with the British Government had been more and less intimate from the time of the conquest

of Delhi by Lord Lake in 1803. However, the real foundation and basis of the political relation between them was laid on 25 April 1809 when the British Government signed a treaty with Maharaja Ranjit Singh. As per the terms of this treaty of the British Government undertook to abstain from any interference with the territories of Ranjit Singh north of the Sutlej. Moreover, it was by the proclamation of 3rd May 1809 that the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Malerkotla, Faridkot, Kalsia on their own volition and entreaty were taken under the protection under the company against the 'authority and control' of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. This arrangement was to be the basis of the political dynamics of Punjab till the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. During the three years before 1809, Maharaja had led repeated expeditions to the Cis-Sutlej region. As the most powerful sovereign of the times he had posed a serious threat to the existence of these several small Chiefships. It would be impertinent to claim that the Cis- Sutlej Sikhs Chiefs were ignorant of the imperialistic designs of the British. This period that fell between the reign of Wellesley and the reign of Hastings. The reign of Wellesley was also an important period of British expansion in India. The two Governors Generals pursued a 'clearheaded' policy which was quite authoritarian. They played a significant role in the extension of British supremacy in India. This period was marked by the implementation of a less vigorous and more considerate policy towards the Native States. The British administrators after Wellesley and Hastings applied their energies and efforts towards consolidating the enormous gains which had been acquired by the spirited policy and measures of Wellesley. As a result of this they deliberately avoided any further conquests and annexations. On these grounds it can be said that Minto did not have any plan to extend the western frontier of the British Empire. However, given the stature of Maharaja Ranjit Singh he was definitely conscious of the urgent need to take effective measures for the defense and security of the Empire the other side of the Sutlej. As stated above Ranjit Singh, had been aggressively launching repeated expeditions to the Cis- Sutlej region and there were apprehensions that he might conquer the entire area between the Sutlej and Jumna and emerge as a potential rival in the area contiguous with the British. Apart from the assurance of permanent protection against the impending threat of Ranjit Singh's there were several strategic advantages offered by the alliance between the British and the Cis- Sutlej Chiefships. The British allowed the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs free exercise autonomy and authority within their territories and did not in any way reduce their status as Chiefs. As per the agreement, in return for all

the British protection Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were obliged to provide the British force with supplies of grains and other amenities whenever the British were engaged in general warfare. The chiefs were also bound to allow the European articles intended for the use of army to pass through their territories without any obstruction of levies. The British Army with their forces would have free access to the land and the resources in case of attack from an enemy for the purpose of conquering the country. It was specifically laid down that they would be exempted from the payment of any pecuniary tribute. It is evident that these terms were obviously quite favorable to the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs in comparison to the terms of many previous treaties between the governments of Wellesley before Minto and of the Government of Hastings. It is also significant to note that no treaty or written agreement, based on mutual negotiations, was concluded between the British Government and the individual Cis- Sutlej States. Based on the above facts it can be said that overall the relations of Cis- Sutlej states with the British Government remained cordial from time to time of the conquest of Delhi by Lord Lake in 1803. The internal discords and mutual rivalries among the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were very common and often gave rise to hostilities between them. the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were also accorded protection against mutual usurpations. As per this proclamation it was decreed that if Chiefs encroached upon the estate of one another, the British Government would intervene and compel the offending party to return the revenues to the lawful proprietor of the estate from the date of the objection. It is significant to note that before the Cis -Sutlej States were brought under British protection by government of Minto, the Muslim petty Chiefships of Pataudi, Loharu and Dujana, as also Jhajjar, Dadri, Bahadurgah, Farrukhnagar and Ballabhgarh, had already been brought under the British protection. The founders of these small States were originally Jagirdars of the Mughal Empire. During the First Anglo Sikh War two British officers who happened to be two brothers Henry and John Lawrence had become permanently attached to the affairs of the Punjab. Both were personally selected by the Governor General, Harding for duties in the Punjab. One of the consequences of the annexation of the Punjab in March 1849 was that several petty Cis Sutlej Chiefs were deprived of their entire civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction. In this way they were reduced to the position of ordinary subjects of the British Government. On the other hand the Cis Sutlej Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Malerkotla, Faridkot and Kalsia as also those of Mamdat, Dialgarh and Raikot were allowed to keep their status intact and exercise their rights and authority. Thus, it can

be contended that through a gradual process the Company had established a firm grip over the Punjab States including the Phulkian Chiefships. The British intervention in the internal affairs of the Phulkian States before 1857 was occasional rather than systematic and uniform. However, on the occasions when they interfered in their internal affairs they betrayed authority and even with the show of force. Some important indications of the paramount status of the British began emerge during this period. It is apparent that the Supreme Government had begun to assert its rights as a Paramount Power to decide authoritatively the questions of succession in the Phulkian States to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chief themselves and to intervene with the object of preventing misgovernment in the States and to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs. Thus several Sikh and Muslim States had come under British protection, British Government began gradually to assert its rights as a Paramount Power and exact military and other obligation from them as necessitated by the prevailing circumstances and conditions from time to time. Although under the Proclamation of 1809 the Cis Sutlej Chiefs had been assured free exercise of the rights and powers enjoyed by them hitherto. However, it is evident that despite this assurance the British Government habitually interfered with the internal affairs of the princely States on one pretext or the other. On the first hand, British Government intervened on the grounds of the maladministration in the States. It may, however, be observed that the cases of intervention of such a nature were very few. On the one hand it is true that that company's Government genuinely desired to see that the administration of the States should be carried on in a responsible manner without any arbitrary and whimsical tendencies. At the same time that it was not the British policy during the Company's period to impose completely illegitimate and unreasonable authoritative interference in the internal affairs of the States. Most often the British intervention was exercised for resolving questions and disputes about succession in the States. The British authorities also intervened with the objective of arbitrating settlements of disputes that occurred between Chiefs at different points of time. The British intervention was also exercised in the matters of the Chiefs vis-à-vis their feudatories. Thus it is clear that the Company intervened in the internal affairs of the Punjab States mainly to prevent misgovernment or the decide questions of succession or to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories. However, it is important to state that the British intervention in the internal affairs of the States throughout the Company's tenure was

occasional and incidental rather than normative and indispensable. The Company apparently did not formulate any well defined or consistent policy or principles in the matters pertaining to intervention in the internal affairs of the States. Such matters were left for the Crown after 1858. In fact the British administration during the Company's period were more concerned about such diplomatic intervention as could give them control the much desired territories or portions of territories of Native States on one pretext or the other.

As far as the resumption of territories of the states was concerned, the representatives of the company were often on the lookout for legitimate excuses of confiscating the territories of Native States on one pretext or the other. During the period from 1824 to 1834 a good number of minor states in the Cis Sutlej region lapsed to the British Government of William Bentinck. It is quite clear much before Dalhousie, the doctrine of lapse was being applied in many cases of the Cis Sutlej States of the Punjab. Apart from confiscation of State territories by the application of the doctrine of lapse; the British authorities also availed of all other opportunities to resume the territories of the States. The Company also confiscated the territories of the States on the ground of disloyalty to the Paramount Power. After the First Anglo Sikh War, the British Government absorbed many petty Cis Sutlej Sikh States that were found to be disloyal to the crown and that had supported the enemies of the British. Apart from this the British also confiscated portions of the territories of some principal states whose loyalty was thought to be doubtful. The Company seized all the opportunities to resume the territories of the States either by the application of the doctrine of lapse or by arbitrary decisions about disputed lands or on grounds of disloyalty to the suzerain. It was, indeed, the predominant characteristic of the policy of the successive Governors General of the period to confiscate the territories of the States on one pretext or the other. Where diplomacy failed, they frequently applied force to achieve their object. For the main problem before the British administrators was to extend the British supremacy throughout the country. When, as a result of annexation of large portion of the Country by 1857, the existence of remaining Native States could be assured by the British Government under the crown.

In lieu of protection extended to them, the Punjab Chiefs were required to furnish, in proportion in their respective means, carriage, supplies and troops to the Company at the requisition of the latter in any emergency. In accordance with these

obligations , the various Chiefs of the Punjab States rendered necessary material assistance to the British Government during the wars into which the Company was involved from time to time. When the Company was involved in the First Anglo Sikh war of 1838-42; the Chiefs of Patiala, Bahawalpur, Nabha, Kapurthala and Malerkotla rendered great assistance to the British Government. During the first Anglo Sikh War of 1845-46, all the Sikhs Chiefs did not prove faithful to the British Government. During the first Anglo Sikh War of 1845-46, all the Sikhs Chiefs did not prove faithful to the British Government. At the larger level the Sikh Chief by and large had sympathies with Khalsa Army. Spurred by their personal interests and security which were deeply dependent on the success of the British, the Chief of Patiala, Jind and Faridkot, of course, evinced their loyalty to the British cause and rendered all possible assistance to their Paramount. But the other Chiefs kept on showing doubtful vacillation. Some were clearly hostile to the British. After the close of the war the British Government rewarded obedience and punished disobedience. Whereas the Chief of Patiala, Jind, Malerkotla and Faridkot were rewarded with additions in their territories, the other Chiefs had to suffer because of the penalties for what was perceived as their disloyal conduct. When the Second Anglo Sikh War 1848-49 broke out, the Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot offered their services to the British Government which were utilized to some extent in the form of carriage and supplies. After the annexation of the Punjab, Dalhousie Government deprived many petty Chiefs of all civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction, reducing them to the position of ordinary subjects of the British Government in 'possession of certain exceptional privileges. But the Sikh Chief of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Faridkot and Kalsia as also the Muslim Chiefs of Bahawalpur, Malerkotla, Pataudi, Laharu and Dujana were allowed to exercise, their usual rights and authority. After the revolt of 1857 there was a gradual change in the British policy towards all native states in respect of military matters. The main reason for this change was evidently the great concern of the Crown's Government for security and defense of the Indian Empire. The experience of 1857-58 had come as a very big learning experience for the British statesmen who were at the helm of Indian affairs in the following years. They began to focus their attention with a renewed vigour on the ways and means of ensuring in future stability of the British Empire in India. In terms of policy formulation they arrived at certain significant decisions having a bearing for the socio-political future of the next few decades. The most important among these decisions was the plan of a

thorough reorganization of the military system of India. In accordance with this scheme artillery as a norm was hereafter to be comprised exclusively of the Europeans. The number of native sepoys in the army was considerably truncated and the strength of the European soldiers was increased. It was therefore considered essential to exercise some sort of control over the arms and armies of the Native Chiefs and to seek their co-operation in any eventually of foreign invasion. The British Government had expressed its commitment to protect the Native Chiefs not only from foreign invasions but also from internal revolts. After 1858, it had also abandoned the policy of any further annexation of the Native States which implied. This was important to prevent more wars between the Native States and the British Government. In return for the prospect of abiding peace British Government required that the Native Chiefs should not trouble and challenge the military defense of the Empire. Moreover, they were expected to render active co-operation in improving and augmenting the efficiency of the imperial Army and that they should dispense the responsibility assigned to them. In certain Native States the law of primogeniture was definitely established which greatly mitigated the possibility of succession disputes between Chiefs and their brothers and collaterals. But in other Chiefships disputes for succession were very frequent. The basic cause giving rise to such disputes was that no definite law of succession was prevalent in those states. Sometimes the eldest son succeeded to the Chiefship after the death of ruler and sometime claim of younger son was asserted in preference to that of the elder. This was the biggest reason for disputes. After the assumption of Government of India by the crown a great change took in the British policy. The British authorities were no longer interested in take advantage of the succession matters for the purpose of acquiring territories and they became genuinely interested in settling the succession disputes in the states to their satisfaction. The British Government therefore evolved definite policy for putting an end to such disputes and thereby securing peace and order in the States. By 1857 the Company had established a firm grip over the Punjab States. There is no doubt that the Chiefships had been protected by the Proclamation of 1809 against the ambition of Lahore and by the Proclamation of 1811 from one another. These Chiefships enjoyed a prolonged period of peace and security and almost free exercise of Civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction in their respective territories subject to the authority of the British Agent or Resident. It was a period when Maharaja Ranjit Singh had absorbed all the petty independent States to the north of the Sutlej except Kapurthala.

These Chiefships in the south of the Sutlej had survived and thrived under the British Government and had no more obligations to fulfill than to remain loyal and support their paramount with their forces at the time of war. But it would be too simplistic to say that the attribute the Chiefships thrived under the British because of their innate generosity, goodness and liberality. The British imperialists were very clever imperialist and to treat them as liberal and generous would be simple and puerile. It was actually the diplomatic calculations of a wider policy which weighed with the British Administrators. They were haunted by the external danger from France in early stages and from Russia afterwards. Under these circumstances, it was thought expedient to retain the friendship and fidelity of the Principal Chiefs of this region.

Punjab did not only remain calm but also helped to crush one of the most serious challenges to the British authority that they ever faced in the history of their rule in India. this was primarily made possible due to the ground realities and the political scenario in Punjab which was highly suitable for the British. There was a deep rooting and fierce sense of autonomy among the Punjabis; they felt a deep antagonism against the Hindustani powers. The People of Punjab regarded the Hindustani occupation and detested them ever since the First Sikh War. It is important not to disregard the fact that the revolt of 1857 was an army revolt, the disbanded soldiery and the martial classes of the Punjab could have perceived it as their opportunity to get liberated from the British yoke. However, due to strategic reasons the province remained peaceful. All influential Chiefs who might have become the centre of disaffection against the British were either in exile or had died. There was no unifying force that could bring the anti British elements together. Moreover, the new regime had given to the people social security and in collective sense there was no incentive for the people to cultivate conditions of political instability and anarchy. In the absence of agitators and popular leaders, the masses had become apathetic and did not make efforts for political change. In terms of territorial expansion in Punjab by 1849, the British had advanced their frontier to Attock and established a firm grip over the Punjab states included the Cis- Sutlej Chiefships. With the passage of time the power and authority of the British began to grow and because of this Supreme Government had asserted in these states its rights as a Paramount Power to decide the questions of successions to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chiefs themselves. Intervention was also exercised to prevent misgovernment in the States or

to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs. The Cis- Sutlej area was governed by the Sikh Chieftains who had remained loyal to British even during Ranjit Singh's reign. The princes of the various Princely states of Punjab besides those of Cis- Sutlej States, did not vacillate in helping the British. The revolt of 1857 can be described as one of the greatest uprisings that took place in India against the British occupation. In the Punjab, within three days after the fall of Delhi, most of the forts, arsenals, treasures and strategic positions were swiftly transferred to the care of British Forces. When the British approached the Sikh Chiefs of Cis -Sutlej States for assistance during the crisis of 1857 these chiefs faced a dilemma. These Chiefs had two options before them. The first was to honour their obligation of faithfully rendering help to British or dishonour the agreement that bound them to give help to the British during any emergency. However, it is evident that the Sikh Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States believed that the British would surely crush the mutineers. Thus, the Chiefs opted for the first option as they could foresee that not only would the mutiny be crushed because of the disproportionate power of the British in comparison with the natives, the chiefs would also become entitled to further favours and rewards from their suzerain. In other words, the Sikh Chiefs were convinced that if they were disloyal to the British they would be treading on the road to self destruction. Any disloyalty or breach of faith towards the powerful suzerain would inevitably make them the targets of British retribution. Thus they responded to the British call for help with great promptness. It is clear that they did not wish to be accused of any breach of trust. The Patiala ruler's instantaneous decision to send troops to Ambala when required to do so by the district officer of Ambala showed that he simply followed the rulers of pragmatism and avoiding falling foul of the political masters i.e. the British disloyalty. The Raja of Jind was also driven by the same pragmatism. When he heard the news of the outbreak of mutiny in Delhi, he instantly took up arms against the rebels and on his own initiative and dispatched a messenger to the British authorities at Ambala for advice on further action. It can be said that the same considerations of common sense and pragmatic choice acted as the main reason behind the support of the smaller Chiefs of Nabha and Faridkot. The loyal conduct of Sikh *Jagirdars* of the Cis Sutlej area also left little doubt as to their self interested motives. Many of them must have felt greatly gratified that the British had approached them for help. It is quite clear that given the mighty political power of the British, the Princes, Jagirdars and rulers were competing with one another to prove their usefulness towards them in

this time of crisis. In other words, it can be said that their prime considerations for coming out strongly on the side of the British during the sepoy mutiny was to show themselves in a favorable light and ensure the continuity of their rules. The outbreak of the mutiny the various parts of the country had drained the courage and resources of the British. It can be said that Captain Briggs was conscious of his obligation to the Civil authorities and the Cis Sutlej States who gave British Government their utmost support. During the disturbance of 1857-58, no prince of India showed greater loyalty or rendered more conspicuous service to the British government than the Maharaja of Patiala. He was the acknowledged head of the Sikhs and his hesitation or disloyalty would have been a huge setback to the British. On the other hand, his ability, character and high position could have made him the most formidable leader to lead the forces against the Government. However, as discussed above like the other princes he demonstrated gratitude and loyalty towards the British. Without even an iota of hesitation he placed his whole power, resources and influence at the disposal of the English and during the darkest and most doubtful days of the mutiny. He never for a moment wavered in his loyalty, but, on the contrary, increased his overtures of friendship towards the British. When the news of the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut reached Patiala and there was a threat from the native troops at Ambala, the Maharaja placed himself at head of all his available troops and marched at the head of his forces with his elephants, camels and other such resources to Kalka. His prime objective was to transport the European troops to Ambala from the hill stations of Kausli, Dagshai and Sabathu. From Jesmoli he marched to Thanesar and deployed a force of 1300 men with four guns there to provide protection to the district. When the mutiny broke out in May 1857 Raja Sarup Singh, the Raja of Jind was not behind the Maharaja of Patiala in showing active loyalty to the British. When the news of the revolt at Delhi reached him at Sangrur, he at once collected all his troops and marched towards Karnal on the 18th of May. At Karnal he undertook the responsibility of the defense of the city and cantonments. Raja Sarup Singh was the first to march against Mutineers at Delhi. He did not even wait for the summons from government to show his fealty towards the British. He even sent a messenger to Ambala for instructions and in the meanwhile collected all his troops. However, the request of Barnes's request reached him. As discussed above he led his troops to take control of Karnal and the main road. It is evident that the commissariat was completely crippled by the suddenness of the outbreak. The Raja of Jind proved to be a model of unfaltering loyalty towards the

British. He was very prompt in choosing his side in the mutiny. There was no indecision or wavering in taking the decision. The mutiny had placed the British in a desperate position and the Raja committed himself to stand or fall with British government and tried his best to keep his pledge. His services to the British are distinguished by the fact that he was always in the midst of the struggle and arguably the only Chief present in person. His loyalty towards the British was by no means less than that of the Maharaja of Patiala. It can be further added that his realm was large; the boundaries of his territory were dangerously close to the sites of mutiny in the Delhi Districts. The administration of the district of Rohtak was passed on to the Raja of Jind during the most disturbed period. As part of this plan the head men of the villages and Zamindars were directed to pay their revenue to him. The receipts issued by the Raja were to be treated as sufficient acknowledgment of payment. It can be said that the services of Raja Sarup Singh were most valuable for the British. When the mutiny broke out, Raja Bharpur Singh put in tremendous efforts to make amends for the decisions of his father particularly in showing loyalty to the British. He rendered services to the British Government in an open show of support for the British. Raja Bharpur Singh replaced his father on the throne as a minor and attained his majority a few months after breaking out of the mutiny of 1857. At this critical time he acted with utmost loyalty and intelligence and his services were considered to be as praiseworthy by the British as those of the other Phulkian Chiefs.

Just like the other Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, the Raja of Nabha on hearing the news of the disturbances at Delhi proceeded from Nabha with all available forces towards Ambala. However, on his way, he was directed by the commissioner to march to Ludhiana. The Raja Bharpur Singh remained at Ludhiana in person throughout the campaign and played an important role in protecting the city. He deployed contingents of his troops for the protection of the roads between Ludhiana and Nabha and Ambala, Ludhiana, Nabha and Ferozpur. The Raja also sent his troops to Panipat, Ambala and Ferozpur. The most important service rendered by the Raja of Nabha was to provide an escort for the Siege Train ordered from Phillaur to accompany the Field Force under the Commander-in-Chief to Delhi. The heavy guns and the ammunition, comprising a train of some hundred wagons were taken in safety from Phillaur to Karnal by the Nabha troops. The Raja of Nabha provided timely and quick services to the British in terms of men and provisions. As pointed out, Raja Bharpur Singh

was anxious to march to Delhi at the head of his troops. He wanted to help the British in the same manner as the Raja of Jind had done. This was not allowed. He was very young and such service could not be entrusted to an inexperienced and callow youth. As far as the trans- Sutlej territory was concerned there was the raja of Kapurthala State Raja Randhir Singh was very prominent ruler. Randhir Singh and his brother Kanwar Bikram Singh took an active part in assisting the British Government. When the mutiny of the Bengal Army broke out in 10 May 1857, Raja Randhir Singh availed the first opportunity of evincing his loyalty towards the British Government. As per the agreement, he was, as vassal of the crown, bound to render all possible aid to the Government in times of difficulty. However, as per the terms of the agreement, military service could not be demanded from him. However, at the first intimation of the outbreak at Delhi and Meerut, the raja marched into Jalandhar with every available soldier. He was accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and his Chief advisers. He remained at Jalandhar throughout the hot season at the head of his troops. The raja volunteered to send a portion of his troops to Delhi and this offer was not not accepted as their presence was required at Jullundur. On the night of mutiny at this town, his troops guarded the civil station, the jail, and the treasury and he placed the whole of his cavalry under the British officer, General Johnstone for the pursuit of mutineers. It can be said that the region of the Jalandhar Doab was not very severely affected by the mutiny. The inhabitants of this region were prosperous. They were chiefly agriculturist and did not show any desire to rise against the government. However, the Government was nevertheless made very strong in both the Jalandhar Doab and in the Cis-Sutlej with the help of the rajas and princes. It should be remembered that the Raja took the side of government without hesitation and without having had time or opportunity to ascertain what were the intentions of the great Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. After the movable column had been sent to Delhi, the only reliable force in Jalandhar Doab was the force of Raja Randhir Singh. It is quite apparent that the Raja did not waver in his loyalty at a time when Delhi was holding out against the British. It was time when so many friends of the crown had turned their back on the British. The raja showed great eagerness to lead his men on active service. His offer to lead his men was genuine and that this was proved by his subsequent conduct.

It is significant to note that during the Second Anglo Sikh War of 1849, Wazir Singh had served on the side of the English. During the mutiny of 1857, he seized

several mutineers and made them over to the English authorities. As the mutiny broke out he hastened to Ferozpur on receiving the first news of mutiny at that station. He seized several fugitive sepoys escaping through his territory and handed them over to the British authorities. His troops also accompanied Major Marsden, when that officer went to Seytokee in the Nabha territory to quell an insurrection.

The Trans Sutlej Sardars who had lost their kingdom to the British in 1849 looked upon the sepoy rising as a possible way of restoring their social and economic status which had been gradually sinking lower and lower after the annexation of the Punjab. During the eight years between annexation and the outbreak of the sepoy mutiny the jagirs of many leading landed aristocracy families had been reduced by the Government. Loyalty and support was shown particularly by those surviving Sikh families who had suffered heavy losses socially and economically. This was the most conclusive proof that sheer prudence and self interest were motives the loyal behavior of the Sikhs during the uprising of 1857. The Sikh *Jagirdars* and Big Zamindars who opposed the British Government in Anglo Sikh Wars had been punished by the Government. Notably, most of the *Jagirdars* who helped the British in the revolt of 1857 were awarded *jagirs* and honors. The Nalwa family from Gujranwala district had lost their lands after annexation of Punjab. However, the service rendered by Sardar Jawahir Singh at Delhi who was the son of the Sikh general Hari Singh Nalwa, restored the Nalwa family to prominence among of the Sikh aristocracy. In other districts and area of Trans Sutlej Punjab, the loyal and helpful behavior of the Sikh leaders such as Raja Tej Singh in the Lahore district, Jawahir Singh in the Jammu Hills the Chief of Kapurthala State and numerous small Sardars lent further support and active help to the British during the sepoy mutiny of 1857. All these Sikh leaders were rewarded with rewards and recognition. The interest shown by the Government in the welfare and prosperity of the Sardars and *Jagirdars* was a direct consequence of the renewed attitude towards Landed Aristocracy. Government had learned a few lessons from the sepoy rebellion and perhaps the most significant of all was the realization that its policy of degrading and destroying the Sikh Chiefs and aristocrats was a flawed policy. There was a realization that the aristocratic families could provide much needed help during an emergency. They had immense influence and control over the peasantry which remained firm and loyal towards the Sardars. As such the British realized that it was wrong on their part to look for help and leadership

among lower classes, merchants and money lenders. The leadership and loyalty exhibited by the leading Sikh families during the crisis of 1857 had therefore radically changed Government's attitude towards them. Owing to their experience during the mutiny the British adopted a new policy of nourishing ties with influential Sikh families.

After rebellion of 1857-58 the British Government conferred several rewards on the Sikhs leaders and rulers. These rewards were much more than simple and perfunctory acknowledgements of the services rendered by them in the time of crisis. The Sikh Princes and Landed Aristocracy were liberally rewarded according to their rank and the services they had rendered. In the recognition of their services and as a distinct religious community, the Sikhs were appreciated by the British rulers and commended for their role in saving the British rule during the mutiny of 1857-58. As a result of this recognition the Sikhs were elevated to an unrivalled place among the native communities of the Punjab. As a reward for their unswerving loyalty and services during the mutiny of 1857-58 the Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala Jind and Nabha were granted some extraordinary concessions. The British government promised to respect the rights, dignity and honors of these Native rulers. Sanads in response to the collective request of the three chiefs were issued which bestowed on them rights to govern their territory and give capital punishment. The Sanads can be seen as the mark of the greatest concession to the Native Chiefs. It was a defining feature of the new policy. The hallmark of this new policy was the assurance that the British Government would perpetuate their regimes and ensure the continuance of the royal houses. The *Sanads* were granted individually to each one of the in fulfillment of their collective demands for autonomy and right to rule. Out of all the Sikh princes the Maharaja of Patiala, Narinder Singh, was accorded the greatest consideration by the government. It was observed that not only did he provide timely and prompt help to the British but his attitude was a proof of unswerving loyalty. In the immediate wake of the British success in the mutiny, the three Phulkian Chiefs, namely, the rulers of Patiala, Jind and Nabha collectively were also granted a number of concessions which they had cherished for very long. As discussed above, these included the right to inflict capital punishment. This right had been forfeited from the Chiefs after the first Sikh war. Secondly the government also allowed them some degree of autonomy in relation to the appointment of a council of Regency. Apart from the three Chiefs the Government gave suitable rewards to the numerous smaller Sikh Chiefs and *Jagirdars* in the Cis-Sutlej who rendered useful and loyal services to government during the mutiny. During the Sepoy rebellion the Sikh Sardars and *Jagirdars* in the trans-Sutlej Punjab had rendered service to Government according to their means. Thus, as stated above they were rewarded with honors and *khillats* or cash. Moreover, the government also extended generous land grants to Sikh

officers when their services were terminated. Through this liberal policy of the British, the economic status of several aristocratic Sikh families in the Punjab was further improved. There were some Sikh families that had opposed the British in the Second Sikh War. However, as they showed loyalty towards the Government during the Sepoy rebellion they were also liberally rewarded. The approach of the Government leading to the welfare and prosperity of the Sardar and *Jagirdars* was a manifestation of the new outlook of the authorities towards the Sikh aristocracy. Government had learned a few lessons from the sepoy rebellion. There was a realization that its policy of suppression and forfeiture which was adopted by the earlier civil servants under John Lawrence was a flawed policy. The Mutiny of 1857 had established the fact that the Sardars and *Jagirdars* could act as an important asset and support for the British. The British were clearly mistaken in ignoring and punishing the Sardars and seeking the help of the lower classes. This had become apparent to local authorities during the mutiny. The leadership and loyalty exhibited by leadership and loyalty exhibited by the leading Sikh families during the crisis of 1857 were instrumental in transforming the orientation of the Government. The new policy was formulated around the need to preserve and nourish the aristocratic Sikh class.

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ROLE OF SIKH CHIEFS AND LANDED ARISTOCRACY IN THE REVOLT OF 1857

A
THESIS

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CHAPTER-VI

CONCLUSION

In the dynastic History of Sikh States the erstwhile Princely States of Patiala, Nabha and Jind were collectively known as the Phulkian State after the name of their common ancestor, Phul. The fourth period of the history of his Phulkian House is connected with the Chiefs of Khiwa Rao had no issue from his Rajput wife. He married a second wife, the daughter of Basera a Jat Zamindar of Neli. From this marriage a male child named Sidhu was born. It was from this child that the Sidhu tribe derived its name. Sidhu, who according to the Rajput custom, was made to owe allegiance to the caste of his mother was a Jat. He had four sons from whom the family of Kathial and Phulkian Chiefs descended. Brar Rao, fourth in descent from Sidhu, was a powerful Chief of the Jat clan. He was succeeded by six sons of whom the most notable were Dul and Paur. The members of the Faridkot House were the direct descendents of Dul and from Paur descended the House of Phulkian States. After this the Chiefs of these houses came to be known as the Sidhu Jat Clan of the Jats. After the tenth descendent of the tribal Chief Paur Rup Chand rose to the position of the Chief. He had two sons, Phul and Sanadali. It is said that Phul and Sandali ,along with their uncle Kala visited Guru Har Rai (Six Guru of Sikh) at Gursur. In the presence of Guru, the young Phul patted his stomach. When the Guru asked the reason, Kala told him that he did so when he felt hungry. The guru is said to have blessed Phul by saying. “What matters the hunger of one belly, Phul would satisfy the hunger of thousands. The horses of Phul's successor would drink water from Jamuna and their raj would extend to it.” The prophecy came out to be true. Taken as a whole, the fourth period of the Phulkian clan comprised twenty generations commencing with Sidhu and terminating with Rao Rup Chand, the father of Phul. It coincides with the period which intervened between the end of Ala –Ud-Din Khalji's reign and middle of the reign of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan. The appellation or name of the dynasty Phulkian House is derived from Chaudhury Phul. This dynasty ruled over the States of Patiala, Nabha and Jind. Phul was born in 1619. Phul had six sons. From the eldest, Tiloka, descended the family of Nabha and Jind and from the second son, Rama, the family of Patiala. In later years this family came to be bound with the sacred history or Sikhism when in 1696 A.D. Guru Gobind, The

Tenth Guru and the founder of Khalsa, called upon Tiloka and Rama to bring their followers to fight against the hill Chiefs who were troubling the Guru at Anandpur. Baba Ala Singh was the grandson of Phul and son of Chaudhury Ram Singh. He assumed the leadership in 1714 after the death of his father. By the middle of the eighteenth century, he became the undisputed master of the entire region between Barnala and Patiala. Ala Singh died on 22nd August 1765 and was succeeded by his grandson Amar Singh.

On the death of Tailok Singh who was the eldest son of Chaudhari Phul Singh, his territory was divided between his sons, Gurdit Singh and Sukhchain Singh. Gurdit Singh's descendents founded the Nabha State. Hamir Singh was the real founder of the Nabha State. He founded the town of Nabha in 1755 A.D. which became the headquarters of the State. This was followed by the conquest of Bhadson in 1759.A.D. Jaswant Singh 1783-1840 succeeded his father Hamir Singh in December 1783. His step mother Rani Desu, became his guardian and regent because he was only eight year old at that time. She managed the affairs of the State quite successfully till her death in 1790. After her death Jaswant Rai assumed the reins government and took the overall control of the state in his own hands.

Tilok Singh, the eldest son of Chaudhri Phul Singh, had two sons , Gurdit Singh and Sukhchain Singh. The son of Sukhchain was Gajpat Singh (1763-1786) who was the founder of the Jind State. He made Jind his headquarters and also built a large brick fort there. In 1772, Emperor Shah Alam conferred the title of Raja on him through a Royal decree. From this time Gajpat Singh ruled as an independent Prince and coined money in his own name. He was an intrepid ruler and brave warrior. Raja Gajpat Singh died in 1786. He was succeeded by his son Bhag Singh (1786-1819). He was first of the Cis Sutlej Princes to seek an alliance with the British Government in 1803.

Kapurthala is said to have been founded by Rana Kapur, a Rajput immigrant from Jaisalmer, about the time of the invasions of India by Mahmud Ghazni, at the beginning of eleventh century. In fact, the traditions of almost every Jat tribe in the Punjab point to a Rajput descent. It is possible that Jats and Rajputs had probably a common origin. The Kapurthala state entered into relations with the British during the first decade of the nineteenth century. At that time Fateh Singh Ahluwalia (1801-37)

was the Chief of the State. In 1806, Fateh Singh and Ranjit Singh also entered into joint treaty with the British.

The Faridkot family had its provenance in the same lineage as the Phulkian Chiefs. They had a common ancestor in Brar who lived almost twelve generations before Phul. The Faridkot dynasty was founded during the reign of Akbar by Bhallan, who was appointed *Chaudhri* of the Brar Jat tribe by the Mughal Government. He subjugated the neighboring villages of Kotkapura Faridkot, Mari, Mudki and Mukstar. He died issueless and was succeeded by his nephew Kapura in 1643. Sardar Hamir Singh was first independent Chief of Faridkot. His brother, Jodh Singh erected a new fort at Kotkapura in 1766 and almost rebuilt the town. However, his oppression was so great that the inhabitants abandoned the city and the artisans, who had been renowned for their skill and industry, emigrated to Lahore, Amritsar and Patiala.

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promise that they would not indulge in any operations against the English. Thus, during this period there was a counterbalance of the British dictated by their self interest, and the campaigns of annexation carried out by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the year January 1809.

The establishment of the British power in the Cis- Sutlej States commenced from the treaty with Ranjit Singh on 25 April 1809. Through the articles of the treaty Maharaja Ranjit Singh engaged neither to commit nor suffer any encroachments on the possession or right of the Chiefs on the left bank of Sutlej. On the 3 May 1809 a Proclamation was issued extending the protection of the British Government to the Chief of Sirhind and *Malwa* without demand of tribute requiring service in time of war. The proclamation defined the relation of the protected States to the British Government in very general terms.

Maharaja Sahib Singh of Patiala died in 1813 and was succeeded by Maharaja Karam Singh who had greatly distinguished himself by his whole hearted and unswerving support to the British Arms in several expeditions. In 1814, the Gurkhas of Nepal encroached upon the British territory and when war was declared against them, Maharaja Karam Singh sent strong detachment of the State forces to serve in the Army led by Colonel Ochterlony. At the close of the war in recognition of his services, the British Government awarded 16 paragana in the Simla hill on the payment of a *nazrana* of Rs. 2, 80,000 to Maharajas Karam Singh of Patiala. The Gurkhas had become a source of trouble both to the British Government and at the Patiala State. It was due to the action of the Patiala forces that the British Villages of Mandali and Bharowali, which had earlier been seized by the Gurkhas were taken.

Raja Bhag Singh (1786-1819) died in 1819 and was succeeded by his son Fateh Singh. Raja Fateh Singh was an ambitious man, but his period is very uneventful as he ruled for a very short period of three years. He died on 3 February, 1822 at the age of thirty three, leaving only son Sangat Singh who succeeded to the office. The installation ceremony of Sangat Singh was performed on 30th July 1822 at Jind. His mother Sahib Kaur was appointed to work as Regent for him. In February 1826 A.D., Raja Sangat Singh paid a visit to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In 1827 A.D,

Maharaja Ranjit Singh bestowed on him the grants of Antiana state. It was, however, decided by the Britishers that the states under the British should be directed to abstain from maintaining any connection or entering into any dialogue with Maharaja Ranjit Singh without a prior intimation to them or without their sanction. Raja Sangat Singh wanted to maintain good relations with Maharaja Ranjit Singh as had been done by his father Raja Bhag Singh. As such he did not pay any heed or adhere to the advice of the British. He had plans to visit Lahore Darbar again in 1834 without obtaining sanction from the British agent at Delhi. On learning about his intention the British became annoyed. But before some action could be taken against him, the Raja fell ill at Bassian on 3 November 1834 and died the same day. Raja Sarup Singh the second cousin of Raja Sangat Singh was accepted as the legal heir to the office by the Britishers. Accordingly, he succeeded to the *gaddi* or throne of Jind. When the second Sikh War broke out, Raja Sarup Singh of Jind was once again anxious to prove his fidelity to the Government and offered to lead his troops in person to Lahore. After the annexation of the Punjab. The Raja of Jind was one of the few chiefs permitted to retain independent powers. During the Cis-Sutlej expeditions of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1807-08, the Nabha Chief Jaswant Singh remained his firm ally. In 1807, he received a grant of four villages of the Glumgrana estate and the district of Kannah from Ranjit Singh. However, the recurring aggressions of Ranjit Singh beyond Sutlej naturally produced consternation and fear among the Malwa Chiefs and they turned towards the British protection for protection. Jaswant Singh sided with the British when Holkar, the Maratha Chief was being driven northwards to Lahore and aided them with a detachment of riders. Lord Lake, in return for his loyalty, assured him that his possessions would not be curtailed and no demand for tribute would be made on him so long as his disposition towards the British remained unchanged. Raja Jaswant Singh was formally taken under the protection of the British Government in May 1809 A.D., with the other Cis-Sutlej Chiefs.

Position of Kapurthala state became highly precarious because it held territories both in the Cis and Trans Sutlej areas. The position of the state was delicate as the former territories of the Cis were under the sphere of the British influence and later under that of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. As such, the Kapurthala Chief had often to perform a balancing act. On a few occasions, however, the Raja of Kapurthala Fateh

Singh, was brought into direct confrontation with the British Government. In 1825, the relations of Maharaja Ranjit Singh Fateh Singh became strained to such an extent that there was a possibility of confrontation between the two. In the last week of December 1825, the Ahluwalia Chief was alarmed by the rumours that two battalions of the Lahore Army were advancing towards his territory. So he fled across the river Sutlej with the whole of his family and took refuge at Jagraon. Fateh Singh also sent confidential messages to seek British protection. The British authorities found it impossible to extend protection to the Kapurthala Chief in respect of his Trans Sutlej possessions, as under the Treaty of 1809 they had given the commitment that they would not interfere with Maharaja Ranjit Singh's possessions north of the Sutlej. Fateh Singh had an expectation that the British Government would interfere in this matter in his favor. Although the British Government declined active interference, yet they expressed sympathy with the Sardar. After this Fateh Singh returned to the Jalandhar Doab and then lived at Kapurthala in peace and died in October 1837. The First Anglo Sikh War broke out in 1845. All Sikh Chiefs did not prove faithful towards the British.

When the British Government demanded from Maharaja Ranjit Singh the restitution of all his conquests on the left bank of the Sutlej made during 1808-1809, he showed great reluctance to surrender Faridkot. He claimed that he had a special right firstly as Faridkot was a dependency of Kot Kapura which he had previously conquered. Secondly, he claimed that the owners had made a promise when it was besieged in 1807, that they would within one month, put themselves under his authority and that should they fail to do so, they would consent to undergo any punishment which he might think fit to impose upon them. As far as the first claim was concerned, it was clear that no right could be maintained on account of any connection between Kot Kapura and Faridkot. Ever since the division of the territory among the sons of Sukia, Faridkot had been independent, more powerful than Kot Kapura and in no way subject to it. Even had there been any connection such as that alleged, still it was well known that the Maharaja had seized Kot Kapura, before he had requested the assent of the British Government to the extension of his conquests beyond the Sutlej.

In the revolt of 1857 the main actors were the sepoys. They formed an overwhelming majority of the British Army in those times. The British troops were only a small percentage of the British Army India. The defense of the Indian Empire

was the collective responsibility of both the Native and British forces. The British Branch of the Indian army consisted of a part of the Queen's Army and of additional British troops, recruited by the English East Company on its own. Between 1842 and 1845 the East Indian Company recruited a British Army of 4333 soldiers for service in India. These soldiers were recruited from London, Liverpool, Dublin, Cork and Edinburgh. Out of the entire British Army recruited like this British or White Army London alone supplied 52 percent of the recruits. The company also maintained a native army for each of three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. Thus it is immensely important fact related to the composition of the British army that the native troops outnumbered the Europeans. The fall of Delhi at the hands of the Meerut sepoys led to a great rebellion all over the Northern India. An important aspect of the political situation of this time was that in this crisis, it is generally believed that the Punjab alone was peaceful. Most of the rulers of Punjab remained faithful to the British. At the same time he had the support and loyalty of the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs of princely states like Patiala, Jind Nabha, Karnal. it soon became clear that the Bengal Sepoys were not a very big challenge as a large number of them were removed from the force under various pretexts. It was quite strange that the British who had conquered Punjab only eight years before this major political crisis found supporters and loyalists only in the Punjab. The support of the rulers of Punjab was very crucial for the British. It can be said that throughout the campaign against the mutiny the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the charge of contingents provided by the Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States. Their troops protected British stations and patrolled the grand trunk road from Ferozpur and Phillor till the boundary of Delhi. The safety of this province was almost completely dependent on the loyalty of the Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States. On the other hand, the troops of the Maharaja of Patiala guarded Thanesar and Ambala and the safety of Ludhiana was entrusted to the Raja of Nabha and the Kotila Nawab. Thus it can be said that services provided by the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs form an important part of the history of the British campaign against the mutiny in Meerut. In this context, It was a time when there was no assistance from either the Ganga Doab or the Delhi territory. Captain Briggs also expressed acknowledgement and obligation to the Civil authorities of the Cis Sutlej States who gave the utmost support to British Government. In the light of the immense importance of the support of the Cis Sutlej States Mr. Forsyth wrote to the Maharaja of Patiala and Rajas of Nabha and Jind in order to summon them. It was very

important for the British to secure of the grand trunk road and the loyalty of the native Chiefs was the necessary for saving the treasuries from mutiny. The British treasures were under the sepoy guards at the time of the outbreak of the mutiny. In the western division 157 extra men were entertained in the police establishment and the feudal Chiefs provided help in the form of 200 horsemen and 40 foot soldiers. When the news about the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut reached Patiala, the Maharaja placed himself at the head of all his available troops and marched the same night to Jesomli a village close to Ambala. He sent his elephants, camels and other carriage to Kalka for the transport of European troops to Ambala from the hill stations of Kasuali Dagshai and Sabathu. From Jesomli he marched to Thanesar and placed there a force of 1300 men with four guns for the protection of district. his straightforward and loyal conduct was of infinite importance to our cause at that time. The minds of the common people were greatly agitated and disturbed because of the various rumors about the cartridges, about the adulteration of flour and other subtle designs of the British to desecrate the purity of their caste. When the Maharaja of Patiala, placed himself at the head of his forces on the side of the British, the reports began to be discredited. The Maharaja was quite orthodox and enjoyed the trust of the people. His support at the time of the crisis was of unmatched important to the English troops as it played an important role in pacifying the people. Thanesar, Karnal and the station of Ambala were held by Patiala troops who also guarded the Grand Trunk Road from Karnal to Phillor. The Maharaja constantly expressed his wish to lead the contingent to Delhi but he was dissuaded from doing so by both the Commander-in-Chief and the Civil Authorities. Patiala forces remained engaged in carrying out reconnaissance of the surrounding Country with small mounted detachments. Besides the Thanesar region the Patiala state played an important role in helping the British at other places like Bathinda and Firozpur. Colonel Daya Singh, commandant 3rd Cavalry Regiment was deputed by the Patiala State to take the command of troops at Bathinda and to enlist soldiers in accordance with the needs of the emerging situation. It is significant to note that help of the Patiala Forces was also sought by the Deputy Commissioner of Firozpur in order to quell disturbance at Jaito and Dabrikhana. However, on the 10th June the cavalry stationed at Firozpur mutinied. Once again the help of the Patiala forces was sought. The Patiala detachment at Firozpur had an encounter with some insurgents and mutineers. Several men of the Patiala force were killed and wounded in this encounter. On the 5 of June 1857 Resaldar Dal Singh proceeded from Patiala to

Hissar district in order to crush the mutiny in Hissar and deal with the insurgents there. . On reaching Tohana the forces were successful in quelling the revolt taking place there in the span of a day. the forces were successful in bringing the disturbances to an end and in restoring peace besides securing the safety of the lives and property of the common people. Under Maharaja Bhag Singh a small but less organized force was being maintained by Jind State. Maharaja Bhag Singh of Jind State was one of the foremost of those who offered their allegiance to the British Government and joined lord Lake in his pursuit of Jawant Rao Holkar in 1805. Jind forces earned praise from lord Lake for coming to the help of the British during the first major insurrection against the British Empire. Raja of Kapurthala received the information of the outbreak at Delhi and Meerut. He also marched towards Jalandhar with every available soldier at his disposal. He was also accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and his Chief advisors. He remained at Jalandhar at the head of his troops throughout the summer seasons. His loyalty to the British can also be judged from the fact that he relinquished the comforts of his palace life at Kapurthala and stayed at Jalandhar. His troops guarded the Civil Station of Jalandhar as well as the Jail and Civil Treasury. Mr. Barnes exercised an extraordinary influence with the native Chiefs. as it was mainly a sepoy mutiny they did not receive active support of the community. The whole native community consisting of traders, artisans and government employees remained aloof and non committal. No help no and supplies were provided by anyone. The Punjab Army had its Artillery branch which was mainly composed of Sikhs, Punjabi Muhammadans and a few Hindustani. The Sikhs recruits came from Amritsar and Cis-Sutlej states. The Muhammadans of the Punjab Artillery were recruited from the Jhelum area, Lahore, Rawlpandi and Jullundur while the Hindustani sepoys were enlisted mainly from Oudh. This testimony of the contribution of the Indian soldiers is of great historical importance as points to the fact that the British would have been unable to deal with the mutiny if the native princes and their armies did not support them. In acknowledgement of their services Maharaja of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot, Kapurthala, Karnal were rewarded and were conferred with titles. Along with rewards, the principle of compensation for the plundered and destroyed property was also introduced. Finally, the Punjab government dealt with the mutineers in a stringent manner. They were disbanded and sent off to their own homes. The rebellion was completely quelled in Punjab and

approximately 15,000 soldiers were killed in the political disturbance caused by the mutiny.

The policy of the British towards the native states constitutes one of the most important chapters of their imperial strategy in India. It is clear that the British as part of their policy allowed these states to retain as distinct political entity.. By the time Lord Dalhousie abdicated the office of the Viceroy, the British Dominion in India had reached its logical limits. The British carved out an empire unparalleled in its geographical dimensions, wealth and resources. This ushered in an era of the hegemony of the British all over the world. This extraordinary phenomenon of British expansion unfolded in three phases. In its first phase, the East India Company entered into armed conflict with its European rivals. In the second phase the East India Company established its trade monopoly and established political supremacy in India. In the third phase, which began with the battle of Plassey the Company blended commerce with conquest and in both achieved unprecedented success. It gained a vast territory endowed with abundant natural resources and inhabited by teeming millions of patient, hardworking and docile peasants and artisans. It is evident that Bengal was among the first regions to come under British control. The early conquests also prepared the ground for more investment in the lucrative overseas trade. The early conquests also prepared the ground for more investment in the lucrative overseas trade. the Company gave up its exclusively commercial character and compensated itself by further expansion of its dominions through establishment of political domination. the attraction of political dominion was irresistible for the British. They realized that the native rulers were no match for them and they could acquire new territories with ease. This acted as an incentive to bring more and more of the fertile Indian territories under British rule. Thus under a long drawn process aggressive wars were waged by Lords Hasting, Ellenborough and Dalhousie. Most of the times, the mismanagement and primitiveness of the native rulers acted as the justification of the annexation. the desire for more and more territories overlapped with the lust for revenue as well as the need for security. the British policy of expansionism was equally propelled by the consciousness of the weakness of the native rulers and princes and the flaws of feudalistic regimes.

However, Lord Dalhousie faced serious difficulty due to the ineptitude and the inability of Sir Henry Lawrence to implement the Governor General's orders. It is

evident that Lord Dalhousie was not content with disarming the common people and raising a frontier force. Rather, he was determined that the local Chiefs of the Punjab should be effectively deprived of the power and should be made incapable of doing any mischief. Most of these chiefs had their lands and fiefdoms from the previous Sikh Government on condition of rendering military service under a feudal dispensation. Thus, these rulers could not expect a sympathetic attitude from the British powers. They had fought the British fiercely with the help of means and the resources placed by the native government at their disposal. While Lord Dalhousie did give rewards to individuals on personal merit or for showing loyalty. However, was destroyed the entire class of the chiefs who acted as the support system for the Sikh rulers of Punjab. The British had learnt important lessons from the first and the second Anglo Sikh wars. Mainly the mutiny of 1857 the Punjab could be crushed and the native British troops stationed in Punjab could be used for the Seige of Delhi because the powerful Sikh Chiefs who had fought against the British in 1848 had been completely decimated by Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie clearly foresaw that the Punjab under annexation would not be entirely secure without ensuring the Sikh artillery was impaired and debilitated. Thus, Lord Dalhousie insisted upon the absolute dismemberment of the Sikh Confederacy. While the chiefs were disarmed they were not deprived of their life and property as this would lead to social instability. Thus, it can be said that Punjab was both safe and supportive of the British during the Mutiny, it was because the policy adopted by Lord Dalhousie had a balance of firmness tempered by consideration and rigorously enforced curtailment of power by Lord Dalhousie. The annexations significantly enhanced the revenues of the Company. The Punjab was first province of the British in India in which the Non Regulation System was practiced. This system was specifically aimed at providing a cheap and efficient administrative mechanism. Such a mechanism would accelerate economic and social development in order to make the province a source of revenue generation. Besides this, this administrative mechanism offered a very simply and uncomplicated way of governance suitable for the socio economic conditions prevailing in the Punjab. This mechanism was also aimed at hastening the transformation which the province was destined to undergo. Besides it guaranteed the personal control of the Governor General over the province as it was based on a closely centralized administrative hierarchy. Historical evidence suggests that the relation of the Cis Sutlej states with the British Government had been more and less intimate from the time of the conquest

of Delhi by Lord Lake in 1803. However, the real foundation and basis of the political relation between them was laid on 25 April 1809 when the British Government signed a treaty with Maharaja Ranjit Singh. As per the terms of this treaty of the British Government undertook to abstain from any interference with the territories of Ranjit Singh north of the Sutlej. Moreover, it was by the proclamation of 3rd May 1809 that the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Malerkotla, Faridkot, Kalsia on their own volition and entreaty were taken under the protection under the company against the 'authority and control' of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. This arrangement was to be the basis of the political dynamics of Punjab till the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. During the three years before 1809, Maharaja had led repeated expeditions to the Cis-Sutlej region. As the most powerful sovereign of the times he had posed a serious threat to the existence of these several small Chiefships. It would be impertinent to claim that the Cis- Sutlej Sikhs Chiefs were ignorant of the imperialistic designs of the British. This period that fell between the reign of Wellesley and the reign of Hastings. The reign of Wellesley was also an important period of British expansion in India. The two Governors Generals pursued a 'clearheaded' policy which was quite authoritarian. They played a significant role in the extension of British supremacy in India. This period was marked by the implementation of a less vigorous and more considerate policy towards the Native States. The British administrators after Wellesley and Hastings applied their energies and efforts towards consolidating the enormous gains which had been acquired by the spirited policy and measures of Wellesley. As a result of this they deliberately avoided any further conquests and annexations. On these grounds it can be said that Minto did not have any plan to extend the western frontier of the British Empire. However, given the stature of Maharaja Ranjit Singh he was definitely conscious of the urgent need to take effective measures for the defense and security of the Empire the other side of the Sutlej. As stated above Ranjit Singh, had been aggressively launching repeated expeditions to the Cis- Sutlej region and there were apprehensions that he might conquer the entire area between the Sutlej and Jumna and emerge as a potential rival in the area contiguous with the British. Apart from the assurance of permanent protection against the impending threat of Ranjit Singh's there were several strategic advantages offered by the alliance between the British and the Cis- Sutlej Chiefships. The British allowed the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs free exercise autonomy and authority within their territories and did not in any way reduce their status as Chiefs. As per the agreement, in return for all

the British protection Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were obliged to provide the British force with supplies of grains and other amenities whenever the British were engaged in general warfare. The chiefs were also bound to allow the European articles intended for the use of army to pass through their territories without any obstruction of levies. The British Army with their forces would have free access to the land and the resources in case of attack from an enemy for the purpose of conquering the country. It was specifically laid down that they would be exempted from the payment of any pecuniary tribute. It is evident that these terms were obviously quite favorable to the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs in comparison to the terms of many previous treaties between the governments of Wellesley before Minto and of the Government of Hastings. It is also significant to note that no treaty or written agreement, based on mutual negotiations, was concluded between the British Government and the individual Cis- Sutlej States. Based on the above facts it can be said that overall the relations of Cis- Sutlej states with the British Government remained cordial from time to time of the conquest of Delhi by Lord Lake in 1803. The internal discords and mutual rivalries among the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were very common and often gave rise to hostilities between them. the Cis- Sutlej Chiefs were also accorded protection against mutual usurpations. As per this proclamation it was decreed that if Chiefs encroached upon the estate of one another, the British Government would intervene and compel the offending party to return the revenues to the lawful proprietor of the estate from the date of the objection. It is significant to note that before the Cis -Sutlej States were brought under British protection by government of Minto, the Muslim petty Chiefships of Pataudi, Loharu and Dujana, as also Jhajjar, Dadri, Bahadurgah, Farrukhnagar and Ballabhgarh, had already been brought under the British protection. The founders of these small States were originally Jagirdars of the Mughal Empire. During the First Anglo Sikh War two British officers who happened to be two brothers Henry and John Lawrence had become permanently attached to the affairs of the Punjab. Both were personally selected by the Governor General, Harding for duties in the Punjab. One of the consequences of the annexation of the Punjab in March 1849 was that several petty Cis Sutlej Chiefs were deprived of their entire civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction. In this way they were reduced to the position of ordinary subjects of the British Government. On the other hand the Cis Sutlej Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Malerkotla, Faridkot and Kalsia as also those of Mamdat, Dialgarh and Raikot were allowed to keep their status intact and exercise their rights and authority. Thus, it can

be contended that through a gradual process the Company had established a firm grip over the Punjab States including the Phulkian Chiefships. The British intervention in the internal affairs of the Phulkian States before 1857 was occasional rather than systematic and uniform. However, on the occasions when they interfered in their internal affairs they betrayed authority and even with the show of force. Some important indications of the paramount status of the British began emerge during this period. It is apparent that the Supreme Government had begun to assert its rights as a Paramount Power to decide authoritatively the questions of succession in the Phulkian States to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chief themselves and to intervene with the object of preventing misgovernment in the States and to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs. Thus several Sikh and Muslim States had come under British protection, British Government began gradually to assert its rights as a Paramount Power and exact military and other obligation from them as necessitated by the prevailing circumstances and conditions from time to time. Although under the Proclamation of 1809 the Cis Sutlej Chiefs had been assured free exercise of the rights and powers enjoyed by them hitherto. However, it is evident that despite this assurance the British Government habitually interfered with the internal affairs of the princely States on one pretext or the other. On the first hand, British Government intervened on the grounds of the maladministration in the States. It may, however, be observed that the cases of intervention of such a nature were very few. On the one hand it is true that that company's Government genuinely desired to see that the administration of the States should be carried on in a responsible manner without any arbitrary and whimsical tendencies. At the same time that it was not the British policy during the Company's period to impose completely illegitimate and unreasonable authoritative interference in the internal affairs of the States. Most often the British intervention was exercised for resolving questions and disputes about succession in the States. The British authorities also intervened with the objective of arbitrating settlements of disputes that occurred between Chiefs at different points of time. The British intervention was also exercised in the matters of the Chiefs vis-à-vis their feudatories. Thus it is clear that the Company intervened in the internal affairs of the Punjab States mainly to prevent misgovernment or the decide questions of succession or to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories. However, it is important to state that the British intervention in the internal affairs of the States throughout the Company's tenure was

occasional and incidental rather than normative and indispensable. The Company apparently did not formulate any well defined or consistent policy or principles in the matters pertaining to intervention in the internal affairs of the States. Such matters were left for the Crown after 1858. In fact the British administration during the Company's period were more concerned about such diplomatic intervention as could give them control the much desired territories or portions of territories of Native States on one pretext or the other.

As far as the resumption of territories of the states was concerned, the representatives of the company were often on the lookout for legitimate excuses of confiscating the territories of Native States on one pretext or the other. During the period from 1824 to 1834 a good number of minor states in the Cis Sutlej region lapsed to the British Government of William Bentinck. It is quite clear much before Dalhousie, the doctrine of lapse was being applied in many cases of the Cis Sutlej States of the Punjab. Apart from confiscation of State territories by the application of the doctrine of lapse; the British authorities also availed of all other opportunities to resume the territories of the States. The Company also confiscated the territories of the States on the ground of disloyalty to the Paramount Power. After the First Anglo Sikh War, the British Government absorbed many petty Cis Sutlej Sikh States that were found to be disloyal to the crown and that had supported the enemies of the British. Apart from this the British also confiscated portions of the territories of some principal states whose loyalty was thought to be doubtful. The Company seized all the opportunities to resume the territories of the States either by the application of the doctrine of lapse or by arbitrary decisions about disputed lands or on grounds of disloyalty to the suzerain. It was, indeed, the predominant characteristic of the policy of the successive Governors General of the period to confiscate the territories of the States on one pretext or the other. Where diplomacy failed, they frequently applied force to achieve their object. For the main problem before the British administrators was to extend the British supremacy throughout the country. When, as a result of annexation of large portion of the Country by 1857, the existence of remaining Native States could be assured by the British Government under the crown.

In lieu of protection extended to them, the Punjab Chiefs were required to furnish, in proportion in their respective means, carriage, supplies and troops to the Company at the requisition of the latter in any emergency. In accordance with these

obligations , the various Chiefs of the Punjab States rendered necessary material assistance to the British Government during the wars into which the Company was involved from time to time. When the Company was involved in the First Anglo Sikh war of 1838-42; the Chiefs of Patiala, Bahawalpur, Nabha, Kapurthala and Malerkotla rendered great assistance to the British Government. During the first Anglo Sikh War of 1845-46, all the Sikhs Chiefs did not prove faithful to the British Government. During the first Anglo Sikh War of 1845-46, all the Sikhs Chiefs did not prove faithful to the British Government. At the larger level the Sikh Chief by and large had sympathies with Khalsa Army. Spurred by their personal interests and security which were deeply dependent on the success of the British, the Chief of Patiala, Jind and Faridkot, of course, evinced their loyalty to the British cause and rendered all possible assistance to their Paramount. But the other Chiefs kept on showing doubtful vacillation. Some were clearly hostile to the British. After the close of the war the British Government rewarded obedience and punished disobedience. Whereas the Chief of Patiala, Jind, Malerkotla and Faridkot were rewarded with additions in their territories, the other Chiefs had to suffer because of the penalties for what was perceived as their disloyal conduct. When the Second Anglo Sikh War 1848-49 broke out, the Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot offered their services to the British Government which were utilized to some extent in the form of carriage and supplies. After the annexation of the Punjab, Dalhousie Government deprived many petty Chiefs of all civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction, reducing them to the position of ordinary subjects of the British Government in 'possession of certain exceptional privileges. But the Sikh Chief of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Faridkot and Kalsia as also the Muslim Chiefs of Bahawalpur, Malerkotla, Pataudi, Laharu and Dujana were allowed to exercise, their usual rights and authority. After the revolt of 1857 there was a gradual change in the British policy towards all native states in respect of military matters. The main reason for this change was evidently the great concern of the Crown's Government for security and defense of the Indian Empire. The experience of 1857-58 had come as a very big learning experience for the British statesmen who were at the helm of Indian affairs in the following years. They began to focus their attention with a renewed vigour on the ways and means of ensuring in future stability of the British Empire in India. In terms of policy formulation they arrived at certain significant decisions having a bearing for the socio-political future of the next few decades. The most important among these decisions was the plan of a

thorough reorganization of the military system of India. In accordance with this scheme artillery as a norm was hereafter to be comprised exclusively of the Europeans. The number of native sepoys in the army was considerably truncated and the strength of the European soldiers was increased. It was therefore considered essential to exercise some sort of control over the arms and armies of the Native Chiefs and to seek their co-operation in any eventually of foreign invasion. The British Government had expressed its commitment to protect the Native Chiefs not only from foreign invasions but also from internal revolts. After 1858, it had also abandoned the policy of any further annexation of the Native States which implied. This was important to prevent more wars between the Native States and the British Government. In return for the prospect of abiding peace British Government required that the Native Chiefs should not trouble and challenge the military defense of the Empire. Moreover, they were expected to render active co-operation in improving and augmenting the efficiency of the imperial Army and that they should dispense the responsibility assigned to them. In certain Native States the law of primogeniture was definitely established which greatly mitigated the possibility of succession disputes between Chiefs and their brothers and collaterals. But in other Chiefships disputes for succession were very frequent. The basic cause giving rise to such disputes was that no definite law of succession was prevalent in those states. Sometimes the eldest son succeeded to the Chiefship after the death of ruler and sometime claim of younger son was asserted in preference to that of the elder. This was the biggest reason for disputes. After the assumption of Government of India by the crown a great change took in the British policy. The British authorities were no longer interested in take advantage of the succession matters for the purpose of acquiring territories and they became genuinely interested in settling the succession disputes in the states to their satisfaction. The British Government therefore evolved definite policy for putting an end to such disputes and thereby securing peace and order in the States. By 1857 the Company had established a firm grip over the Punjab States. There is no doubt that the Chiefships had been protected by the Proclamation of 1809 against the ambition of Lahore and by the Proclamation of 1811 from one another. These Chiefships enjoyed a prolonged period of peace and security and almost free exercise of Civil, criminal and fiscal jurisdiction in their respective territories subject to the authority of the British Agent or Resident. It was a period when Maharaja Ranjit Singh had absorbed all the petty independent States to the north of the Sutlej except Kapurthala.

These Chiefships in the south of the Sutlej had survived and thrived under the British Government and had no more obligations to fulfill than to remain loyal and support their paramount with their forces at the time of war. But it would be too simplistic to say that the attribute the Chiefships thrived under the British because of their innate generosity, goodness and liberality. The British imperialists were very clever imperialist and to treat them as liberal and generous would be simple and puerile. It was actually the diplomatic calculations of a wider policy which weighed with the British Administrators. They were haunted by the external danger from France in early stages and from Russia afterwards. Under these circumstances, it was thought expedient to retain the friendship and fidelity of the Principal Chiefs of this region.

Punjab did not only remain calm but also helped to crush one of the most serious challenges to the British authority that they ever faced in the history of their rule in India. this was primarily made possible due to the ground realities and the political scenario in Punjab which was highly suitable for the British. There was a deep rooting and fierce sense of autonomy among the Punjabis; they felt a deep antagonism against the Hindustani powers. The People of Punjab regarded the Hindustani occupation and detested them ever since the First Sikh War. It is important not to disregard the fact that the revolt of 1857 was an army revolt, the disbanded soldiery and the martial classes of the Punjab could have perceived it as their opportunity to get liberated from the British yoke. However, due to strategic reasons the province remained peaceful. All influential Chiefs who might have become the centre of disaffection against the British were either in exile or had died. There was no unifying force that could bring the anti British elements together. Moreover, the new regime had given to the people social security and in collective sense there was no incentive for the people to cultivate conditions of political instability and anarchy. In the absence of agitators and popular leaders, the masses had become apathetic and did not make efforts for political change. In terms of territorial expansion in Punjab by 1849, the British had advanced their frontier to Attock and established a firm grip over the Punjab states included the Cis- Sutlej Chiefships. With the passage of time the power and authority of the British began to grow and because of this Supreme Government had asserted in these states its rights as a Paramount Power to decide the questions of successions to settle disputes between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chiefs themselves. Intervention was also exercised to prevent misgovernment in the States or

to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs. The Cis- Sutlej area was governed by the Sikh Chieftains who had remained loyal to British even during Ranjit Singh's reign. The princes of the various Princely states of Punjab besides those of Cis- Sutlej States, did not vacillate in helping the British. The revolt of 1857 can be described as one of the greatest uprisings that took place in India against the British occupation. In the Punjab, within three days after the fall of Delhi, most of the forts, arsenals, treasures and strategic positions were swiftly transferred to the care of British Forces. When the British approached the Sikh Chiefs of Cis -Sutlej States for assistance during the crisis of 1857 these chiefs faced a dilemma. These Chiefs had two options before them. The first was to honour their obligation of faithfully rendering help to British or dishonour the agreement that bound them to give help to the British during any emergency. However, it is evident that the Sikh Chiefs of Cis-Sutlej States believed that the British would surely crush the mutineers. Thus, the Chiefs opted for the first option as they could foresee that not only would the mutiny be crushed because of the disproportionate power of the British in comparison with the natives, the chiefs would also become entitled to further favours and rewards from their suzerain. In other words, the Sikh Chiefs were convinced that if they were disloyal to the British they would be treading on the road to self destruction. Any disloyalty or breach of faith towards the powerful suzerain would inevitably make them the targets of British retribution. Thus they responded to the British call for help with great promptness. It is clear that they did not wish to be accused of any breach of trust. The Patiala ruler's instantaneous decision to send troops to Ambala when required to do so by the district officer of Ambala showed that he simply followed the rulers of pragmatism and avoiding falling foul of the political masters i.e. the British disloyalty. The Raja of Jind was also driven by the same pragmatism. When he heard the news of the outbreak of mutiny in Delhi, he instantly took up arms against the rebels and on his own initiative and dispatched a messenger to the British authorities at Ambala for advice on further action. It can be said that the same considerations of common sense and pragmatic choice acted as the main reason behind the support of the smaller Chiefs of Nabha and Faridkot. The loyal conduct of Sikh *Jagirdars* of the Cis Sutlej area also left little doubt as to their self interested motives. Many of them must have felt greatly gratified that the British had approached them for help. It is quite clear that given the mighty political power of the British, the Princes, Jagirdars and rulers were competing with one another to prove their usefulness towards them in

this time of crisis. In other words, it can be said that their prime considerations for coming out strongly on the side of the British during the sepoy mutiny was to show themselves in a favorable light and ensure the continuity of their rules. The outbreak of the mutiny the various parts of the country had drained the courage and resources of the British. It can be said that Captain Briggs was conscious of his obligation to the Civil authorities and the Cis Sutlej States who gave British Government their utmost support. During the disturbance of 1857-58, no prince of India showed greater loyalty or rendered more conspicuous service to the British government than the Maharaja of Patiala. He was the acknowledged head of the Sikhs and his hesitation or disloyalty would have been a huge setback to the British. On the other hand, his ability, character and high position could have made him the most formidable leader to lead the forces against the Government. However, as discussed above like the other princes he demonstrated gratitude and loyalty towards the British. Without even an iota of hesitation he placed his whole power, resources and influence at the disposal of the English and during the darkest and most doubtful days of the mutiny. He never for a moment wavered in his loyalty, but, on the contrary, increased his overtures of friendship towards the British. When the news of the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut reached Patiala and there was a threat from the native troops at Ambala, the Maharaja placed himself at head of all his available troops and marched at the head of his forces with his elephants, camels and other such resources to Kalka. His prime objective was to transport the European troops to Ambala from the hill stations of Kausli, Dagshai and Sabathu. From Jesmoli he marched to Thanesar and deployed a force of 1300 men with four guns there to provide protection to the district. When the mutiny broke out in May 1857 Raja Sarup Singh, the Raja of Jind was not behind the Maharaja of Patiala in showing active loyalty to the British. When the news of the revolt at Delhi reached him at Sangrur, he at once collected all his troops and marched towards Karnal on the 18th of May. At Karnal he undertook the responsibility of the defense of the city and cantonments. Raja Sarup Singh was the first to march against Mutineers at Delhi. He did not even wait for the summons from government to show his fealty towards the British. He even sent a messenger to Ambala for instructions and in the meanwhile collected all his troops. However, the request of Barnes's request reached him. As discussed above he led his troops to take control of Karnal and the main road. It is evident that the commissariat was completely crippled by the suddenness of the outbreak. The Raja of Jind proved to be a model of unfaltering loyalty towards the

British. He was very prompt in choosing his side in the mutiny. There was no indecision or wavering in taking the decision. The mutiny had placed the British in a desperate position and the Raja committed himself to stand or fall with British government and tried his best to keep his pledge. His services to the British are distinguished by the fact that he was always in the midst of the struggle and arguably the only Chief present in person. His loyalty towards the British was by no means less than that of the Maharaja of Patiala. It can be further added that his realm was large; the boundaries of his territory were dangerously close to the sites of mutiny in the Delhi Districts. The administration of the district of Rohtak was passed on to the Raja of Jind during the most disturbed period. As part of this plan the head men of the villages and Zamindars were directed to pay their revenue to him. The receipts issued by the Raja were to be treated as sufficient acknowledgment of payment. It can be said that the services of Raja Sarup Singh were most valuable for the British. When the mutiny broke out, Raja Bharpur Singh put in tremendous efforts to make amends for the decisions of his father particularly in showing loyalty to the British. He rendered services to the British Government in an open show of support for the British. Raja Bharpur Singh replaced his father on the throne as a minor and attained his majority a few months after breaking out of the mutiny of 1857. At this critical time he acted with utmost loyalty and intelligence and his services were considered to be as praiseworthy by the British as those of the other Phulkian Chiefs.

Just like the other Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, the Raja of Nabha on hearing the news of the disturbances at Delhi proceeded from Nabha with all available forces towards Ambala. However, on his way, he was directed by the commissioner to march to Ludhiana. The Raja Bharpur Singh remained at Ludhiana in person throughout the campaign and played an important role in protecting the city. He deployed contingents of his troops for the protection of the roads between Ludhiana and Nabha and Ambala, Ludhiana, Nabha and Ferozpur. The Raja also sent his troops to Panipat, Ambala and Ferozpur. The most important service rendered by the Raja of Nabha was to provide an escort for the Siege Train ordered from Phillaur to accompany the Field Force under the Commander-in-Chief to Delhi. The heavy guns and the ammunition, comprising a train of some hundred wagons were taken in safety from Phillaur to Karnal by the Nabha troops. The Raja of Nabha provided timely and quick services to the British in terms of men and provisions. As pointed out, Raja Bharpur Singh

was anxious to march to Delhi at the head of his troops. He wanted to help the British in the same manner as the Raja of Jind had done. This was not allowed. He was very young and such service could not be entrusted to an inexperienced and callow youth. As far as the trans- Sutlej territory was concerned there was the raja of Kapurthala State Raja Randhir Singh was very prominent ruler. Randhir Singh and his brother Kanwar Bikram Singh took an active part in assisting the British Government. When the mutiny of the Bengal Army broke out in 10 May 1857, Raja Randhir Singh availed the first opportunity of evincing his loyalty towards the British Government. As per the agreement, he was, as vassal of the crown, bound to render all possible aid to the Government in times of difficulty. However, as per the terms of the agreement, military service could not be demanded from him. However, at the first intimation of the outbreak at Delhi and Meerut, the raja marched into Jalandhar with every available soldier. He was accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and his Chief advisers. He remained at Jalandhar throughout the hot season at the head of his troops. The raja volunteered to send a portion of his troops to Delhi and this offer was not not accepted as their presence was required at Jullundur. On the night of mutiny at this town, his troops guarded the civil station, the jail, and the treasury and he placed the whole of his cavalry under the British officer, General Johnstone for the pursuit of mutineers. It can be said that the region of the Jalandhar Doab was not very severely affected by the mutiny. The inhabitants of this region were prosperous. They were chiefly agriculturist and did not show any desire to rise against the government. However, the Government was nevertheless made very strong in both the Jalandhar Doab and in the Cis-Sutlej with the help of the rajas and princes. It should be remembered that the Raja took the side of government without hesitation and without having had time or opportunity to ascertain what were the intentions of the great Cis-Sutlej Chiefs. After the movable column had been sent to Delhi, the only reliable force in Jalandhar Doab was the force of Raja Randhir Singh. It is quite apparent that the Raja did not waver in his loyalty at a time when Delhi was holding out against the British. It was time when so many friends of the crown had turned their back on the British. The raja showed great eagerness to lead his men on active service. His offer to lead his men was genuine and that this was proved by his subsequent conduct.

It is significant to note that during the Second Anglo Sikh War of 1849, Wazir Singh had served on the side of the English. During the mutiny of 1857, he seized

several mutineers and made them over to the English authorities. As the mutiny broke out he hastened to Ferozpur on receiving the first news of mutiny at that station. He seized several fugitive sepoys escaping through his territory and handed them over to the British authorities. His troops also accompanied Major Marsden, when that officer went to Seytokee in the Nabha territory to quell an insurrection.

The Trans Sutlej Sardars who had lost their kingdom to the British in 1849 looked upon the sepoy rising as a possible way of restoring their social and economic status which had been gradually sinking lower and lower after the annexation of the Punjab. During the eight years between annexation and the outbreak of the sepoy mutiny the jagirs of many leading landed aristocracy families had been reduced by the Government. Loyalty and support was shown particularly by those surviving Sikh families who had suffered heavy losses socially and economically. This was the most conclusive proof that sheer prudence and self interest were motives the loyal behavior of the Sikhs during the uprising of 1857. The Sikh *Jagirdars* and Big Zamindars who opposed the British Government in Anglo Sikh Wars had been punished by the Government. Notably, most of the *Jagirdars* who helped the British in the revolt of 1857 were awarded *jagirs* and honors. The Nalwa family from Gujranwala district had lost their lands after annexation of Punjab. However, the service rendered by Sardar Jawahir Singh at Delhi who was the son of the Sikh general Hari Singh Nalwa, restored the Nalwa family to prominence among of the Sikh aristocracy. In other districts and area of Trans Sutlej Punjab, the loyal and helpful behavior of the Sikh leaders such as Raja Tej Singh in the Lahore district, Jawahir Singh in the Jammu Hills the Chief of Kapurthala State and numerous small Sardars lent further support and active help to the British during the sepoy mutiny of 1857. All these Sikh leaders were rewarded with rewards and recognition. The interest shown by the Government in the welfare and prosperity of the Sardars and *Jagirdars* was a direct consequence of the renewed attitude towards Landed Aristocracy. Government had learned a few lessons from the sepoy rebellion and perhaps the most significant of all was the realization that its policy of degrading and destroying the Sikh Chiefs and aristocrats was a flawed policy. There was a realization that the aristocratic families could provide much needed help during an emergency. They had immense influence and control over the peasantry which remained firm and loyal towards the Sardars. As such the British realized that it was wrong on their part to look for help and leadership

among lower classes, merchants and money lenders. The leadership and loyalty exhibited by the leading Sikh families during the crisis of 1857 had therefore radically changed Government's attitude towards them. Owing to their experience during the mutiny the British adopted a new policy of nourishing ties with influential Sikh families.

After rebellion of 1857-58 the British Government conferred several rewards on the Sikhs leaders and rulers. These rewards were much more than simple and perfunctory acknowledgements of the services rendered by them in the time of crisis. The Sikh Princes and Landed Aristocracy were liberally rewarded according to their rank and the services they had rendered. In the recognition of their services and as a distinct religious community, the Sikhs were appreciated by the British rulers and commended for their role in saving the British rule during the mutiny of 1857-58. As a result of this recognition the Sikhs were elevated to an unrivalled place among the native communities of the Punjab. As a reward for their unswerving loyalty and services during the mutiny of 1857-58 the Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala Jind and Nabha were granted some extraordinary concessions. The British government promised to respect the rights, dignity and honors of these Native rulers. Sanads in response to the collective request of the three chiefs were issued which bestowed on them rights to govern their territory and give capital punishment. The Sanads can be seen as the mark of the greatest concession to the Native Chiefs. It was a defining feature of the new policy. The hallmark of this new policy was the assurance that the British Government would perpetuate their regimes and ensure the continuance of the royal houses. The *Sanads* were granted individually to each one of the in fulfillment of their collective demands for autonomy and right to rule. Out of all the Sikh princes the Maharaja of Patiala, Narinder Singh, was accorded the greatest consideration by the government. It was observed that not only did he provide timely and prompt help to the British but his attitude was a proof of unswerving loyalty. In the immediate wake of the British success in the mutiny, the three Phulkian Chiefs, namely, the rulers of Patiala, Jind and Nabha collectively were also granted a number of concessions which they had cherished for very long. As discussed above, these included the right to inflict capital punishment. This right had been forfeited from the Chiefs after the first Sikh war. Secondly the government also allowed them some degree of autonomy in relation to the appointment of a council of Regency. Apart from the three Chiefs the Government gave suitable rewards to the numerous smaller Sikh Chiefs and *Jagirdars* in the Cis-Sutlej who rendered useful and loyal services to government during the mutiny. During the Sepoy rebellion the Sikh Sardars and *Jagirdars* in the trans-Sutlej Punjab had rendered service to Government according to their means. Thus, as stated above they were rewarded with honors and *khillats* or cash. Moreover, the government also extended generous land grants to Sikh

officers when their services were terminated. Through this liberal policy of the British, the economic status of several aristocratic Sikh families in the Punjab was further improved. There were some Sikh families that had opposed the British in the Second Sikh War. However, as they showed loyalty towards the Government during the Sepoy rebellion they were also liberally rewarded. The approach of the Government leading to the welfare and prosperity of the Sardar and *Jagirdars* was a manifestation of the new outlook of the authorities towards the Sikh aristocracy. Government had learned a few lessons from the sepoy rebellion. There was a realization that its policy of suppression and forfeiture which was adopted by the earlier civil servants under John Lawrence was a flawed policy. The Mutiny of 1857 had established the fact that the Sardars and *Jagirdars* could act as an important asset and support for the British. The British were clearly mistaken in ignoring and punishing the Sardars and seeking the help of the lower classes. This had become apparent to local authorities during the mutiny. The leadership and loyalty exhibited by leadership and loyalty exhibited by the leading Sikh families during the crisis of 1857 were instrumental in transforming the orientation of the Government. The new policy was formulated around the need to preserve and nourish the aristocratic Sikh class.

ABSTRACT

The revolt of 1857 in India cannot be compared with French and American revolutions because of its different nature. The main idea in the revolt of 1857 was simply to get rid of the British rule. As regards participation of people, it is always limited in all political revolts. So India in this case was no exception. After the downfall the Mughal Empire, like the rest of India, Punjab was divided into several parts. The rise of Ranjit Singh in the North and the expansion the British in the South posed a problem to the Cis- Sutlej States and ultimately they fell in the lap of the latter. When the Punjab was annexed to stay, a large number of Princes supported the British cause. The rulers of Cis- Sutlej States vied with each other in mustering support for the British. They supported the Government with men, money and material. Infact, it is attributed to the Princes that their support to the British brought the downfall of the nationalist revolt of 1857.

The British administrator realized that the policy of destroying traditional landlords and aristocrats followed by the British was one of the reasons behind uprisings. Thus it was politically imperative to resurrect the aristocracy. This powerful class of natives had their own stakes in the perpetuation of the British rule also. The British, supported the landed gentry as natural leaders in the belief that their loyalty would be transferred to the next generations. In my thesis, First Chapter is obviously Historical Background of Sikh Chiefs and Landed Aristocracy. In the Second Chapter states that helped the British Government with military have been studied. In the revolt of 1857 the main actors were the sepoys. Third Chapter is that in 1857 the Company had established a firm grip over the Princely States. In fourth Chapter, British approached the Sikh Chiefs of Cis- Sutlej States for assistance during the crisis of 1857 Sikh Chiefs faced a dilemma. Fifth Chapter. the Sikh princes were rewarded with many honors and generous accretion to their principalities, through liberal land and the *Jagirdars* were once again elevated in society. Last, The factors related to the historical significance of this alliance between the British and the Sikh Princes and Chiefs in studied in relation to the future developments.

ਐਬਸਟ੍ਰੈਕਟ

ਭਾਰਤ ਵਿੱਚ 1857 ਦੇ ਵਿਦਰੋਹ ਦੀ ਤੁਲਨਾ ਫ਼ਰਾਂਸ ਅਤੇ ਅਮਰੀਕਾ ਦੀ ਕ੍ਰਾਂਤੀ ਨਾਲ ਨਹੀਂ ਕੀਤੀ ਜਾ ਸਕਦੀ ਕਿਉਂ ਕਿ ਇਸਦਾ ਸਰੂਪ ਵੱਖਰਾ ਹੈ। 1857 ਦੇ ਵਿਦਰੋਹ ਦਾ ਮੁੱਖ ਉਦੇਸ਼ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸ਼ਾਸਨ ਤੋਂ ਛੁਟਕਾਰਾ ਪਾਉਣਾ ਸੀ। ਮੁਗਲ ਸਾਮਰਾਜ ਦੇ ਪਤਨ ਤੋਂ ਬਾਅਦ ਪੰਜਾਬ ਕਈ ਹਿੱਸਿਆਂ ਵਿੱਚ ਵੰਡਿਆ ਗਿਆ ਸੀ। ਉੱਤਰੀ ਭਾਗ ਵਿੱਚ ਮਹਾਰਾਜਾ ਰਣਜੀਤ ਸਿੰਘ ਦਾ ਰਾਜ ਸੀ ਅਤੇ ਦੱਖਣ ਵੱਲ ਸਤਲੁਜ ਦਰਿਆ ਦੇ ਨਾਲ ਲੱਗਦੇ ਇਲਾਕੇ ਵਿੱਚ ਰਿਆਸਤਾਂ ਦਾ ਰਾਜ ਸੀ। 1809 ਦੀ ਸੰਧੀ ਵਿੱਚ ਅੰਗਰੇਜ਼ਾਂ ਨੇ ਮਹਾਰਾਜਾ ਰਣਜੀਤ ਸਿੰਘ ਦੇ ਇਲਾਕਿਆਂ ਦੀ ਸੀਮਾ ਤਹਿ ਕਰ ਦਿੱਤੀ ਸੀ। ਪਟਿਆਲਾ, ਨਾਭਾ, ਜੀਂਦ, ਫ਼ਰੀਦਕੋਟ, ਕਪੂਰਥਲਾ ਅਤੇ ਹੋਰ ਰਿਆਸਤਾਂ ਦੇ ਰਾਜਿਆਂ ਅਤੇ ਸਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਨੇ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਨੂੰ ਹਮੇਸ਼ਾ ਪੱਖ ਪੂਰਿਆ ਸੀ। ਇਹਨਾਂ ਨੇ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਦੀ ਮਦਦ ਕਰਨ ਲਈ ਧਨ-ਦੌਲਤ ਅਤੇ ਫ਼ੌਜ ਦਿੱਤੀ ਸੀ। ਇਸ ਤੋਂ ਇਲਾਵਾ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਨੇ ਜਾਗੀਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਅਤੇ ਜਿਮੀਂਦਾਰਾਂ ਦੇ ਨਾਲ ਵੀ ਨਰਮ ਵਤੀਰਾ ਰੱਖਿਆ ਕਿਉਂਕਿ ਉਹ ਇਸ ਗੱਲ ਤੋਂ ਜਾਣੂ ਹੋ ਗਏ ਸਨ ਕਿ ਜਾਗੀਰਦਾਰ ਅਤੇ ਜਿਮੀਂਦਾਰ ਉਹਨਾਂ ਦੇ ਵਿਰੁੱਧ ਜਾ ਸਕਦੇ ਹਨ। ਮੈਂ ਆਪਣੇ ਖੋਜ-ਕਾਰਜ ਦੇ ਪਹਿਲੇ ਅਧਿਆਇ ਵਿੱਚ ਸਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਅਤੇ ਜਾਗੀਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਦਾ ਪਿਛੋਕੜ ਅਤੇ ਸਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਅਤੇ ਜਾਗੀਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਦੇ ਅੰਗਰੇਜ਼ਾਂ ਨਾਲ ਸੰਬੰਧਾਂ ਨੂੰ ਦਰਸਾਇਆ ਹੈ। ਦੂਜੇ ਅਧਿਆਇ ਵਿੱਚ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਦੀ ਫ਼ੌਜ ਅਤੇ ਭਾਰਤੀ ਫ਼ੌਜ ਬਾਰੇ ਵੇਰਵੇ ਦਿੱਤੇ ਗਏ ਹਨ ਅਤੇ ਪੰਜਾਬ ਦੇ ਰਿਆਸਤਾਂ ਦੇ ਰਾਜਿਆਂ ਨੇ 1857 ਦੇ ਵਿਦਰੋਹ ਨੂੰ ਦਬਾਉਣ ਲਈ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਨੂੰ ਜੋ ਫ਼ੌਜ ਦੀ ਮਦਦ ਕੀਤੀ ਗਈ ਉਸ ਬਾਰੇ ਦੱਸਿਆ ਗਿਆ ਹੈ। ਤੀਜੇ ਅਤੇ ਚੌਥੇ ਅਧਿਆਇ ਵਿੱਚ ਪੰਜਾਬ ਦੇ ਹਾਲਾਤ ਅਤੇ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਦੀਆਂ ਪੰਜਾਬ ਦੇ ਰਿਆਸਤਾਂ ਪ੍ਰਤੀ ਨੀਤੀਆਂ ਬਾਰੇ ਦਰਸਾਇਆ ਗਿਆ ਹੈ। ਪੰਜਵੇਂ ਅਧਿਆਇ ਵਿੱਚ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਦੁਆਰਾ ਆਪਣੇ ਪੱਖੀ ਲੋਕਾਂ ਨੂੰ ਜਾਗੀਰਾਂ, ਇਨਾਮ, ਅਹੁਦੇ, ਪੈਨਸ਼ਨਾਂ ਆਦਿ ਜੋ ਦਿੱਤੇ ਗਏ ਉਹਨਾਂ ਨੂੰ ਦਰਸਾਇਆ ਗਿਆ ਹੈ ਅਤੇ ਈਸਟ ਇੰਡੀਆ ਕੰਪਨੀ ਦਾ ਖਾਤਮਾ ਅਤੇ ਇੰਗਲੈਂਡ ਤੋਂ ਸਿੱਧਾ ਪ੍ਰਸ਼ਾਸਨ ਨੂੰ ਦਰਸਾਇਆ ਗਿਆ ਹੈ। ਅੰਤ ਵਿੱਚ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਅਤੇ ਸਿੱਖ ਸਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਦੀ ਇਤਿਹਾਸਿਕ ਮਹੱਤਤਾ ਬਾਰੇ ਦੱਸਿਆ ਹੈ ਅਤੇ ਬ੍ਰਿਟਿਸ਼ ਸਰਕਾਰ ਅਤੇ ਸਿੱਖ ਸਰਦਾਰਾਂ ਦੇ ਆਪਸੀ ਸੰਬੰਧਾਂ ਦੇ ਨਿਚੋੜ ਬਾਰੇ ਦੱਸਿਆ ਗਿਆ ਹੈ।

CANDIDATE'S DECLARATION

I **Ramandeep Kaur** certify that the work embodied in this Ph.D. thesis is my own bonafide work carried out by me under the supervision of **Dr. Kulbir Singh Dhillon**, Professor (Retired) Department of History, Punjabi University, Patiala from 2-11-2014 to 10-6-2021 The matter embodied in this Ph.D. thesis has not been submitted for the award of any other degree/diploma.

I declare that I have faithfully acknowledged, given credit to and referred to the research workers wherever their works have been cited in the text and the body of the thesis. I further certify that I have not willfully lifted up some other's work, Para, text, data, results, etc. reported in the journals, books, magazines, reports, dissertations, theses, etc., or available at web-sites and included them in this Ph.D. thesis and cited as my own work. I also declare that I have adhered to all principles of academic honesty and integrity and have not misrepresented or fabricated or falsified any idea/data/fact/source in my submission. I understand that any violation of the above will be cause for disciplinary action by the university.

Date: 10.6.2021


Place: Patiala


(**Ramandeep Kaur**)

Certificate from the Supervisor

This is to certify that the above statement made by the candidate is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date: 10.6.2021


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PUBLICATION

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Preface

The revolt of 1857 in India cannot be compared with French and American revolutions because of its different nature. The main idea in the revolt of 1857 was simply to get rid of the British rule. As regards participation of people, it is always limited in all political revolts. So India in this case was no different. After the downfall the Mughal Empire, like the rest of India, Punjab was divided into several parts. The rise of Ranjit Singh in the North and the expansion the British in the South posed a problem to the Cis- Sutlej States and ultimately they fell in the lap of the latter. When the Punjab was annexed to stay, a large number of Princes supported the British cause. The rulers of Cis -Sutlej States vied with each other in mustering support for the British. They supported the Government with men, money and material. Infact, it is attributed to the Princes that their support to the British brought the downfall of the nationalist revolt of 1857.

The relations between the Phulkian States and the British Government primarily were built on the fear of these powers from the growing strength of Maharaja Ranjit in the Punjab. The Phulkian rulers feared that with the growing power of Ranjit Singh they would be absorbed in the Raj of Lahore whereas the British wanted to confine the Raj of Maharaja Ranjit Singh to the northern banks of the Sutlej. The first foundation of an alliance was laid at the meeting between Lord Lake and the Chiefs of the Cis -Sutlej States in the spring of 1804 at a small Village called Tamak Lodha. At this time the Sikhs in the neighbored of the Yamuna continued to be apprehensive of the intensions of the British and assisted the Rohillas and the Marathas against them. In order to give reassurance to these Sikhs an amnesty was proclaimed in the month of March 1805 by the British Commander-in-Chief to all those Sikhs in return for an assurance of peace and a promise that they would not indulge in any operations against the English. Thus, during this period there was a counterbalance of the British dictated by their self interest, and the campaigns of annexation carried out by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the year January 1809. The establishment of the British power in the Cis- Sutlej States commenced from the treaty with Ranjit Singh on 25 April 1809. Through the articles of the treaty Maharaja Ranjit Singh engaged neither to commit nor suffer any encroachments on the possession or right of the Chiefs on the left bank of Sutlej. On the 3 May 1809 a Proclamation was issued extending the protection of the British Government to

the Chief of Sirhind and *Malwa* without demand of tribute requiring service in time of war. The proclamation defined the relation of the protected States to the British Government in very general terms. The general scope of the proclamation of 1809 was to establish the Chiefs and consolidate their power in the States they held before they were received under the British protection.

It was tenure of John Lawrence that the essential British policy towards the Punjab regents had been established. His brother Henry Lawrence's belief was that the Landed Aristocracy could be use to the British if only they were tactically handled. John Lawrence however thought them to be parasitic and unworthy of any alliance. He believed in nullifying the importance of these chieftains and end their supremacy.

Dalhousie went in for John Lawrence's policy. His instructions to the Board of Administration specified that no grant should be upheld in favor of any person who had participated in the Anglo Sikh Wars against the British. Governor General's dispatch dated 31 March 1849 emphasized that Jagirs and properties of the Sardars who fight against the British should be confiscated. The leading Sardars were thus punished not only by the confiscated of their Jagirs but of their entire property. Those who had remained loyal to the British during First Anglo Sikh Wars were however treated differently. Their treatment was planned in such manner that their incomes were reduced but not that drastically as in case of the 'rebel.' They loyal were confirmed but only during the life time of existing incumbents. Only small portion of the Jagirs was to go to heirs and successors of incumbents. But in these cases the grantees were not allowed to retain any administrative powers. They were not supposed to treat their estates or properties. This measure, thus, aimed at reducing the power and influence of the Jagirdars and to add to the importance of the actual tax payer or the peasant properties.

The First Chapter **Historical Background : Previous relation between British and Punjab Chiefs Sardar.** This chapter deals with Dynastic History of Sikh States Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot, Kapurthala and their relation between British and Sikh States. British Government towards the Phulkian Chiefs from 1809-1857 had been on the whole very reasonable. It can be said that the diplomatic calculations of a wider policy determined their approach. The Governor General of East India Company during this period had been absorbed first in dealing with the Gurkhas, Marathas and Pindaries and then with the Frontier States of Sindh and the Punjab.

Second chapter **Military Position of British in North West India.** In this chapter the states that helped the British Government with military have been studied. In the revolt of 1857 the main actors were the sepoys. They formed an overwhelming majority of the British Army in those times. They shared the glory of victories in many campaigns along with the British troops. The British troops were only a small percentage of the British Army India. The defense of the Indian Empire was the collective responsibility of both the Native and British forces.

Third Chapter is **British Policy and Programs towards the Punjab Chiefs and Sardars** in which it is discussed that in 1857 the Company had established a firm grip over the Punjab States. Although the policy and attitude of the Government was different from state to state was different, yet it may be said on the whole that in the middle of the 19th century the indications of the Paramount Power had begun to emerge. Government had asserted its rights as a Paramount Power to decide authoritatively the questions of succession in the States, to settle dispute between the Chiefs and their feudatories and between the Chiefs themselves. They had also arrogated the right to intervene with the object of preventing misgovernment in the states and to exact military and other obligations from the Chiefs.

Fourth Chapter is **Critical Juncture and timely help of Punjab Chiefs and Sardar.** The chapter discusses that when the British approached the Sikh Chiefs of Cis- Sutlej States for assistance during the crisis of 1857 these Chiefs faced a dilemma. These Chiefs had two options before them. The first was to honour their obligation of faithfully rendering help to British or dishonour the agreement that bound them to give help to the British during any emergency. However, it is evident that the Sikh Chiefs of Cis- Sutlej States believed that the British would surely crush the mutineers. Thus, the Chiefs opted for the first option as they could foresee that not only would the mutiny be crushed because of the disproportionate power of the British in comparison with the natives, the Chiefs would also become entitled to further favors and rewards from their suzerain..

Fifth Chapter is **Rewards and Concessions.** The rewards conferred by Government upon the Sikhs did not fall short of their expectations. As a martial community the Sikhs always had strong instinct for self –preservation. After 1857 the British had learnt to trust the Sikhs. The Sikh princes were rewarded with many honors and generous accretion to their principalities, through liberal land and the *Jagirdars* were once again elevated in society and those Sikh families which were ruined by annexation were rehabilitated. The support to the

British during the biggest challenge to the British power was instrumental in restoring the community in terms of their economic and social status; as they were restored to their socially prestigious positions through liberal grants of land, property, estates in addition to honors and titles.

Last Chapter is **Conclusion** and is a survey of the most important implications and the background of the princely rulers, Landed Aristocracy and the British during 1857. The factors related to the historical significance of this alliance between the British and the Sikh Princes and Landed Aristocracy is studied in relation to the future developments. Whereas the Sikh rulers benefitted from this alliance by regaining their glory and stature the imperial powers also rule India for another 100 years by making a strategic use of their relations with the Sikh Chiefs.

This study is based on both the primary and secondary sources, I have used Home Political Proceeding, personal writing, Government records, newspapers, Gazetteer, books and Articles. An attempt has been made to bring all the relevant facts into light and present them objectively.

I am, indeed, privileged to have worked under the intelligent and able guidance of Dr. Kulbir Singh Dhillon Professor, Department of History, Punjabi University, Patiala. I do not find adequate words to express my deep sense of gratitude to her. His personal guidance, encouragement, constructive criticism and invaluable feedback throughout this research work have been a source of continuous inspiration for me. This work could not have taken the present form and shape without her guidance.

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